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Introduction
Particularly important were the Nottinghamshire miners.
Some of them struck but most of them worked through
the strike. They had political traditions that separated
them from miners elsewherein the country and their jobs
seemedsafer than those of their colleagueselsewhere.1
When mention is madeof the 1984-85miners' strike rarely are commentsmade
without reference to the controversial role played by the Nottinghamshire
miners. Typically, comments usually centre on the issues surrounding the
Nottinghamshireminers' role in the 'breakingof the strike', this topic often being
entwined with the issueover the formation of a breakawayunion, the Union of
DemocraticMineworkers (UDM). As Adeney and Lloyd commented, becauseof
the events of Spencerismin 1926 and its apparent similarity to the events of
1984/85, it was in the Nottinghamshire coalfield that 'the core of strike-
breaking, its inspiration and its moral justification, was to be found'. 2 Despite
significant numbers of miners working in several other coalfields during the
1984-85 strike, the centre of attention was typically centred on the
Nottinghamshire coalfield. 3 As Morgan and Coates commented, it was the
Nottinghamshire coalfield that was politically and strategically the most
important one to the outcome of the strike:
1 Richard Vinen, Thatcher's Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 19805, (Sydney,
2010), p. 164.
2 Martin Adeney and John Lloyd, The Miners'Strike 1984-85: Loss without Limit (london 1986),
p.258.
3 Significant numbers of miners worked in the NUM Areas of leicestershire, South Derbyshire,
the Midlands, North Wales, Lancashire, and the NUM clerical section, the Colliery Officials and
Staff Association (COSA).
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The key problem in the analysis of what went wrong
involved an answer to the question of why was
Nottingham different. It was there that the strike was
lost, in both psychological and material terms; it was
there that the National Union was divided and the strike
finally broken. 4
Over a quarter of a century since the end of the strike, the controversial role
played by the Nottinghamshire miners still causes fervent debate. On one side
the pro-strike argument suggested that the role of the working Nottinghamshire
miners was one of treachery. It was the role played by the 'scabs' that
ultimately lost the strike, and was thus responsible for the post-strike demise of
the British deep mining coal industry. Various explanations have been put
forward in trying to explain the Nottinghamshire miners' attitudes and actions in
1984-85. These characteristically included the Nottinghamshire miners'
'apartness' from other British miners, their insulated, more modern pits with
easy geology and the phantom of 1926 and Spencerism that existed in the
county. Following the formation of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM)
in 1985 even more emphasis has been placed on the 'ghost of Spencerism' that
supposedly existed in the Nottinghamshire coalfield: 5
Nottinghamshire miners were accused of acting as they did
for many reasons, not least because of what was referred
to as their birthright. 'Spencerism' was widely invoked as a
4 W. J. Morgan and K. Coates, The Nottinghamshire coalfield and the British Miners'Strike 1984-
85(Nottingham, 1989), p. 2.
5 Spencerism is the popular term given to the Nottingham Miners Industrial Union (NMIU)
formed during the latter part of the 1926 lockout following the expulsion of Nottinghamshire
Miners' leader George Alfred Spencer from the Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB). It
lasted from 1926 to 1937.
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parallel for the situation in the Nottinghamshire coalfield
and for the creation of the UDM. 6
Likewise, Richards referred to the apparent shadow of 'Spencerism' which
permeated the Nottinghamshire coalfield and its miners:
Miners elsewhere inevitably viewed Nottinghamshire's
refusal to strike in 1984-85 as being rooted in the area's
role as a bastion of "scab unionism" after the 1926 strike
and during the 1930's. 7
Strangely, the splits and left-wing breakaways in the Scottish coalfield in the
1920s seem to get less exposure than that of the Spencer Union, excluding the
work of Campbell and McArthur. 8 Chapter 6: Part 2 looks at this subject in more
detail. Laurence Turner suggested the reason for this state of affairs was
because there was a greater sense of betrayal with the Spencer breakaway,
possibly because of the spectre of 'non-political unionism'. 9
Lerner set the scene for academic debate on breakaway unions. 10 Her study
was in two parts. Firstly, she looked at the David versus Goliath situation, the
small trade-unions versus large trade-unions scenario. The second part looked
at various case studies, scrutinising internal union problems that led to
breakaway trade unions being formed. She then looked at their subsequent
relationship with the parent union. Lerner looked at splits in the
telecommunications and clothing trade unions in the period c1905 to 1920. This
6 Linda Bardill, 'Changing perceptions of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike in the Nottinghamshire
Coalfield' , The Joumal of Regional and Local Studies, Vol. 22 (2), Spring 2003, pp. 47 - 63,
here p. 47.
7 Andrew J. Richards, Miners on Strike: Class Solidarity and Division in Britain (Oxford, 1996), p.
44.
8 Alan campbell, The Scottish Miners 1874 -1939: Trade Unions and Politics Vol. 2,. (Aldershot,
2000); Ian MacDougall, (ed.), Militant Miners: Recollections of John McAlthur(Edlnburgh, 1981).
9 laurence Turner, Spencerism: Industrial and Ideological conflict in the Nottinghamshire
Coalfield, a presentation to the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Labour History Society, Skegby,
18 September 2010.
10 Shirley Lerner, Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union (London, 1961).
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case study follows a similar approach to Lerner, principally looking at the
problems of trade union democracy, oligarchy and internal dissension in the
NUM in the 1984-85 strike.
Both during and since the strike, a preoccupation with the alleged continuity
between the events of 1984-85 and 1926 seems to have dominated the
chronicles for some commentators, especially on the left. 11 Hester Barron
believed that 1926 was distinctly used to summon images of a valiant past:
Miners' Union leaders and miners frequently invoke the
memory of the 1926 dispute in order to reinforce the
image of a heroic past. 12
Some similarities did exist between the two periods. Gilbert identified some of
these traits as being:
The hardships of a long strike, the outstanding strength
of the strike in South Wales, the treatment of blacklegs
and the miners' eventual defeat all had antecedents in
1926. 13
Because of these traits and the spectre of breakaway unionism occurring again
in the aftermath of the 1984-85 strike, 1926 has often been used as a point of
departure for trying to explain the events in Nottinghamshire in 1984-85. Colin
11 See Alex callinicos and Mike Simons, 'The lessons of 1926', In The Great Strike: The Miners'
Strike of 1984-85 and its lessons (London, 1985), pp. 221-229; David Bell, 'Introduction' in
Memories of the Nottinghamshire coalfields (Newbury, 2008), pp. 9-14; 'Scabs and Scabs' in
Thurcroft: A Village and the Miners Strike, an oral history (Nottingham, 1986), pp. 244-246;
NUM, A Century of Struggle: Britain's Miners In Pictures 1889 - 1989 (Sheffield, 1989), pp. 123-
124; Jim Coulter, S. Miller, and M. Walker, 'A History of Division', The Iron Ast, A State of Siege
Vol. II: A report to the Yorkshire Area, NUM (London, June 1984), pp. 20-24.
12 Hester Barron, 'Durham's Big Meeting', HiStory Today, Vol. 55 (07), July 2005, p. 40.
13 David Gilbert, Gass, Community and Collective Action: Social Change in two British coalfields
1850 -1926 (Oxford, 1992), p. 1.
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Griffin, however, writing during the strike in September 1984, stated that whilst
comparisons between the 1984-85 dispute and 1926 were plausible, there was a
danger that prejudiced views were 'clouding the situation' for both analysts and
participants alike:
This preoccupation with 1926 is understandable but there
is the danger that it is a subjective interpretation of 1926
that is unwittingly influencing the thinking of both
commentators and participants alike. 14
Griffin suggested the real lesson from 1926 was not necessarily about
Nottingham being a 'weak link' in the national chain of miners' solidarity but that
'1926 led to breakaway trade unionism and bitter inter-union rivalry which for
over a decade effectively weakened the bargaining position of the miners at all
levels'. 15 Colin Griffin was well placed to comment on the situation as his
father, the late Dr A. R. Griffin, was the prominent authority on the history of
the Nottinghamshire miners, especially on the spectre of Spencerism. 16 Colin
Griffin believed that the majority of Nottinghamshire miners were not, and never
had been the 'jellybabies of Spencerite mythology'. 17 There were distinct
differences between the 1926 and 1984-85 disputes. Gilbert identified some of
the variances:
14 Colin P. Griffin, Nottinghamshire Miners between the Wars: The Spencer Union revisited,
(Nottingham, 1984), Introduction.
15 Ibid.
16 See Alan R. Griffin, The Miners of Nottinghamshire 1914-1944 (London, 1962), Chapter 9 'The
1926 Lockout' pp. 162 - 202 and Chapter 10 'The Spencer Union', pp. 203 - 220; Alan R.
Griffin, Mining in the East Midlands 1550 -1947(London, 1971), Part 3 'Spencerism', pp. 302-
318; Colin P. Griffin, (ed.), The Nottingham Miners Industrial Union (Spencer Union): Rufford
Branch Minutes 1926-36 & Notts District Minutes 1926-27 (Nottingham, 1990), pp. 13-27; Alan
R. Griffin and Colin P. Griffin, 'The Non-Political Trade Union Movement' in Asa Briggs and J.
Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History 1918-1939, (Beckenham, 1977), pp. 133 - 162.
17 Colin P. Griffin, The Spencer Union Revisited, Introduction.
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In 1984 the vast majority of Nottinghamshire miners
never came out on strike unlike 1926 and there were
changesin the tactics in both picketing and policing. 18
Significant numbers of Nottinghamshire miners did not come out on strike in
1984, arguing that it was both 'unconstitutional and undemocratic' from the
outset. Various events had occurred in the ensuing years since 1926 that had
the effect of diminishing the effects of Spencerism. The collapse of the Butty
system, the nationalisation of the coal industry in 1947, significant post-war
migration of miners into the Nottinghamshire coalfield from Eastern Europe,
Scotland, the North-East and Derbyshire, the standardisation of Face-workers'
wages under the National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) in 1966 and the
subsequent affirmative role played by the Nottinghamshire miners in the
national strikes of 1972 and 1974, were all key factors that played a part in
rejecting the notions of Spencerism.As Barry Johnson, industrial and labour
history academicand author, stated:
There were traits that linked 1926 and 1984, but the
events of the NPLAin 1966, and the role played by the
Nottinghamshire miners in the national strikes of 1972
and 1974,dispel these links as myths. 19
Thus a case can be made that too much emphasis has been placed on the
notion of Spencerismin the Nottinghamshirecoalfield in 1984. It was as if the
spectre of Spencerismresurfacedwith the strike itself. 20 Do we need to look
nearer to the events of 1984 than those of 1926 to get a clearer understanding
of what happenedin the Nottinghamshirecoalfield in 1984-85?
18 Gilbert, Class, Community and Collective Action, p. 5.
19 Interview with Barry Johnson and Hilary cave, Chesterfield, 8 March 2008.
20 The author was a NUM Branch Committee member at Annesley Colliery In the year preceding
the 1984-85 strike and cannot remember the issue of Spencerism being debated or mentioned
at all until the strike broke In March 1984.
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Is the answer to the role played by the Nottinghamshire miners in 1984-85
more likely to be found in the events during the twenty years that preceded the
1984-85 strike rather than those of 1926? Stanley suggested that one of the
reasons for the failure of the 1984-85 strike was the failure to educate new
entrants into the coal industry following the 1974 strike. 21 This would only
account for a limited portion of the workforce and would not account for older
miners who defied the strike. However, it is probably the reaction of older
miners who had witnessed the events in the coal industry from the mid 1960s
onwards which was a more instrumental factor in determining the course of the
1984-85 strike than that of new recruits.
The introduction of NPLA in 1966 saw real wages drop for many
Nottinghamshire faceworkers, one of its effects bringing apathy and decreasing
production in the deep mining coal industry. Additionally, because of the severe
rationalisation that took place in the deep coal mining industry during the
Labour administration of 1964-70 (an average of a pit a week closed during the
life of the Labour Government), what Taylor described as a 'betrayal thesis' took
root in some sections of the NUM. 22 Under the Labour administration of 1974 -
79 wage restraint again became an issue under the terms of the Social Contract.
1
The 'betrayal thesis' showed itself in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in the 1977
Ashfield by-election when a Conservative MP was elected for the first and only
time. Such was the astonishment with the election of Tim Smith that it was
described as being like 'Arabs electing a Jew'. 23 Even in the left-wing
dominated Kent Area in the 1970's there was deep suspicion and bitter
memories from the massive pit closure programme under Labour between 1964
and 1970. Pitt suggested the passive attitude to closures in this period was
because the NUM leaders did not want to 'rock the boat' for their Labour mates.
21 Keith Stanley, Nottinghamshire miners do strike (Mansfield, 2009), p. 37.
22 Andrew Taylor, The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2: 1969 -1995(Aldershot, 2005), p, 10.
23 BBC lV, Panorama, 27 June 1977.
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24 By the early 1980s, and with the introduction of enhanced redundancy terms,
many miners who had experienced the wage restraints and rationalisation of the
1960s and 1970s were now over 50 and in many cases were agitating for
voluntary redundancy. Under the threat of 70,000 job losses, Peter Heathfield
(NUM General Secretary) reported to the 1983 NUM Annual Conference that
there were 53,000 miners nationwide in the over 50's category, around a
quarter of NUM rnembershb." Even though the NUM was broadcasting their
fears for the coal industry under the Thatcher administration many of these over
50s miners knew there would probably be no respite even under a Labour
administration; history had shown that. Acceptable redundancy terms were now
in place to get them out of the 'grime and dust' of an industry that was
seemingly always in a state of turmoil and chaos.
One of the main aims of this study is to give a clear and coherent view of the
main events, and to examine the role played by the Nottinghamshire miners in
the strike of 1984-85. It will also critically analyse some of the more negative
and inexact accounts of their role which have painted them as the anti-heroes in
the 1984-85 strike. 26 Basically this thesis will try and make a case that the
majority of Nottinghamshire miners acted in line with their established 'custom
and practice'. Fundamentally, the first half of the study (Chapters 1 to 3) is a
narrative of the main events in the Nottinghamshire coalfield from c1979 to
1985. The need for this narrative is in response to there being few if any
academic studies which have been done on the subject. Also in some cases the
actual events that took place have become 'blurred in the mists of time'. Some
24 Malcolm Pitt, The World on our Backs: The Kent Miners' and the 1972 Mlners'Strike (London,
1979), p. 96.
25 National Union of Mineworkers, Report to 1983 Annual Conference, p. 498.
26 See Alex call1nicos and Mike Simons, The Great Strike, Chapter 3, The Tragedy of
Nottinghamshire pp. 47 - pS1; David Bell, Memories of the Nottinghamshire Coalfield, Chapter
10 - Strike and Division pp. 108, pl17; Angela Franks, Nottinghamshire Miners' Tales
(Keyworth, 2001), Part 8, The 1984-85 strike, pp. 67 - 76; Jim Coulter, S. Miller and M. Walker,
'The "Jewel in the Crown", Union splitting in Nottinghamshire' The Iron fist: A State of Siege, ,
pp. 17 - 24; Jonathon Symcox (ed.), The 1984-85 Miners' Strike in Nottinghamshire, If Spirit
alone won Battles; The Oiary of John Lowe (Bamsley, 2011).
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of the text in Symcox's account inferred that the UDM existed during the strike,
whereas in fact the UDM break came following the end of the strike. 27 Likewise,
the Eastwood and Kimberley Advertiser made a similar mistake in its twenty-
fifth anniversary coverage of the strike, suggesting the UDM was formed on 11
December 1984; it actually came into being almost a year later. 28 Stephenson
looked at whether the issue of the UDM was a case of democratic unionism or
union busting. 29 Richards spent six months in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in
1990 and his findings provided some interesting evidence. 30 However, a
significant proportion of these findings were made through oral evidence
gathered more than six years after the event. Butcher and Seymour and Stanley
have provided subjective accounts from the working and striking Sides
accordlnqly." Very recently Symcox's edition of John Lowe's diary has added
another subjective and at times glaringly inaccurate account of the strike in
Nottinghamshire. 32 Additionally Franks and Bell have, in certain respects,
added limited and unbalanced accounts. 33 The second half of this study
(Chapters 4 to 6) is a critical analysis of some of the theories that have been put
forward as to why there was an unreceptive reaction to the 1984-85 strike in
the Nottinghamshire coalfield. These theories are based around the controversy
surrounding the 'ballot issue' and the subsequent decision to run the strike on
an area by area basis. They are critically analysed and reasons put forward as to
why they may be unsustainable in their views.
27 Symcox (ed.), The Diary of John Lowe, p. 9, p. 14 and p. 146.
28 'Events leading up to the strike', Eastwood and Kimberley Advertiser, 27 March 2009, p. 6.
29 R.C. Stephenson, The UDM and the 1984-85 Miners' Strike, Democratic Breakaway or Union
BUsting?(BA Dissertation, University of Bradford, November 1986).
30 Richards, Miners on Strike, pp. 175 - 204.
31 Chris Butcher and Malcolm Seymore, The Link up of Friendship (Nottingham, 1991) and Keith
Stanley, Nottinghamshire Miners do strike (Mansfield, 2009).
32 Symcox (ed.), The Diary of John Lowe. The diary starts on 15 April 1984 and misses the
crucial early events in the first five weeks of the strike which caused the initial split in the NUM
membership in the Nottinghamshire coalfield from which the NUM never recovered.
33 Franks, Nottinghamshire Mining Memories, pp. and Bell, Memories of the Nottinghamshire
Coalfield, pp.
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In Chapter 1 the main events which affected the Nottinghamshire coalfield in
the five year period that preceded the start of the strike (c1979 - March 1984)
are appraised. Two local fights against pit closures, at Teversal and New
Hucknall, ended in failure. It also looks at aspects of internal politics within the
Nottingham Area NUM in relation to events happening on the national stage.
The final pieces of the jigsaw were put in place which saw the left secure the
leadership of the NUM at national level by early 1984. In the Nottinghamshire
Area NUM some experience was lost at Area level between 1977 and 1984 with
the retirement of moderate stalwarts, Albert Martin, Len Clarke and George
Cheshire. The sudden tragic death of Joe Whelan (Nottingham Area NUM
General Secretary) in 1982 robbed the left-wing of the vital experience it
needed to deal with the Nottinghamshire problem in 1984-85. 34 Finally, some
proceedings around the subject of industrial unrest are considered. Ironically,
some pre-strike events in the Nottinghamshire coalfield had similar tendencies
to those which sparked the strike in the Yorkshire coalfield. Threatened pit
closures (at the Annesley-Bentinck-Newstead complex), actual pit closures (at
Moorgreen and Pye Hili), problems in the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area with
transport and tipping connected with the overtime ban, plus the effects of job
rationalisation following the introduction of enhanced redundancy terms in
1981, all combined to produce a climate of great turbulence. Indeed, when the
National Coal Board (NCB) announced the cuts to the industry for 1984-85 (the
issue which sparked the strike) it could be argued that the rationalisation in the
NCB South Nottinghamshire was more severe than that in the NCB South
Yorkshire Area where the strike started. 35
34 Comments made by Barry Johnson, Interview with Barry Johnson and Hilary Cave, 8 March
2008, Chesterfield.
35 Both Areas had cuts of 0.5 million tons but the manpower losses In the NCB South
Nottinghamshire Area were greater than those in the NCB South Yorkshire Area. This was to
take account of the two pit closures that were taking place at the time through the closures of
Moorgreen and the Pye Hill Complex.
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Chapters 2 and 3 provide a crucial narrative of the main events that affected the
Nottingham Area NUM and its members from the start of the strike through to
the formation of the UDM. Chapter 2 covers the main events from the start of
the strike in March 1984 through to December 1984. The key events centred on
the controversy surrounding the non-holding of a national ballot under NUM
Rule 43 and the subsequent decision to use the Rule 41 'domino strategy' as a
strike tactic. These two factors ensured that the NUM was fractured from the
start of the strike. Basically the Rule 41 Area by Area strategy was a different
attempt at trying to mobilise strike action over the issue of pit closures. It failed
in that it found the weak links in the NUM armoury of differing area cultures and
behaviours plus the federal structure of the union. It was in this period that the
initial splits within the union, i.e. between the rank and file membership and
some pro-strike Branch and Area Officials, began to appear. Pro-strike and anti
'no-ballot strike' demonstrations were held and legal moves were initiated that
eventually led to the strike being declared unofficial in the Nottingham Area of
the NUM. At national level a 'war of attrition' had commenced within the NUM,
firstly initiated by the 'no-ballot issue' and the subsequent domino strategy, then
added to in August 1984 by the introduction of the Rule 51 'Star Chamber'
Disciplinary Rule. The effects of introducing Rule 51 was far reaching, being the
main cause of the constitutional crisis that engulfed the NUM during 1985.
Chapter 3 is an interpretation of the main events in 1985. The strike ended after
51 weeks in early March 1985 but it was the start of subsequent events from
March 1984, which Alan Griffin described as "having the inevitability of a Greek
Tragedy", which were now in full motion and seemingly unstoppable. 36 In
January 1985 the Nottingham Area NUM had been threatened with expulsion
from the national union but the Special Conference to expel them never took
place. However, it was the events surrounding the complete revision of the
NUM Rules and Constitution which dominated proceedings following the end of
36 Alan R. Griffin, County under Siege (Ashboume, 1985), p. 6.
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the strike. Fundamentally, the new set-up would see a more nationally
controlled NUM effectively ending the 'federal' set Up of the NUM which had
been in place since its inauguration in 1944. Prior to the 1985 Rules Revision
Conference there was still a distant hope that the NUM could emerge from the
ashes of the strike united. The hostile treatment that the Nottingham Area NUM
delegation received, and their subsequent walk-out, put pay to any hopes of
reconciliation. The Nottingham Area NUM broke from the national union on 6
July 1985 following a ballot of Nottinghamshire NUM members held in May
1985. During the autumn of 1985 moves were made which resulted in the
formation of the UDM, the union receiving certification on 6 December 1985.
The second part of the study (Chapter 4 to 6) is an in-depth critique of the main
controversial aspects of the strike, namely the controversy surrounding the
failure to hold a national ballot and the heavy picketing associated with the Rule
41'Area by Area' strike strategy. The critique is focused on the Nottinghamshire
coalfield and why there was an adverse reaction to the conduct of the strike
there. Chapter 4 evaluates three main theories which have been put forward as
to why a national ballot in 1984 was deemed to be unwarranted. Firstly, the
safe pits theory suggested it was unfair for miners in coalfields unaffected by
the effects of rationalisation to vote on miners' jobs in coalfields that were
threatened. Secondly, the events linking the controversial introduction of Area
Incentive Schemes (AISs) in 1977-78 are analysed. One theory suggests that
the AISs were responsible for dividing the NUM because of pay differentials in
different areas. It advocated that miners in some areas were on big bonuses
and this was a factor for them not wanting to strike. This was not necessarily
the case because of the option of negotiating on norms and contracts at pit
level, and not all Nottinghamshire miners were on big incentive bonuses. 37 The
incentive ballot also caused an internal rumpus in the NUM over the topic of
37 Workers on the coalface which the author worked on at the time the strike broke (Hl'S -
Annesley Colliery - Deep Hard Seam) were often on fall-back bonus rates because of ~r
geological conditions. To a man they were against the conduct of the strike from the start and In
the absence of a national ballot continued to work throughout the duration of the strike.
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trade union democracy. Thirdly, the circumstances surrounding the introduction
of enhanced redundancy terms in the early 1980s are debated in order to
assess how this could have impacted on a national ballot.
Linking in with issues explored in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 explores the weaknesses
of the Rule 41 'domino theory' strategy and looks at explanations as to why it
failed in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. What was the problem with a strategy
relying on solidarity and the use of 'persuasive picketing'? The rise of the left in
the NUM can be seen to date from the unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970. As
Taylor said this would have profound effects for the coal industry, the NUM and
British politics as a whole. 38 However, there were similar traits in the
Nottinghamshire miners' reaction to the 'unofficial strike action' in 1969, 1970,
and 1981 to that of 1984-85. One of the main problems in the 1984-85 strike
was that the NUM was not truly a national union, but technically a loose
combination of independent trade unions within a federal structure. Arthur
Scargill had used this justification in the autumn of 1983 when attempts were
made to split the NUM up into two sectors (a central block and a peripheral
block) in order to keep two seats on the Trades Union Congress (TUC) General
Council. 39 As Taylor said, the 1944 NUM Rule book had been set up with the
different area traditions and cultures in mind:
Differing regional industrial traditions and political cultures
were expressed in the structure and ethos of the 1944
Rulebook which had been consciously designed to reflect,
contain and manage diversity. This was fundamental to
the NUM's polities. Solidarity was not automatic. 40
A key issue as to why the 1984-85 strike evolved as it did was the role played
by the moderates on the NUM National Executive Committee (NEC). Their
38 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 1.
39 NUM, 1983 Annual Conference Report, pp. 562 - 564.
40 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 3.
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involvement was significant to the subsequent development of the strike. The
NEC was the body that ran NUM policy between Annual Conferences. The
moderate influence on the NEC had been in decline since the retirement of Joe
Gormley in 1982. Nevertheless, why did a majority of moderate NEC members
go along with an 'area-by-area' strike strategy in 1984 when they knew a
majority of their members would probably be against such a course of strike
action? 41 The ensuing no-strike ballot results in several moderate NUM Areas
during March 1984 confirmed this view (see Chapter 2 - Appendix 3). John Lloyd
described the domino strategy, and subsequent conduct of the strike through
Special Delegate Conferences (SOC's), as being a process of 'delegated
democracy'. 42 As lloyd stated, the problem for the NUM was that there was a
number of countervailing pressures on this process, the main one being a
national ballot of all members under NUM Rule 43. What was the more accurate
indicator for a mandate; a decision taken at Branch or Special Meetings or one
obtained from a ballot vote of members? This was the crux of the matter for
the NUM that led to there being 'differing perceptions of democracy' in the
union following special meetings in some Areas that overturned no-strike Area
ballot results. Arkell and Rising suggested that the NUM had a right to ask the
NECto convene a SOCand thus ask 'mandated delegates' what course of action
the strike should take. 43 The problem was, as Ottey stated, what happens in
the absence of a ballot vote if a delegation votes for strike action when three-
quarters of its members voted to work? 44 Hence the confusion over what
constituted a genuine mandate.
41 The NUM NEe voted 21 - 3 to authorise the strike in Scotland and Yorkshire under NUM Rule
41 on 8 March 1984.
42 John Lloyd, Understanding the Miners'Strike (London, 1985), p. 20.
43 P. Arkell and R. Rising, Unfinished Business: The Miners'Strike for jobs 1984-85 (London,
2009), p. 17.
44 Roy Ottey, The Strike: an Insider's view (London, 1985), p. 124.
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The 1984-85 strike was not Arthur Scargill's strike. Jack Collins, militant leader
of the Kent NUM, stated that the initiative for the strike did not come from
national level but from Branch and Lodge level:
The fight came from the bottom, not the leadership ( ...)
the only tactic we needed was to let the men develop the
strike.45
Claims were made that certain NECmembers had been 'leaned on' which could
explain the reason for their pro-strike views at national level, often in conflict
with their own members'views at area level. NUM NECmembers were paid by
the national union and their terms and conditions of service (and retirement)
were determined by the NUM General Finance Committee. In 1984 the left had
a hold on this committee. This was advocated as a reason for there being no
moderate backlash against the Rule 41 picketing policy. 46 Chapter 6 looks
briefly at some of the traditions and behaviours in the Nottinghamshire coalfield.
Did the working Nottinghamshire miners of 1984-85 strictly fit the bill as 'scabs'
or 'blacklegs'? Because there were significant doubts over the democratic nature
of the strike can a case be put that the Nottinghamshire miners were acting
within their established union traditions? The issues of· Spencerism are also
scrutinized in this section and some proposals made as to why they may have
not been relevant to the 1984-85 strike.
Previously un-accessed primary evidence is crucial to the findings of this thesis.
Such evidence includes extracts from the Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, and
accounts of the dispute from the local press based around the Sutton-in-Ashfield
region of the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Various Circulars, letters and
correspondence from the NUM (at national, Nottinghamshire area and branch
levels), documents from other organisations connected with strike, and oral
45 Mike Simons, Striking Back: Photos of the Great Miners'Strike (London, 2004), p. 14.
46 'Can you remember' The Working Miners' Newsletter, Issue 1, 20 August 1984.
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evidence from some key players are also used. This previously un-accessed
evidence is used to try and give a more sensitive and reflective picture of the
events in the Nottinghamshire coalfield during 1984-85. It will also be used to
dispel some of the abiding myths that have been created both during and since
the dispute, about the role of Nottinghamshire miners, supposedly modern pits
with easy geology and thus large incentives, plus the issue of having a history of
non-sol idarity.
It is the role of the Nottinghamshire miners (NUM members), and their
relationship with the union at branch, area and national levels, which are the
key in trying to understand what happened in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in
1984-85. Some 'distant views' often place too much emphasis on other, less
significant factors. The Silver Birch and the NMWC played a role in the dispute
but it was always secondary to what was happening in union circles and
probably not as prominent as some commentators suggest. 47 As Alan Griffin
commented, some accounts of the situation in Nottinghamshire misunderstood
it after being influenced by a biased minority with prejudiced, illusory views:
I have read accounts of the situation in Nottinghamshire
written by well-meaning outsiders, who appear to have
studied the area with as little sympathy and
understanding as most Western anthropologists brought
to the study of native cultures, and who allowed
themselves to be over influenced by a small minority of
47 Symcox (ed.), The Diary of John Lowe, p. 146. It was suggested that the UDM was formed
out of the National Working Miners Committee. The Nottinghamshire Area (NUM) disassociated
from both the Nottinghamshire and National Working Miners Committees at the December 1984
Area Council meeting. They disassociated on the grounds that the Union worked through the
Nottinghamshire constitution, from Branch to Area, and not through Working Miners
Committees. The formation of the UDM occurred as a result of the constitutional crisis which
engulfed the NUM from January 1985. It offidally became a bona-fide trade union on 6th
December 1985. .
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local people whose un-representative views dovetailed
with their own prejudices and preconceptions. 48
Given that the author of this study was involvement on one side of the dispute,
it has been a central concern to try and main a balanced view of the issues.
What the thesis has attempted to do is to provide a detailed and thoroughly-
documented account of the main events of the strike as they affected the
Nottinghamshire coalfield. At the same time, it does provide a critique of some
of the mainly left-wing theories which have portrayed the Nottinghamshire
miner's as the chief culprits in the failure of the strike. It bases this critique on
an analysis of the widest range of evidence available. There were on occasions
problems in obtaining some of the evidence because of the controversial legacy
of the strike. Cases of people not speaking to each other still occur over
twenty-seven years since the start of the strike. Moreover, the stance of the
Nottinghamshire NUM devout strike loyalists, who continue refusing to appear
on the same stage as UDM members (or past UDM members in the author's
case), meant that certain oral evidence could not be obtained. This meant that
the 2009 twenty-fifth anniversary radio programme broadcast by Radio
Salistune as part of the Selstonia Living Heritage Project (2008 - 2011) and
Stanley's 2009 account were particularly crucial sources for the present account.
As a scholarly appraisal of the role of the Nottinghamshire miners in the 1984-
85 strike, this study seeks to contribute to broader understandings of the strike
as a whole. Shortly after the end of the 198+85 Miners' Strike, the socialist
historian Raphael Samuel suggested that the meaning of the strike would be
determined 'not by the terms of settlement ( ...) or even by the events of the last
year but by the way in which it is assimilated in popular memory, by ( ...)
retrospective understanding both in the pit villages themselves and the country
48 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 6.
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at large'. 49 Samuelalso suggested that many different histories of the miners'
strike had yet to be written and these would all be radically different, sometimes
even within a single family. 50 As a new regional study, this thesis aims to
provide one such strand of interpretation and to complement other regional
studies of the dispute by Colin Griffin, David Howell, Jonathon and Ruth
Winterton, Keith Gildart and Hywel Francis. 51 As the study covers the
Nottinghamshire coalfield in the period c.1980 - 1985 it is hoped that it
complements the work of the late Alan Griffin, so adding towards a complete
history of the NottinghamshireMinersfrom 1881onwards. 52
49 Raphael samuel, Barbara Bloomfield, and Guy Boanus, The Enemy Within: Pit Villages and
the Miners'Strike of 1984-85 (London, 1986), Preface, ix.
50 Ibid., Preface, xvii
51 Colin P. Griffin, The Leicestershire Miners Vol. 1111945 -1988(Lelcester, 1989); David
Howell, The Politics of the NUM: A Lancashire Wew(Manchester, 1989); J. and R. Winterton,
Coal, otss and Conflid: The Yorkshire Miners and the 1984-85 Miners'Strike (Manchester,
1989); Keith Gildart, North Wales Miners: A Fragile Unity 1945 -1996 (Studies in Welsh History),
(Cardiff, 2001); Hywel Francis, History on our side: Wales and the 1984-85 Miners'Strike,
(Ferryside, 2009).
52 See Alan R. Griffin, The Miners of Nottinghamshire Vol. 1, 1881 -1914 (Nottingham, 1955)
and The Miners of Nottinghamshire Vol. 2, 1914 -1944 (London, 1962).
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1. Introduction to Chapter 1
Whilst it is probably true to say that the peripheral coalfields of South Wales and
Scotland were in the front line for most closures in the early 1980s, it does not
follow that pits and jobs in Nottinghamshire were safe. South Wales had been
especially hard hit since the demise of the 'steel industry following the 1980
strike; its main markets were for the steel industry in South Wales. For the
financial year 1984-85 it was budgeted to lose £70.7 million, the heaviest
financial loss of any coalfield in Britain. Scotland was also experiencing serious
problems; a number of collieries had closed in the early 1980s and there had
been a number of conflicts between the Scottish NUM and the NCB Scottish
Director over under handed tactics he had supposedly employed in that coalfield
to close down collieries. For the financial year 1984-85 the Scottish Area was
budgeted to lose £55.1 million. In total the combined South Wales and Scottish
Areas were budgeted for 1984-85 to produce 12 million tons of coal at a loss of
£125.8 million. 1 In contrast the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area was the 'jewel
in the crown' of the British coalfield. Its 12 million tons of deep mined coal was
budgeted to produce a profit of £44.4 million. 2 However, not all
Nottinghamshire collieries were in the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area. It was
a very different story in the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area. There the
collieries were much older being based on the edge of the older 'exposed
coalfield' that ran up the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire border. A large
proportion of its older workforce had experienced the mass of closures in the
1960s during the 'Robens Era', especially in the nearby Derbyshire coalfield.
1 NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area, Deep Mined Budgets -1984-85(Eastwood Hall, 1984).
D. Amos collection.
2 Ibid.
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In the early 1980s two Ashfield based collieries, Teversal and New Hucknall, had
closed following lengthy and exhausting campaigns fought by the local NUM
Branches to try and extend their working lives. Both closures went to appeal at
National level. Keith Pruden cited the Teversal closure as a factor that made
Nottinghamshire miners unwilling to strike in 1984-85:
We asked the NUM National Executive to help keep it
(Teversal) open, and they said no. They wouldn't
support us, and Teversal shut ( ...) when they started
shutting Yorkshire pits, Mr Scargill came to the
Nottinghamshire Miners and said "You've got to
support us". And we said ( ...) "You didn't support us
when Teversal was shutting so why should we
support you". That was where it stemmed from. 3
Teversal and New Hucknall had hardly closed when it was announced that two
more Ashfield based collieries had been identified for closure. Both Pye Hill and
Moorgreen Collieries were coming near the end of their economic lives and were
approaching 'seam exhaustion'. The closure of both collieries was eventually
agreed at NUM Branch level; a deciding factor in agreeing to close earlier was to
allow the under 50s to get jobs at other Nottinghamshire collieries. 4
Underground mergers had closed the Coal Preparation Plants (CPP's) at
Annesley, Newstead and Babbington in the early 1980s with associated job
losses for surface workers. Just prior to the outbreak of the 1984 strike the
local NUM Branches had to agree to 550 job losses at the Annesley-Bentinck-
Newstead Complex in order to try and get it into profitability.
Job losses and manpower rundowns were nothing new to the Ashfield region of
the Nottinghamshire coalfield. From 1960 until the eve of the 1984 strike the
3 Keith Pruden, cited in Bell, Memories of the Nottinghamshire Coalfield, p. 111.
4 Interview with David Wain, 5elston, 16 February 2009.
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number of operating collieries fell from seventeen to nine. (see Fig 1) NUM
membership for the Ashfield region for the same period dropped from 19,196 to
9,830; this represents a forty-nine per cent drop in membership. These figures
do not suggest a coalfield that was unthreatened; indeed by the NUM's own
admission in March 1984, no pit was safe from the McGregor axe. 5
5 NUM, 'Why no pit is safe', The Miner (Sheffield, March 1984). D. Amos collection.
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Table 1. Trends in NUMmembership in the Ashfield region of the
Nottinghamshire coalfield 1960 to end February 1984.
Year
NUM Branch
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984
Collieries
1 Annesley 800 828 833 854 902 960
2 Bentinck 1511 1634 2024 1860 1910 1514
3* Bestwood (c1967) 2136 1847
4* Brookhill (c1969) 959 871 428
5* Hucknall No.1 (c1960) 750
6 Hucknall No.2 857 1112 1046 981 1045 965
7* Kirkby (c1968) 1608 1542
8* Langton (c1968) 853 910
9 Linby 1099 1020 1320 1095 1054 927
10# Moorgreen 2040 1559 1345 1244 1009 733
11* New Hucknall (c1982) 547 613 . 610 616 530
12 Newstead 1197 1115 1179 1284 1276 760
13# Pye Hill/Selston
(Pye Hill No.1 & No.2
from 1970) 816 712 733 951 968 633
14* Selston (merged as
Pye Hill Complex 1970) 652 680 203
15 Silverhill 1157 1176 1126 947 1180 1049
16 Sutton 520 683 830 800 746 700
17* Teversal (c1980) 900 981 881 776
Transport" Workshops
Bestwood Industrial 380 312 359 307
Bestwood Workshops 204 350 382 349 375 393
Moorgreen Workshops 440 440 529 606 634 508
South Normanton
Transport 150 149 217 288 179 381
Totals 19196 18222 14066 12963 12167 9830
* Denotes Colliery closed and date.
# Denotes Colliery due to close.
Source: Nottingham Area (NUM) Area Minutes 1960,1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1984.
Figures 1960 to 1980 are NUM Branch returns ending December in each year
Figure for 1984 are for NUM Branch returns for 4 weeks ending 28 February 1984 (pre-strike)
After its merger Brookhill was worked from Bentinck and became Bentinck No.4 Branch for a while
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2. The Teversal Colliery Closure: 1980
The dust had hardly settled from the 1974 national strike and the subsequent
birth of the Plan for Coal when questions were being asked about the future of
a Nottinghamshire colliery. Early in 1976 the Teversal Branch of the Nottingham
Area NUM asked the Union's mining engineers to make a report on the quality
and quantity of coal in the Clowne seam and the feasibility of mining it from
Teversal. 6 Following the report, the Nottingham Area (NUM) agreed to
approach the NCB to drive two new 350 yard drifts to gain access to 2.5 million
tons of coal in the Clowne Seam. This would extend the life of the colliery
beyond the expected closure date of 1981. Following the meeting on Teversal's
future with the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area a report was made to the
Nottingham Area NUM Area Executive Committee (AEC) on 10 May 1976. 7 It
was reported that the local NCB had decided to put the development of the
Clowne seam on hold for a number of reasons. Firstly, current reserves at
Teversal were expected to last until 1981 and by this time the workforce would
be reduced by natural wastage from 700 to 400. The remaining men could
transfer to the nearby Silverhill and Sutton Collieries. Secondly, there was
concern over the possibility of bad mining conditions, with water and a soft
floor, in the Clowne Seam. This would invalidate the cost of £4.5 million needed
to develop the Clowne seam and offset the revenue expected from the two
million tons of coal reserves expected. Finally, it was reported that currently no
decision could be made regarding mining the Clowne seam and any decision
reached locally would have to be endorsed by the NCB nationally. The
Nottingham Area NUM asked that a decision on the development of the Clowne
seam be made by 31 October 1976 at the latest. However, everything was back
at square one in November when the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area turned
down the development of the Clowne seam as being against the best interests
6 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1976, p. 6. D. Amos collection.
7 Ibid., pp. 130-131.
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of the mining industry and the men in the North Nottinghamshire Area. 8 The
Nottingham Area NUM AEC rejected the NCB's decision on the grounds that
similar low seam workings were being successfully worked at Cresswell Colliery
on the Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire borders. A Delegation from the Nottingham
Area NUM had visited Cresswell to see the low seams being worked. Little
appears to have happened regarding the future of Teversal until the issue flared
up again in May 1977.
At the Nottingham Area NUM Area Council Meeting (ACM) on 23 May 1977
concern was again expressed by the Teversal Branch about recent NCB reports
concerning the future of Teversal. 9 The ACM agreed that an appeal against the
local NCB's decision should be dealt with at national level as a matter of
urgency. More Significantly, in August 1977 a letter was sent from the
Nottingham Area NUM to the National NUM concerning the 'lack of support for
the Nottingham Area' from National level over the Teversal closure. 10 The
problem appeared to be overcome when the National NUM said it would
produce the necessary documentation following the 1977 August Bank Holiday.
11 The Nottingham Area NUM case for Teversal was put to the NCB at National
level in London on 20 December 1977. However the NCB's reply in early 1978
was unfavourable. In replying to the NUM's submission to mine the Clowne
seam the NCBsaid:
Under all circumstances the Board (NCB) feels that it
would be quite wrong to subject men to work under
such conditions and consider that such a high risk
venture could not be justified. 12
8 Ibid., p. 307.
9 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1977, p, 145.
10 Ibid., p, 248.
11 Ibid., p. 277.
12 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1978, p. 38.
24
Chapter 1 - Teversal to Turmoil
The Nottingham Area NUM dismissed the NCB's claims and reaffirmed their
support to develop and mine the Clowne seam. Also it was agreed to make
moves to get the National NUM representatives to see Tony Benn, Secretary of
State for Energy, to try and get the NCB's decision reversed. The NUM National
level agreed to support the Nottingham Area in trying to get a meeting arranged
with Tony Benn. A specially convened Nottingham Area NUM AEC Meeting was
called on 3 April 1978 to consider the contents of a letter from Tony Benn to
Lawrence Daly (NUM General Secretary). 13 In the letter Tony Benn deferred
making a decision saying that whilst he was willing to meet representatives from
the NUM it was the NCB who had the statutory responsibility for the coal
industry and that included dedslons on which collieries should be worked and
which closed. Ironically Tony Benn's stance on colliery closures would take a
different turn in 1984 under the Thatcher administration.
In reply to Tony Benn's letter the specially convened AEC meeting decided to
pursue a meeting with Mr Benn at the earliest date, inform all other Nottingham
Area NUM branches to operate an embargo on receiving transfers from Teversal
and call a meeting of all Nottingham Area NUM Branch Officials and Committee
(BOCM) members with a recommendation to take industrial action in opposition
to the Teversal closure. 14 At the meeting of BOCM on 8 April 1978 the Vice
President of the Nottingham Area NUM said the issue was not just about
Teversal but was:
a fight to maintain other pits in the Area which still
have reserves of coal but which the NCBwould want
to close as part of their current programme for the
concentration of output at selected units. 15
13 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
14 Ibid., p. 98.
15 Ibid., p. 102.
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The meeting of Nottingham Area NUM BOCM on 8 April 1978 put forward a
motion to lobby the NEC of the National NUM at its meeting on 13 April 1978
and voted to support the AECs recommendation for strike action in opposition
to the Teversal closure. 16 Arrangements for the Nottingham Area NUM
Delegation to attend the Lobby were made at the AECMeeting on 10 April 1978.
The lobby, along with a meeting with Tony Benn, was arranged for the 27/28
April 1978 in London. Joe Gormley (NUM National President) presented the
NUM's case for Teversal to the Energy Secretary. In reply Tony Benn said that
if the NCB had not won the Union's approval then they had not won their case.
He said he would endeavour to arrange a meeting between Derek Ezra (NCB
Chairman) and Joe Gormley. 17 The meeting with the NCB the following day
again saw the National President, supported by other members, forcefully put
the case for keeping Teversal open to the NCB. The aftermath of these
meetings was that the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area approached the
Nottingham Area NUM in May 1978 with a proposal to set up a technical
working party with the aim of 'sorting out opinions from facts' and to 'reduce
the area of judgement as to what is optimistic and what is pessimistic' in the
mining of the Clowne Seam. 18 The Nottingham Area NUM AEC accepted the
report and suggested it be acted on as a matter of urgency. By September
1978 the NCB's 'delaying tactics' over Teversal were noted and again the
Nottingham Area NUM AEC passed a motion to press the NCB over a 'final
decision' on Teversal by 31 October 1978. This was exactly two years after a
similar motion had asked for a final decision on Teversal in 1976. Two years of
meeting and negotiations appear to have solved nothing.
By early 1979 the Nottingham Area NUM again received correspondence from
NCB North Nottinghamshire Area stating the development of the Clowne Seam
at Teversal could not be justified and hence Teversal Colliery would close by
16 Ibid., p. 103.
17 Ibid., p. 138.
18 Ibid., p. 133.
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1981.19 The NEC of the National NUM had considered the issue at its meeting
the previous week and had sanctioned an Area Ballot for the purpose of
'ascertaining the feelings of the membership' with regard to taking industrial
action over the Teversal closure. The Nottingham Area NUM AEC reaffirmed
their decision from 3 April 1978 in proposing industrial action in opposition to
the NCBclosure plans for Teversal Colliery. A meeting of Nottingham Area NUM
BOCM reaffirmed the AEC decision at a meeting on 14 February 1979. The
Nottingham Area NUM ACM endorsed the decision to ballot the Nottingham Area
NUM membership by a vote of 31 Branches to 2. 20 The Area Ballot was
arranged for 14 March 1979. In the weeks leading up to the ballot all
Nottingham Area NUM Branches were visited by delegations from Teversal, with
the aim of securing support for industrial action (Fig 2). Implications from one
of these visits, to Ollerton Colliery, were resurrected in 1986. A former Teversal
NUM Branch Official accused one of the chief 1984 strike supporters in
Nottinghamshire of hypocrisy and double standards over pit closures by his
apparent failure to support Teversal in 1979. 21 The Area Ballot took place on
14 March 1979 and resulted in 6,387 (28%) voting to support industrial action
in support of Teversal and 16,778 (72%) voting against industrial action.
In July 1979 a letter was sent from the Teversal Branch of the NUM to the
Nottingham Area NUM HQ expressing the branch's feelings regarding the NCB's
actions in reversing their decision over the Deep Duffryn Colliery closure in
South Wales. 22 The NCB had targeted Deep Duffryn for closure because the
economic workable reserves were reaching exhaustion. Unlike Teversal, the
colliery had made heavy financial losses during the previous six years. This was
19 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1979, p. 39.
20 Ibid., p. 52.
21 Gerry Todd, (former Teversal NUM Branch Offldal), Mansfield Chad, 9 October 1986. (It was
suggested In the letter that the then Ollerton Delegate, Jimmy Hood (now a Member of
Parliament), was more interested in his campaign for the vacant position of Area NUM Official
than supporting the Teversal campaign).
22 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1979, p. 241.
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Nottingham Area NUM campaign Literature - Teversal Colliery closure:
March 1979
WHY NOmNGHAMSHIRE MIt~£ItS SHOUl;D
VOTE 'YES' FOrt STRIKE ACTION
IN SUPPOlT Of TIVEkSAl COl\.IIIlY
IN THE FOkTHCOMING BAllOT
TEVEItSAL COLL1ERY - PIT CLOSURES
The Coal »oard have dedd.ed to close Teversal Colliery O'n
Economic Grounds. This CoUiery bas Inade a profit ot half a
mUlion pounds except on two occasions since 1947.
The Coal Board accept tha't there are over two mUtion tollS
or coal in the Clowne Seam that! C8I). be worked .•
The Coal Board refuse to spencl money to d,rift
Seam. They say the ~oney is needed elsewhen
the mepow'r. That's in spit('; bf past ml'Omitll_
The Coal Board are not being
out, just to lnftSt some of our
Source: Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Labour History Society collection.
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the main basis of the Teversal complaint. The Deep Duffryn NUM Branch, like
Teversal, had organised opposition to the closure, both within the local
community around Mountain Ash and more widespread through parts of the
South Wales Coalfield. Like Teversal, this was the backdrop to taking the
closure through the official Review Procedure. Emlyn Williams, South Wales
NUM President, made an emotional plea to save Deep Duffryn at the 1979 NUM
Annual Conference. However, prior to any constitutional steps being taken by
the South Wales NUM, Deep Duffryn was reprieved from closure in the week
following the NUM Annual Conference. The reprieve was for a six week period
and was on the grounds of successfully developing a coal face and getting the
colliery towards profitability. Similar tactics were used when Cefn Coyd, the
last working deep mine in the Dulais Valley, closed in 1968. 23 Cefn Coyd was
given a three month stay of execution in 1968 pending getting the colliery into
viability. The Cefn Coyd Branch put all emphasis on trying to get the colliery
into viability by implementing policies of economic rationalisation. This included
working with the management at the colliery to apply a redundancy programme
for older miners to eliminate 'natural wastage'. 24 However, all efforts came to
nothing as Cefn Coyd eventually closed later in the same year. Deep Duffryn
closed after the six week trial period. The development of the new coalface ran
into dangerous geological conditions and all concerned, the South Wales NUM,
the Deep Duffryn NUM Lodge, and the South Wales NCBagreed that the colliery
had to close.
Prior to the problems encountered at Deep Duffryn, a Special Executive
Committee Meeting (SEC) of the Nottingham Area NUM was held at the Area HQ
on 2 August 1979. 25 At the meeting, which was attended by the NCB North
Nottinghamshire Area Director, a case was put to try and reprieve Teversal from
23 For an account of the closure of Cefn Coyd Colliery see John Sewel, Colliery Oosures & Social
Change (cardiff 1975), pp. 11-28.
24 Ibid., p. 20.
25 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1979, pp. 267 - 270.
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closure. Emphasis was put on the drastic changes that were now taking place
in the world's energy situation and the likelihood of coal being at a premium in
the near future. Additionally the Nottingham Area NUM Delegation asked why a
colliery like Teversal, in one of the most profitable areas in the country, was
being closed when Deep Duffryn had significant financial losses over the past
five years and was being reprieved. 26 The Teversal NUM Branch believed they
were being treated shabbily by the NCB after years of profitability and were the
victims of their own moderation. 27 In conclusion the Nottingham Area NUM
asked that the NCB should defer the closure of Teversal and, in view of the
current situation in the industry, look into the feasibility of extending the life of
the colliery. In reply the local NCBwere unwilling to reopen the Teversal case.
They cited various factors including that time had run out for Teversal, the
decision to close the colliery had been taken at NCB National level and there
was a fundamental difference between the development at Teversal and what
was going on at Deep Duffryn. 28 Importantly it was painted out that transfers
from Teversal to nearby Silverhill Colliery had commenced, and that there was
the option of Teversal's reserves being transferred there. The option of re-
allocating reserves to a nearby colliery was a ploy used by the NCB on many
occasions. More controversially the local NCB Area Director, whist agreeing
there was an increase in demand for coal, stated it need not necessarily be
British mined coal, as it was cheaper to buy foreign coal. 29 This statement
caused much upset in Nottingham Area NUM circles and was replied to in no
uncertain terms. However, the final insult did not end there, as the Nottingham
Area NUM approached the National NUM for assistance in seeking to see David
Howell, the incoming Conservative Secretary of State for Energy, about
reopening the Teversal case. The National NUM replied that following the
Nottingham Area NUM Ballot, the NUM's NEC had no option but to accept the
26 Ibid., p. 268.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 269.
29 Ibid.
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NCB's decision on the Teversal closure and that they therefore were unwilling to
reopen the matter. 30
The closure of Teversal Colliery was accepted at a Nottingham Area NUM AEC
meeting on 19 September 1979. It was agreed that everything possible
regarding support to keep Teversal open had been done, and there was now no
alternative but to accept the NCB's plans to close the colliery. 31 Teversal
finished production on 25 July 1980 after 111 years. 32 It was the first colliery
closure in the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area since it's formation in 1967; it
was also the first closure anywhere in Nottinghamshire since the ill-fated Kirkby
'Summit' Super Pit project was aborted in 1968. The majority of the Teversal
workforce, 458, took short-term transfers to other local collieries at Silverhill,
Sutton and Sherwood. 33 Just one man took a long term transfer. Forty men
(over 55's) took redundancy, with 21 taking Voluntary Early Retirement (VERS).
Stanley suggested that the 'betrayal' over the Teversal closure became part of
Nottingham mining trade union history and laid the foundations for the divisions
in 1984-85. 34 However, the betrayal cannot be' solely laid at the door of
Nottinghamshire miners as the NUM failed to raise a critical consciousness over
the issue of pit closures at any time, in any coalfield, especially during the mass
closure programme of the 1960's. Even following the two national strikes of
1972 and 1974, in a period of supposed renaissance for the deep mining coal
industry, problems remained in getting united support against pit closures. This
included the North Derbyshire coalfield in 1976 over the Langwith closure, in the
traditional left-wing areas of the South Wales Coalfield in 1979 and 1983, and in
the Scottish coalfield in the 1982-83 period. Stanley's betrayal thesis cannot be
30 Ibid., p. 270.
31 Ibid., p. 303.
32 NCB North Nottinghamshire Area, Teversal Col/iery 1862 -1980(Edwinstowe, 1980}, p. 1.
33 Nottingham Area NUM, An appraisal of the British eoalmlnlng Industry and an examination of
the possible consequences fol/owlng pit dosures in the NUM Nottinghamshire Area, (ManSfield,
1983), Table XXII
34 Stanley, Nottinghamshire Miners do strike, p. 41. Stanley's account suggests that the
Nottinghamshire miners betrayal in 1984 had its roots in the 1979 Ballot over the Teversal
closure when they failed to show support in the fight to keep Teversal open.
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solely nailed to the door of the Nottinghamshire miners. Many different factors
came into play on the closure of a colliery in any coalfield. As Taylor stated 'no
national coalition had ever been built around pit closures, historically their effect
was to fragment not unite'. 35 Few area coalitions against pit closures had been
built up either.
3. The NewHucknall Colliery Closure -1982
Whilst the Teversal closure debacle had been on-going, uncertainty was being
expressed about another Nottinghamshire colliery based in Ashfield. New
Hucknall Colliery was situated some three miles to the south of Teversal, near
the mining community of Huthwaite. Unlike Teversal the colliery was placed in
the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area. By 1980 the colliery had been in
production for over a hundred years. Concern over the future of New Hucknall
was first expressed at a Nottingham Area NUMAEC Meeting on 11 August 1980.
At that meeting it was reported that the Area's NUM mining engineers had been
monitoring the coal reserves for some two years and the NCB's forecast was
that the colliery would close in 1981. 36 The report stated there was 'cause for
optimism' in that, based on present output, there were a further two and a half
years of coal reserves beyond the NCB's forecast. It was also noted that the
difference between the NCB's forecast and the Notti~gham Area NUM Report
was based primarily on economic considerations and not geological or total
exhaustion of reserves. 37 It was agreed that informal talks between the NCB
South Nottinghamshire Area and the Nottingham Area NUM go ahead regarding
the future of New Hucknall Colliery. The meeting took place on 28 August
1980, followed by a Colliery Review Meeting on 8 September 1980. It was also
agreed that a joint report be made by the NUM and NCB Mining Engineers on
future coal reserves at New Hucknall and a formal meeting on the future of New
35 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 186.
36 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1980, p. 277.
37 Ibid. .
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Hucknall was offered to the Nottingham Area NUM by the NCB South
Nottinghamshire Area Director. 38
A NUM Special Executive Meeting on 24 September 1980 considered the various
options regarding remaining coal reserves at New Hucknall. At the meeting it
was noted that the 'interpretation of seam exhaustion' in relation to the National
NUM's policy on colliery closures was of upmost importance. 39 The National
NUM had a policy to oppose all colliery closures unless on the grounds of total
exhaustion of economic reserves. A Nottingham Area NUM Special Area
Executive Meeting (SAEC) considered the New Hucknall position on 13 October.
Mr A Davies, Area Director for NCB South Nottinghamshire, attended the
meeting in addition to the full New Hucknall NUM Branch Committee. At the
meeting the Area Director reported that in 1976 he had obtained approval from
the NCB at national level to develop the Yard seam at New Hucknall. 40
Unfortunately, the development of the Yard seam proved abortive due to
excessive amounts of water which found its way into the mine's workings. This
was due to past complex inter action from past workings at closed collieries to
the west of New Hucknall in the Derbyshire coalfield. The only available
reserves left for New Hucknall to develop were under the high subsidence risk
areas of Sutton-in-Ashfield and Huthwaite. Subsidence costs in Ashfield were
becoming a major problem in the Ashfield coalfield by the early 1980s. More
importantly, in answer to a question from the Nottingham Area NUM, the NCB
stated that the current workforce at New Hucknall could be absorbed at other
collieries in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. 41
The New Hucknall situation was again discussed at a Nottingham Area NUMAEC
Meeting on 10 November 1980. It was agreed that the New Hucknall issue be
referred to National level, this being on the grounds that the NCB's refusal to
38 Ibid., p. 298.
39 Ibid., p. 326.
40 Ibid., p. 332.
41 Ibid., p. 333.
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mine the three remnants of coal in the Yard seam should be opposed in that 'a
state of seam exhaustion had not been reached', As with most contested
colliery closures, it was a case of a difference of opinion as to whether a colliery
had come to its 'useful economic end'. At Teversal and New Hucknall there was
no issue of 'lonq life pits', in both cases it was an issue of trying to extend the
life of the colliery for a short period of time. Both were situated near the old
workings on the exposed coalfield that ran up the Nottinghamshire / Derbyshire
border. This region had a history of extensive coal mining for several centuries.
Early in 1981 the NCBat national level announced they could see no justification
for keeping New Hucknall Colliery open. The issue would therefore be referred
for discussion to national level, pending an appeal. However, other events in
the coal industry overtook the New Hucknall issue. In early February 1981, at a
nationally based meeting between the NCB and the mining unions, it was
announced that in order to move the coal industry towards profitability,
between twenty and fifty collieries nationwide would have to be closed, with the
associated loss of jobs (see Chapter 5: Part 4) In the aftermath of the 1981
coal crisis it was revealed that none of the proposed closures would affect the
North Nottinghamshire Area. However, the South Nottinghamshire Area
Director announced that the proposed closure of New Hucknall would still go
ahead, along with the merger of Babbington Colliery with Hucknall Colliery. 42
On 18 March at the Nottingham Area NUM AECMeeting it was reported that two
Colliery Review Meetings had been held on the future of New Hucknall. The
NCB had put forward revised plans for the colliery following the Government's
decision to grant further financial assistance to the coal industry. The plan
would mean the colliery reverting to one operating coalface only, followed by a
period of no production at all. New Hucknall would therefore revert to being a
development- only colliery for a period of time. This would mean the temporary
42 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1981, p. 50.
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transfer of New Hucknall miners whilst the new reserves were developed. The
Nottingham Area NUM AEC Meeting accepted the report as the development
would extend the life of the colliery. In the meantime a National Appeal
meeting over the future of New Hucknall was set at the NCB National HQ for 29
June 1981. Prior to the appeal industrial relations between the New Hucknall
NUM Branch and the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area took a turn for the
worse. The New Hucknall Branch had implemented a ban on consultation
following the Area Director's attitude towards the New Hucknall development. A
move to extend this ban to the whole of the Nottingham Area of the NUM was
defeated by a vote of 27 Branches to 5. 43 Despite the Branch ban it was
agreed that the four Area Officials should seek an early meeting with Mr
Griffiths, the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area Director, to try and sort things
out. 44 However, Mr Griffiths refused to meet the four Nottingham Area NUM
Officials whilst the consultation ban remained in place. 45 It was proposed that a
letter be sent to the Area Director to try and get him to reconsider so as to try
and avoid an escalation of the situation. This can be considered a serious
breach in industrial relations involving a union branch which epitomised the
moderate stance of the Nottinghamshire NUM. 46
Following the National Appeal a letter was sent from the NCBat National level to
the National NUM General Secretary regarding the future of New Hucknall
Colliery. 47 In this letter it was outlined that the last two operating coalfaces in
the Deep Soft Seam, 57's and 59's, would work the colliery out to seam
exhaustion by August 1982. Regarding the development in the Yard Seam, the
43 Ibid., p. 191.
44 Ibid., p. 183.
45 Ibid., p. 219.
46 A ban on consultation was a rare occurrence in labour relations in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. New Hucknall was considered a 'family pit' and good, sometimes informal industrial
relations, between the NCBand the union branch were considered the norm. New Hucknall was
also the ancestral home of George Spencer, the controversial Notts Miners Leader in the 1920's
& 30's. Spencer advocated the use of conciliation and arbitration to solve industrial conflicts.
This moderate trait was the normal state of play at the New Hucknall Branch of the NUM.
47 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1981, p. 271-272.
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NCB agreed that the development into Y2's should continue in an attempt to
prove the geological conditions in that area. Until this development was
completed the NCBwould not make a final decision on New Hucknall Colliery. 48
In the meantime there would be a rundown in manpower at the colliery because
of the reduction in the number of faces and production shifts. In reply the
Nottingham Area NUM were disturbed that there was no mention of potential
development into the Blackshale, Piper and Tupton seams as proposed by the
Union's mining engineers. 49
Rundown of the manpower at New Hucknall continued into the latter part of
1981. This was by means of transfers to other Nottinghamshire Collieries and
'natural wastage' through redundancies for older mineworkers. At the
Nottingham Area NUM AECmeeting on 23 September 1981 it was reported that
a further meeting concerning New Hucknall's future had been held in London on
16 September 1981. 50 Prior to this meeting taking place it was reported there
had been an unexpected breakthrough of water in Y2's development heading.
The Nottingham Area's NUM Mining Engineers, on investigation, concluded that
the mine water was likely to affect any future workings in the Yard and
Blackshale seams. In view of the situation it was agreed that New Hucknall
Colliery should close when the current workings on 59's finish around August
1982. A specially convened Branch Meeting of the New Hucknall NUM accepted
the closure decision. In reply, the NCB gave an undertaking to provide jobs for
all New Hucknall men who required a transfer to other Nottinghamshire
collieries.
The closure of the colliery was brought forward because of deteriorating
geological conditions early in 1982. Actual production finished on Friday 5
February 1982 and the colliery closed after 106 years of life.
48 Ibid., p. 272.
49 Ibid., p. 258
50 Ibid., p. 288.
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4. Rationalisation in the Nottinghamshire Coalfield (1980-1984)
In addition to the closures of Teversal and New Hucknall in the early 1980s,
there were other risks to the Nottinghamshire coalfield. At the 1983 NUM
Annual Conference,Peter Heathfield (North DerbyshireNUMGeneralSecretary)
suggested that the problems faced by the Midlands coalfields paled into
insignificance compared to those faced by the peripheral coalfields of South
Wales, Scotland and Durham. 51 The inference was that areas like
Nottinghamshire were immune from rationalisation. It provoked a fervent
responsefrom RayChadburn,NottinghamArea NUMPresident:
(...) we cannot sit back and say what is happening in
the rest of the coalfield is not affecting
Nottinghamshire. Becausein Nottinghamshire they are
cutting back on capacity, they are cutting back on
machineshifts and they are cutting backon jobs. 52
In 1983 the Nottingham Area NUM Education and Research Department
identified five Nottinghamshire collieries that had short spans of life. 53 In the
introduction to the booklet about this Situation, Henry Richardson,Nottingham
Area NUM General Secretary, stated that there was no guarantee that the
NottinghamAreawould remain immune to pit closures.54 Hestated that the:
(...) cutting out of dead wood and rationalisation could
threaten collieries then regarded as long life, thus making
them vulnerable virtually overnight to the threat of
closure. ss
51 1983 NUM Annual Conference Report, p. 498.
52 Ibid., pp. 498-499.
53 Nottingham Area NUM, An examination of the possible consequences following pit closures in
the NUM Nottingham Area, p. 2.
54 Ibid., p. 1.
55 Ibid.
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Of the five short-life collieries cited in the booklet, three were in the Ashfield
region - Annesley, the Pye Hill Complex and Sutton, whilst the other two,
Moorgreen and Babbington, were based just outside Ashfield. Of those
collieries, Babbington was the worst financial loss-maker in the whole
Nottinghamshire Coalfield; in the financial year 1981-82 the colliery recorded
losses of some £20.6 million, more than the rest of the Nottinghamshire
coalfield put together. At the time Babbingtonwas the oldest working colliery in
the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Sunk in 1842 by Thomas North, it had the
distinction of having the oldest union branch in Nottinghamshire. The
Nottinghamshireminers' historian, Dr Alan Griffin, was an active member there
as a young man in the late 1930s. In 1983 it was expected that as a single
autonomousunit Babbingtonhad a life of some eight to nine years. Threats to
the colliery were made early in 1981 when an argument occurred over the
tipping of pit waste. 56 However, in 1981 the NCBmade proposals to link up
Babbington with Hucknall Colliery to form a Hucknall-Babbington Complex.
Planswere put forward to link the two collieries underground, with all coal to
surface at Hucknall No.2 Colliery. This meant that all coal transport and coal
preparation would finish at Babbington with a subsequent loss of jobs. Plans
were also hatched for the Babbingtonworkforce to accessthe reservesvia the
Hucknall shafts. This would give additional 'machine available time' as the
Babbington reserves were geographically nearer to the Hucknall shafts. 57 In
total around £30 million was spent linking up the two collieries and upgrading
coal preparation facilities at Hucknall. The two collieries offiCially became a
Complex in 1985when all the link work had been completed. It was predicted
56 'Babblngton Colliery: an uncertain future', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 24 January 1981,
p.4.
57 NCB South Nottinghamshire Area, Report on Babbington Colliery (Eastwood Hall, October
1982), p. 1. D. Amos collection. Machine available time is the actual time for cutting coal per
shift minus travel time and various other associated tasks.
38
Chapter 1 - Teversal to Turmoil
that the combined collieries would have a life of around twenty years. 58 In the
event the Complex closed after only eighteen months in October 1986, being
the first Nottinghamshire closure following the 1984-85 strike.
Moorgreen Colliery, near Eastwood, was the last colliery in the former NCB East
Midlands No.5 Area. The colliery, sunk in 1865, formally belonged to the Barber
Walker Company. It was renamed as Minton Colliery in Sons and Lovers by the
Eastwood writer, OH Lawrence. By the early 1980s the colliery had been
identified as having a limited life due to exhaustion of viable reserves. Life
expectancy in 1983 was expected to be around three years. 59 The Waterloo
seam became exhausted in 1976 and from that time all production came from
the Blackshale seam. Late in 1982 reports of both Babbington and Moorgreen
as being on a NUM hit list were described as 'hysterical talk' by Roy Lynk,
Nottingham NUM Area Official. 60 Commenting on the limited life expectancy of
the two collieries he stated that the NUM had known since 1979 that the two
collieries, plus the Pye Hill Complex, had been earmarked for closure within a
decade. 61 Closure of the Colliery was accepted by the Moorgreen NUM Branch
in 1983 and a gradual rundown of manpower commenced from that time.
Miners aged under 50 transferred to other Nottinghamshire collieries, whist over
50s were offered voluntary redundancy under the new enhanced terms
introduced in 1982. Following the loss of K97's face in September 1983 the
closure of Moorgreen Colliery was brought forward and it finished production in
July 1985.
Not far from Moorgreen, the Pye Hill Complex was a combination of the former
Selston Colliery, at Underwood, and Pye Hill Colliery near Jacksdale. It was the
58 In the 1983-84 period many former miners from the closing Pye Hill Complex and Moorgreen
Colliery transferred to Hucknall with promises of some twenty years of life. They were there for
around eighteen months to two years maximum.
59 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1983, p. 215.
60 'Hit list talk is hysterical says Union Man', Eastwood & Kimberley AdvertiserL 3 December
1982, p. 1.
61 Ibid.
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last deep-mining in the Parish of Selston. For production purposes the two
collieries had been linked up in the late 1960s, with all the preparation and
transport facilities for coal being at Pye Hill No.2 at Jacksdale. SelstonColliery
was renamed Pye Hill No.1 Colliery. Both collieries retained separate NUM
Branches, being part of the Nottingham Area of the NUM. In 1983 it was
expected that the Complexwould have a maximumof four years life. 62 Plansto
try and extend the life of the Pye Hill Complex were dashed in 1983, when a
planned mix of opencast coal from the proposed nearby Smotherfly site with
Pye Hill's deep mined coal was aborted. 63 Henry Richardson,whilst stressing
disappointment with the closure, stated that the men at both Moorgreen and
PyeHill (1,900 in total) were 'lucky in that the coal industry could absorb them
at the present time'. 64 However, he stressedthat his real worry was that this
type of guarantee could not be made in the future if further closuresoccurred.
As at Moorgreen plans were made for a gradual rundown of the Pye Hill
Complex up to closure. Miners aged under 50 transferred to other
Nottinghamshire collieries, with the over 50s being offered voluntary
redundancy. Receiving collieries offered over 50s voluntary redundancy to
make way for the PyeHill and Moorgreenmen. The PyeHill Complexmined its
last coal on 9 August 1985.
It was expected that Sutton Colliery, also in the Ashfield region, would close
around 1990. The COlliery,sunk in 1873, had limited economic reserves.The
main restriction on reserves at Sutton was that only two seams in one area
could be worked, following the loss of other potential reservesbecauseof high
subsidence costs. As mentioned earlier (p. 32) subsidencewas becoming a
major issue in parts of the Nottinghamshire coalfield in the early 1980s. In
1983 the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area announced that 'half of the 3,500
62 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1983, p. 2.
63 'Pit loses fight for life', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser,. 12 Aug 1983, p. 3.
64 Ibid.
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subsidence claims it had last year came from the Ashfield region'. 65 Rumours
abounded of there being a 'claims bandwagon'. The issue for several Ashfield
collieries was that the abandonment of coal reserves under potential high cost
subsidence areas could considerably shorten the life span of some collieries.
The Mansfield NUM Branch was aware of this when they submitted an appeal to
the Nottingham Area NUM ACM to 'try and get an agreement with the
appropriate bodies, to offset the costs of surface damage from collieries whose
mining activity had caused that damage'. 66 Mansfield Colliery, known locally as
Crown Farm, had large amounts of its workings under high cost subsidence
areas to the north-east of the Nottinghamshire town of Mansfield. In early 1984
Ian McGregor (NCB Chairman 1983-1986) commented on the subsidence
problem affecting Mansfield:
( ...) if Mansfield's rate of claims were to be matched in other
mining districts, the industry would have to extract far less
coal, profitable pits would go into the red and the whole
country's available reserves would be reduced. 67
Subsidence costs and future reserves under high subsidence areas would be
major factors when Mansfield Colliery closed in 1988 and Sherwood closed in
1992. The subsidence problem was, as economist Andrew Glynn indicated, that
claims were set against the NCB's operating costs. If these claims were to be
met by the Areas actually causing the subsidence damage then the NCB North
Nottinghamshire Area could incur charges in the region of £148 million. 68 The
issue of high subsidence costs affecting the life of collieries was brought home
in February 1984 when Bentinck Colliery had to abandon large reserves of coal
under the towns of Ravenshead and Kirkby-in-Ashfield. SubSidence levels in the
65 'Crumbling Ashfield', Notts Free Press, 7 October 1983, p. 1.
66 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1982, p. 394.
67 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Mlners'Strike, p. 3.
68 A. Glynn, cited in Ibid p. 4.
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two areas stood at £4 per ton and it was stressed that this would have to be
brought down to around £1 per ton to try and help the Annesley-Bentinck-
Newstead Complex achieve improved profitability. 69 This decision considerably
shortened the working life of Bentinck Colliery.
Peter Heathfield (NUM National General Secretary) claimed that
Nottinghamshire's miners were immune from the effects of rationalisation. This
statement can be seen to be incorrect. Parts of the Nottinghamshire coalfield,
especially in the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area, were suffering from the
effects of rationalisation and were looking at uncertain futures as the evidence
in this chapter shows. Yet in the 1984-85 post-strike aftermath he defended the
decision to reject a national ballot in the 1984-85 strike because of
Nottinghamshire's supposed immunity from the effects of pit closures:
I am an advocate of ballots on major issues, with one
qualification, the issue of the ballot affects everyone
participating in the ballot, for example wages (oo.) but on
the question of colliery closures, the issues were
affecting a minority (oo.) So people working at long life
pits, especially Notts, don't see themselves as affected,
leading to a tendency to vote against strike action. 70
69 NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area, Informal minutes re Future of Annesley-Bentinck-Newstead
Complex, (Bestwood, 17 February 1984). D. Amos collection.
70 Peter Heathfield (NUM General Secretary), cited in Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 183. Also see
Chapter 4 of this thesis: Chapter 4: Part 1 - The Ballot Issue and the 'safe Pits' theory.
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5. The Nottingham Miners and the NUM (1979 - 1983).
In addition to the issue of pit closures, the NUM at national level was much
concerned with the succession to Joe Gormley, the outgoing moderate NUM
President. The election took place on 8 December 1981 with Arthur Scargill
winning and taking office in Spring 1982. Scargill gained over 70% of the vote
in the election in what is often described as a landslide victory.
A lot of emphasis was placed on the margin of Scargill's election: never before
had a NUM President been elected by such a large majority. At the 1982 NUM
Annual Conference, Scargill deemed his election to be a vote for change and for
more militant tactics. However, did Scargill win by a landslide or was it the NUM
moderates who lost miserably? Joe Gormley was a hard act to follow and there
was no natural moderate successor to him. Tommy Bartles had been the
moderate choice but he was killed in a car crash. Scargill benefited hugely from
the divisions amongst his enemies. As Routledge stated, the right could not
even agree on a single candidate. 71 Three moderate candidates stood in the
election for NUM President in 1981. They were Trevor Bell, Bernard Doherty and
. Ray Chadburn, Nottingham Area NUM President. Trevor Bell was a NEC and
NUM Official for the clerical side of the NUM, the Colliery Officials and Staff
Association (COSA). Bell was always an unlikely candidate to secure the NUM
Presidency, firstly because he was not a miner and secondly, because he had
been likened to Sir Sidney Ford. Ford was NUM National President from 1960 to
1971 and in many circles was identified with the passivity which saw the mass
rundown of the coal industry in the 1960s. As Joe Gormley commented:
As the election approached, the moderates woke up
to the fact that the lads were unlikely to repeat the
71 Paul Routledge, Scargill: The Unauthorised biography (London, 1994), p. 107.
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experiment of electing a representative from CaSA,
as Sid Ford had been. 72
Lancashire Area Official Bernard Doherty was put into the election simply
because the moderate Lancashire NUM, and its Area Secretary Sid Vincent, did
not want to nominate Arthur Scargill. Doherty was virtually unknown at Branch
level outside his native Lancashire and therefore could not be expected to gain
many votes. As Routledge noted 'Doherty was nominated simply to avoid having
to back that Yorkshireman'. 73 This leaves the position of Ray Chadburn who
was likened to the proverbial 'dithering bride to be' who did not know whether
to get married or not. Described by Routledge as an amicable, middle of the
road man, he initially decided to stand for the position of National President. 74
He then changed his mind and stood down, only to change it again at the last
minute. In the end Chadburn did not even get nominated by his own
Nottingham Area, having to rely on the small Cumberland Area to nominate him.
His actions hardly portrayed him as a man who was hoping to lead the 'storm
troopers' of the British trade union movement. Most Nottinghamshire miners
voted for Scargill simply on the grounds he fitted the main criteria; he was well
known, was a good orator and he was a 'pit man'. The mediocrity of the
moderate opposition to Scargill ensured he was elected with a landslide. Scargill
was elected with 138,803 votes or 70.3% in an 80% turn out of 248,000 NUM
Members. 75 The three moderates totalled 58,496 votes.
Despite the landslide victory, concern about Scargill's leadership surfaced in the
autumn of 1983 when the Annesley NUM Branch put forward a vote of no
confidence in him. This was for disparaging comments he had supposedly
made against the Solidarity Trade Union in Poland and the shooting down of a
72 Joe Gormley, Battered Cherub (London, 1982), p. 207.
73 Routledge, Scargil/, p. 107.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
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Korean airliner by the Soviet Union in 1983. Scargill faced his accusers by
addressing a Special Branch Meeting at Annesley Miners Welfare in December
1983. He managed to successfully talk round most of the Annesley meeting.
However this was done with a certain amount of showmanship as the author
recalls. Questions were taken three at a time and 'political type speeches'
given. 76 The meeting overturned the vote of no confidence into a vote of
confidence. Commenting on the turn around, Steve Williamson, Annesley NUM
Branch Secretary, said "It was complete reversal of opinion". 77 At the meeting
Scargill claimed that half of the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area collieries
would close in the next ten years, a view later confirmed by the NCB in South
Nottinghamshire. 78
Annesley was not the only Nottingham Area NUM Branch to show concern about
Scargill's leadership. A 1983 Harworth NUM Branch appeal to the Nottingham
Area NUM ACM stated "it was time the National President did the job he was
elected to do and negotiated better wages, improved pensions and terms of
employment". 79 The appeal added that recent media statements made by the
NUM National President were "making the NUM lose all credibility, both home
and abroad". The appeal was ruled out of order on the grounds the matter was
being dealt with by the NUM NEC.
Whilst the NUM at national level in 1979 - 1983 saw the prominence of the left
gaining some momentum, in Nottinghamshire things stayed much the same in
terms of politics at Area level. Three Area Ballots in 1979, 1982 and 1983
respectively saw a left wing Official and two moderates elected. All three newly
elected Area Officials would playa prominent role in the 1984-85 strike, but for
different reasons. In March 1979 Roy Lynk, Branch Secretary at Sutton Colliery,
76 The author was In attendance at this meeting as an elected NUM Committee member at
Annesley NUM Branch, Nottingham Area NUM.
77 'Scargill's Annesley Visit', The Chad (Kirkby Edition), 30 December 1983, p. 1.
78 Ibid.
79 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1983, p. 379.
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was elected as Area Agent in place of the departing Len Clarke. A long time
moderate, Roy Lynk had been a union branch official at Sutton NUM for a
considerable time. Roy Lynk very much fitted into a similar moderate role to
that of the departing Len Clarke. Lynk, in many ways, epitomized the
Nottingham Area's moderate, traditionalist stance. However, amongst the
established left at Area level the election of Roy Lynk caused some concern. As
the count progressed at the NUM Area Offices on 26 April 1979, Joe Whelan,
left-wing Nottingham Area NUM General Secretary commented to Area President
Len Clarke "It looks as if the village idiot's going to win" 80 Lynk suggested that
there was 'bad blood' between himself and Joe Whelan prior to him getting
elected because of differences in 'pit politics'. Roy Lynk would come to
prominence in the 1984-85 strike when, following Ray Chadburn and Henry
Richardson's decision not to back the Nottinghamshire working mandate, he
became the Nottingham Area's leader, in his words, 'by default'. 81
In September 1982 Joe Whelan, Nottingham Area NUM General Secretary, died
suddenly. A life long member of the Communist Party, he was elected as an
NUM Area Agent in 1965, and he was initially a NUM Branch Official at Linby
Colliery. He had been Nottingham Area NUM General Secretary since 1977.
Whelan had been instrumental in moving the Nottingham Area of the NUM
beyond the legacy of Spencerism during the 19605 and 19705. 82 Barry Johnson
believed that the loss of Whelan was influential to the outcome of the 1984-85
strike:
80 Interview with Roy Lynk (Retired Nottingham Area NUM and later UDM National and Area
Official), Sutton-in-Ashfield, 28 December 2005, p. 3.
81 'Miners' Strike, I finished up leader by default', The Chad (Mansfield, 17 March 2004), p. 4.
82 Notts NUM Ex and Retired Miners' Association, Tribute to Joe Whelan,
httD:!!www.nottinqhamshireexrniner.com. retrieved 8 January 2009.
46
Chapter 1 - Teversal to Turmoil
Joe had a mining background under the guidance of such
union stalwarts such as Les Ellis and Bernard Savage. He
acquired some of their skills in addition to developing his
own skills. Joe was an excellent orator but his main
strength was in interpreting difficult situations, which he
could decipher into simple, understood terms. The role he
played in the implementation of the National Power
Loading Agreement (NPLA) in 1966 was an example of
this.83
In the ensuing Area Ballot to succeed Whelan, Henry Richardson, Cresswell
NUM Branch Delegate, was elected as a Nottingham Area NUM Official.
Through him the left were still represented in the Nottinghamshire coalfield.
Much controversy surrounded his stance in Nottinghamshire during the 1984-85
dispute when, from early April 1984 he told the Nottinghamshire NUM members
to "get up off their knees and stop scabbing". 84 A major split occurred between
Richardson and the majority of the rank and file who, in the absence of a
national ballot, continued to adhere to the Area's working mandate. The strains
between the two disparate sides grew until Richardson's dismissal in the edgy
atmosphere following the threats to expel the Nottingham Area from the NUM in
the early part of 1985.
The final key figure to be elected in this period was David Prendergast, NUM
Branch Secretary at Babbington Colliery, who was elected an Area Official in
1983. He replaced the retiring George Cheshire. Again, like Roy Lynk and
Henry Richardson, Prendergast's stance during the 1984-85 strike would be
controversial. He was dismissed for gross misconduct, along with Roy Lynk, at
83 Interview with Barry Johnson, 3 September 2011, Derby.
84 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 191.
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the 1985 NUM Annual Conference. 85 Prendergast can be regarded as a
moderate, although perhaps not of the same hue as Roy Lynk. By the autumn
of 1983 the Nottingham NUMArea Officials comprised:
Ray Chadburn
Henry Richardson
Roy Lynk
David Prendergast
NUM Area Chairman & NECMember
NUMArea General Secretary & NECMember
NUM Area Financial Secretary
NUM Area Agent
The Nottingham Area of the NUM had lost considerable experience at Area level
in the seven years prior to the 1984-85 strike. The stalwarts from the national
strikes of 1972 and 1974 had all departed. Firstly, Albert Martin retired in 1977,
Len Clarke followed him in 1979, Joe Whelan died in 1982 and, finally, George
Cheshire retired in 1983. A similar situation occurred at the national level of the
NUM, Mick McGahey being the exception. The two senior offlclals, Arthur
Scargill and Peter Heathfield, took office in 1982 and 1984 respectively and the
NUM lost considerable experience with its back up staff following the move from
London to Sheffield in 1983. Inexperience in significant sections of the NUM
would be a factor in the 1984-85 strike debacle because of the diverse
backgrounds in the union.
Whilst the Nottingham Area NUM Area Council, made up by the elected
Delegates from the 31 Nottingham NUM Branches, remained in moderate
control, the Area Executive (AE), which dealt with Area Business between Area
Council meetings, swung to the left in the early 1980s. The AE was made up of
ten delegates, elected annually and made up of five members from the NCB
South Nottinghamshire Area and five from the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area.
For the union year 1983-84 the Area Executive was made up as follows:
85 Lynk and Prendergast were dismissed at the 1985 NUM Annual Conference for gross
misconduct and for refusing to carry out the 'lawful instructions' of the NUM at National level.
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North Nottinghamshire Area AECmembers
J Byard (Bevercotes NUM Branch)
M. B. Howarth (Blidworth NUM Branch)
B. Smith (Welbeck NUM Branch)
G. Todd (Mansfield NUM Branch)
M. Walker (Rufford NUM Branch)
South Nottinghamshire Area AEC members
S. Abbott (Calverton NUM Branch)
R. T. Baxter (Linby NUM Branch)
N. Chamberlain (Moorgreen NUM Branch)
L. Hardwick (Pye Hill No.2 NUM Branch)
G. Skinner (Gedling NUM Branch)
When the strike broke in March 1984, only one of the Nottingham Area NUM AE
members, Jeff Byard, remained at work. The others, along with other striking
Nottingham Area NUM Branch Delegates, would be replaced en bloc by working
miners in the Branch Elections of May and June 1984. Morgan and Coates
suggested that only 4 NUM representatives out of a total of 310 remained in the
hands of strikers following these elections S6
George Bolton, Scottish NUM NECmember, suggested the tragedy of the strike
happening when it did was that the left had started to emerge in the
Nottingham Area of the NUM.s7 But as Adeney .and Lloyd stated
Nottinghamshire's leftism was activist deep only. 88 The left did not have the
time or will to change traditions in Nottinghamshire and their belief that
militancy could be forced on the Nottinghamshire miners' ended up splitting the
NUM.
86 Morgan and Coates, The Nottingham Coalfield and the British 1984-85 Miners' Strike, p. 19.
87 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 261.
88 Ibid.
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6. Prelude to the Turmoil- The Nottinghamshire coalfield
(October 1983 - February 1984).
The NUM held three national ballots for strike action in a fifteen month period
between January 1982 and March 1983. The issue of pit closures was included in
the two ballots of October 1982 and March 1983. The membership of the NUM
nationally turned down industrial action in all three ballots (see Appendix 1). There
was some confusion over the wording of the October 1982 Ballot which linked
together wages and pit closures. Some leading figures in the NCB suggested the
linking of pay and closures was a 'transparent manoeuvre to provoke a strike for
political reasons'. 89 Despite the problems, the ballot turned down strike action by
61 per cent to 39 per cent. Some in the NUM blamed the linking of the pay and
closures for the ballot failure. As Taylor stated, there were no such illusions in the
ballot of March 1983, over the Lewis Merthyr closure, when NUM members turned
down industrial action by the same margin of 61 per cent to 39 per cent. 90
During 1983 the NCB had continued to close collieries and shed manpower under
the chairmanship of Norman Siddall. In the twelve months to March 1984 twenty
three collieries closed with the loss of 21,000 jobs. Siddall adopted a judicious
approach to closures and manpower cuts, similar to what happened through the
mass closure programme in the Robens era during the 1960s. Prior to his
appointment as NCBChairman in 1982, Siddall predicted that the forthcoming battle
would be about trying to save deep coalmining in the peripheral coalfields:
Because we have been so richly blessed by nature, we
don't have to go on scratching about in places where
(...) no amount of skill and effort by management and
men can succeed. Whilst we have vast resources to go
for, it cannot be right that about twelve per cent of our
89 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 174.
90 Ibid.
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output should lose £250 million as it did last year
(1981). 91
Siddall's stay as NCB Chairman was short, at just eighteen months, and he
suffered ill health for the majority of his period in office. However, his
replacement by Ian McGregor in September 1983 would set the scene for the
coming battle. A known anti-trade unionist, and no-nonsense type management
advocate, he acquired the nickname 'Mac the Knife'. This followed his exploits as
Chairman of British Steel in the early 1980s when the workforce was slashed from
150,000 to 85,000 in less than three years. Shortly into his period as NCB
Chairman he controversially summarised his own views on obtaining loyalty from
management and employees: "The quick way is to chop heads off, otherwise it
takes longer". 92 With McGregor in place as NCB Chairman, Peter Walker as
Secretary of State for Energy following the re-election of the Thatcher
Government for a second term in June 1983, and Scargill plus McGahey as NUM
Senior National Officials, the scene was set for the crisis to come. There was one
more key event to put the last of the key players of the 1984-85 strike in place.
Peter Heathfield was elected as NUM General Secretary in January 1984 following
a National Ballot of NUM Members. He replaced the retiring Lawrence Daly who
had been NUM General Secretary since 1968. Heathfield had been General
Secretary of the small Derbyshire Area NUM. Significantly, he represented the left
on the union. His eventual election would ensure that the three senior posts at
NUM National level were all filled by the left. In the future there would be no
moderating influence at NUM National level. Heathfield's main rival in the January
1984 election was John Walsh, a moderate from the North Yorkshire coalfield.
Walsh, the NUM's North Yorkshire Areas Agent, was a critic of the militants in
NUM. Ted Mackay, from the small moderate North Wales coalfield, made up the
field for the position of NUM General Secretary. When the results were
91 David Powell, T17ePowerGame: T17eStruggleforCoal(London, 1993), p. 218.
92 Ibid., p. 220.
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announced Heathfield scraped home by 3,516 votes. This was following the
redistribution of the 13,547 votes received for Ted Mackayunder the transferable
vote system. The turnout was sixty-eight per cent in an electorate of 221,344.
Final voting figures in the second ballot were Heathfield 74,186 (51.2%) to
Walsh's 70,571 (48.8%). As Powell commented; "the narrownessof the victory
graphically illustrated the extent of the differences that divided the NUM".93 The
narrownessof Heathfield'svictory was put forward as one of the reasonswhy the
NUM NEC rejected calls for a national ballot in the 1984-85 strike. It was an
indicator of the divisionswithin the NUMrank and file membership.
Prior to this in early October 1983 the NCBoffered the NUMa pay rise of 5.2%.
Tied in with the pay offer was the issueof eliminating 'uneconomicpits'. The NUM
insisted the NCB had linked the issues of increased wages and eliminating
'uneconomic pits'. A NUM Special Delegates Conference (SOC) on 21 October
1983 decided to implement a full overtime ban from 31 October 1983. A
resolution on the current situation in the Industry was unanimouslycarried at the
SpecialDelegatesConference.(see Appendix 2) This was to be a first step in the
campaign against the NCB's attack on jobs and living standards. 94 In
Nottinghamshire Special NUM Branch Meetings were held to discuss the
forthcoming Overtime Ban. This was prior to the Nottingham Area NUMACMon
20 October 1983 and subsequent NUM National SOC the next day. At the
Nottingham Area NUMACM the Overtime Ban was passed by the narrowest of
margins, 16 Branchesto 15. 95 (seeAppendix 3). There was a feeling that a ban
on overtime could seriously jeopardise the industry in some parts of
Nottinghamshire coalfield. Steve Williamson, Annesley NUM Branch Secretary,
summed up the situation in the Ashfield region:
93 Ibid., p. 221
94 NUM, NUM Area Circular No. AS273/83 (Sheffield, 1983). D. Amos collection.
95 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1983, p. 365
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It (the Overtime Ban) will do more harm than good.
Pits are on the borderline now and if we stick to a strict
overtime ban, it could jeopardise pits. It's alright being
militant and not doing safety work, but in effect, we'll
be closing the pits ourselves. 96
In the Ashfield region of the Nottinghamshire coalfield a whole swathe of
problems surrounding the Overtime Ban would occur during the ensuing months.
These ranged from emergency safety cover, to transport problems and geological
and pumping problems in the collieries. However, the overtime ban caused major
problems for the service sectors of the industry, that is for Time and Wages
Departments, Transport Departments and Plant Operators. They had to man
sections of the industry that ensured collieries could get production over five days
from the Monday dayshift through to the Friday nightshift. These issues were not
unique to Nottinghamshire but applied to the whole British coalfield. During the
strike stories circulated about there being different interpretations of the overtime
ban in parts of the Yorkshire coalfield. Reports were received of nearly full car
parks and coal being produced for supposed 'concessionary purposes'. 97 Serious
problems were experienced all over the British coalfield by the introduction of the
overtime ban. At Silverdale Colliery, in the NCB Western Area, forty-winding-
enginemen were reported to be defying the ban and there was talk of a
breakaway winders' union being formed in the Stoke-an-Trent area. 98
The South Normanton NUM Transport Branch received 'special dispensation' from
the overtime ban because of the problems with low staffing and having to work
outside normal hours. The Nottinghamshire NUM Emergency Committee gave
96 'Overtime Ban: Fear over Jobs', Notts Free Press, 28 October 1983, p. 1.
97 Story told by Pete Wood to the Author on several occasions since the dispute. Pete worked at
the NCB Payroll HQ in Doncaster but had relatives that worked in the Nottinghamshire coalfield.
He lived in the Doncaster region at the time of the strike. Concessionary fuel was for retired
miners and their widows.
98 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 182.
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them dispensation at its meeting on 29 October 1983. 99 South Normanton's work
included having to transport around 3,000 miners daily from the former colliery
villages on the Derbyshire borders to collieries including Calverton, Gedling and
Cotgrave to the east of Nottingham. Other vital work included the transportation
of wages documentation between the NCB Computer Centre and individual NCB
units in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. However, it was a tendered contract for
taking 'run-of-mine' coal from Babbington Colliery to Hucknall Colliery that almost
brought the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area to a standstill in early November
1983. 100 Work was on-going to merge Babbington and Hucknall Collieries with all
output being surfaced at Hucknall. This meant that coal preparation facilities
would be eliminated at the Babbington end. The Babbington CPPhad been taken
out of use and all 'run-of-mine' coal was being transported to Hucknall for
preparation. This involved the movement of 30,000 tons of 'run-of-mine' coal
weekly between the two collieries. The NCB contract, tendered for against
outside competition, was won on the basis of an 11 hour shift. Failure to move
the run-of-mine coal from Babbington could jeopardise the future of the Hucknall -
Babbington Complex.
The special dispensation for this work was reinforced at the Nottingham Area NUM
Emergency Committee Meeting on 3 November 1983. Within a week the
Emergency Committee had to deal with a dispute by the NUM Bestwood Plant
Branch. The Dirt Disposal men at the Bestwood Branch had gone on strike from
the day shift of 8 November 1983, in protest at the special dispensation that had
been granted to South Normanton alone. 101 Because of tipping facilities being
brought to a standstill the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area contacted the
Nottingham Area NUM stating that the whole Area would be brought to a standstill
within 48 hours. In the best interests of all South Nottinghamshire NUM
99 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1983, pp. 400-401
100 Run of mine coal is unwashed and unprepared coal. It is the state of coal prior to going
through a Coal Preparation Plant and Washery.
101 Ibid., p. 406.
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members, the Emergency Committee was forced to withdraw the special
dispensation for the South Normanton NUM Branch forthwith. This caused
immense problems with transport arrangements, especially at Calverton Colliery,
where serious problems were experienced getting the Friday night shift home
early on Saturday mornings. The only way around some of the problems was the
use of outside contractors to transport the miners' in order to try and preserve
five shifts per week for most of the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area Collieries.
As 1983 drew to a close large parts of the British Coalfield were experiencing
industrial relations problems. The Scottish Area (NUM) was in dispute over the
proposed closure of Killoch, Cardowan and Monktonhall collieries. This followed
the controversial Kinneil Colliery closure earlier in 1983 when Scottish miners went
through picket lines for the first time ever. 102 Following the failed Lewis Merthyr
campaign earlier in 1983, the NUM South Wales Area continued to experience
problems with the closure of Penrikyber Colliery and the transfer of its reserves to
Deep Navigation Colliery. The South Wales Coalfield had been especially hard hit
in the early 1980s since the decline in the market for coking coal to the steel
industry. The Lancashire Area NUM had to deal with its first closure for a decade
at Cronton Colliery. Problems were being experienced in the North-East with the
proposed closure of Herrington Colliery and in Kent with replacement development
at Snowden Colliery. In nearby NCB North Derbyshire Area, Pleasley Colliery was
merged with Shirebrook with significant associated manpower losses. In
September 1983 significant job losses were announced in the Ashfield region of
the Nottinghamshire coalfield when the High Main seam finished at Newstead
Colliery and K97's coalface at Moorgreen Colliery closed sooner than expected. 103
At Newstead the High Main Seam closed because of extended travelling times and
difficult geology. It was expected that around 200 jobs would be lost at Newstead,
102 Emlyn Williams, Area President, South Wales Area (NUM) addressing the 1983 Nottingham
Area (NUM) Annual Conference said this incident must have shaken every miner In Britain,
Nottingham Area NUM Conference Report, 8 February 1983, Morning Session, p. 22.
103 'Pit Shock as 200 jobs go', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 2 September 1983, p. 1.
55
Chapter 1 - Teversal to Turmoil
with an associated loss in output of around 200,000 tons of coal. By January
1984 the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area continued to contract with the run
down of Moorgreen and Pye Hill Collieries. This meant that redundancies were
available for miners aged over 50s at other collieries in the area.
Problems were experienced with the overtime ban at Hucknall Colliery over a
capping/rope change in one of the shafts. The NCB South Nottinghamshire Area
had indicated that when a capping or rope change was due to take place and
underground men were sent home, then in future all surface personnel not
involved in the capping or rope change would also be sent home. 104 At the
meeting of the Nottingham NUM Emergency Committee on 18 January 1984 the
Committee endorsed the actions of the Hucknall Agent, Roy Lynk, in criticising the
NCB South Nottinghamshire Area management for this action, especially bearing
in mind the efforts which had recently been made 'to improve morale at the pit'.
lOS In February 1984 serious questions started to be asked about the future of
the Annesley-Bentinck-Newstead Complex. The Complex was planned as a
merger of the three collieries, with a workforce of around 3,400 and production of
2 million tons of coal annually. All coal was to surface at Bentinck CPP,Annesley's
CPP had closed in 1981 and Newstead's CPP in 1983. From the autumn of 1983
Newstead's run-of-mine coal was being taken by road to the Bentinck CPP. The
underground connection from Newstead was eventually completed in the autumn
of 1984. It was envisaged by the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area that there was
some twenty years of reserves to the eastern side of the shafts at Annesley and
Newstead. From 1990 it was expected that Bentinck would be a surface only
mine with Drift and CPP Facilities for coal from Annesley and Newstead. In
February 1984 Bentinck's workforce totalled 1,600.
In early February 1984 the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area Board had been
called to NCB HQ in London to account for losses of £6.8 million at Bentinck and
104 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 8.
105 Ibid.
56
Chapter 1 - Teversal to Turmoil
£9.4 million at Newstead in nine-months of the 1983-84 financial year. A strong
case was put forward to keep the two collieries open and secure the majority of
the jobs in the Annesley-Bentinck-Newstead Complex. 106 As a result of the
arguments put forward the NCB at National level agreed to give the Complex
eighteen months to break even or become profitable. To do this large reserves of
coal reserves in high subsidence areas under Ravenshead and Kirkby would have
to be abandoned. More significantly the Nottingham Area NUM had to agree to a
shedding of manpower of 550. This would reduce the manpower at the Complex
from 3,390 to 2,840. All men over 55 within the Complex would be asked to take
voluntary redundancy with a probability of bringing the age down to 50. The NCB
South Nottinghamshire Area's annual production budget for 1984-85 had recently
been cut from 7.7 million tons to 7.2 million tons. (See Appendix 4) The half
million tons cut was the same as the NCB South Yorkshire Area, the same cuts
which started the strike at Cortonwood Colliery but with additional job losses in
South Nottinghamshire to take account of the two ongoing pit closures at
Moorgreen and the Pye Hill Complex.
As Taylor commented, despite the predicament in Britain's deep coalmining
industry between October 1982 and February 1984, the miners opted to playa
passive role, their behaviour reflecting an acute awareness of their vulnerability.
107 This would all change following the meeting of the Coal Industry National
Consultative Committee (CINC) on 6 March 1984 and the subsequent meeting
of the NUM NEC on 8 March 1984 to discuss the CINC meeting. The coal
industry and the NUM were about to be plunged into their greatest ever crisis.
The Nottinghamshire coalfield and its miners would be right at the centre of that
crisis.
106 NCB South Nottinghamshire Area, 17 February 1984.
107 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 182.
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Chapter 2: Ballots, Blacklegs and Bedlam
1. Introduction
This Chapter is an account of the main events in the 1984-85 strike as it
affected the Nottinghamshire coalfield from early March 1984 through to the
constitutional crisis that engulfed the NUM in autumn of 1984. It will aim to give
an accurate and concise portrayal of the strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield
using previously un-accessed primary evidence. In the ensuing years since the
strike some basic facts have become mixed up in the mists of time, the classic
one being that the Nottinghamshire working miners and all the other striking
miners were in different trade unions. 1 This chapter looks at the
unconstitutional nature of the strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield, which was
a legacy from the 'federal structure' of the NUM, each area having its own
distinct cultures and traditions. Taylor suggested that the Nottinghamshire view
of events in March 1984 was to see them as a 'fundamental challenge to a
deeply entrenched industrial and political tradition'. 2 He cited a breakdown of
the post-1944 federal consensus as the main reason for the crisis in the NUM in
1984:
Rule 41, the promulgation of Rule 51 (Disciplinary Rule)
and the emphasis on absolute Conference sovereignty was
a breach of the post 1944 relationship between Areas and
national level, between left and right and between
competing sovereignties of Conference and the individual
(NUM) member. 3
1 W. Ivory, 'War of Words', Radio times, 26 February 2004, p. 39. The article was for the
forthcoming BBC play, 'Faith', on the 20th anniversary of the strike. The accompanying image
from 1 May 1984 was described as police lining up between strikers and supporters of the
breakaway Union of Democratic Miners. The UDM was not formed until the autumn of 1985
following the strike. Also see Symcox (ed.), 711eDiary of John Lowe, p. 9, p. 14 and p. 146 for
Similar accounts to IVOry.
2 Taylor, 711eNUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 191.
3 Ibid., p. 192.
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The roots of the constitutional crisis can be traced back to the start of the strike
and were centred on the area by area 'domino strategy' employed under
national NUM Rule 41. The strike strategy under Rule 41 opened up the crevices
in the NUM's armoury, the main debating point being the lack of a national
ballot. In previous calls for strike action a national ballot of all NUM members
was held using national NUM Rule 43. The 'domino strategy' employed by the
NUM in March 1984 was based on respecting the 'sanctity of the picket line'. It
was the use of these tactics which split the NUM from the outset as the policy
relied on the use of coercion to achieve solidarity. Many accounts of the use of
force and intimidation were reported as flying pickets, mainly from Yorkshire,
tried to bring the Nottinghamshire coalfield to a standstill. Roy Lynk, former
Nottinghamshire miners' leader, argued that the strike was 'possibly the right
thing to do, but the wrong way to do lt'." He cited timing and tactics as crucial
factors as to why the strike was lost:
I had been against pit closures as much as anyone and
went on strike in 1972 and 1974, but you can't have a rule
book and then ignore it because someone shouted in your
ear ( ...) sending pickets was a self defeating exercise. The
more they picketed the more people would keep going.
No one wanted to back down from what they were doing.
s
The timing was indeed crucial, as the Yorkshire flying pickets defied a
Nottingham Area NUM request not to enter the Nottinghamshire coalfield prior
to the Area ballot taking place on 15 -16 March 1984. This ensured that, when
the Area ballot came round at the end of the first week of the strike, that many
Nottinghamshire miners voted against the action of Yorkshire flying pickets
4 Roy Lynk, 'I finished up leader by default', The Chad, Mansfield, 17 March 2004, p. 6.
5 Ibid.
59
Chapter 2 - Ballots, Blacklegs and Bedlam
instead of focusing on the real issue of saving jobs and fighting pit closures.
(Chapter 5 deals with the Rule 41 Domino Strategy in more depth).
The initial split in the NUM in the Nottinghamshire coalfield happened during the
first few days of the strike in early March 1984 and it proved impossible to
recover from. The fissures that opened up then eventually led to a split in the
union in 1985. As 1984 progressed the national NUM had to deal with various
legal actions taken against them over the legality of the strike. The legal action
taken by members of the Nottingham Area NUM challenged the legitimacy of
the strike following the NUM SDC on 19 April 1984. 6 In fact it went right to the
heart of the democratic debate in trade unions. What is the fairest way of
obtaining a mandate; through meetings and a Conference of Delegates or by a
ballot of the union membership? John Lloyd referred to the 1984-85 strike
strategy as a system of 'delegated democracy'. 7 The result of the various legal
actions eventually resulted in the funds of the NUM being sequestrated in the
autumn of 1984.
Additionally, there was the controversy over the introduction of NUM Disciplinary
Rule 51 in the summer of 1984. The Nottingham Area NUM refused to adopt
Rule 51 into its Area rules, a decision which led to its threatened expulsion from
the NUM in January 1985. The question needs asking, did the NUM need to
introduce a lengthy disciplinary rule during a period when it was torn apart by
internal strife? By December 1984 the NUM was facing its greatest
'constitutional crisis' since its formation in 1944 and the Nottinghamshire miners
were at the centre of the dispute. The crisis in the NUM was destined to
deepen during 1985 when an amendment to rule was planned by the national
union that would establish a single trade union to embrace all workers in the
coalmining industry. This was encompassed in the philosophy One Union, One
Industry. (Chapter 3 covers that part of strike and its aftermath).
6 The legal action was taken under the name of Pye Hill No.1 NUM Branch in May 1984.
7 Lloyd, Understanding the Miners'Strike, p. 20.
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2. Sowing the Seeds of Destruction: The Nottinghamshire
Coalfield -March 1984
It seems that the allegations being made of hooliganism
by pickets must be fact. If we allow this to happen,
there'll be no union left 8
This quotation could quite easily come from the Nottinghamshire coalfield at the
start of the 1984-85 strike. It was in fact made by Joe Gormley, NUM National
President (1970-1982), and dates from the unofficial NUM strike of 1970. NUM
Flying Pickets had 'lobbied' the NUM NEC prior to a meeting at the NUM
Headquarters at Euston Road in London on 12 November 1970. Militant left-
wing NUM members from various coalfields were on unofficial strike action over
the wages issue and the pickets were attempting to target moderate NEC
members to support strike action. A national ballot vote had shown in favour of
industrial strike action by 55% but the NUM rules at the time required a two-
thirds majority to declare a national strike official. Following the national ballot
vote the NUM NEC instructed the NUM members on unofficial strike to return to
work; constitutionally a national strike could not be made official through the
NUM rules. Later national NUM Rule 43 was amended to require 55% in favour
to declare national strike action legal; 55% in favour of strike action was still
needed to authorise a national strike at the commencement of the 1984-85
dispute.
Back in 1970, according to Gormley, Sid Schofield, NUM Vice President, was
roughed up, Albert Martin, NEC Member for Nottinghamshire was kicked and
Gormley himself was hit. Gormley accused the Scottish NUM of arranging the
picket; Mick McGahey and Bill McLean denied the allegations. However Gormley
replied to McGahey and McLean that if they wanted to bring pickets down they
8 Gormley, Battered Cherub, p. 76.
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should control them or there would be an 'almighty row in this union'! 9 Such
was the fragile nature of unity in the NUM. The almighty row Gormley
threatened eventually blew up in 1984, and the Nottinghamshire coalfield would
be at the centre of the controversy. 10 History virtually repeated itself when the
two Nottingham Area NUM NEC members were attacked following an NEC
meeting on 8 March 1984. However, in 1984 different tactics would be
employed by the NUM NEC to those used in 1970. It was the actions of the
NUM NEC on 8 March 1984 that would be instrumental in a bitter year's strike
occurring and a split in the NUM which would eventually result in the
Nottinghamshire miners leaving the NUM and setting up a 'breakaway union' in
the autumn of 1985. (see Chapter 5: Part 6)
The start of the strike in the 1984-85 dispute can be said to stem from 8 March
1984. On that date the NUM NEC convened a meeting to discuss the situation
in the coal industry following the NCB's announcement at the Coal Industry
National Consultative (CINC) meeting on 6 March that twenty collieries
nationwide were to close in the next year, with the loss of 20,000 jobs. At the
CINC, individual collieries were not identified for closure; it would be left for the
individual NCB Area Directors to implement the cuts. The situation in the
Scottish coalfield had been deteriorating for some time and industrial relations
between the Scottish NCB Director, Albert Wheeler, and the Scottish NUM were
strained. In the Yorkshire coalfield the dispute came to a head over the
announcement of the closure of Cortonwood Colliery, near Elsecar. The NUM
NEC issued a lengthy resolution condemning the NCB's action (Appendix 5) and
at the same time made the industrial strike action in the NUM Yorkshire and
Scottish Areas official under NUM national Rule 41. Rule 41 allowed for Area
disputes to be authorised; for national strike action a ballot of NUM members
was required under Rule 43. (Appendix 6)
9 Ibid.
10 From its formation in 1944 the NUM was a federal based trade union made up of a number
of Area and Trade organisations, each a legally formed trade association in its own right.
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Strike action in Yorkshire and Scotland commenced from the end of the Friday
night shift on 10 March 1984. In addition the NUM NEe declared that any
similar industrial action in any other NUM Area would be deemed official under
National Rule 41; how this was to be achieved was unclear at the time.
Normally, a national ballot of all NUM members under national rule 43 would
take place prior to any proposed national strike action. However, at the NUM
NEe meeting on 8 March, Ray Chadborn and Henry Richardson, the two
Nottingham Area NUM NEC members, obtained approval for an individual area
strike ballot of the Nottingham Area NUM membership. This was in line with
long established 'custom and practice' on major issues such as wage rises or
strike action affecting Nottingham Area NUM members. The NUM strike
strategy was based on getting each NUM Area out on strike, and then a national
strike in all but name would be exist. However the domino theory would have
to rely on the use of coercion: 'picketing out' collieries and units in NUM areas
that did not follow the solidarity action. The whole theory was based on the
sanctity of the picket line. It was here that the seeds of destruction for the
NUM were sown; different NUM Areas had different ideas of how solidarity
should be achieved and also had different ideas what constituted official and
unofficial strike action. The NUM as a truly national union was a myth; it was a
Federation of different Areas and Trade Groups with a loose binding
constitution.
Following the NUM NECmeeting on 8 March the Nottingham Area NUM AECmet
on 10 March 1984 to consider the NUM national resolution and to arrange
details for the Nottinghamshire NUM Area strike ballot. The area ballot would
take place over a twenty-four hour period from 6pm on Thursday 15 March to 6
pm on Friday 16 March 1984. 11 The count was planned for Saturday 17 March
1984 at the Nottinghamshire NUM Headquarters at Berry Hill, Mansfield; with
the result of the ballot being announced to a Special Conference of Nottingham
11 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 79.
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Area NUM BOCM on Sunday 18 March 1984. One stipulation put into the ballot
arrangements was that all other NUM Areas were advised not to send pickets
into the Nottinghamshire coalfield prior to the Area ballot taking place. 12 Many
Nottinghamshire miners saw the presence of flying pickets in breach of this
instruction as being a major factor which split the NUM from the start of the
strike and kept the Nottinghamshire coalfield working throughout its duration.
Colin Bottomore, NUM Branch Secretary at Bentinck Colliery, saw a hardening of
attitudes against the Yorkshire pickets from the onset:
The attitude hardened against the striking miners because
of the violent picketing that had taken place, from the
very first day they entered into Nottinghamshire. 13
Following the Nottingham Area NUM AEC meeting on 10 March 1984, a
Conference of BOCMmet for an update from the national meeting with the NCB
on 6 March and the NUM NECmeeting on 8 March. At the meeting a resolution
was passed reaffirming the total confidence of the meeting in the two
Nottingham Area NUM NEC members and that adverts should be placed in the
Scottish and Yorkshire NUM newspapers condemning the serious harassment of
them at the NEC Meeting held on 8 March. Henry Richardson and Ray
Chadburn faced a hostile reception outside the meeting and had several missiles
thrown at them. Sections of the crowd had harassed them believing they were
automatically opposed to the strike on the assumption that by being pro-
national ballot they were anti-strike. It was a similar situation to the moderate
representatives who got abused during the 1970 unofficial strike (see page 62).
The Nottingham Area NUM resolution read:
This Conference reaffirms its total confidence in the two
Nottingham Area NEe members and that space be
12 Ibid.
U R. samuel, B. Bloomfield, and G. Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 72.
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obtained in the Scottish Miner and Yorkshire Miner in
order to express the Nottingham Area's contempt at the
treatment inflicted on the two Nottingham Area NEC
members outside the NUM National Headquarters in
Sheffield on Thursday, 8 March, 1984. 14
The NUMNECmeeting authorised strike action in accordancewith NUMnational
Rule 41 by a vote of 21 to 3. It was at this meeting that Henry Richardson
prophesied that labelling the Nottinghamshire miners as scabs would not help
the situation:
Calling us scabs will not help us. I have already been
called that outside. If Notts are scabs before we start,
Notts will becomescabs. Youwill make our jobs (as NUM
Area representatives) impossible.15
Back at the meeting of BOCM,NCB Budgets were outlined for the coming
financial year which nationally would be reduced by four-million tons and
manpower by 20,000 (see Appendix4). Locallythe NCBSouth Nottinghamshire
Area would have a reduction of 500,000 tons and manpower loss of around
1,700. At the meeting it was also agreed that becauseof the anti-trade union
legislation of the time that the four Nottingham Area NUMTrustees should be
protected by the union in the event of sequestration of their personal assets,
arising out of decisions that they may have to take in the interests of the
NottinghamArea of the NUM. 16
14 Ibid., p. 80.
1S Henry Richardson (Nottingham Area NUM General Secretary) cited in Ottey, The Strike, p. 63.
16 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 81.
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It was at the Nottingham Area NUMAECon the Mondaymorning of 12 March
that the first reports were receivedof picketing at a Nottinghamshirecolliery. 17
Yorkshire Pickets, wearing official NUM picketing badges, were reported as
picketing Harworth Colliery in the north of the county. This was in defiance of
the Nottingham Area NUMdirective for all NUMAreas not to send pickets into
the area prior to the Nottinghamshire Area ballot. The NUM Yorkshire Area
Secretarywas contacted immediately and he assuredthe Nottingham NUMArea
that no instructions had been given from the Yorkshire Area to picket any
Nottinghamshire colliery. The Yorkshire NUM did however request that a
deputation of two to three men from their area visit each Nottinghamshire
colliery to explain their position. This was agreed on the grounds that all
Yorkshire pickets should be withdrawn from the Nottinghamshire coalfield until
the Area ballot had taken place at the end of the week. 18 Other stipulations
were put in place for the Yorkshire delegation to carry official letters of
recognition and to liaise with Nottinghamshire NUM Branch Secretaries to
arrange for the delegation to address the Nottingham Area NUM rank and file
members. Nevertheless, all the arrangements were to no avail as one hour
after the end of the NottinghamArea NUMAECmeeting it was reported that the
NUM Yorkshire Area Council had made a decision to lift all restrictions on
picketing by their members. The battle lines were now drawn that would soon
turn the picket lines in Nottinghamshire into scenes of direct conflict between
miner and miner.
Locally working miners and NUM flying pickets had clashed outside Sutton
Colliery on Wednesday morning, 14 March 1984. 19 It was reported that
Yorkshire flying pickets had mounted a blockade to try and stop the Tuesday
nightshift going in; only around twenty men at the colliery worked through the
17 Ibid., p. 83.
18 Ibid., p. 84.
19 'Ugly scenes at Sutton Colliery: Yorkshire pitmen mount blockade', The Chad: Kirkby News, 15
March 1984, p. 1.
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Tuesday nightshift. By Wednesday morning only six North Nottinghamshire
collieries and eight South Nottinghamshire collieries were reported as producing
some coal. Three flying pickets were arrested outside Hucknall Colliery and were
charged with public order offences. However, most picket lines were reported
as being peaceful due to the massive police operation which had been put in
place more or less from the time the picketing started. The Nottingham Area
NUM Officials reiterated their plea for pickets to keep out of the area until the
Area ballot had taken place; they warned that the pickets' actions would only
bring a "No" vote in the forthcoming area strike ballot. 20 Henry Richardson,
Nottingham Area NUM Official, was pessimistic about the forthcoming area
strike ballot result:
The way we are going we may well get defeated because
of the action of the Yorkshire pickets. They have
destroyed all the work we have done in the last twelve
months to try and win our membership over. Give the
men a chance because there is a strong indication they
may support us. This sort of picketing is alienating men
and becoming counter-productive, that is the tragedy. 21
In a joint press statement dated 13 March 1984, the four Nottingham NUMArea
Officials condemned the picketing in the Nottinghamshire Coalfield. 22 (Appendix
7) The statement said that the Yorkshire pickets were in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield unofficially and that it was not picketing but mass blockading that was
taking place. However, the main point of the press statement suggested that
no trade union could sustain a strike under these circumstances; it stated that
the way things were developing it would be at the price of destroying the NUM
20 Ibid.
21 'The NCB Hit Back', Mansfield Chad, 15 March 1984, p. 3.
22 Nottingham Area NUM, Joint Press Statement: re Picketing Concems, 13 March 1984.
D. Amos collection.
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itself. It also called on the NUM National Officials to get a grasp of the situation
before someone was seriously injured.
In the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area various NUM branch spokesmen
passionately opposed the way the strike was developing. A NUM spokesman at
Moorgreen Colliery, near Eastwood, said the men at the colliery were 'violently
opposed to the picketing' which, he added, was against the NUM rule book. 23
He added:
What is happening on the picket lines is absolutely
disgraceful; they will split the union into fragments. 24
Babbington Colliery was one of the Nottinghamshire collieries the hardest hit by
picketing because of its close proximity to Junction 26 of the Ml motorway.
Commenting on the picketing tactics in the first week of the strike, a Babbington
NUM spokesman said:
The men just don't know where they stand, they resent
the picketing and want to be left alone to make up their
own minds on how to vote in Friday's Area strike Ballot
( ...) this picketing is likely to put the men against a strike.
25
It was reported that there was some doubt about the validity of some of the
pickets. Some were reported as being armed with rubber hose pipes and were
wearing black baladavas as disguises. 26 They were described as not being
miners but mercenary bully boys from outside the coal-mining industry. At
Bentinck Colliery, a picket from Kiverton Park Colliery stated they had not had
much success there but were confident that "we'll stop them by the weekend".
23 'Pickets swoop: Let us vote say angry miners', Eastwood and Kimberley Advertiser, 16 March
1984, p. 3.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 'Battlefield', Notts Free Press, 16 March 1984, p. 1.
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27 Sutton Colliery was reported as being at a standstill (at the time the Chad
went to press) and that the flying pickets had guaranteed not to swell their
ranks if the Sutton miners stayed away from work. At Annesley it was reported
that the miners were due to have a mass meeting at dawn and were expected
to ram their way, en-masse, through the picket line. The NCBadmitted to being
as confused as everyone by the determination and mobility of the flying pickets.
Along with the Nottingham NUM Area Officials, the local NCB feared there would
be worse to come in the run up to Friday's area strike ballot. Comments were
made about the lamentable lack of support from other NUM Areas for
Nottinghamshire miners when they had fought pit closures in the past:
Where were they when the Teversal men marched to save
their jobs; Where were they when New Hucknall joined
the list of pits to go; Where were they when the Kirkby
(Summit) Colliery shockwaves reverberated around the
area ( ...) pit closures are nothing new to Ashfield miners,
they had fought tooth and nail to save them but at the
end of the day had to accept them for a variety of
reasons.j"
It was added that the appeal for pickets to keep out of the Nottinghamshire
coalfield until the Area ballot result was known had been blatantly ignored and
had driven another splinter into the 'disjointed platform of this national
campaign'. 29 By then the prophecy of 'picket lines becoming battlefields over
the next few days' was already fact at many Nottinghamshire collieries. 30
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 11.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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The notion of the flying pickets using intimidation and threats has been
challenged. Keith Stanley, a coalfacechargemanat NewsteadColliery in 1984,
suggested intimidation was not an issue:
I was going to work on the pit bus, on days, and it
stopped at the pit gates. There was a peaceful picket
from Yorkshire stood at the gates. We went over and
listened to what they had to say. I went over to the
canteen, and all of my face team came out that day and
they stopped out. All this about we'd been bullied into it
is a load of nonsensebecausewe were askedquite clearly
if we'd support. And we gave the support straight away.
31
BobCollier, also a striking miner at Newstead,suggested there was no violence
on the picket line at Newstead but there was intimidation from working miners
'sticking two fingers up at the strikers and waving twenty-pound notes at them'.
32 However, Trevor Taylor, a working miner at Newstead, put a different slant
on the early days of picketing at Newstead:
I was coming off the Afternoon shift when we were told
there were pickets at the pit gates. I got bathed and went
home; there were just a few pickets at the gate and at that
time there were no problems. However the next day when
we arrived at the pit there was a massof people at the pit
gates (...) I had been told not to go to the pit in my car,
myself and a friend walked from his house to the pit. We
had a job getting into the pit ( ...) the police ringed around
31 Bell, Memories of the Nottinghamshire Coalfield, p. 113.
32 'Miners' Strike still divides the community 25 years on', Ashfield Chad, 4 March 2009, p. 4. The
waving of the £20 notes was the inspiration for the song 'The Judas Bus' by Jez Lowe as part of
the 2009 BBC Radio Ballad, The Bal/ad of the Miners'Strike. The Radio Ballad was broadcast in
September 2009 on BBC Radio 2.
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twenty of us and bundled us through the mass of pickets
(...) Around forty of us went in to work, we did not go down
the pit that day, and they found us work on the pit-top. As
I remember the picket was a mixture from both Newstead
and Yorkshire, probably about 50-50. The Yorkshire pickets
were the ones doing the spouting, I think the (pro-strike)
Newstead NUM Branch Secretary had been on the phone
and askedthem to come to the pit. 33
At BentinckCollieryone of the most serious incidents of picket intimidation was
a major factor in keeping the vast majority of the colliery's 1,600 miners at
work. The incident happenedduring the early part of the strike and involved a
disabled former miner who worked on the surface in the colliery offices. The
flying pickets stopped the disabled miner in his specially adapted car; a
confrontation took placewhich ended up with the disabledvehicle being toppled
over, with the disabled miner inside. Neil Greatrex, Bentinck NUM Branch
Presidentat the time, recalledthe incident:
I got a messageto say that around 300 pickets were at
the pit so I went down to meet them. They told me they
were there as a peaceful picket and were intending to
stop BentinckNUMmembersas they got off the pit buses
to ask for support. I told them there was no problem with
that, in fact at the time I was of the opinion a strike
should take place against pit closures. I told them I would
probably ask the lads to support the strike as well.
However I reminded the Yorkshire pickets that both Colin
Bottomore (Bentinck NUM Branch Secretary) and me as
strike supporters had been nearly crucified at a recent
33 Interview with John Trevor Taylor, 6 August 2008, Sutton-In-Ashfield.
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mass meeting of Bentinck NUMmembers. The open air
meeting was adamant they were not going to be told what
to do and would only come out on strike following a
national ballot (...) The incident with the disabled miner's
vehicle happened at a short distance from us. When I
cballengedthe pickets about the picketing being peaceful,
the picket leader said "You know the score". A
confrontation then took placejust as the pit busesarrived
(...) the men said they would listen only to me as their
elected union representative. They got to know about the
incident with the disabledminer and they vowed that they
were determined to work more than ever now. 34
Chris Butcher, a BevercotesColliery Blacksmith, became known as the working
miner, the 'Silver Birch', during the early part of the strike. He described a
confrontational incident that took place outside BevercotesColliery during the
first few days of the strike. The incident resulted in a winding-engineman's car
being damaged. Apparently he had done a deal with the pickets to enter the
COllierypremises to wind up the men that were still in the pit from the shift
before. Describingthe incident Butchersaid:
They (the pickets) agreed to let Norman in, to bring up
those who were already down there, but not to wind any
more down. We agreed to return home, immediately the
men were up (the pit). Norman (...) drove through the
pickets. As we watched, horrified, they kicked and dented
it, as they did other cars who tried to pass them (...) It
was not their opinions we disagreedwith, so much as the
34 Interview with Neil Greatrex (Nottingham Section and National UDM Official), Mansfield, 20
March 2008. Martin Severn, a Safety Officer at Bentinck Colliery, also recalled this incident in an
interview in 2002.
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methods they were using to try and force those opinions
on us. 35
Various defamatory messages were sent to Nottingham NUM Working Branch
Officials during the first few weeks (see Fig 3). Ray Chadburn, Nottingham Area
NUM President, had referred to attacks made on the Nottinghamshire miners at
the 1983 NUM Annual Conference. He suggested that labelling Notts miners
with derogatory terms would not help the campaign against pit closures:
I deplore those people who call Nottinghamshire
blacklegs. I deplore the attitudes when they call us scabs.
You have to look at the Nottinghamshire coalfield,
because 50 per-cent of the workforce in Nottinghamshire
are transferees from every section of the British coalfield
( ...) we talk about unity, I support that. In 1978
Nottinghamshire was isolated with a pit closure. We went
to the NEe for them to support us over Teversal. They
isolated us. 36
In March and April 1984 all the anti-Nottinghamshire propaganda helped to
strengthen the resolve of the Nottinghamshire working miners against a strike
which they considered was both unofficial and being run by intimidation and
bully boys.
The issue of the early picketing is crucial to an understanding of what eventually
happened in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Some evidence suggests that some
of the Yorkshire pickets went into action in advance and before the official union
machinery had a chance to kick in. Dave Douglass, Hatfield Main NUM Branch
Official and Yorkshire NUM Executive member, said it was always the aim to get
35 Butcher and Seymour, The Unk up of Friendship, pp. 2-3.
36 NUM 1983 Annual Conference Report, p. 499.
73
Chapter 2 - Ballots, Blacklegs and Bedlam
Fig 2. Anti-Nottinghamshire propaganda sent to the Annesley Branch
NUM from April 1984.
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their own area out before going to any other coalfield; "but Armthorpe being
like it was, and everyone was on hooks, Armthorpe just said "Come on, we're
going, so half the pickets went with them" 37 A twenty-one year old Armthorpe
Faceworker described the first couple of days of picketing in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield:
We went to Harworth first and Jack Taylor (Yorkshire NUM
General Secretary) got on the phone and told us to come
out because Nottingham were having a vote. He said
leave it to the vote and see what happens. We said no
chance, if we're out, they're out. It's their jobs and all
that sort of thing. So we went picketing. 38
Another Doncaster miner described the events of picketing on the first Monday
night:
We had what you call a piss-call meeting ( ...) a few lads
(...) phone calls were made and we decided to go out on
the Monday before the Executive meeting on the Tuesday
to make them think, to make them know how the lads felt
( ...) We honestly believe we swung the Executive (AEC) to
our way of thinking. 39
This might have been the case to try and make the Yorkshire NUM AEC react to
their way of thinking but it produced a counterproductive reaction in most parts
of the Nottinghamshire coalfield; an anti-strike reaction grew in opposition to
the type of picketing taking place. The situation in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield took a turn for the worst with the death of David Jones, a Yorkshire
flying picket, on the Wednesday evening 14 March 1984. Following David
37 R. Samuel, B. Bloomfield, and G. Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 70.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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Jones' death, following a melee outside Ollerton Colliery, the Nottingham Area
NUM AEC had an emergency meeting the morning after and a decision was
made to call all Nottinghamshire NUM members out on strike from 6pm on the
15 March until the result of the Area Ballot was known. 40 The Area Ballot was
due to take place the day after on 16 March with the result on 17 March. The
decision was made in the interests of safety to try and allow the Nottingham
and Yorkshire NUM Area Officials to meet to try and 'tone down the situation'. 41
In response to the Nottingham Area NUM decision, the Yorkshire NUM agreed to
withdraw their pickets and allow the Nottinghamshire ballot to go ahead
unhindered. However, the damage had already been done, the pickets'
presence in the first few days was instrumental in determining the result of the
Nottinghamshire Area strike ballot, as Henry Richardson had predicted. Most
NUM Branches in the Ashfield region of the Nottinghamshire coalfield came out
for the duration of the area ballot; however the majority of men at Bentinck
Colliery continued to work. Neil Greatrex, then a Bentinck NUM Branch Official,
recalled the situation:
Because of what had happened with all the intimidation
and picketing at Bentinck we defied the Area decision to
bring the men out for the duration of the Area Ballot ( ...)
we were of the opinion that we had fought and battled
our way in for four shifts, we were going to do it for five.
42
40 This meeting took place in the early hours of 15 March at the Nottingham Area NUM HQ. Ray
Lynk suggested that Arthur Scargill was seething and demanded that the Nottinghamshire
miners had a moral obligation to come out on strike now that someone had been kliled. Roy
Lynk dissented suggesting the Yorkshire NUM pickets should not have been in the
Nottinghamshire Area in the first place as they had been asked to keep out until the Nottingham
NUM Area Ballot had taken place. (Interview with Roy Lynk, 28 December 2005)
41 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 88.
42 Interview with Neil Greatrex (UDM Nottingham Section and National Official) , Mansfield, 20
March 2008.
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The result of the area ballot was announced at a Conference of Nottingham
Area NUM BOCM at the Area HQ on Sunday 18 March 1984. To little surprise
the vote recorded 20,188 (73.5%) being against strike action with 7,285
(26.5%) voting in favour of striking (Appendix 8). Not one Nottinghamshire
NUM Branch had a majority for strike action, the nearest vote being at Blidworth
with 399 (46%) being in favour of strike action with 461 (54%) being against
strike action. In light of the area ballot result the Nottingham Area NUM
Conference of BOCMon 18 March 1984 unanimously agreed that:
1. In line with the ballot decision of the Nottinghamshire membership, there
would be an immediate return to work. However the overtime ban would
continue.
2. Areas were asked not to picket outside their own Area.
3. A request is made for an immediate reconvening of the NUM NEe, with
view to supporting the call for a national ballot. 43
Despite the area ballot result some men stayed out on strike whilst the majority
of Nottinghamshire NUM members obeyed the decision of the area ballot and
remained at work. Picketing from outside intensified during the second week
of the dispute, as did the police presence. This resulted in what Alan Griffin
described as the 'ludicrous situation that men, loyally obeying the
Nottinghamshire NUM Area's decision to work, were being assailed as scabs'. 44
The ballot result put the pro-strike Nottingham Area NUM AEC, the two
Nottingham NECmembers and some pro-strike NUM Branch representatives into
a quandary; the membership they represented had overwhelmingly voted
against strike action until a national ballot of all NUM members voted in favour
of such a strike. Did they follow the working mandate from the rank and file or
their own consciences?
43 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, pp. 89-90.
44 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 7.
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3. Widening the divide: The Nottinghamshire coalfield, April 1984.
One of the peculiarities of the Nottingham Area of the NUM in the early 1980s
was that despite it being classified as a moderate area, the left-wing had a
dominant position on the AEC (see Chapter 1 - Part 5). After the no-strike area
ballot result was announced on 18 March 1984 they found themselves in a
'catch 22' situation. Following the Nottingham Area NUM Conference of BOCM
on 18 March, the Nottingham Area NUM AEC met the following day and
endorsed all the decisions made by the Conference. 45 However, they also
condemned the police operation in Nottinghamshire for its over-reaction.
Because of the rapidly changing situation in the Nottinghamshire coalfield, it
was decided that members of the AEC should man the Area Offices on a round-
the-clock basis. This would in time pose a problem for the two moderate NUM
Area Officials, Roy Lynk and David Prendergast. For around three months they
had to 'run the gauntlet' at times as the left-wing and its pro-strike supporters
had a near free run in the Area Offices. 46 Roy Lynk remembers this period as
being one of continual harassment from left-wing supporters milling about the
Area Offices. 47 All this would change with the results from the Nottinghamshire
NUM branch elections in June when the majority of pro-strike Nottinghamshire
Branch Officials and Committee members were voted out of office and were
replaced by working miners more sympathetic to the views of Lynk and
Prendergast and the working Nottinghamshire miners'.
At the Nottingham Area NUM AEC meeting on 21 March 1984 the AEC again
found them in a delicate situation. The AEC agreed on the following advice
being sent out to all Nottinghamshire Area NUM branches: 48
45 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 90.
46 Interview with Roy Lynk, 28 December 2005, Sutton-in-Ashfield.
47 Ibid.
48 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 92.
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• We respect the fundamental right of members not to cross picket lines,
but ask any member who wishes to recognise a picket line to return
home immediately after he has observed it.
• We must respect the mandate of the Nottinghamshire Area Ballot
decision which gives the fundamental right of a member to go to work, if
he wishes.
A similar instruction was given out in the Lancashire NUM Area on 22 March
1984. The Ashton and Haydock Craftsmen Delegate identified a major failing in
a resolution of this kind:
The resolution (...) had one fatal flaw (...) if you advised
people to work normal but not cross picket lines it meant
effectively you were on strike without a national ballot (...)
therefore the only way you could get a national ballot was
by continuing to work normal. 49
Initially, the AEC meeting on 21 March was lobbied by members of the Bolsover
NUM Branch, historically a Nottinghamshire Area Branch since the times of
Spencerism, but a NCB North Derbyshire Area colliery. With the colliery being in
another NCB Area it had been subject to mass picketing following the NUM
North Derbyshire Areas decision to ignore their own area ballot result and call
out all their members on strike. 50 A representation from the Bolsover Branch
requested that the Nottingham Area NUM AEC close the colliery in the interests
of safety. However, the AEC advised that the Bolsover Branch should call a
Special Branch meeting for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the
49 Howell, The Pol/tics of the NUM, p. 116.
50 The area ballot result in the NUM North Derbyshire Area returned a result of 49.9% in favour
of strike action with 50.1% being against strike action. The North Derbyshire was considered a
'barometer area' for what could happen nationally. The North Derbyshire NUM AEC voted 12-2
to overturn the Area Ballot vote at the end of March 1984.
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membership. The deputation was asked to be mindful of the Area Ballot result
from 18 March; at Bolsover, 341 were in favour of strike action with 479 being
against. At the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 26 March it was reported that
95% of the Bolsover NUM membership were not crossing the picket lines at the
colliery. 51 The Bolsover NUM Branch were seeking permission from the
Nottingham Area NUM ACM to make the strike official under Rule 41 of the
national NUM rules. This was turned down by thirty votes to one, the one
branch in favour being Bolsover itself. This was on the grounds of the Bolsover
branch not having had the special meeting to ascertain the views of the
membership to close the colliery.
The Bolsover NUM Branch then held its special meeting at which 299 votes were
cast in favour of an official stoppage with 205 against. The Bolsover Branch
again asked the Nottingham Area NUM AC to make the stoppage at the colliery
official under national rule 41. Following further consideration of the Bolsover
request the ACM turned down the Bolsover request by 27 branches to 4. 52 This
was the nearest that any Nottinghamshire Area NUM Branch ever got to making
the dispute official through the union machinery at Area level. It also hit the
'Achilles heel' of the democratic process within the NUM itself. What was the
true mandate at Bolsover, the branch ballot vote taken during the area ballot on
18 March or the Special meeting held at the Bolsover branch some two weeks
later? Could a 'Special Meeting' overturn a ballot result within such a short
space of time? 820 Bolsover NUM members voted in the Area Ballot; 504 voted
at the special branch meeting. What happened to the votes of the 316 people
who voted at Bolsover in the Area Ballot but not at the special meeting?
Several NUM areas had area ballots (Appendix 1) at the start of the strike
period, all of which turned down industrial strike action only for the ballot
51 Ibid., p. 98.
52 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
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decision to be overturned shortly afterwards by 'special meetings'. Traditionally
the NUM always had large percentage turnouts for pit-head ballots; on major
issues these were usually in excess of 80%. In the Yorkshire NUM Area the
mandate to strike in March 1984 was derived from a 1981 Area ballot vote
taken prior to Arthur Scargill leaving office to take up the position of National
President. The ballot vote recorded a majority of 86% in favour of taking strike
action if a Yorkshire colliery were to be threatened with closure. However, the
Yorkshire vote was not a vote over an actual pit closure but was a 'vote in
principle'. In the March 1983 national ballot over colliery closures the Yorkshire
NUM Area's majority for industrial action was 27,597 (54%) to 23,841 (46%).
Twenty-eight Yorkshire pits voted against strike action, five of them returned No
votes over 80% with most of the other twenty-three returning No votes around
the 60% mark. 53 This infers that either the mood for industrial action in
Yorkshire had diminished over two years (1981-1983), or that the Yorkshire
Area NUM members were not so keen to save a South Wales Colliery as one in
their own area. There was some food for thought that when the strike
commenced in March 1984 it was because of a Yorkshire colliery being directly
affected, that it was demanded that all NUM members should come out on
strike immediately. Steve Williamson, former Annesley NUM Branch Secretary
(1983-85), suggested that because the left had control of the three senior NUM
positions, headed by a Yorkshire PreSident, that there was a feeling among the
left in the NUM that the strike would follow automatically. 54 In the Lancashire
coalfield the Parsonage NUM Branch Delegate reflected on manpower cuts at
Parsonage over recent years which had been agreed with the NCB at local level.
The Parsonage manpower had been reduced from 1,300 to 300 by consent.
Commenting on the strike tactics the Delegate added:
53 'NEC denied strike power in ballot', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.1, February 1985, p. 2.
54 Interview with Steve Williamson (Former NUM Branch Secretary, Annesley Colliery), 8 March
2009, Selston.
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It seemed ludicrous that this whole thing should blow up
over a rundown in Yorkshire when we had encountered
similar rundowns without any thoughts of a strike for a
number of years. 55
An old Nottingham NUM Branch Official told the author in 1983 that the way
things were developing in the NUM, the Nottingham NUM Area banner displayed
in the main meeting hall at the Berry Hill HQ would have to be changed to read
'The Yorkshire National Union of Mineworkers' 56
It was at the Nottingham Area NUM AEC meeting on 3 April 1984 that the first
constitutional signs of a split between the pro-strike members of the AEC and
some NUM Branch Officials and the rank and file occurred. The AEC had
considered correspondence from the Associated Society of Locomotive
Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), the rail union, that they were recommending
sympathetic industrial action to support the NUM in their dispute with the NCB.
The Nottingham Area NUM AEC recommended by eight votes to five that the
following resolution be put to a meeting of Nottingham Area NUM BOeM due to
be held on 5 April 1984:
In view of the fact that other trade unions throughout
Great Britain are instructing their members not to cross
picket lines in support of the miners' fight for jobs, this
Area must search its trade union principles regarding its
policy on picket lines. We therefore, recommend that
Nottinghamshire NUM branches set up their own picket
lines and the AEC instruct our members not to cross those
55 Howell, The Politics of the NUM, p. 121.
56 Comment told to the author by an older Nottinghamshire NUM Branch Offidal at a meeting of
NUM Branch representatives at the Nottinghamshire NUM HQ in 1983.
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picket lines. We reiterate our support for a National ballot
vote. 57
Henry Richardson saw the 5 April meeting as a test as to whether trade
unionism was alive or dead in Nottinghamshire. 58 The dilemma faced by
Nottinghamshire NUM Branch elected representatives was that if they decided
to agree to put on their own picket lines, they would have played the card the
left-wing in the NUM had been hoping for all along - a strike without a national
ballot. At the Conference of BOCM on 5 April 1984 the resolution was turned
down by 186 votes to 72. 59 The Conference reiterated the AEC decision from
21 March to respect the fundamental right of members not to cross picket lines
and also the Nottinghamshire Area ballot mandate which gave members a
fundamental right to go to work. The Nottingham Area NUM ACM confirmed all
the Conference decisions the following day.
The first indications of a significant strained relationship between some working
Nottinghamshire NUM Branch elected members and the two Notts NEC
members started to surface at this time. At the Nottingham Area NUM AEC
meeting on 13 April 1984 the two NEC members, Henry Richardson and Ray
Chadburn, reported from a meeting of the NUM NEC the previous day. At the
meeting they had supported Nottinghamshire's mandate for a national ballot
under Rule 43 but this had been turned down. Instead the NUM NEC meeting
decided to convene a Special Delegates Conference (SOC) at the NUM HQ in
Sheffield on 19 April 1984. 60 A national rally against pit closures was arranged
to coincide with the SOC. 61 The NUM SOCwould also consider an amendment
to Rule 43 to provide a simple majority (50% +1) in any individual ballot vote
instead of the 55% required at the present time. It was following the NUM NEC
57 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1984, p. 121.
58 'It's D Day at the pits', Notts Free Press, 6 April 1984, p. 1.
59 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1984, p. 122.
60 Ibid., pp. 127-129.
61 Ibid., p. 130.
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meeting on 12 April that Henry Richardson was reported as labelling the
Nottinghamshireminers who chose to cross picket lines as 'scabs'. Richardson
and Chadburn defended their position as reiterating the national viewpoint,
which in their view they were allowed to do. Commenting on his outburst
against his own Notts membershipHenry Richardsonstated:
I might have gone too far in view of the fact that there
had been a ballot vote to work but we are all in it together
now (...) our mandate is still to seeka national ballot (...) I
have never broken any mandate. I can only vote the way
I am told by the membership(...) but as a member of the
NECI still have a right to vote reflecting the views of the
majority of the coalfields. 62
However, working NUM Branch officials saw the situation differently. Steve
Williamson,NUMBranchSecretaryat AnnesleyColliery, said:
I always understood that the union (NUM) worked from
the bottom up. The members decide, in the case of
Nottinghamshire by an individual ballot on major issues,
and this mandates the Branch representatives. The
Branch Delegate is then mandated to carry out the
branch's wishes at meetings of the AC which is the
governing body for the area. The AC thus decides the
mandate vote for the NECmembers. In the caseof Henry
Richardsonand RayChadburn, they were voted in by the
Nottinghamshire membership to represent the
Nottinghamshire interests, not to make statements about
policy in other areas. The Nottinghamshire Area of the
62 'We won't quit', Notts Free Press, 20 April 1984, p. 1.
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NUM decided that it was working until a national ballot
under Rule 43 said otherwise. This was Henry Richardson
and Ray Chadburn's mandate. 63
The NUM had reached a significant point where conflicting views would clash;
one view coming from the rank and file from the bottom up and the other from
the NECworking its way down. What followed was described by Alan Griffin as
"a piece of sleight of hand worthy of a conjuror". 64 The NUM SDC on 19 April
turned down the call for a national ballot and instead adopted a Kent NUM Area
resolution 'calling on' all miners to join the 80% already on strike. At the same
SDC Rule 43 was amended from a 55% majority for a strike to a simple
majority. The Nottingham Area NUM Delegation voted against both proposals.
It was at the SDC that Bernard Donaghy, from the Lancashire NUM, made a
passionate plea for a national ballot. He reminded the anti-ballot Delegates of
the fragile unity that existed in the NUM:
If you think at the back of your mind that a ballot vote will
lose and you are urging you men to come out on strike, I
think you are cheating on your membership ( ...) for the first
time since 1926 we have had confrontations between miner
and miner. 65
According to Griffin the SDC had no authority to call a national strike, only the
NUM NECcould do that following a national ballot. 66 That is why the resolution
used the term 'call on' inferring a request rather than an instruction. However,
this did not stop the Nottingham Area NUM NEC members from contacting
branches telling them the strike was now official. 67 Nottinghamshire Area NUM
63 Interview with Steve Williamson, Selston, 8 March 2009.
64 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 7.
6S Howell, The Politics Of the NUM, p. 125.
66 Ibid.
67 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 150.
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Branches were to be circulated with the information and hold Special Branch
Meetings following the Easter break to explain the situation to the rank and file
NUM members. The Special Branch Meetings were held and initially the first
week following Easter saw an increase in picketing at most Nottinghamshire
pits. At Annesley it saw some miners who had been previously working since
early March join the strike. Some of these miners were part of the deputation
that had visited the rally outside the NUM headquarters whilst the SOC took
place; none of the elected Annesley NUM representatives attended the Sheffield
rally. The number of Annesley miners joining the strike increased following the
SOC of 19 April. Annesley NUM branch figures for the week-ending 27 April
1984 saw 97 miners on strike at the colliery; this represented around 10% of
the workforce. 68 By the week ending 16 June this was down to 50 on strike
(approx 5% of the workforce); these would remain the hard core of strikers at
Annesley that would see the strike through to the bitter end in early March
1985.
However, the problem of the NUM in Nottinghamshire being hopelessly split
remained. On one side the NUM working representatives and working miners
saw the way the strike was developing as being unofficial and unconstitutional.
On the other side Nottinghamshire strikers saw the SOC as overruling all Area
decisions and the strike now being official. The SOC did not solve the problems
in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. The Area Ballot mandate combined with the
now entrenched position of most Nottingham Area NUM branches that were
working saw them more determined than ever that only a national ballot,
showing a majority for a strike, could persuade them to stop work. The
National NUM needed to lean more on the elected Nottinghamshire NUM branch
representatives who were still working in an attempt to get them to join the
strike. This happened at a Conference of BOCMon the 25 April 1984.
68 Annesley NUM Branch documentation, 1984. D. Amos collection.
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All Nottingham Area NUM elected branch representatives were called up to the
Area HQ on the afternoon of 25 April 1984. The meeting was convened
following the SDC on 19 April to report on the SDC and the subsequent Kent
Area resolution. However, this time it was not only the Nottingham Area NUM
Officials that would be addressing the meeting as usually happened, but the
NUM National President and National Secretary. The Area President addressed
the meeting and reiterated that the adopted conference decision was now the
official policy of the NUM as all SDC and Annual Conference decisions supersede
all Area decisions. 69 Keith Staley, Bentinck NUM Committee member and an ex
Derbyshire 'mining gypsy' made a passionate verbal attack on Peter Heathfield,
on the virtues of democracy. 70 The National President reaffirmed that the strike
was now official and called upon all other miners to join the 80% already on
strike. This was to ensure maximum unity and solidarity throughout the NUM.
It was the National President's claim that the strike was now official in
Nottinghamshire, which would provoke one Nottingham Area NUM Branch to
initiate the legal action against the national union which eventually proved the
strike in Nottinghamshire unofficial. The author was present at this meeting and
clearly remembers Colin Clarke, NUM Branch Delegate at Pye Hill No.1 Colliery,
holding up the rule book to Arthur Scargill and telling him that he would pursue
legal advice to get the strike in Nottinghamshire proved unofficial if need be. 71
Following the meeting one delegate, when commenting on the accusation of
Spencerism 72 by the National President, said:
69 Ibid., p. 158.
70 A 'Mining Gypsy' referred to a miner who had worked at several collieries in a short place of
time during the mass closures in the 1960's. Usually they came from coalfields which suffered
significant closures i.e. The West Durham coalfield, Scotland, South Wales and Derbyshire being
among these.
71 The author was an elected NUM Branch Committee member at Annesley in the Nottingham
Area NUM during the 1983-84 period.
72 Spencerism refers to the Nottingham Miners Industrial Union (NMIU) that formed in the
autumn of the 1926 dispute following George Spencer's expulsion from the Miners' Federation of
Great Britain (MFGB). The NMIU lasted from 1926 until 1937, when following the Harworth
dispute, a merger took place between the NMIU and the Notts Miners' Association (NMA) to
formed the Notts Miners Federated Union (1937-1944).
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We are not going to live in the shadowsof our forefathers.
We cannot and will not live in the past. I want a vote on
pit closures, not on who governs the country.
Intimidation will not win the day, what they are trying to
do to the Notts miners is give them the order of the boot.
73
The delegate added that a strike without a ballot was illegal under the NUM
rules and that the NUM NECmay be challenged through the courts. Henry
Richardson however was adamant the strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield
was now official. Talking to TV crews following the 25 April meeting, he said:
This strike is now official. We need solidarity of action and
all miners should respond. 74
A collision course between the two Nottingham NUM NECmembers and the
working miners and their representativesnow seemed unavoidable. It would be
in 1985, in the aftermath of the strike, that the drama would be enacted.
However the fallout from the events during April 1984 was not to end there;
legal action against the NUMand an added complication of the Nottinghamshire
Working MinersCommittee (NWMC)would grow out of the inter-union dispute.
Prior to this the pro-strike members of the Nottingham Area NUMAECmade
preparations for what they now perceived as an official strike in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield. The following resolution was agreed to be circulated
to branches:
At the Special Conference held at Berry Hill on
Wednesday, 25 April 1984, the National President
confirmed that the strike is official, as determined by the
73 'Scargill attends meeting of Branch Offidals', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 27 April 1984,
p.3.
74 'Now NUM faces pit rebellion', Notts Free Press, 27 April 1984, p. 1.
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governing body of the NUM, which is the Special National
Delegate Conference. The Nottingham AEC instructs all
BOCM to abide by the National Special Conference
decision of 19 April, not to cross picket lines, and further
instructs Branch Officials and Committee members not to
canvass against that Special Conference decision. It is
incumbent upon all Branch Officials to give all facilities to
members who are on picket lines, for example, Official
Picket cards, liaison with the police and all facilities
necessary when picketing is taking place. 75
The above resolution was circulated to all Nottinghamshire NUM Branches in a
letter dated 25 April 1984. Nevertheless, in most cases it failed to impress
working Nottinghamshire NUM members and their elected representatives.
Amongst reports of some area and branch officials ignoring the SDC resolution
and the AEC decision to make the strike official, the NEC released a statement.
It warned that any local or area official that ignored the SOCresolution and who
urged miners to cross picket lines could face disciplinary action. 76 What
followed next was a mass protest by Nottinghamshire NUM working miners and
their elected representatives against what many saw as a flouting of the
democratic process in the NUM.
4. AWorking Rally, Legal Action and added complications:
The Nottinghamshire Working Miners Committee.
On Tuesday 1 May 1984 Nottinghamshire NUM working miners staged a mass
demonstration outside the Nottingham NUM Area HQ at Mansfield. The aim of
the demonstration was to lobby the Nottingham NUM Area Officials and AEC.
Estimates have been made of around 7,000 to 8,000 working miners forming
75 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 160.
76 Nottingham Area NUM, Circular to Branches: Situation in the Industry, 10 May 1984.
D. Amos collection.
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the demonstration on Berry Hill Park with around 1,000 striking miners
occupying the NUM Area Offices. 77 Over a thousand police kept the two sides
apart in an attempt to prevent an all-out battle. Placards carried by the working
miners depicted what they saw as an undemocratic strike; one read 'No Ballot,
No Strike': 'Scargill's mob rule out', another read 'Scargillism is Communism'.
More controversially some of the working miners erected two sets of nooses on
scaffolds, supposedly for Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn, the two
Nottingham NUM NEC members, who they now saw as no longer representing
their views. On the balcony the striking miners paraded various NUM Branch
Banners and pro-strike placards. Various area officials from both the striking
and working sides struggled to make themselves heard on PA systems placed on
the upstairs balcony of the Area HQ, facing the hordes of working miners on
Berry Hill Park. The two sides baited each other with chants and cat-calling.
Ray Chadburn, almost going hoarse, prophesised that there would only be three
pits left in the county. His speech was virtually drowned out by cries of 'resign'
from the working miners. Roy Lynk reiterated that the only way the
Nottinghamshire NUM members could be brought out was by a national ballot
vote in favour of strike action. Emotions overran and several articles were
thrown resulting in a number of miners on both sides receiving injuries.
The rally was mainly organised by working Nottinghamshire NUM Branch
Officials from the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area. These were elected NUM
representatives who were becoming increasingly fervent in their opposition to
Chadburn and Richardson and to the pro strike members of the Nottingham
Area (NUM) AEC. The rally was a direct response to what Griffin described as
'the spurious strike decision of 20 April'. 78 Some commentators see the working
77 Various other estimations have been made for the size of the crowd: see P. Wilsher, D.
Macintyre and M. Jones, Strike: A Baffle of Ideologies, Thatcher, Scarglll and the Miners: A
Sunday 7imes Insight Book (5evenoaks 1985); p. 110: J, and R.Winterton, Coal, Crisis and
Conflict, p. 73; A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 48.
78 Ibid.
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miners' May Day rally as the start of a movement to establish right-wing control
in the Nottinghamshire Area of the NUM:
The problems with Nottinghamshire were not resolved by
the SDC. As Chadburn and Richardson fell into line with
the NEC, Lynk and Prendergast began to establish right-
wing control in Nottinghamshire. The right-wing backlash
in the Notts Area became evident on 1 May 1984 when
about 7,000 working Notts miners clashed with half as
many strikers from several areas at the Berry Hill Offices
in Mansfield. Lynk, formally unauthorised to speak,
snatched the microphone and encouraged the mob
haranguing Richardson and Scargill. 79
The Wintertons' version of events is incorrect in that Arthur Scargill was not at
the event that day. Roy Lynk was unauthorised to speak to the media; it was
Nottingham Area policy that only the two senior Area Officials could do that.
Because of Richardson and Chadburn's pro-strike stance this situation gave little
chance for working miners to air their protests through the union channels
during the early part of the strike. Neil Greatrex, Bentinck NUM Branch
President, evolved as the 'unofficial spokesman' to the media for the working
miners' cause. He would later be elected as a Nottingham NUM Area Official in
May 1985 following the dismissal of Henry Richardson. Following the
Nottinghamshire Branch Elections of June 1984, which resulted in almost every
striking representative being voted out of office, the 'gagging rule' was one of
the first things to be lifted.
The 1 May 'right to work' rally by the Nottinghamshire miners has always been a
bone of contention for the left for two reasons. Firstly, the 1 May is the
79 J. and R. Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p. 73.
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designated day for International Labour Solidarity. Secondly, they (the left)
argue that the rally was deliberately fostered by the NCB;the claims are that
the NCBallowed rest-days for the event and laid on transport which together
contributed the equivalent of £1.5 million. Brian Walker, former NUM Branch
Secretaryat Newstead,describedthe rally as 'the worst day of infamy ever':
Labour Day, of all days, was used to demonstrate the
sheer wickedness of the 'right to work' mob (...) They
mounted a demonstration during a special rest day and
were transported to the NUM Offices by buses paid for
and organised by the NCB against their own union (...)
such were the times and there was much more to come,
but the shameof that day will stay in my mind as a day of
the worst infamy. 80
In an article commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the strike Brian
Walker suggestedthat the right to work rally did much to change the minds of
the Conservative Government, and until that point they were thinking of
meeting the NUM'sdemandson the pit closure issue. 81 No supporting evidence
is given to confirm this view. Additionally Brian Walker suggested he was
attending an area meeting which was 'besieged by a huge crowd of
Nottinghamshire miners supporting a return to work'. 82 This statement is
incorrect in two instances.Firstly it was not a return to work. The vast majority
of Nottinghamshireminers had been at work since the result of the area ballot
on 18 March. Indeed, some had not lost a shift at all since the picketing started
on 10 March. Secondly, the area meeting held on 1 May was a Nottingham
Area (NUM)AECmeeting which was made up of BranchDelegates,not Branch
Secretaries. The area minutes stated that the meeting Brian Walker attended
80 NUM Nottingham Area, Official2f11' anniversary Programme (Mansfield, 2004), p. 12.
81 'The day the strike tide turned', Nottingham Evening Post, 11 March 2009, p. 6.
82 Ibid.
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was an Area Political Committee Meeting (APCM) which was held the following
day on 2 May 1984. 83 Later an amendment to the minutes stated that Brian
Walker was not officially at any meeting, either on the 1 or 2 May 1984. 84 One
can only assume he was at Berry Hill organising the pro-strike protests. Stanley
suggested that the disappointing part of the 'right to work' rally was it included
some NUM Branch Officials and Committee members opposing the instructions
from Area. 85 Incidentally, the NUM membership at Newstead, which Brian
Walker represented and Stanley was part of, had voted 71 per cent not to strike
in the Nottingham Area Ballot of 15 - 16 March. There is no mention of this in
Stanley's account of the early days of the strike at Newstead. 86
In contrast to the left-wing view of infamy, some working miners saw the rally
as a message to the 'left wing rabble-rousers' that the Nottinghamshire working
mandate would be adhered to until a national ballot under National rule 43 said
otherwise. Chris Butcher, along with some other working miners, was based at
a pit where some of the elected NUM branch representatives had abandoned
the area's no-strike mandate and were following the AEC's pro-strike stance.
For him the rally gave some hope to the confusing situation in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield:
For the first time, we had encountered a situation where
the working miners were in the majority. It was also
heartening to see men who had voted to work were not
going to be intimidated by left-wing rabble-rousers. 87
Chris Butcher, otherwise known as the 'Silver Birch', would later reach national
prominence. Those striking in Nottinghamshire soon christened him 'Dutch Elm'.
83 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 165.
84 Ibid., p. 202.
85 Stanley, Nottingham miners do strike, p. 71.
86 Ibid., pp. 54-56.
87 Butcher and Seymore, The Link up of Friendship, p. 10.
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At the rally Chris Butcher met Kenny Duckworth, NUM Branch Secretary at
Babbington Colliery, who told him a union man's job is to represent the
majority, not his own feelings. He gave him one of his slips of paper and told
them there was to be a meeting of working miners the following week. 88 This
meeting would give added weight to the anti-strike movement in
Nottinghamshire in the name of the Notts Working MinersCommittee (NWMC).
Later a more national working miners' movement would evolve, the National
Working MinersCommittee (NaWMC).Both organisationswould be instrumental
in bringing legal actions through individuals which would put a legal
strangleholdon the NUMduring the autumn of 1984. Initially the 'right to work'
rally gave Colin Clarke, Pye Hill No.1 NUM Branch Delegate, the initiative to
pursue legal action to prove that the strike in Nottinghamshirewas unofficial.
Following the Nottinghamshireworking miners' rally, Colin Clarke, with the aid
of the PyeHill No.1 NUMBranch,started the movestowards getting the strike in
Nottinghamshire proved unofficial. When he initially declared his intention to
follow this route, Henry Richardsonis reported as telling him 'You try and be a
martyr then'. 89 Clarke was to meet this challenge. Initially a whip round
produced £200 with which Clarke, armed with the Area and National NUMrule
books, went to see his family soliCitorsin Ripley, Derbyshire. There he met a
young solicitor, David Negus,who quickly came to a decision that in his opinion
the strike in Nottinghamshire could not be declared otflclal under the rules of
the NUM. This was the good news for Clarkeand his supporters. However, he
then hit them with a bombshell in recommendingthat they should get a proper
supporting opinion from leading counsel; this meant that if it went before a
judge, legal feeswould be in excessof £10,000. The events of the right to work
rally then played their part in the networking process amongst South
Nottinghamshire Area working NUM Branches. A pit-head collection was
arranged for 18 May 1984 at various Nottinghamshire NUM Branches in an
88 Ibid., p. 9.
89 Wilsher, Madntyre and Jones, Strike, p. 110.
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attempt to raise enough money for the legal action that was being sought.
Working Nottinghamshire NUM miners were asked to donate £1 per man as a
'reasonable price to pay for democracy'. The legal action would be sought on
the following points:
1. A declaration that no official strike exists in the Nottinghamshire Area.
2. That accordingly any instruction regarding part 1 given by any national, area
or branch official of the union is void and must be withdrawn.
3. Furthermore, the NUM Branch Committee are instructed to lend the name of
this branch as additional plaintiffs to any action as Pye Hill No.1 Branch may,
upon proper legal advice, henceforth institute. 90
In total over £9,000 was raised at the pit-head collections, with another £1,500
being donated from individuals. The costs to employ the Barrister, M Burton
QC, plus a junior barrister, came to just over £6,000. Additional expenses for
Colin Clarke's party came to almost £1,400. (Appendix 9) A preliminary court
hearing was made on Friday 25 May 1984. Colin Clarke and Howard Shooter,
both from Pye Hill No.1 Branch, plus John Liptrott, NUM Branch Secretary at
Sherwood Colliery, brought the legal action and named the senior two NUM
National Officials in their writ. Clarke and his supporters were reported as being
confident of success with the court case and their next move was to press for
the resignation of the two Nottingham Area NUM NEC members, Henry
Richardson and Ray Chadburn. 91 A spokesman from Pye Hill said:
We would keep protesting for their resignations in a
democratic way because they do not represent the men's
wishes and it would then be up to their consciences. The
90 Nottingham Area NUMAnnesley Branch, 1984. D. Amos collection.
91 'Pye Hill men call for resignations', Notts Free Press, 25 May 1984, p. 3.
95
Chapter 2 - Ballots, Blacklegs and Bedlam
only way to get us out is to hold a national ballot and if
the majority decision is to strike, all 778 men (at PyeHill)
would be out. 92
Despite PyeHill's imminent closure the next year, only 14 out of 778 miners at
the pit were on strike and the transfer plans (to other collieries) were running
smoothly.
The outcome of the hearing on 25 May was a victory for Clarke, Shooter,
Liptrott and the working miners. MichaelBurton, QCfor the working miners, told
Justice Mervyn Davis that they were seekinga declaration that Nottinghamshire
working miners were entitled to continue working without being in breachof the
NUM rules unless and until there was a valid and official strike of the NUMfor
which it was necessary under National Rule 43 to hold a national ballot. 93
Commentingon the ruling he stated:
For the plaintiffs the position is quite simple. There is no
national strike relevant to the NUMnor is there any valid
area strike in Nottinghamshire. The plaintiffs have a
strong argument that there is no national strike or area
strike (in Nottinghamshire) and there are no valid
instructions not to cross picket lines. That makes the
threats of disciplinary action more unlawful 94
Although the legal ruling made the road clearer for the working miners in
Nottinghamshire it did not solve the problem within the NUM. Different
interpretations of what was official and what was unofficial remainedwithin the
union. Colin Clarke appears to infer this when he commented on the legal
ruling:
92 Ibid.
93 'It's wait and see after court victory', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 1 June 1984, p. 12.
94 Ibid.
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We are as interested as everyone else to see what the
union's reaction to this court ruling will be ( ...) we are
going to wait and see. How people interpret the ruling is
up to them. 9S
In the meantime the main core of the Nottinghamshire strikers stayed out on
strike. As far as they were concerned the decision of the SOCfrom 19 April had
become official union policy as Annual Conference or SOCdecisions superseded
area decisions. Working miners' elected representatives questioned the validity
of the mandate of some of the Delegates who attended the SOC. Several areas
had overturned area ballot results by 'special meetings'. The Yorkshire Area of
the NUM was acting on a three year old ballot result. Additionally they argued
that drafting in 10,000 strike activists to lobby outside the Conference Hall was
designed to 'un-nerve moderate delegates'. The legal ruling again brought back
the ghosts of 1977 when legal ruling was sought following the reintroduction of
piece work in the name of Area Incentive Schemes. One judge had ruled that a
ballot was the essence of democracy whilst another said the result of a ballot
was not binding on the NUM NEe. (See Chapter 4: Part 2)
In addition to the legal ruling, the other factor that emerged from the right to
work rally was the evolution of the Notts Working Miners Committee (NWMC).
According to Chris Butcher the inaugural meeting was held on 10 May 1984 at
the Victoria Hotel in Stanton Hill near Sutton-in-Ashfield. 96 Henry Richardson
suggested that the Working Miners Committee was set up in October 1983 with
a brief to ensure that the Nottinghamshire coalfield would remain in production
in the event of a national strike. 97 No supporting evidence is added to say how
this was done. Representatives of working miners from almost every
95 Ibid.
96 Butcher and Seymore, The Link up of Friendship, p. 11.
97 Stephenson, Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting, p. 65.
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Nottinghamshire colliery attended the 10 May meeting and a 'Committee for the
Welfare of mineworkers' was formed. This was to be called the Notts Working
Miners Committee and was made up of the following people; 98
Mick Smith - Bevercotes Chairman
Ken Duckworth - Babbington Vice Chairman
John Blessington - Bevercotes Secretary
Graham Tavener - Gedling Treasurer
Chris Butcher - Bevercotes Committee
Geoff Porter - Bevercotes Committee
Steve Williamson - Annesley Committee
A letter sent out to local Labour Party Constituencies following the meeting
stated that the Committee had been formed because the 'so called
Nottinghamshire leaders' no longer reflected the views of the majority in the
Nottinghamshire Area. 99 It went on to say that the forum had been set up to
help finance working miners whose properties l.e, cars, homes and boundaries,
were being damaged. The reason the NWMCwas set up was to do three things:
1. To form a link-up of all twenty-five Nottinghamshire Collieries to try and
stop rumours spreading throughout the coalfield.
2. To assist miners who are still working for the sake of democracy and may
be being intimidated.
3. To do all in its power to re-affirm democracy within the NUM and not to
break or replace it.
98 Ibid., p. 11
99 D. Amos, collection of memorabilia from the 1984-85 strike in Nottinghamshire.
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Replies from nearly all Labour Party Constituencies to the NWMC were
indifferent and in some cases hostile. 100 At the first meeting of the NWMC Colin
Clarke stated that he was still £5,000 short of the amount needed to go to
court. This is where the idea for the pit-head collection came from. Point three
of the above aims was perceived by the striking fraternity in Nottinghamshire as
being a breakaway from the NUM. Chris Butcher emphatically denied this:
I must emphasise, contrary to what my enemies have
said, that the NWMC was never intended as a breakaway
or a rival union. 101
The striking Nottinghamshire NUM miners formed an organisation called "The
Notts Miners Rank and File Strike Committee (NMRFSC)". The main aim of this
organisation was to bring the entire Nottinghamshire coalfield to a standstill and
consolidate unity in the NUM. 102 A meeting of 500 rank and file pro-strike
Nottinghamshire NUM members representing seventeen Nottinghamshire
collieries met on 16 April 1984 and decided to adopt a policy 'to organise and lift
the fight at the very point of attack' i.e. inside the Nottinghamshire coalfield. 103
The NMRFSCclaimed that 10,000 Nottinghamshire miners, around one-third of
the NUM membership, were on strike at this time. It is more likely that the
number of miners voluntarily on strike in Nottinghamshire only reached this
figure for a short period following the SOC on 19 April. 7,285 (27.5%) voted to
strike in the area ballot, out of a total of 27, 473, and, as Alan Griffin stated, a
good number of men voting to strike obeyed the ballot result and went to work.
The first moves of the Nottinghamshire Working Miners' Committee (NWMC) to
involve collieries out of the county came when a delegation from Agecroft
Colliery in Lancashire attended a meeting of the NWMC on 15 May 1984. A
100 Butcher and Seymore, The Link up of Friendship, pp. 12-13.
101 Ibid, p. 13.
102 Copy of letter from Paul Whetton (Secretary of NMRFSC) to pro-strike Notts NUM Activists:
17 April 1984. D. Amos collection.
103 Ibid.
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majority of Agecroft's NUM membership were defying the NUM Lancashire's
Areas in calling the strike official, even though an area ballot result had initially
turned down strike action by 3,765 (59.2%) to 2,596 (40.8%). 104 Eventually
the National Working Miners' Committee (NaWMC) would evolve under the
guidance of Colin Clarke and John Liptrott. This followed a split with Chris
Butcher following the Nottinghamshire NUM Branch elections in June 1984 when
working miners more or less made a clean sweep in gaining NUM BOCM
positions throughout the Nottingham Area of the NUM. Following the elections
the pro-strike AEC was ousted from office being replaced by a new AEC more
sympathetic to the working miners' cause. The effect of the Nottingham Area
NUM Branch elections in June 1984 is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2:
Part 5.
It was the NaWMC which was reported as having various right-wing Thatcherite
advisors within its ranks, such as Tim Bell and David Hart. Bell was a Director
of Saatchi and Saatchi; they designed the infamous 'Labour's not working'
advertisement for the Conservatives in the run-up to the 1979 General Election.
He was also a confidant of Mrs Thatcher and was working as a public relations
assistant to the NCB Chairman, Ian McGregor, during the dispute. Hart was a
'special advisor' to Mrs Thatcher, and the one time Secretary of the NaWMC,
Bob Copping, suggested it was Hart who was actually running the show. 105
Copping eventually resigned from the NaWMC because he thought it was
'turning into an anti-union organisation with a Conservative orientation'. 106
Colin Bottomore, Branch Secretary at Bentinck Colliery, also saw it this way. He
saw no point in maintaining a separate faction following the removal of the
strike supporters from prominent positions following the Nottingham Area NUM
branch elections in June 1984. Bottomore suggested that the working miners'
committees were continuing their separate faction because it was their aim to
104 Howell, The Politics of the NUM, p. 111.
105 Stephenson, Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting, p. 57.
106 Ibid., p. 59.
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"defeat the strike ( ...) and bring the union to its knees. That is not my aim". 107
It was a move from the Bentinck NUM Branch that would detach the NWMC and
the NaWMC from the official union channels of the Nottingham Area of the
NUM. At the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 26 November 1984 a Bentinck
appeal was put out to all Nottinghamshire Branches to disassociate both the
NWMC and the NaWMC from the official Nottingham NUM constitution. The
appeal read as follows:
We, the Bentinck NUM Branch, appeal to council to
publicly disassociate the Nottingham miners from the
Nottingham and National Working Miners' Committees.
We feel that the Nottingham NUM should make it known
that this union works through the Nottingham
constitution, from Branch to Area, and has no relationship
with the Nottingham or National working committees. 108
The appeal was passed by 23 branches to 8 at the December 1984 Nottingham
Area NUM ACM. It was also at this meeting that the Nottingham Area deleted
Rule 30 from its Area rule book. Rule 30 gave the national rules precedence
over the area rules in case of a disagreement. This was seen as being an
integral move in the Nottingham Area breaking ranks with the National union.
(see Chapter 2: Part 7) Both Morgan and Coates and Stephenson fail to
mention the important factor of the Nottingham Area of the NUM disassociating
from the two working miners' committees. It is important evidence that
suggests that the Nottinghamshire miners, like Bob Copping, were not happy
with what in effect had become anti trade-union, Tory infiltrated organisations.
It also confirms that the Nottinghamshire miners were keen to see that their
disagreement with the national union was one about the unconstitutional nature
of the strike.
107 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners'Strike, pp. 19-20.
108 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 373.
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The left always contend that the NCB and various Conservative backed
supporters funded the working miners' committees. Stephenson suggests one
fifth of the NaWMCwas funded by business and Tory enterprises, with the other
four-fifths being publicly donated. 109 Bob Copping suggested David Hart was
introduced to him as 'the money man', that he was running the NaWMC and
was handing over sums of money up to £300 in cash as floats. 110 David Wain,
NCB Safety Officer at Pye Hill Colliery, told of various strangely addressed
envelopes which started to arrive at Pye Hill Colliery during May 1984. Some
were simply addressed 'to the miner aiming to defeat Scargill, Pye Hill Colliery,
Nottinghamshire.' 111 On opening such letters the colliery clerk found cash
donations of various amounts which were surmised to be for the legal action to
prove the strike in Nottinghamshire unofficial. The donations were forwarded on
to Colin Clarke. Itwas reported that the NCBChairman, Ian McGregor had used
his good offices to put the working miners' representatives in touch with small
town solicitors and business men eager to give financial backing. 112 Colin
Clarke strongly denied there was any involvement by Ian McGregor or financial
assistance from business men. 113 His reply emphasised five main points,
Firstly, there had been no contact, direct or indirect, between the working
miners' committees and Ian McGregor, who had not masterminded any of the
legal actions. Secondly, Colin Clarke's own family lawyers from Ripley had
conducted the case. Thirdly, all funds of the working miners' committees had
been raised by donations from ordinary members of the public. David Wain
backs this point up with his evidence of donations arriving at Pye Hill Colliery.
Additionally, a balance sheet survives from the legal action pursued by Colin
Clarke which lists the source of the donations (see Appendix 9). Fourthly, the
court actions had been solely motivated by the desire to return the union to the
109 Stephenson, Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting, p. 63.
110 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield & British Miners'Strike, p. 20.
111 Interview with David Wain, Selston, 16 February 2009.
112 Cited in Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield & the British Miners Strike, p. 24.
113 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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democratic control of its membership. Fifthly, and finally Colin Clarke stated he
could not comprehend why 'government sources' should tell such tales. At a
NUM trade union school at Stoke Rochford in January 1985 the author and
several other students asked Colin Clarke how much money was actually
involved with the working miners' committees. Students were politely reminded
that they (the Nottingham Area NUM) had disassociated themselves from the
issue and it was no business of theirs (the students). Colin Clarke left the coal
mining industry on redundancy terms in the autumn of 1985 following the
closure of the Pye Hill Complex. He died at Eastwood, Nottlnqhamshire in 2004.
5. All change: the June 1984 Nottinghamshire NUM Branch
elections.
At the Nottingham Area NUM AEC meeting on 14 May 1984 it was reported that
the NUM NEC had made a decision to instruct all Areas to postpone all branch
elections in areas where industrial action was being taken until the situation in
the industry returned to normal. 114 The subsequent legal opinion obtained by
the national NUM suggested that the action to postpone the 1984 branch
elections was perfectly legitimate. However, at the Nottingham Area NUM AEC
on 4 June 1984 it was reported that further information had subsequently been
received from the national NUM indicating that branch elections should proceed
as usual. 115 This was following consultation by a leading Counsel. The
Wintertons implied that Sir Robert Mergarry instructed the Nottingham Area of
the NUM to go ahead with branch elections following threatened legal
proceedings to get them reinstated. 116 The decision to go ahead with the
Nottingham Area NUM Branch elections would be significant as the pro-strike
NUM elected branch representatives were replaced with working branch
representatives almost to a man. The political effects of this at Area level would
114 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 166.
115 Ibid., p. 174.
116 J. and R. Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p. 71.
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be to transform a pro-strike body into an anti-strike one. Branch elections took
place each year and could be held between 15 May and 29 June in line with
Nottingham Area Rule No. 13 (b), 117
Morgan and Coates described the election result as leading to 'practically all
traces of support for the strike in Nottinghamshire being virtually obliterated'. 118
Working miners were returned to all four NUM Branch Officials positions at
Annesley, Bentinck, Silverhill and Sutton collieries. At Newstead, traditionally
one of the more militant NUM Branches in Nottinghamshire, three out of the
four NUM Branch Officials positions went to working miners. Barry Rodgers
replaced striking miner Jack Beet as NUM Branch Delegate. Ted Walker, NUM
Branch President and a striking miner, kept his position. According to Trevor
Taylor this was a deliberate ploy to allow some experience to remain at branch
level. 119 Bryn Long replaced Keith Johnson as NUM Branch Secretary; former
long standing NUM Secretary Brian Walker was reported as accepting voluntary
redundancy and had left the coal industry in June. 120 Oddly, Stanley's account
of the elections suggested Brian Walker's position as NUM Branch Secretary was
up for challenge. 121 It was common knowledge around Newstead that Brian
Walker had accepted voluntary redundancy and had left the industry. Stanley
became one of the very few strikers to get elected as a NUM Branch Committee
member. 122 As was common among the striking miners, many of the newly
elected branch representatives had been politicised by the events of the strike in
Nottinghamshire. 123 Many openly admitted to not being involved in union
affairs at their pits prior to the strike; a body of Nottinghamshire NUM elected
117 Nottingham Area NUM, Rules and Standing Orders, 1983, p. 19. D. Amos collection.
118 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners'Strike, p. 19.
119 Interview with John Trevor Taylor, 6 August 2008, Sutton-in-Ashfield.
120 'Moderates win seats', Notts Free Press, 6 July 1984, p. 5.
121 Stanley, Nottingham Miners do Strike, p. 80.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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NUM Branch Officials and Committee members now contained many
inexperienced representatives within its ranks, as Stanley suggested. 124
The immediate effects of the branch elections in Nottinghamshire was at branch
level where it was now estimated that only 4 out of 310 places on branch
committees were taken by striking miners. 125 Two out of these four places
were at Newstead. At Annesley the entire NUM Committee was returned en
bloc, all NUM representatives being returned with an increased majority from
the 1983 elections. In some cases the branch elections saw the place for NUM
Branch Officials being a straight fight between a working miner and a striking
miner; this was the case at Annesley. (Fig. 4) The ploy was not to split the
working miners' moderate vote. In some cases reports were made on
information sheets available for rank and file members which showed who the
strikers' representatives were and who the working ones were. The 31 man
Nottingham Area NUM AC, which originally had 12 of its representatives on
strike, was now made up of 28 working miners and 3 strikers. The Nottingham
Area NUM AEC was transformed from a pro-strike body into an anti-strike body
more or less over night. The new AEe members were voted in at the first
meeting of newly elected delegates which was always in July of each year in line
with Area Rule 22. 126 The political balance at Area level was now in favour of
Roy Lynk and David Prendergast, while the two NUM NEe members, Henry
Richardson and Ray Chadburn, were becoming increasingly isolated from the
bulk of the Nottingham Area NUM membership and their newly elected
representatives. As Griffin commented, 'tension between the (new) AEC and
their two NEe members was now unavoidable'. 127 Commenting on the change
of representation from striking to working miners, Ray ehadburn suggested that
124 Ibid.
125 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners Strike, p. 19
126 Nottingham Area NUM, Rules and Standing Orders, 1983, pp. 28 - 29.
127 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p, 8.
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Fig. 3: NUMBranch Election results at Annesley - June 1984.
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'the new Nottingham Area NUM AEC now contained Liberals, Social Democrats
and even some Tories'. 128 Remarking on the possibility of a split within the
NUM, Chadburn added, "I think at the end of the day they now realise the
implications of trying to form a breakaway trade union". 129 Events from July
onwards would determine otherwise. The anti-Nottinghamshire sentiments
expressed by Terry Thomas (South Wales NUM) at the 1984 NUM Extraordinary
Annual Conference and the introduction of NUM (Disciplinary) Rule 51
aggravated an already delicate situation. 130
6. Entering a minefield: the introduction of disciplinary Rule 51
and its effects
The planned 1984 NUM Annual Conference due to take place at Tenby did not
go ahead. The extraordinary circumstances in the industry caused by the strike
made a normal Conference impossible to hold. Instead, it was proposed that a
NUM Extraordinary Annual Conference (EAC) would take place at the Firth Hall,
Sheffield University. The EAC took place over 11 and 12 July 1984. It was at
this conference that the South Wales NUM Delegation walked out because they
objected to being in the same room as 'scabs' from Leicestershire and South
Derbyshire. 131 A large proportion of the conference delegates left the hall when
the NUM South Derbyshire President, Ken Toon, tried to address the
conference. (see Chapter 6: Part 2) The vast majority of the small South
Derbyshire NUM Area had been at work since the start of the strike.
Back at Area level the newly elected NUM Branch Delegates had been due to
meet for a Special Council Meeting (SCM) to record branch decisions for the
Annual Conference and thus mandate which way the Nottingham NUM
Delegation should vote at the EAC. On the agenda of the EAC the NUM NEC
128 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 265.
129 Ibid.
130 NUM, Extraordinary Annual Conference Report 1984, p. 403 and pp. 410 - 426.
131 The Nottingham NUM Delegation was still represented by mainly pro-strike NUM
representatives elected for the 1983-84 term of office in line with NUM Policy.
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had put forward an amendment for the introduction of a new disciplinary rule.
This would become NUM National Rule 51, later to be dubbed 'the Star Chamber
rule'. Eventually Rule 51 would fill one-fifth of the NUM national rule book. For
the working Nottinghamshire miners the main point of objection to the new
disciplinary rule was it would be used to discipline working miners in 1984 for
adhering to their working mandate. Rule 51 was titled 'Disqualification of
members, Branches, Areas and removal of Officers'. The main point of
contention of Rule 51 was Section (d) Part (vii) which stated:
The National Disciplinary Committee shall have the power
to consider a complaint that a member has done any act
(which includes any omission) which may be detrimental
to the interests of the union and which is not specifically
provided for in this rule. 132
In defence of the introduction of Rule 51 the national NUM suggested that it
was not intended to be used to discipline working miners in the current strike
but had been in preparation before the 1984-85 strike began. Rule 51 was
designed to bring the NUM's disciplinary rules up to date with present
requirements and in line with natural justice: 133
It (Rule 51) was not designed or introduced to deal with
the current strike action, nor has it been used at any time
since its adoption in August 1984, by the National Union.
134
In February 1985 the Nottingham Area of the NUM came up with evidence that
Rule 51 had been used to expel working miners in other NUM areas. The AEC
had received a copy of a letter from a working Sunderland miner giving
132 NUM, Decisions of the Extraordinary Annual Conference, p. 2.
133 NUM, No return to Spencerism, leaflet January 1985. D. Amos collection.
134 Ibid.
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evidence of his expulsion from the Durham Mechanics under the new
disciplinary rule. 135 The article suggested that several hundred miners had
been expelled in other areas using Rule 51. One of the consequences of the
expulsions in Durham was the formation of a breakaway union. The Colliery
Trades and Allied Workers Association (CfAWA) eventually became one of the
constituent unions of the UDM when it was formed in the autumn of 1985.
Commenting on the potential introduction of the new disciplinary rule, Bentinck
NUM Branch Delegate, Dave Morrell, told Ashfield based miners not to lose any
sleep over it:
I don't see where we in Notts have done anything wrong.
We had an area vote and 73.5% voted to continue
working pending a national ballot ( ...) but at no time have
we been instructed to come out (on strike). 136
The Nottingham Area NUM SCMdue for 9 July never took place because of a sit
in at the Area HQ by pro-strike miners. It was reported that around one
hundred striking miners were in the building with around three hundred other
strikers outside. 137 There was widespread belief that the successful protest was
aimed at preventing the newly elected anti-strike Nottingham NUM Delegates
from voting on the new disciplinary rule at the EAC. Henry Richardson and Ray
Chadburn refuted allegations that they had anything to do with the protest. 138
The protest turned violent the next day when there was a clash between the
protestors and riot police. Alan Griffin saw some irony in 'Official Picket' posters
being put in place outside the entrance to the Nottingham Area (NUM) HQ to try
and prevent democratically elected NUM delegates from deciding on union
business, and being called scabs in the process. 139
135 'Kicked out', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.1, February 1985, p. 1. D. Amos collection.
136 'Aborted Council Meeting', Notts Free Press, 13 July 1984, p. 3.
137, Berry Hill Sit In' , Notts Free Press, 13 July 1984, p. 1.
138 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 229.
139 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 47.
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Although they were not mandated, the Nottingham NUM delegation to the NUM
EAC, represented by the pro-strike 1983-84 delegates, took cognisance of the
feelings in the Nottinghamshire coalfield and voted against the introduction of
disciplinary Rule 51. 140 Nevertheless, it was accepted at the EAC by 166 votes
to 62. Explanations into the long delay in the formulation of the disciplinary
rules referred to a court action when a Nottingham Area NUM member had
taken the union to court. This was the case of Bill Richards, a Blidworth NUM
member, who took the Nottingham Area NUM to court in the mid 1970s over
alleged ballot irregularities in the NUM at Blidworth. 141 The Nottingham Area
NUM denied that it had ever proposed the introduction of Rule 51. Len Clarke,
former Nottingham Area NUM President, suggested that "no proposal ever came
from the Nottingham Area". 142 Another factor in the delay of Rule 51 was that
the QC drawing up the rules had been appointed as Chairman of the National
Reference Tribunal (NRT) and a successor had to be sought to replace him.
Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn stated that although Rule 51 had been
accepted nationally there would be no witch hunt in the county. 143 Prior to the
EAC, seventeen Nottinghamshire NUM Branch Officials had sought a High Court
ruling in an attempt to stop the EAC going ahead. This eventually resulted in
the decision of the EACbeing made 'null and void' because the Nottingham Area
(NUM) delegation had not been properly mandated. In answer to this the NUM
NECcalled another SDC for 10 August, again with the introduction of Rule 51 on
the agenda. The voting from the Nottinghamshire NUM Branches on the
introduction of Rule 51 was eventually conducted at the Nottingham Area NUM
ACM on 23 July 1984. 27 branches voted against its introduction with just 3
140 The newly elected Nottingham Area NUM Delegates were not mandated because of the SCM
on 9 July which never took place because of the blockade of the Nottingham Area NUM HQ by
pro-strike supporters.
141 See Bill Richards, Blidworth Pit and the NUM (Blidworth, 1994), pp. 31-71.
142 Nottingham Area NUM Circular, 'What kind of men do they think you are? Rule 51: Now the
Truth', January 1985. D. Amos collection.
143 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 230.
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branches, Bolsover, Clipstone and Weibeck, being in favour. 144 At the same
meeting the Nottingham Area had been asked to provide nominations for the
new seven man disciplinary committee, the so called 'star Chamber', It was
decided to seek legal advice, bearing in mind the Nottingham Area could be held
in contempt of court following Sir Robert Megarry's (High Court Judge) ruling
that the introduction of Rule 51 was illegal. This ruling was from the original
EAC, held on 11 -12 July 1984, when the Nottingham Area NUM Delegation
had not been properly mandated because of the sit-in at the Area HQ. It was
also decided to obtain legal advice as to whether the Nottingham NUM
delegation should attend the re-arranged SOC on 10 August. 145 If the advice
was not to attend, the two Nottingham NUM NECmembers should vote against
introduction of Rule 51; if the ruling was in favour a bus would take the
Nottingham NUM delegation (made up of the newly elected NUM Delegates
1984-85) and would leave the NUM Area Offices at 9.30am on 10 August.
At the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 9 August it was decided by 27 votes to 3
that the Nottingham NUM delegation should not attend the SDC on 10 August.
146 Unknown at the time, this was to be the last time a Nottingham NUM
Delegation attended a NUM national meeting until the fateful 1985 NUM Annual
Conference in July 1985. At the ACM it was also decided not to send any
nominations for the National Disciplinary Committee (NDC) or the National
Appeals Committee (NAC). The national NUM had also requested that all NUM
Areas amend their own area rules to accommodate the new Rule 51. The
Nottingham Area NUM again sought legal advice on this issue before
proceeding. The outcome of this was a reporting conference arranged to be
made up of the four Nottingham NUM Area Officials, all Nottinghamshire NUM
Branch Officials, Igor Judge QC, Peter Keenan, Barrister and the union's legal
advisors, Hopkins Solicitors. Proposals from this meeting would be instrumental
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., p. 258.
146 Ibid., p. 259.
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in leading to a 'constitutional split' between the Nottingham Area NUM and the
national NUM in December 1984.
The special reporting conference was held on 25 September 1984. Igor Judge
QC told the Nottinghamshire NUM representatives that he was not prepared to
become involved in the politics of the situation; he was there to clarify any
paints contained in his advice. It was for the Nottingham Area of the NUM to
decide on which course of action they should take. Copies of the legal advice
had been circulated to Nottinghamshire NUM Branch Officials prior to the
meeting. In his advice Egor Judge described the eight page Rule 51 as being
'the most draconian rule ever introduced by a British trade union to discipline its
own members'. 147 In conclusion Igor Judge said whatever decision the
Nottingham Area reached on Rule 51 they should at the same time 'take full
cognisance of and be prepared to accept the consequences of that decision' 148
The inference from this statement was that the Nottingham Area could be
expelled from the national NUM or indeed could be seen as constitutionally
breaking away from the federal structure of the NUM.
At a meeting on 8 October 1984 the Nottingham Area NUM AEC decided to not
accept the new disciplinary Rule 51 after considering the legal advice from Egor
Judge QC. Whilst rejecting Rule 51 the AECwished to state categorically that:
It was not their intension to instigate moves which would
lead to a breakaway of the Nottingham Area from the
NUM.149
The AEC also agreed to recommend appropriate rule changes to the Nottingham
Area Rules to protect the Nottingham Area from the new disciplinary rule.
Amendments were done each December when the Nottingham Area NUM ACM
147 Interview with Roy Lynk, 28 December 2005, Sutton-in-Ashfield.
148 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 322.
149 Ibid., p. 323.
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voted on any proposed rule alterations. As the strike entered December 1984
the NUM was about to be plunged into its greatest ever crisis.
7. Self Defence or Gerrymandering: The Nottingham Area NUM
December 1984 Rule Changes.
At the Nottingham Area NUM AEC meeting on 17 October 1984 the committee
considered draft proposals for the amendment of the Nottingham Area rules for
the forthcoming December ACM. The proposals were drafted with the help of
the Nottingham NUM Area's legal advisors, Hopkins and Sons Solicitors. In
preparing the rule amendments the Nottingham Area and its legal advisors had
sought to preserve the local autonomy of the Area Union whilst maintaining its
status as a constituent member of the national union. 150 The AEC agreed a
proposal that the various rule amendments should be submitted to the
November Nottingham Area NUM ACM in accordance with Area Rule 24. This
would allow all Nottinghamshire NUM branches to vote on the various
amendments which would then be finalised at the December NUM ACM. The
first sign of any threats from legal advice came at the Nottingham Area NUM
AEC meeting on 6 December 1984. The AEC considered correspondence from
the national NUM regarding the illegality of the proposed Nottingham Area rule
changes. The national NUM contended that a number of the rule amendments
would be in conflict with the national and model rules of the NUM. The rule
amendment causing the most concern was the deletion of Rule 30 from the
Nottingham Area NUM Area rule book. Rule 30 concerned the relationship of
the Nottingham Area rules to that of the national rules. It stated:
In all matters in which the rules of this union and those of
the national union are in conflict, the rules of the national
union shall apply. In all cases of doubt or dispute the
150 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 326.
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matter shall be decided by the NEe of the national union
and such decision shall be subject to the right of appeal
set out in rule 30 of the rules of the national union's. 151
With the national union now considering legal proceedings to try and stop the
Nottingham Area rule amendments, the Nottingham Area NUM AEe agreed that
authority be given to Hopkins and Sons to represent the Nottingham Area if this
was to happen. The dispute over the rule amendments had the effect of
bringing the simmering relationship between the Nottingham Area NUM working
representatives and Henry Richardson, the pro-strike Nottingham NUM Area
General Secretary, to a head. At the Nottingham Area NUM AECmeeting on 19
December 1984 it was noted that at a recent meeting of the NUM NEe Henry
Richardson had voted in support of a proposal to take his own Area to court
over the proposed rule amendments. 152 The meeting agreed by 12 votes to 2
that Henry Richardson should resign his position as Nottingham NUM Area
General Secretary. In reply Henry Richardson refused to resign on the grounds
that previous NEe decisions gave any NEe member the right to support national
policy when it was in conflict with his own area. The outcome from this
situation would eventually see Henry Richardson suspended from office in
January 1985, with his dismissal being later in the year.
The proposed Nottingham Area rule amendments were considered at the
December 1984 Nottingham Area NUM AeM. NUM Branch delegates had been
mandated at December branch meetings throughout the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. This followed a campaign to get 'rank and file' members to attend the
meeting to enable the rule amendments to go through. (Fig. 5) Generally,
attendance at Nottinghamshire NUM Branch monthly meetings had increased
since the start of the strike but there was still the concern among the moderates
in the Nottinghamshire NUM that the general 'rank and file' colliery worker was
151 Nottingham Area NUM, Nottingham Area (NUM) Rules and Standing Orders, 1983, p. 41.
152 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 404.
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unenthusiastic about attending branch meetings, thus allowing an
unrepresentative left-wing to take control of some branches. Prior to voting
taking place on the Area rule amendments, the Nottingham Area (NUM) General
Secretary read out a communication which had arrived from the national NUM
that morning. The statement said that at a court hearing the previous day Mr
Justice Warner had told the national NUM that 'they had an argument which
should go to full trial.' 153 He also made it clear that if the Nottingham Area
NUM amended their rules, they would have effectively disaffiliated themselves
from the national NUM. The national union was then in a position to be able to
suspend or expel the Nottingham Area from membership of the national union.
The voting went ahead and Nottingham Area Rule 30 was deleted by a vote of
29 branches to 2. A card vote confirmed the deletion of Rule 30 by 540 to 28.
154
As the strike entered 1985 there was a' distinct possibility of a split in the NUM
in the same county where a split had occurred some forty eight years
previously. Potential repercussions from the introduction of Disciplinary Rule 51
and the subsequent Nottingham Area rule amendments laid the foundations for
the actual split in 1985. The NUM in Nottinghamshire had been 'physically split'
from the first days of the strike, now it had become a 'constitutional split'. Had
the Nottingham Area jumped or were they pushed? The Nottingham Area
argued it was a defence pact and they had acted to protect their members from
the new diSCiplinary Rule 51 and any subsequent purge that might happen. The
national NUM was adamant that the Nottingham Area were in breach of the
NUM rules and constitution as a number of the Area rule amendments were in
conflict with the National and Model Rules of the NUM. On the eve of 1985, with
the strike in its tenth month, the NUM had plunged ever deeper into its gravest
ever crisis. The county in which it was born could possibly see its diSintegration
in its present form.
153 Ibid., p, 409.
154 Ibid., p. 410.
115
Chapter 2 - Ballots, Blacklegs and Bedlam
Fig. 4. Nottingham Area NUM Propaganda to attend the Rule amendment
meeting in December 1984.
WAKE UP
You have voted for Democracy, but you should also
make the Effort and ATTEND BRANCH MEETINGS.
That is where all Union Decisions are made -
THESE AFFECT YOU
THE DECEMBER BRANCH
MEETING IS OF CRUCIAL
IMPORTANC-E.
PLEASE ATTEND
The Strikers always attend Meetings
r---
WHY DON'T YOU!
SUPPORT YOUR L.CAL BRANCH -
You have only just voted them into Office
THEY NEED YOUR SUPPORT
WAKE UP
Source: D. Amos collection.
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Despite this desperate situation the NUM reached the end of the strike as a
'united union' of sorts but the 'straw which broke the camel's back' was waiting
just around the corner. It was the twin factors of the disciplining of Roy Lynk
and David Prendergast, the two Nottingham Area NUM 'working miners'
Officials, and the complete revision of the NUM Rules and Constitution which
initiated the actual split in the NUM in 1985. Essentially it was the complete
NUM rules revision which was the actual cause of the split, although it was the
lack of a national ballot and the subsequent 'domino theory' strike strategy
which were responsible for initiating the initial split in the NUM ranks at the start
of the strike in early March 1984. Such was the intense hostility and deep
rooted hatred caused by the strike that acts of vengeance were always likely to
be the outcome following the end of the failed strike. In the post-strike period
the working Nottinghamshire miners' and their elected representatives would be
the key target for retribution in the NUM. They responded with a deepening of
the 'defence ethos' which they had adopted since the early stages of the strike
in March 1984. A ballot vote of the Nottinghamshire membership in May 1985
gave a mandate to leave the NUM in the event of the new Rules and
Constitution being adopted. The 1985 NUM Annual Conference would be the
final one of its kind, the Nottinghamshire miners break with the NUM occurring
on 6 July 1985. Five months to the day from this saw the official recognition of
the UDM on 6 December 1985 and from that time onwards miners' in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield would be represented by two trade unions, as was the
case from 1926 to 1937.
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Chapter 3: UDI to UDM
1. Introduction
The events of 1985 were dominated by a constitutional crisis in the NUM, in
Colin Griffin's words, the NUM being 'more divided and polarised than at any
time in its forty-year history'. 1 The year commenced with the threatened
expulsionof the Nottingham Area from the NUMand ended with the formation
of the UDM in December 1985. The prominent issue throughout 1985 was
dominated by the possibility of a 'Nottinghamshire breakaway' from the national
NUM. The NUM started the 'Keep Notts National' campaign when it was
proposed to expel the Nottingham Area from the national union in February
1985. The SOC to expel the Nottinghamshire rebels never took place.
However, the campaign was given fresh initiative following the Nottingham
Area's decision to disassociatefrom the national union following the 1985 NUM
Annual Conference and Rules Revision Conference. As the Revolutionary
CommunistParty pointed out, the pleas to remain loyal to the national union in
1985were entangledwith the events that started in March 1984when the flying
picketsfirst entered the Nottinghamshirecoalfield:
The only reason any miner would support the national
union is if he could be persuaded to support the strike,
that is what causedthe division in the first place. 2
As the year progressed, a war of attrition emerged between the Nottingham
Area NUM and the national NUM. The Nottingham Area made constant
reference to the events which initially caused the split in the NUM in March
1984. The national union made constant reference to any breakaway union
1 C. P. Griffin, The Leicestershire Miners Vol. 3, p. 269.
2 'The Notts Scapegoats', Revolutionary Communist Party Paper, January 1985.
D. Amos collection.
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being in the lap of the NCB, the Tory Government and big business. Anti-
Nottinghamshire literature constantly referred to any breakaway being a 'return
to Spencerism'. The year ended with the official recognition for the UDM by the
Certification Officer on 6 December 1985 following an amalgamation ballot of
the former Nottingham Area NUM, the South Derbyshire Area NUM, and the
Colliery Trade and Allied Workers Association (crAWA) based in the north-east
coalfield, in October 1985. Later a clerical section, the Colliery Staff and
Supervisory Section (CSSS)was formed.
The amalgamation ballot to form the UDM needed a simple majority to carry the
amalgamation through; one to amend the rules would require a two-thirds
majority. The national union saw this move as a ploy by the Nottingham Area to
form the breakaway more easily. However, when national Rule 43 (the rule for
national strike action) was amended at the NUM SDC on 19 April 1984 the
national union argued for an amendment from 55% needed for strike action to
a simple majority (50%+1). The Nottingham Area NUM argued against a simple
majority, suggesting 55% gave a more substantial mandate. In the autumn of
1985 the roles were reversed. Relations had become so strained during the
1984-85 strike that reprisals following the strike were more or less inevitable.
Crick, writing in February 1985, suggested a climate of hatred and vengeance
would continue from the strike, creating a climate which might see a breakaway
union become reality:
Relations during the strike have become so bitter that
afterwards there are bound to be attempts at reprisals. It
is not difficult to see how Spencerism could return to the
mining industry. 3
3 Michael Crick, Scarglll and the Miners (Harrnondsworth, 1985), p. 126.
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Although the threatened expulsion of the Nottingham Area and the end of the
strike caused their own internal problems in the NUM, it was the events
surrounding the 1985 NUM Annual Conference which finally fractured the fragile
unity which cemented the union together. Two crucial events brought the
strained relationship between the Nottingham Area NUM and the national union
to a head. The national NUM dismissed the two Nottingham NUM Area OffiCials,
Roy Lynk and David Prendergast, for supporting the working Nottinghamshire
NUM members during the strike. Both were subsequently employed by the
Nottingham Area union following the break from the national union. The period
prior to and following the 1985 NUM Annual Conference saw the dismissals of
Henry Richardson and Ray Chadburn, the two Nottingham Area NUM NEC
representatives. Both were subsequently employed by the national union. All of
the dismissals were not conducted amicably and as Colin Griffin stated, 'a more
pragmatic leadership, could perhaps, have held the union together until the
spirit of recrimination and vengeance had time to dissipate'. 4 This mood was
not forthcoming, Richardson and Chadburn arguing that they were right to
support the NEC line on mandates, with Lynk and Prendergast equally arguing
they were in the right in carrying out the 73% Nottingham Area (NUM) working
mandate in the absence of a national ballot.
The second issue stems from the events of the 1985 NUM Annual and Rules
Revision Conference. The new rules and constitution, introduced in July 1985,
broke the federal base of the NUM which had existed since its formation in
1944. Many Areas jealously guarded their assets, and as Professor Chris Wrigley
stated some Area Officials of the NUM acted in a similar fashion to the Ancient
Briton chiefs that existed in Britain prior to the Roman invasion, each one
guarding their little empire. 5 The Nottingham Area had an additional asset to
guard, a county pension fund. The Nottinghamshire Miners Pensions Scheme
4 C. P. Griffin, The Leicestershire Miners Vol. 3, p. 269.
5 Author In discussion with Prof. Chris Wrigley, University of Nottingham, 21 November 2009.
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(NMPS) came into being in 1939 and was founded by George Spencer, the
vilified Nottinghamshire miners' leader who led the 1926 breakaway union. In
2008 the fund had assets worth £148 million. For some the image of the NUM
as the 'vanguard of the union movement', an all-powerful united force, was a
myth. Keith Staley, Bentinck Colliery NUM Committee member and former
Derbyshire miner, always thought of the NUM as a federation:
What was said repeatedly in the 1950s and 1960s, when
Derbyshire miners were being transferred to Notts, was
that the NUM never was, and never had been, a 'National
Union of Mineworkers', only a letter-heading (oo.) all these
years we have been a federation of unions. 6
Andrew Richards identified three main factors which explained the Nottingham
Area's actions during the 1984-85 strike:
The failure to hold a national ballot, the consequent
attempts to spread the strike through picketing (the
domino effect), and the subsequent efforts to make
dissident areas more accountable to the national union. 7
It was around the 'more accountability' issue that the events of 1985 were
enacted. The 1985 post-strike constitutional crisis in the NUM cannot be
divorced from the events of the 1984-85 strike. The worst case scenario in
March 1984 was that the split in the union could lead to a 'breakaway union'.
The events of 1985 saw the worst case scenario become a reality and the UDM
was born.
6 'The Myth of the NUM', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertise~ 19 July 1985, p. 4.
7 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 194.
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2. Expelling the Nottinghamshire Rebels? The Nottinghamshire
Coalfield: January and February 1985
The start of 1985 saw the NUM in what Roy Ottey described as being in 'another
deep constitutional crisis'. 8 The Nottinghamshire miners were at the centre of
that controversy. The initial constitutional crisis Ottey referred to was caused by
the way the strike had commenced under Rule 41 and the 'domino strategy'.
Now a constitutional split in the national union had occurred and for some,
history was about to repeat itself with the situation being likened to the Spencer
Union split from the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) in 1926.
Following the decision of the Nottingham Area NUM to delete Rule 30 from its
Area rule book two differing opinions developed. The national NUM insisted that
the Nottingham Area had refused to adopt the Model Rules for Areas (including
the Disciplinary Rule 51) and thus were in breach of the Union's Rules and
Constitution. The NUM Model Rules stated that in an area of conflict between
Area and National rules, the National Rules shall apply. With the Nottingham
Area deleting this rule it had effectively broken away from the national union.
The Nottingham Area argued that they had acted in self-defence to protect their
members from being disciplined under the new Disciplinary Rule 51. They
argued that there never was or had been a national strike, only a series of Area
strikes, and therefore only a national ballot of all NUM members could have
overturned the Nottinghamshire Area ballot working mandate from 15 - 16
March 1984.
The NEC of the NUM met on 10 January 1985 to consider the situation in
Nottinghamshire. The national union had taken legal action in December 1984
to seek an injunction to stop the Nottingham Area NUM from proceeding with
the Area rule amendments. Although the Judge refused to grant the injunction
he had pointed out that provision existed within the NUM rules for dealing with
8 Ottey, The strike: an insider's view, p. 143.
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an Area that refused to adopt the Model rules of the Union. This was National
Rule 40, titled 'Exclusion or Suspension of an Area or Branch'. Rule 40 (part b)
stated:
If an Area or a Branch in an Area shall: refuse to adopt
the model rules resolved upon by Conference as being
applicable to such subordinate division (Area or Branch)
( ...) such Division (i) may be excluded from the Union by a
resolution of Conference and upon such resolution being
passed all the members of such division shall
automatically cease to be members of the union. 9
The NUM NECmeeting of 10 January 1985 decided that they would continue to
pursue the legal action against the Nottingham Area rule amendments of
December 1984 but were of the opinion that the current situation was that the
Nottingham Area NUM, its Area Council (AC), Area Executive Committee (AEC),
and NUM Officials, by their actions taken at the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on
20 December 1984, had refused to adopt the Model Rules for Areas, and
therefore were in breach of the NUM Rules and Constitution. The NEC agreed
that the following resolution be recommended to a NUM Special Conference
(SDC):
That the NUM Nottinghamshire Area is excluded from the
Union with effect from 1 February 1985 in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 40 of the Union and that the
NEC be only permitted to rescind this decision on receipt
of completely satisfactory undertakings prior to its
implementation. 10
9 National Union of Mineworkers, NUM Rules, Model Rules and Standing Orders, 1978, pp. 20-
21. D. Amos collection.
10 National Union of Mineworkers, Circular: Nottingham Area of the NUM, dated 10 January
1985, Sheffield. D. Amos collection.
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The SDC to expel the Nottingham Area was planned to take place on 30 January
1985. Commenting on the possible expulsion of the Nottinghamshire miners
from the NUM, Ray Lynk, Nottingham NUMArea Official, stated:
It is not our wish to be expelled from the (National) union
( ...) what does seem odd to us in that we in
Nottinghamshire appear to have been sentenced to death,
and then told that the trial will be in two weeks.
Nottinghamshire have never sought a split from the
National Union, it is the National Union that wants. a split
from us and it is my own personal opinion that the real
issue behind the strike never was pit closures. It was
engineered purely for political reasons. 11
Counteracting Roy Lynk's views, Henry Richardson, pro-strike Nottingham Area
NUM General Secretary, suggested it was the Nottingham Area's working
miners' representatives who wanted to split from the NUM:
Make no mistake, they want to breakaway. Already they
are producing literature and leaflets urging people to stay
with the Area and not the National union. They say they
only changed the rules because of the new Disciplinary
Rule ( ...) but that rule change was never put there to
expel Notts members en masse ( ...) the change of the
Notts Area rules was a back door way of breaking away. 12
What Henry Richardson did not state was that the national union was also
producing leaflets at the same time urging miners to stay loyal to the national
11 'Seconds out for Scargill v Lynk', Notts Free Press, 18 January 1985, p. 1.
12 'Witch Hunt in Notts', Labour Weekly, 18 January 1985, p. 1.
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NUM. It was one of these leaflets, along with a letter suggesting that
Nottinghamshire NUM individual Branches could apply en bloc to be admitted to
the new Nottingham Division of the NUM (in the event of the Nottingham Area's
expulsion at the SDC on 30 January) that would bring the simmering
relationship between Richardson and the working Nottingham Area NUM
representatives to a head. Initially, Henry Richardson was suspended from duty
and was eventually dismissed from his position as a Nottingham Area Official
later in 1985. This followed a lengthy and chaotic series of events, involving
various legal actions, which were not concluded until the decision of a High
Court Hearing on 2 April 1985.
At the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 28 January 1985 the contents of a leaflet
that was circulating the Nottinghamshire coalfield was discussed. It was
reported that the leaflet was being distributed by Henry Richardson and his
agents. The leaflet was entitled 'No return to Spencerism: Stay with the NUM'
(Fig. 6) The nature of the complaint was that the leaflet, in the names of the
NUM National Officials, was canvassing for membership of the NUM at a time
when the Nottingham Area was still a constituent association of the national
union. It also contained Henry Richardson's home address to which completed
forms should be sent; all correspondence was normally sent to the NUM Area
Offices. Leading Counsel Opinion had been sought on the contents of the leaflet
and the advice expressed the view that the leaflet was a libellous document. 13
It was proposed that legal action against the contents of the document would
be taken in the names of Roy Lynk, Nottingham Area NUM Acting Secretary and
David Prendergast, Nottingham Area NUM Official. Henry Richardson suggested
he had not been aware of the contents of the leaflet and he undertook to notify
national level that some items in the leaflet could be libellous. 14
13 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1985, p. 23.
14 Ibid.
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Fig.5: No return to Spencerism leaflet: January 1985.
Source: Annesley NUM Branch correspondence 1985, part of D. Amos collection.
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The contents of the leaflet suggested Spencerism had returned to the
Nottinghamshire coalfield:
The Nottingham (Area) Council's decision to delete the
National Union's Model Rules from the Area rule book
effectively creates a breakaway organisation. The spectre
of Spencerism has reared its ugly head in a direct throw-
back to those dark days over half a century ago when
trade unionism in the Notts coalfield was hijacked by
management and the mine-owners. 15
Ironically the same leaflet suggested the NUM would ensure that the 'local
pension rights' of all our members would not be affected by the breakaway,
despite the fact it was George Spencer who created the Notts Miners Pension
Scheme (NMPS) in 1939. 16 NMPSensures that Nottinghamshire miners get an
additional pension to that of the nationwide Mineworkers Pension Scheme
(MPS). The nationwide pension scheme commenced for industrial workers in the
industry initially in 1961, later becoming an earnings related pension scheme in
April 1975.
The author was directly involved in the exposure of the Spencerism leaflet at a
Nottingham Area NUM trade union school at Stoke Rochford Hall in January
1985. The leaflets were left by Roger Windsor, Chief Executive of the NUM,
following a lecture at the school. Roger Windsor was the centre of media
attention when he was exposed as the NUM's representative who met Colonel
Gaddafi of Libya in October 1984 in an attempt to raise funds for the strike.
Britain had broken off diplomatic relations with Libya after Yvonne Fletcher, a
WPC, was reportedly killed by gunfire from the Libyan People's Bureau in
London in April 1984. Following Windsor's aborted lecture at the trade union
school, the author picked up one of the leaflets and brought it to the attention
15 NUM, Leaflet: No retum to Spencerism: Stay with the NUM, Sheffield, January 1985.
16 Ibid.
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of the school's liaison Officers, Colin Clarke and John Allsop. 17 Both men were
working representatives on the Nottingham Area NUM AECand Colin Clarke was
a leading light in the NaWMC (see Chapter 2: Part 4). Copies of the 'Spencerism
leaflet' were forwarded to the Nottingham Area NUM Offices. A letter was then
sent to all Nottinghamshire NUM Branches, enclosing a copy of the leaflet. 18 It
was suggested that the decision to expel the Nottingham Area had already been
made, and the SOC on 30 January 1985 was merely being held to ratify the
decision.
The working Nottingham Area NUM Area Officials issued their own leaflet and
refuted in a leaflet of their own some of the allegations made in the NUM' s
Spencerism leaflet. The suggestion that the Nottingham Area had proposed the
Disciplinary Rule was challenged. The Nottingham leaflet suggested that the
Spencerism leaflet was a 'clumsy attempt at a confidence trick' by inviting
Nottingham Area members to remain in the NUM:
What a nerve! You are the NUM. One thing is for certain,
we don't think that they even begin to understand you.
Can they seriously believe that you will desert your
democratically elected Officials to join those who attacked
your homes, assaulted your mates and called you scab?
What kind of men do they think you are? 19
In response to this 'Notts breakaway' the pro-strike NUM loyalists in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield started a campaign called 'Keep Notts National'. Its
committee was made up largely of striking ex NUM Nottinghamshire Branch
17 The Lecture was aborted following advice from Nottingham Area NUM HQ following the
finding of the Spencerism leaflet. However, the two NUM Uaison Officers put the matter to a
vote of the all the students before the terminating of the lecture.
18 Letter from Roy Lynk (Acting Area Secretary Nottingham (NUM) to all Nottinghamshire NUM
Branches, 23 January 1985. D. Amos collection.
19 Nottingham Area (NUM), 'What kind of men do they think you are? Rule 51: Now the Truth~
January 1985. D. Amos collection.
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Officials, some whom had been ousted in the June 1984 branch elections.
Various allegations were made about supporters of the 'Keep Notts National'
campaign being victimised by the NCB for distributing Keep Notts National
literature. It was also suggested that pressure was being exerted to prevent
working miners from hearing the case for the national union. Nonetheless, after
ten months of the strike, the two opposing sides were as entrenched as ever
and there was little chance of any reconciliation.
The 30 January 1985 arrived and the threatened SOC to expel the Nottingham
Area of the NUM was postponed. A newsletter from the 'Keep Notts National'
campaign stated that the SOC had 'only been deferred'. 20 The initiative
changed to the issue of trying to get a settled agreement on the strike. In the
week leading up to the SOC, moves were made to try and get the NUM and the
NCB back to the negotiating table to resume negotiations to end the strike. The
TUC were heavily involved in setting up these negotiations which were planned
for the week commencing 28 January 1985. In view of the developments the
NUM NEC had agreed that the SOC be postponed. No other date was ever set
for the expulsion SOC. Griffin believed the reason that the expulsion
Conference never went ahead was because feedback from the county indicated
that a considerable majority of Nottinghamshire mineworkers would remain
loyal to the Area Union and the NUM would be left with a 'small band of
loyalists'. 21 Griffin suggested that instead a policy was made that the 'Scargill
faction' in the county should work within the Area to try and gain control over a
period of years. 22 Eric Eaton, former Newstead striker, confirmed this had been
the strategy, although he did admit to it failing. 23 Another theory is that the
events that eventually resulted in the 'return to work with no agreement'
overtook events.
20 'Keep Notts National', Newsletter No.1, 15 February 1985. D. Amos collection.
21 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 10.
22 Ibid.
23 Selstonia Living Heritage Project, 'The Miners' Strike 2S years on', Radio Salistune, Broadcast
on 1 April 2009.
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3. At the Edge of the Precipice: The Nottinghamshire coalfield:
March to May 1985.
The strike ended following an NUM SDC held at Congress House, London on 3
March 1985. Controversially it ended with no agreement on the pit closure
issue between the NCB and the NUM. During February 1985 the TUC had
intervened to try and get an agreed settlement for the dispute but all efforts
were to no avail and failed. Following the breakdown of talks, the
Northumberland Area of the NUM put in a request to the national NUM for a
SDC to consider a return to work without a settlement. The SDC was held on
Sunday 3 March 1985 to consider a return to work without agreement.
Eventually a South Wales NUM resolution to end the strike without agreement
was adopted by the delegates by a vote of 98 to 91. No Nottinghamshire NUM
delegates attended the SOC, the Nottingham Area NUM AC having sought legal
advice as whether to attend the SDC on 3 March 1985. This legal advice
questioned the legitimacy of all national conferences held since 10 August. This
was on the basis that NUM Branch elections, due in May and June 1984, had
been suspended by the national union and therefore the majority of Delegates
had not been elected by the membership, as required under the NUM Rules and
Constitution. 24 The Nottingham Area NUM AC accepted the legal advice and
voted by 24 Branches to 7 not to participate in the return to work SDC on 3
March 1985. 25
In the Nottinghamshire coalfield the return to work by the strikers was mainly a
low key affair. 26 In other coalfields miners followed NUM Branch Banners and
Brass bands back into the pit yards. 1,200 cases of intimidation had been
reported to the police in Nottinghamshire during the dispute. 27 These included
24 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 86.
25 Ibid., p. 87.
26 See Stanley, Nottingham Miners do strike, pp. 108-111; Symcox (ed.), The Diary of John
Lowe, pp. 171-172; Richards, Miners on Strike, pp. 157-172.
27 'The Price of Peace', Notts Free Press, 8 March 1985, p. 8.
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criminal damage and acts of violence, in 960 cases working miners had been the
victims. In the Ashfield region NCB figures suggested just over 2% of the
workmen were still on strike at five of the region's collieries as at 1 March 1985.
28Figures for five Ashfield collieries were broken down as follows:
Table 2 : Ashfield working and striking miners, 1 March 1985.
Working Striking
Bentinck 1,186 16
Annesley 897 45
Newstead 753 49
Sutton 703 16
Silverhill 1,093 20
Totals 4,632 146
Only a handful of strikers saw the dispute to the end at the collieries due to
close, Moorgreen Colliery and Pye Hill Complex. Final dates for the finish of
production had been agreed at a Colliery Review Meeting in February 1985;
both collieries were scheduled to finish production in late July and early August
1985 respectively. The phasing out of the two collieries had begun in 1983 and
by February 1985 Moorgreen's manpower had reduced from 1,050 to 410 with
Pye Hill's manpower falling from 1,070 to 500. 29 Around 140 miners would
remain at each colliery for salvage work.
Attitudes towards the ending of strike were mixed in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. Bentinck striking miner Paul Beasley suggested the strike had not
been a defeat:
2B Ibid.
29 'Pits to close', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 22 February 1985, p. 3.
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It has not been a defeat. We're right behind the national
leadership. I had made up my mind that whatever the
Conference decision on Sunday I would support them
(...) but I would have preferred to carry on. 30
Working Bentinck NUM Branch Official Neil Greatrex suggested even though the
strike had ended it would not mean an end to the troubles in the coal industry:
I think most working miners are pleased to see this strike
eventually come to an end. Unfortunately it does not
mean an end to the troubles. There will no doubt be
some people looking for scapegoats to blame for the
failure of the strike and there will be lots of shouts for
Nottinghamshire to be expelled from the NUM. This is the
worst thing that could happen. 31
Neil Greatrex's prediction of the troubles ahead would become a grim reality as
1985 progressed. In the meantime the ending of the strike threw up some
other pressing issues that had to be dealt with in the Nottingham Area of the
NUM. The first of these issues was the lifting of the overtime ban which had
been in place since 31 October 1983. Nottingham Area NUM members had
adhered to the ban since that time because it was deemed to have been
implemented constitutionally. Despite this there had been rumblings to lift the
overtime ban since the autumn of 1984. A Calverton appeal to the Nottingham
NUM AC on 26 November 1984 asked for a fresh mandate on the ban as twelve
months had passed since the membership gave that mandate. 32 Prior to this,
various communications had been received at national NUM level that certain
30 'The Price of Peace', Notts Free Press, 8 March 1985, p. 9.
31 Ibid.
32 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 374.
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Nottinghamshire NUM Branches had planned to breach the national overtime
ban. Henry Richardson dismissed these claims stating that the Nottingham Area
(NUM) AEC had upheld the national overtime ban whenever it had been
questioned, only giving dispensation for overtime working in the interests of
safety. 33 Nottinghamshire NUM Branches considered the position of the
overtime ban during February 1985 and the decision to lift the ban was made at
the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 25 February 1985. Branches voted by 20 to
11 to lift the ban, this decision being endorsed by a 'card vote' of 360 votes to
206. 34 A substantive' motion to lift the ban as from the day of the ACM was
carried by 21 Branches to 10. Evidence from the surface overtime book at
Moorgreen Colliery suggests that overtime working recommenced on the
weekend of 9 - 10 March 1985 following the end of the strike. (Fig. 7 p. 136)
Nationally the overtime ban was lifted following the decision of a NUM SOC in
Sheffield on 2 April 1985. 35
A second issue which came about with the ending of the strike was the plight of
NUM members that had been dismissed during the strike. Part of the resolution
which ended the strike on 3 March 1985 was aimed at getting the dismissed
miners their jobs back. The resolution called on the NUM NEC to negotiate with
the NCB on a national basis for an amnesty for those men dismissed during the
dispute. 36 Nationally over 600 NUM striking members were dismissed by the
NCB. At the May 1985 Nottingham Area NUM ACM it was reported that the
Nottingham Area was representing six cases of unfair dismissal in the NCB
South Nottinghamshire Area and fifteen cases in the NCBNorth Nottinghamshire
Area. 37 In conjunction with the 3 March 1985 resolution to reinstate dismissed
NUM members, a resolution was passed to set up a Hardship and Victimisation
33 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 358.
34 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 55.
35 NUM, NUM Annual Report 1985, p. 34.
36 Ibid., p. 59.
37 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 194.
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Fig.6. NUMOvertime Ban (31-10-83 to 9-3-85 Moorgreen Colliery - Surface.
Source: Moorgreen Colliery Surface Overtime Book (the late Roy Bestwick, Heanor)
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Trust Fund, in order for the national NUM to fulfil its obligations to the dismissed
miners under National Rule 42. 38 The NUM NEe considered this resolution at a
meeting on 7 March 1985 and it was decided that a special levy of SOpper week
should be paid by all members of the NUM to the Miners' Solidarity Fund. 39 A
national ballot would be held to ratify the NEe decision. The Nottingham Area
NUM AEe considered the case of the SOplevy for sacked miners, along with the
subsequent ballot planned to implement the levy, at a Special Area Executive
meeting on 18 March 1985. After considering the matter the AEe unanimously
agreed that the Nottingham Area's legal advice that all conferences since 10
August 1984 were illegal should be adhered to. Thus the Nottingham Area NUM
did not participate in the national-ballot, or the SOp levy for sacked miners. 40
Similar decisions were made in the South Derbyshire and Leicestershire Areas of
the NUM, both who had a majority of NUM members who worked through the
1984-85 strike. In the event the national ballot turned down implementing the
SOp levy for dismissed miners. Following this, the national NUM embarked on a
campaign for NUM members to voluntarily donate to the Miners' Solidarity Fund.
The other main issue concerned the wage claim which had been outstanding
since October 1983. The last wage increase for miners dated from the autumn
of 1982, by the end of the strike it was almost two and half years since NUM
members had received any wage rise. At a Nottingham Area NUM Special AEC
meeting on 7 March 1985 the apparent lack of any negotiations on wages and
terms of conditions at national NUM level was considered. 41 With the strike now
ended and the Nottinghamshire coalfield almost back to normal working, it was
agreed that Nottingham NUM Area Officials, Roy Lynk and David Prendergast,
should meet the NeB Area Board and have informal discussions regarding the
outstanding wage claim. An appeal on the wages issue from the Pye Hill No.2
38 NUM, Report of Special Delegates Conference, 3 March 1985, p. 105.
39 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 100.
40 Ibid. .
41 Ibid., p. 87.
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Branch, was referred to all Nottinghamshire NUM Branches for a decision at the
ACM on 25 March 1985. The appeal was worded as follows:
We, the Pye Hill No.2 Branch, appeal to Council that due
to the fact that since November 1982 the national union
has failed to negotiate any wage settlement with the
Board, therefore, we ask that Council make a direct
approach on behalf of the membership of the Nottingham
Area.42
The Pye Hill appeal was turned down by the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 22
April 1985 by 19 votes to 12. 43 Eventually a 10.65% pay offer over two years
was accepted by the national NUM in April 1985. Ironically, following the major
upheavals of the dispute, the NUM accepted the same wage increase that was
on offer prior to the dispute, dating back to October 1983. Commenting on the
wage settlement, Roy Lynk suggested it could be construed as a drop in pay:
The offer is worth less how. We have negotiated a drop
in pay. It is a pity they did not accept the 5.2% offer
when it was first offered in 1983. Hundreds of men who
have left the industry have lost out 44
Furthermore, Ray Lynk stated that the Nottingham Area NUM would not be
seeking any bonus payment for those who had worked through the strike.
Commenting on the extra pay allegations that had been made he stated:
We did not work through for the satisfaction of the
Government or the NCB. We were working and
fighting for a principle and we would be insulted if
42 Ibid., p. 117.
43 Ibid., p. 148.
44 'Pit Pay, no victory says NUMleader', Notts Free Press, 19 April 1985, p. 4.
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someone asked us to accept more payment for
working through the dispute. 45
At the end of the strike a 'moderate pact' of the AECs from the Nottinghamshire
Area NUM, the South Derbyshire Area NUM and the Leicestershire Area NUM,
met on 14 March 1985 to discuss issues arising from the dispute. The main
paints were:
1. That the dispute since 1984 had not been of a 'national character'.
2. The actions of the national union since March 1984 have divided the
union. A national ballot under Rule 43 would have alleviated the problem
of the miners being divided.
3. Despite the end of the strike the outstanding problems within the coal-
industry have not been solved.
4. That the NECbe contacted will an aim of lifting the overtime ban. Failing
a satisfactory response from the national union the joint areas will use
their own autonomy and allow their membership to work overtime.
S. If any attack is made, from whatever source, on any of the three areas, it
will be collectively opposed.
6. The joint areas make it explicitly clear that their aims and objectives at all
times are committed to the NUM and reiterate they are totally opposed to
the NCB policy of pit-closures and rundown of manpower.
7. The three joint areas should make it clear, that by their attitudes, they
are not in the hand of the NCB or the Government. The joint areas were
45 Ibid.
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keen to help resolve the current problems facing the industry at the same
time uniting all sides of industry in a democratic manner.
How an attack on the moderates might occur was not entirely clear at the time.
Nevertheless, by the time the Nottingham Area NUM AC met at a SCM on 10
April 1985 things became a little clearer. Correspondence from national NUM
level had been received giving details of a Special Rules Revision Conference
that would take place following the 1985 NUM Annual Conference. The entire
rules of the NUM were to be changed and the federal constitution of the union
abolished.
4. New Rules for Democracy?
In January 1985 when the National NUM SOC was proposed, to consider
expelling the Nottingham Area from the NUM, Section 8 of the NUM document
gave details of an amendment to rule which aimed to 'establish a single national
organisation to embrace all workers within the British coalmining lndustrv'." In
considering the Nottingham Area's refusal to adopt the disciplinary Rule 51 into
its Area Rules, the NUM SOCof 10 January 1985 resolved that:
In order to avoid a similar situation arising again, the
national office is required, in consultation with the
union's legal advisors, to prepare an amendment to
rule that will give effect to the intentions of the
inaugural Conference of the NUM in 1944 and
establish a single national organisation to embrace
all workers within the British Coalmining Industry. 47
46 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 4.
47 Ibid.
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Initially the Nottingham Area NUM AC decided to call a Conference of Branch
Officials and Committee Members (BOCM) in order that the "fullest possible
discussion and understanding of the proposed rules revision could take place".
48 It was further agreed that a meeting of the moderate pact of the Nottingham
Area NUM, the South Derbyshire Area NUM, the Leicestershire Area NUM and
COSA, the clerical section of the NUM, should take place to discuss the
implications from the rules and constitution change. The Nottingham Area NUM
Conference of BOCM took place at the Nottingham Area HQ on 18 April 1985.
The Conference had been convened to offer as much legal advice and
information as possible regarding the proposed new NUM National Rules and
Constitution. 49 In attendance were Mr Igor Judge QC, Mr Peter Keenan
(Barrister) and Paul Todd from the Nottingham Area NUM's solicitors, Hopkins
and Sons to give legal advice. Igor Judge dealt with the main points in the
proposed changes which were listed as being Membership, Areas, Discipline,
Dissolution, Control, Model Rules and Strike Action. However, in his opening
remarks Mr Judge stressed that the rules revision represented fundamental
changes in the relationship between the national union and the areas, which if
carried out, would have a great effect on the autonomy and control of area
unions. 50 This would result in greater control being placed in the hands of the
national union; in his opinion the federal structure of the NUM would be
finished. Mr Judge also stressed the importance of ensuring that the Nottingham
Area NUM membership were made fully aware of the implications of the
proposed rules revision and their effect on the future of the Nottingham Area if
they were passed at the Special Rules Revision Conference in July. In his
summing up Igor Judge placed an emphasis on several key points of the
proposed rules revision if they were implemented. He stated that the new rules
48 Ibid., p. 133.
49 Ibid., p. 140.
50 Ibid.
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would be detrimental to the Nottinghamshire Area in a number of ways. 51 In
his opinion they would:
• Greatly increase the power of the national NUM against the Area unions.
• Confer disciplinary power of the widest kind upon the National
Disciplinary Committee (NDC)
• Enable the NUM NEC to call a strike, which could be declared official,
without a ballot and without the likelihood of court interference of the
type recently seen
• Enable the general funds of the Area unions to be used by the national
NUM.
• Enable the current President of the NUM to exercise the increased
powers conferred upon him without the need for re-election under the
new (trade-union) legislation.
In conclusion, he stated that it was the two main issues of control by the
members, along with the autonomy and independence of the constituent
unions, which remained as the most important aspects of the proposed NUM
rules revision. Mr Judge also suggested that as the recent dispute loomed large
in the minds of all members of the union their reaction to it could affect their
stance regarding the proposed rule changes. Commenting on the new rule
proposals, Peter Heathfield (NUM General Secretary), stated they were designed
to:
51 The Proposed Changes in the rules of the NUM, Legal Advice, Hopkins & Sons Solicitors, April
1985. D. Amos collection.
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Strengthen democracy in what we proudly claim is one of
the most democratic trade unions in the world. 52
For many working Nottinghamshire miners, the Heathfield statement had a
hollow ring about it following the events of the last twelve months. For them it
was a case of strengthening an oligarchy. A 'breakaway union' in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield now seemed more likely than ever with the proposed
rules revision debacle now taking centre stage. A Conference of Nottingham
Area NUM BOCM decided that a ballot vote of the Nottinghamshire NUM
membership would be necessary in order to ascertain what action the
Nottingham Area should take; in the event of the new rules coming in. 53 The
decision was endorsed by the AEC. The ballot was arranged to take place for
the week commencing Monday 13 May 1985, with a recommendation that the
membership vote against the proposed national rule changes. The two opposing
camps now commenced their respective campaigns in the run up to the ballot.
Commenting on the forthcoming ballot Roy Lynk put the case for opposing the
rule changes:
In the forthcoming ballot we are asking the
Nottinghamshire membership to indicate through the
ballot box that they are prepared to give the Nottingham
AEC the power to resist these rule changes ( ...) if the rule
changes are implemented (...) Mr Scargill will have
complete and utter control over the lives, thoughts and
deeds of every member ( ...) there is no such place in a
democratic society for anyone man to have such power.
54
52 NUM, 'New Rules for Democracy', The Miner: Special Edition, May 1985, p. 1.
53 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 140.
54 'Pit leaders in Stay Loyal plea', Notts Free Press, 3 May 1985, p. 1.
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Speaking in support of the proposed rule changes, Peter Heathfield, NUM
General Secretary, suggested that a hysterical campaign against the new rules
had been whipped up by enemies of the NUM and by the media. 55 He stated
that the new rules would not affect the powers of the Areas whatsoever and
that AECswould have the same control over their members, to hold area ballots
and control area pension funds and union funds. The aim was to bring the old
rules up to date, with others being made necessary by the Thatcher
Government's trade union laws and legal actions taken up during the strike.
Author David Howell suggested that even though some sectors of the NUM were
receptive to breakaway initiatives, the rewriting of the NUM Rule Book gave
these breakaway initiatives more credibility. 56 In his opinion certain proposals
in' the rule changes contained 'elements that were bound to reawaken the
passions and divisions from the strike'. 57 Not least of these was the issue of
industrial action, Rule 26c, under the title of Industrial Action, which recalled the
controversial strategy which had underpinned the 1984-85 strike from the
outset:
The NEC shall have the power to call industrial action by
any group of members whether in one, or part of one, or
more than one area and such action will be declared to be
official. 58
For critics of the proposed new rules the spectre of a strike without a ballot was
here once again. In its defence the national NUM stated that Rule 26c needed
introducing because of the legal action taken against it during the strike and
subsequent sequestration of its funds. Trade union lawyers had advised the
NUM that had Rule 26c been in the existing rule book then it would have been
55 NUM, 'New Rules for Democracy', The Miner, May 1985, p. 1.
56 Howell, The Politics of the NUM, p. 181.
57 Ibid.
58 NUM, Preliminary Agenda of the Special Rules Conference 1985, p. 18.
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protected and its funds would not have been sequestrated. Winding up the
national union's defence, the NUM National President placed an emphasis on the
rules being democratically proposed by the democratically elected bodies within
the NUM. He suggested that NUM votes, whether by branch or ballot, always
showed a high turnout.
However, trade union democracy depended on how one viewed it. NUM pit
head ballots historically had high participation rates but attendances at branch
meetings were a different case. In some cases a militant minority could
overtake the running of a NUM Branch as most rank and file members were
unenthusiastic about regularly attending branch meetings. Hallsworth found this
to be the case in the Yorkshire NUMArea in the early 1980s during the Laurence
Scott Electronics dispute. 59 Fryer suggested 'remoteness from home and place
of work, timing of the meetings, arcane procedure and archaic language' as
reasons for poor attendances at union branch meetings. 60 Fryer also identified
the problems that were caused by the mass pit closures of the 1960s which had
caused the 'bussing in' of large sections of colliery workforces at the remaining
collieries:
Even the mining industry where branch and lodge
organisation might have been closely integrated with the
pit and the village, the extension of bussing miners to
work from areas were pits had closed meant they (Branch
meetings) fell increasingly to an activist minority. 61
By the early 1980s in many coalfields, miners were travelling to work from
regions where the pits had shut in the Robens Era of the 1960s. The NCBSouth
59 D. Hallsworth, 'When strikes were strikes', www.SDiked-online.com. 2002, retrieved 20
September 2011.
60 B. Fryer, 'Trade Unionism in Crisis', in Huw Beynon (ed.), Digging Deeper: Issues in the
Miners'Strike (London, 1985), p. 75.
61 Ibid., p. 76.
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Nottinghamshire Area was an example of this, with many miners travelling daily
from areas of the Derbyshire coalfield around Heanor, Ripley and Alfreton,
which had lost their pits in the 1964-70 era. This was also common in other
areas. Down and Warrington's study of the Somerset coalfield looked at this
mobility of labour at a time when the Somerset coalfield had contracted to its
last two working collieries in the late 1960s:
There are several instances of ranks of new houses being
erected to house workmen of a new mine, the village
around Kilmersdon Colliery being an example. For the
older pits, however, the men seem to have integrated into
existing communities without obvious rows of miners'
cottages. These men would often own homes and, when
their local pit closed, be reluctant to move. Instead they
would be content to travel further to work ( ...) even today
there are men who travel ten miles from Pensford to
Kilmersdon for work. 62
It was a fine balancing act when decisions made by an activist few at a union
meeting could affect thousands of union members. There was also the issue of
everyone not being able to attend union meetings; a small section of workforce
always had to be available for weekend work for repair and maintenance. Their
work was vital in keeping the collieries operating from Monday to Friday.
In the meantime another major issue was thrown into the arena during the run
up to the rules revision conference. Nottingham NUM Area Officials Roy Lynk
and David Prendergast were summoned to appear before the NUM hierarchy to
answer allegations concerning their conduct during the strike. They were
62 e.G. Downs and AJ. Warrington, The History of the Somerset Coalfield (Newton Abbott,
1969), p. 38.
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charged with committing acts of gross misconduct relative to their contracts of
employment with the national union and disobeying the lawful instructions of
the NUM NEe. Lynk and Prendergast were summoned to appear before the
NUM NEC on 9 May 1985 with the final decision and appeal going to the 1985
NUM Annual Conference in July. The Nottingham Area NUM AEC considered
the allegations against Roy Lynk and David Prendergast at a SECMeeting on 29
April 1985. After considering the evidence the Nottingham Area NUM gave out
a statement in defence of their area leadership:
We will not stand for our leadership to be treated in this
way. All they are guilty of is obeying the democratic
wishes of the Nottinghamshire NUM membership. We
shall be asking the membership to support our stance.
( ...) These trumped up charges are an attempt to silence
our leadership, if that fails, to sack them (...) We stand for
democracy. Arthur Scargill had better understand that we
will not allow the decisions of our ballot box to be swept
aside.63
The disciplining of Lynk and Prendergast was likened to appearing at a
kangaroo court. It was reported that threatening letters signed by the NUM
General Secretary, Peter Heathfield, had been pushed through the letter boxes
of the two Nottingham Area NUM Officials during the night. 64 At the NUM NEC
meeting on 9 May it was recommended that Lynk and Prendergast be dismissed
by the NUM for gross misconduct. Commenting on his potential dismissal from
the NUM Lynk stated:
63 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 174-175.
64 'Future at Stake', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.3: Part 2, May 1985, p. 1.
D. Amos collection.
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There will be no appeal ( ...) I have carried out my
commitment to the Nottinghamshire miners ( ...) and there
is no way I am going to grovel to anyone. This is justice
gone crazy, but we intend to continue to fight within the
national union rather than go it alone (...) I will continue
to serve and do my job as a Nottinghamshire miners'
leader. Their mandate is the only authority I will accept.
65
Following the proposed dismissals of Lynk and Prendergast the Nottingham Area
NUM AEC met to discuss the situation on 16 May 1985. At the meeting it was
proposed that in the event of the termination of their contracts, contracts of
employment should be offered to them with the Nottingham Area Union. The
new contracts were to be on similar terms to the ones that currently existed
with the National NUM.
In the meantime the Area ballot on the proposed NUM rule change went ahead
on 14 May 1985. On the ballot paper the following question was put:
Do you support your Nottingham AEC in opposing
the new national rule changes, even if this means
being expelled from the NUM, or leaving the NUM?
At a SECmeeting of the Nottingham Area NUM AEC on 16 May 1985 the result
of the area ballot was announced:
Those voting yes 15,157 (73% of those voting)
5,631 (27% of those voting) 66Those voting no
65 'I won't grovel: sacked NUM Chief, Notts Free Press, 17 May 1985, p. 1.
66 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 181.
146
Chapter 3 - UD! to UDM
The Nottingham Area now had an official mandate to oppose the new NUM
rules. Commenting on the May 1985 area ballot result George Liddle,
NottinghamArea NUMVice-Presidentstated:
The Area Executive has tapped right into the grassroots
feelings of the membership. We were confident they
would support us in the ballot and they responded
magnificently. 67
Likewise, Roy Lynk, commenting on the ballot result and on his potential
forthcoming dismissal,said:
The (Nottinghamshire) membership has shown
overwhelmingly that they will not be dictated to by an
unrepresentativeclique in Sheffield who wants to impose
sinister rule changeson them. Nor are they prepared to
put up with these people trying to get rid of the
Nottinghamshireleadership.68
Another Area Ballot took place during May 1985 to replace Henry Richardson,
the dismissedNottinghamArea NUMGeneralSecretary.Thirteen candidatesput
up for the position of NottinghamAreaOfficial and the eventual winner was Neil
Greatrex from the Bentinck NUM Branch. Neil Greatrex had acted as the
unofficial voice of the working Nottinghamshireminers in the Marchto July 1984
period, frequently criticising both Arthur Scargill and the way the strike was
being conducted. Within days of Greatrex being elected as a Nottingham Area
NUMOfficial it was reported that a disciplinary call would be arriving for his
dismissal. As with Lynk and Prendergastthis move had been pre-empted and
67 'Thanks a MIllion', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.3: Part 3, June 1985, p. 1.
D. Amos collection.
68 Ibid.
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plans were made for the newly elected Area Official to have his terms and
conditions of employment underwritten by the Nottingham Area Union. Greatrex
later suggested that he never was paid by the NUM at any time because Arthur
Scargill would not accept his election as a Nottingham Area Official.69
Ironically, prior to the strike Neil Greatrex had been one of Arthur Scargill's
biggest supporters in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Things changed with the
1984-85 strike when Neil Greatrex eventually made a decision to move from
pro-strike to anti-strike. (see Chapter 2: Part 2, p. 75-76) Commenting on his
one-time support for the NUM President he said:
The men at the pit said you will rue the day that you
supported Scargill. In defence of Scargill I said there is a
NEC to keep him in check (... ) however, all of the NEC
was threatened in 1984 because their terms of conditions
were with the national union. When the strike started they
stood the chance of losing their houses, cars and pensions
(...) Roy Ottey [Power Group NECmember and a JP] said
he would not have nothing to do with an illegal strike and
it cost him his £30,000 pension. 70
Roy Ottey resigned from the NUM NEC in November 1984 following the NUM
acting in contempt of the law in respect of the sequestration of its funds. Neil
Greetrex.took office as a Nottingham Area NUM Official in June 1985 following
the Area ballot on 22 May 1985. He retired as UDM Nottingham Section
President in 2008.
69 Interview with Neil Greatrex, Mansfield, 20 March 2008.
70 Ibid.
148
Chapter 3 - UDI to UDM
5. "Aswe left the silence was deafening": The Nottingham Area
NUMand the 1985 NUMAnnual Conference.
, At the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 24 June 1985 Ray Chadburn, the NUM
Area President, gave his annual report. A significant part of his comments
emphasised events from the strike; other comments suggested a rocky road
ahead for the coal industry. Despite the internal divisions that had plagued the
Nottingham NUM since the start of the strike he called for reconciliation on the
eve .of the 1985 NUMAnnual Conference:
( ...) The Union cannot be totally exonerated for their
handling of the dispute, because of the highly emotive
issues that were at stake, mistakes were made, and as a
consequence the union became bitterly divided. It is
essential therefore, that we stop looking over our
shoulders and look to the future and create a climate of
reconciliation whereby we can all go forward together and
bring about a united national union (...) unless we have a
united national union, many of our aspirations will fall by
the wayside. 71
Despite all the bitterness and divisions caused by the strike both working and
striking NUM representatives hoped for some sort of reconciliation following the
end of the strike. Newly elected Nottingham Area Official, Neil Greatrex also
used conciliatory language:
Much remains to be done to heal the mistrust and
bitterness in this coalfield. I see it as part of my task to
help achieve true unity and comradeship again. 72
71 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 247.
72 'Neil will work for true unity', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.4, June 1985, p. 2.
D. Amos collection.
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On the eve of the Conference NUM National President Arthur Scargill made a
plea for unity. He said "We want every member and every area to stay solid
and remain in the NUM. This is the only way we can combat the NCB's pit
closure programme and improve wages and conditions". 73 A Morning Star
article reported that all signs seemed to point to a majority of Delegates being
in a conciliatory mood in an effort to re-unite the areas of the NUM and its
membership. The mood of the Conference, the dismissal of Roy Lynk and David
Prendergast and the Rules Revision later in the week would shatter these
illusions and lead to a split in the the union.
Despite his conciliatory tones on the eve of the Conference, when addressing
the Conference the National President castigated those whom he considered
had let the union down during the strike. In his opinion these included the TUC,
the Electricians and Power unions, the Labour Party and the ISTC steel union.
However the severest criticism was laid at the door of the Nottinghamshire
miners who, in his opinion, had not followed the 'democratic decision under Rule
41' and had not respected picket lines. This, he said, had provided a life line to
the Tory Government. 74 Despite not getting a seconder, to condemn the NUM
NEC for its work over the previous twelve months, other resolutions from the
Nottingham Area NUM achieved some success, with sickness leave and National
Concessionary Fuel Agreements being composited with other resolutions and
one of unsociable hours pay being carried. However, it was when Resolution 2
on Victimisation was debated that all the bitterness and anger stored up from
the strike exploded. Resolution 2 had been submitted by the left-wing Kent
Area NUM on the issue of reinstatement for NUM members dismissed during the
course of the strike:
73 'Scargill calls for unity as NUM Delegates gather', Moming Star, 1 July 1985, p. 2.
74 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 289.
150
Chapter 3 - UDI to UDM
Conference agrees that if, as a result of the 1984-85
strike, any victimised member not in jail at the time who
has not been reinstated by the NCB by the last day of
September 1985, then a Special Conferencewill be held
during the first half of October 1985 in order to decide
upon what action will be taken to bring about their
reinstatement. 75
The issueat stake was the fate of 622 NUMmembers who had been dismissed
during the strike. The Kent Area went to the rostrum demanding national
industrial action on the issue and it was when the Nottingham Area Delegation
voted against the motion that all the bitterness exploded. The Kent Resolution
was carried with only Nottingham Area Delegatesvoting against. Following the
Conference John Allsop, one of the Notts Area Delegates and NUM Branch
Delegateat Sutton Collierysaid:
We were in Sheffield, representingthousandsof men who
had been subjected to unprecedented violence and
intimidation (...) the hatred shown reminded us what
Scargillism meant. Not once during the strike did he
condemnthe thugs who had attacked our members.76
Hilary Cave, National NUMEducationOfficer, suggested some members of the
Nottingham Delegation were equally hostile towards the striking miners'
fraternity at Conference, singling out Neil Greatrex for particular attention. 77
The hostility on both sides was perhaps understandable as former allies Neil
Greatrexand Arthur Scargillwere now bitter enemies.
75 NUM, Decisions of the 1985 Annual Conference, Sheffield, p. 4.
76 'Hatred: don't ever forget', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.S, July 1985, p. 1.
D. Amos collection.
77 Interview with Hilary Cave and Barry Johnson, Chesterfield, 8 March 2008.
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Day three of the Conference saw the Nottingham Area NUM appeal under Rule
30, with regard to accepting the Area's nominations to the Parliamentary A
Group. This was for the nomination of Don Concannon and Frank Haynes, the
two NUM sponsored Nottinghamshire Labour MPs. The issue became embroiled
in the dispute over the Nottingham Areas refusal to accept the NUM Model rules
following the deletion of Rule 30 from its Area Rule Book in December 1984.
Conference voted against accepting the two Nottinghamshire Labour
nominations by 91 votes to 23; it was stated that the NUM NEC could not
sanction any Parliamentary candidates they had no control over. Day three also
saw the Barnsley Area Women's Support Group invited into Conference to make
a £9,500 donation to the Victimised Miners Appeal. They were given a standing
ovation by the rest of the Delegates with a call to the Nottingham Delegation to
'stand up you scabby bastards'. 78
Despite the animosity, and at times intense bitterness and hostility, of the 1985
Annual Conference the Nottingham NUM Delegation were still there after three
difficult days. However, it would be the Rules Revision on Day 4 which would
be the 'straw which broke the camel's back'. For the Nottingham Delegation the
bone of contention was the way the rules revision was conducted. George Rees
from South Wales NUM chaired the Conference Arrangements Committee. As he
was going through the logistics of the amendments, it was stated that the South
Derbyshire Area NUM amendment would be dealt with first. The South
Derbyshire Amendment challenged the NUM NEC amendment by opposing the
new rules en-bloc, leaving the old NUM rules in place. The NUM NEC proposal
on the Rules revision was worded: 'Delete all existing rules, model rules for
areas and standing orders and insert the revised rules, model rules and standing
orders'. 79 The new NUM rules were then to be renumbered into 32 new rules
as against 51 in the old rule book. When George Rees was questioned about
78 Ibid., p. 292.
79 NUM, Preliminary Agenda of the Special Rules Conference, Sheffield, 1985, p. 5.
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the other amendmentshe replied that there could not be any amendmentsuntil
you have got rules; as the South Derbyshire amendment was addressing the
NEC recommendation and that had to go first. If the South Derbyshire
amendment fell, then the NECrecommendation would stand on its own, and
would delete all existing rules and adopt the new model rules en bloc. 80 At
past NUM Conferences amendments to the rules were taken individually,
debated and then voted on. In 1985 the new rules were voted in en bloc, with
amendmentsand debate following. Neil Greatrex, one of the Nottingham Area
delegates to Conference, suggested the voting on the rules en bloc was a
flagrant abuseof customand practice:
Normallysomeonemoves the resolution or changeof rule,
you then go through each individual rule amendment,
debate them and then vote on them. Scargill got to the
rostrum and said something like "That's the new rule
book, we're not spendingtime going through them, I want
you to adopt them in their entirety". I stood up and
accusedhim of being a cheat 81
When voting eventually took place the South Derbyshireamendment fell on a
card vote by 54 to 170. The NECrecommendationto vote the new rules in en
bloc was carried by 174 votes to 58. The Nottingham delegation knew it was
more or less inevitable that they would have to leavethe Conferencebecauseof
their ballot mandate to oppose the new rules. However, Roy Lynk asked for a
ten minute recess for the Nottingham Delegation to consider their position.
During the recessthe Nottingham Delegation reached a decision that they had
no option but to leave the Conference. Recalling the situation Roy Lynk
80 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 292.
81 Interview with Neil Greatrex, Mansfield, 20 March 2008.
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suggested that a 'democracy trap' had been set with the voting taking place first
and the debate afterwards:
We walked out of the Conference because if we had
stayed we were agreeing to the new rules. I got up (...)
and said there was no way we could stay and go through
supposed democracy in this fashion. In effect a trap had
been set in pushing the rules through in this way. The
aim was to get people into voting first and speaking
against afterwards. Scargill could then claim you had
taken part in the vote. 82
The situation Lynk described was confirmed by Jim Dowen, former Clipstone
NUM Branch Delegate and striker, who suggested that because they had
participated in the initial vote, the Nottingham Area NUM had accepted the new
, rules:
By virtue of taking part in the debate on the new rules,
even though they (the Nottingham Area) voted against
them, they have accepted the new rule book. 83
On day four of the NUM Conference it went into Private Session to discuss the
NEC recommendation to dismiss Roy Lynk and David Prendergast from their
employment with the NUM. The recommendations were to dismiss Lynk for
gross misconduct and to reprimand Prendergast. Both had to appear on the
rostrum to defend the allegations made against them. Lynk recalled defending
his position at the 1985 NUM Annual Conference:
82 Interview with Roy Lynk, Sutton-in-Ashfield, 28 December 200S.
83 AA • st.
,·,ommg ar, 9 July 1985, p. 9.
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( ...) I had to go before the NUM NEC on a disciplinary
hearing. There were thousands of people outside the
meeting and it was terrifying (...) At the Conference I had
to make a speech as to why I should not be dismissed. I
told the Conference that the Nottingham Area had voted
73% to continue working until a National Ballot under Rule
43 of the NUM rules. I informed them under no
circumstances would I betray the Nottinghamshire miners
and challenged them that given the same situation which
one of them would go against a 73% mandate. Anyway
they voted to sack me. 84
The voting was 75 to 18 in Lynk's case for him to be dismissed, and 81 to 13 to
dismiss David Prendergast. Both were dismissed on the grounds of gross
misconduct and insubordination. (see Appendix 10)
Could the split have been avoided at the 1985 NUM Conference? It was the first
Conference a Nottinghamshire Delegation had attended since the aborted July
1984 SDCwhich introduced the controversial Disciplinary Rule 51. At that time
the Nottingham Delegation were made up of elected Delegates from the union
year 1983-84, as under the union rules. A majority of these were pro-strike
Branch Officials who had recently been deposed at the recent June 1984 Branch
Elections. However, the Delegation to the 1985 NUM Conference was made up
of working miners, delegates who had replaced the pro-strike Nottinghamshire
NUM Branch Officials in the elections of May - June 1984. It was thought
therefore that they would receive a hostile reception. Keith Gildart suggested
the uncompromising position of the NUM NEC meant any possible reconciliation
between the national NUM and the Nottingham Area was unlikely but the rules
revision conference made it impossible:
84 Interview with Roy Lynk, Sutton-in-Ashfield, 28 December 2005.
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There was a complete intransigence of the officials in their
articulation of a policy for preventing a split. The rules
revision conference of 1985 was crucial in that it codified
the aversion of the union to the situation in Notts and
lacked any sense of conciliation. 85
Alan Griffin, in his assessment of the situation, cited not just the rules issue but
the hostility shown towards the Nottingham NUM delegation by striking
delegates and the bellicose Presidential address by Arthur Scargill as being
factors for making the split inevitable:
The national rule changes of July 1985 created a totally
new situation. The Nottingham Delegation went to that
Conference with a mandate, obtained in a ballot with a
73% majority, to vote against, and to refuse to operate,
the proposed new rules (...) their hostile reception at
Conference killed any such hopes [of reconciliation], and
the belligerent address by a President, in which he
castigated those who had opposed the strike. 86
The argument then centred on whether the Nottingham Area had jumped or
had been pushed. The atmosphere at the Conference had at times been hostile,
interspersed with cries of scab when a working miner went to the rostrum, or in
Roy Lynk's case being greeted with hissing. However, as the Nottingham
Delegation walked out of the Conference on 4th July 1985 it must have been
obvious to everyone there that the NUM in its present form was about to come
to an end after just over forty years. The Nottingham Area NUM report on the
1985 NUMAnnual Conference concluded with the following words:
85 Gildart, North Wales Miners: A Fragile Unity, p. 193.
86 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 10.
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For all the sneers and jeers we had had all week, when we
left the silence was deafening. 87
Events proceeded rapidly following the Nottingham Area walkout. On Saturday
6 July 1985 a Conference of Nottingham Area SOCM met at the Area HQ to
discuss the situation. Members of the Delegation to the National Conference
gave individual reports on the proceedings on the main events. These included
the dismissals of Lynk and Prendergast, the Parliamentary A List debacle and
the National Rules Revision. After receiving the reports the meeting
congratulated the Delegation on its behaviour at the NUM Conference, especially
bearing in mind the 'intense hatred, verbal harassment and intimidation that
had been levelled against them by Delegates from other Areas'. 88 The meeting
then agreed by 228 votes to 20 to recommend to the Nottingham Area Council
(AC) the following resolution:
This Conference confirms the mandate given by the
membership in Nottinghamshire, and disassociates the
Notts Area from the national union with immediate effect.
89
As one of the 20 who voted against breaking away from the national union,
Stanley suggested he was subject to intimidation at the meeting following the
vote to break from the national union. 90 The Nottingham AC met immediately
following the Conference of SOeM to consider the recommendation and
unanimously agreed to accept it. Following sixteen turbulent months the
Nottinghamshire miners had left the NUM after just over forty years. Ironically,
the NUM had been formed in Nottingham at a Special Conference in 1944; the
same county now saw its demise in its present form.
87 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes, 1985, p. 293.
88 Ibid., p. 256.
89 Ibid.
90 Stanley, Nottingham Miners do Strike, p. 116.
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6. Towards the UDM:The Nottinghamshire coalfield: July to
December 1985
Following the split with the national NUM the Nottingham Area union issued
details to all Nottinghamshire miners stating that their employment with the
NCB and membership benefits with the union were unchanged. (Fig. 8) In the
immediate aftermath of the split the Nottingham Area union was faced with two
main issues; firstly, a legal challenge was made against the break from the
national union and, secondly, the precarious position of Ray Chadburn, the
Nottingham Area President.
News of the breakaway caused little surprise in the Ashfield region of the
Nottinghamshire coalfield. Pat Orton, Branch President at Annesley, commented
that 'most of our members had felt the sooner we got away the better'.
Likewise Bentinck Branch Secretary, Colin Bottomore, stated that 'nobody at
Bentinck had reacted strongly against the news'. 91 However, Bob Durrant,
Sutton Branch Secretary, reacted more cautiously to the split in the union but
thought the Nottingham Area had little choice in leaving the NUM following the
events of the 1985 NUM annual conference:
Many of our lads don't like the idea of coming out of the
national union, some have been in it for forty years, but
we've little choice. The rule changes gave Scargill more
dictatorial powers and on top of that were the Lynk and
Prendergast sackings; other Officials feel it might happen
to them. 92
91 'Diary of a Breakaway', Notts Free Press, 12 July 1985, p. 1.
92 Ibid.
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Fig.7. Correspondence relative to the Nottingham Area leaving the NUM -
July 1985.
TO All NOnlNGB1N AREA MEMBERS
NO. TD NOTTIN6BAM AREA
lAS LEFT TIE NATIONAl UNION
TIIS IS YOUR POSIDON-
~YOU REMAIN A FULL FINANCIAL MEMBER
OF THE NOTTINGHAM AREA - - UNCHANGED
N.C.B. PENSION ENTITLEMENT - UNCHANGED
NOTTS. AREA PENSION ENTITLEMENT UNCHANGED
FUEL ENTITLEMENT - - - UNCHANGED
COMMON LAW CLAIMS - - - UNCHANGED
D.H.S.S. REPRESENTATION - - UNCHANGED
BENEVOLENT CLAIMS - - - UNCHANGED
UNION CONTRIBUTIONS - - UNCHANGED
YOU ARE STILL AN EMPLOYEEOF THE NATIONAL COAL BOARD
NEW WAGE aAIH5 TO BE PURSUED
ID NORINGIDI DElIS
OlE 'I fUml. flNUGlUI
DMIIISTRllmlY ID DENIGlAIIWlY
YOUf Poslflon • Unchanltell
FROM THE NOntN8HAM AREA EXECUTIVECOMMlnEE
Source: D. Amos collection.
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A legal challenge was made against the Nottingham 'breakaway' in the names of
Henry Richardson, Ray Chadburn and twenty-nine other Notts ex strikers still
loyal to the national union. Their argument was that the Nottingham Area was
still tied to the national NUM and was linked by 17 clauses within the
Nottingham Area rules. The rules made it clear that the Nottingham Area was
still a constituent association of the NUM through issues such as the Area's
financial contributions, representation on the NUM NEC and even the union's
title. What the NUM was asking was that the Nottingham Area should be
restrained from doing anything until they had held a ballot on the rule changes:
a ballot which would require a two-thirds majority to authorise the area rule
amendments. The Judge, Mr Justice Stuart-Smith, ruled that the Nottingham
Area should ballot its members on 'the break from the national union' and that
for the time being the name of the Nottingham union could not be changed.
(The Nottingham Area had initially proposed that the union change its name to
the Nottingham Union of Mineworkers as an interim measure.) He also accepted
an undertaking from the Nottingham Union that they would follow the correct
legal procedure on the changes needed in their own rule book arising from the
union split, however; no time limit was set.
It emerged that a ballot would probably be held in September 1985 following
the summer holiday period. In a further High Court hearing on 7 August the
Judge, Mr Justice Tudor Price, likened the Nottingham Area's break from the
NUM to that of a marriage break up. He stated:
Of course, for a union to secede from a federation
requires changes of rule in due course. As in the case of
a partner leaving a marriage, there are all kinds of loose
ends to be tied up before the break is completed. 93
93 Transcript of the High Court Hearing Richardson & Others v Lynk & Others, 7 Aug 1985, p.
15. D. Amos collection.
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In the original hearing on 10 July 1985 Justice Stuart Smith had declined to
grant this part of the injunction on the Nottingham Area Officials. The
undertaking was not to amend the Nottingham Area rules except in accordance
with its own rule 24 or in accordancewith the provisions of the 1964 Trade
UnionsAmalgamationAct. Under the 1964 Act a ballot for amalgamationwith
other unions required a simple majority as against a two-thirds majority needed
for the rule changes. Rumoursstarted emerging that an amalgamation ballot
would probably be the preferred option for the Nottingham Area. Followingthe
end of the strike informal arrangementshad been made by the 'working pact' of
Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire,South Derbyshire and the Colliery Trade and
Allied Workers Association.The NUMsaw this as a political manoeuvre by the
Nottingham Area to avoid the two-third majority required under a rules
amendment ballot. Commenting on the forthcoming ballot the national NUM
suggested that an amalgamation ballot would run contrary to the custom and
practiceof the NUM:
Whilst such a ballot may be held to be legal before a
court, it would violate the letter and the spirit of the
Nottingham Area rules and NUM national rules. The
national union have made it clear no matter what type of
ballot is held, all Nottinghamshire miners will remain full
membersof the NUM.94
The great irony here was that in the eyes of many Nottinghamshire NUM
members it had been a flouting of the spirit of the NUMrules that had caused
the whole catalogue of events in the first place. Taylor referred to this as a
'circumvention of the rules'. 95 The author touched on this in a letter to The
Chad newspaperin July 1985following the split:
94 'No vote on rules?', The Notts Collier, August 1985, p. 2. D. Amos collection.
95 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, P
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The roots of the present actions were sown back in
March 1984 when certain elements decided to try
and get Nottinghamshire out by using force (...)
(...) The people who brought this intimidation and
violence are now the same people who now want
your support. Why have they suddenly turned
about face from calling us blind to wanting us with
them? 96
Despite the forthcoming ballot, the Nottingham Area union leaders still
maintained that the ballot would make no difference to the decisionto split from
the national NUM. They maintained that the 73% ballot vote taken in May 1985
gave a mandate for them not to accept the new NUM rule book; all they had
done was leave the national framework of a federation. However, the true
Significance of the forthcoming ballot would be whether a new moderate
federation of miners would emerge in Britain's coalmining industry. This was
not so much a return to Spencerism, as the national NUM were constantly
arguing, but probably more akin to the situation prior to the formation of the
Miners' Federation of Great Britain in 1889. Between 1869 and 1874 two
separatemining organisationsexisted, the Miners'NationalUnion (MNU) formed
in 1863, and the Amalgamated Association of Miners (AAM) formed in 1869.
The AAM was a more militant organisation than the MNU, being based on a
more centralised, national structure; it was founded by Thomas Halliday. In
contrast the MNUwas a national union but based on a federal structure with
more power being based in the separate districts. The MNU, like the
Nottinghamshire miners, believed in the use of arbitration and conciliation to
solve disputes. In contrast the AAM had few arbitration and conciliation
procedureswithin its set up. The AAMcollapsedas a result of a long dispute in
the South Wales coalfield and was taken over by the MNU in 1874. Ironically,
96 David Amos, Letter: Writing on the Wall, Mansfield Chad, July 1985, p. 6. D. Amos collection.
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the AAM was supported by the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire miners during
the dispute and donations were sent to the South Wales miners during the
eighteen month lockout. The end of the following decade, in 1889, saw the
birth of the MFGB, the forerunner to the NUM.
In the aftermath of the Nottingham miners 1985 split, the precarious position of
Ray Chadburn came to a head following the decision to secede from the
national union. Chadburn, like Richardson, had followed the NEC line through
most of the dispute, through to the time that the Nottingham Area seceded
from the national union. A complaint had been made against him in April 1985
in relation to his non observance of the Nottingham Area's working mandate
during the strike. 97 The AEC upheld the complaint and severely reprimanded
him for his lack of commitment to the Nottingham Area during the past year.
He was asked to prepare a statement confirming his future commitment to the
Nottingham Area union. The ambiguous statement was made as part of his
presidential report at the Nottingham Area NUMACM on 24 June 1985:
( ...) Unless we have a united national union, many of our
aspirations will fall by the wayside. Therefore, as
President, I commit myself to the Nottingham Area of the
NUM, to do everything that is reasonable to bring about
the fulfilment of the [unions] objectives, but it will be
impossible to realise them without your support and
commitment of each and every one of you. 98
Unfortunately, any chance for a climate of reconciliation was lost following the
events of the 1985 NUM National Conference. It was in these circumstances
that Chadburn's position as a Nottingham Area Official was determined.
97 Complaint by P. Jones and R. Naylor against Ray Chadburn, Nottingham Area NUM AEC, 17 April 1985,
Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985 ,p. 138.
98 Ibid., pp. 247-248.
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Ray Chadburn was not present on 6 July 1985 at the meeting of BOCM and
subsequent ACM, on 6 July 1985, the meetings which decided to break from the
national union. However, he chaired the meeting of the Nottingham AEC at its
first meeting following the break, on 8 July 1985. At that meeting he explained
he had been appointed President of the Nottingham Area of the NUM and was
not prepared to be President of a breakaway organisation. Prior to leaving the
meeting he stated that he would carry out his duties as an Area Official until
legal opinion said he must do otherwise. 99 Following Chadburn's departure the
Nottingham Area sought legal advice on his position now that the Area had
seceded from the national union. The legal advice suggested that Mr Chadburn
was well aware of the federal structure of the NUM and that the Nottingham
Area union was an independent trade union with its own independent existence.
100 By his words and actions at the start of the AEC meeting it was suggested
that he had in effect resigned his position as President and repudiated his
contract of employment. Therefore, the Nottingham AECwas entitled to exclude
him from the Area Offices pending an appeal. A series of events followed where
Chadburn was locked out from the Nottingham Area HQ and publicly clashed
with Roy Lynk, scenes which were acted out in front of the TV cameras. Lynk
told Chadburn that he had either resigned or dismissed himself by his words and
actions at the AEC meeting on 8 July. Chadburn did not accept this and stated
that he had not resiqned or been removed and therefore was still President of
the Nottingham Area NUM. He commented, "If I finish up on the dole or eating
grass, I am not prepared to lead a breakaway union". 101 The national union
took Chadburn's case for reinstatement to the High Court Hearings as part of
the legal challenge to the 'breakaway'. A Nottingham Area SAECmeeting on 29
July 1985 considered a complaint against Ray Chadburn from Sid Walker of
Clipstone NUM Branch. The meeting was adjourned until 12 August 1985 at
99 Ibid., p. 257.
100 Ibid.
101 'Nottinghamshire NUM sacks Chadburn as Area President', Financial Times, 10 July 1985.
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Chadburn's request. In the meantime, Judge Tudor Price at the High Court
Hearing on 5-7 August 1985 did not reappoint Chadburn to his position as a
Nottingham Area Official. After giving a brief history of Chadburn's actions
during the strike and its aftermath, Judge Tudor Price questioned the
appropriateness of reinstating him as Nottingham Area Official:
I think it is wholly inappropriate to seek to force on a body
of men as one of their officials someone whom they have
lost confidence. 102
Both Walker and Chadburn attended the complaint hearing at the Nottingham
AEC meeting on 12 August 1985. Walker, along with a witness, put his case
against Chadburn and he replied to the allegations. Some of the various
allegations had been cited by Judge Tudor Price in his summing up on 7 August.
These included abstaining from the threatened expulsion of the Nottingham
Area from the NUM in January 1985 and voting in April 1985 for acceptance of
the new NUM rules, including the Disciplinary Rule 51, knowing a majority of
Nottinghamshire miners would be against them. 103 The AEC found the
complaint against Chadburn proven and that his dismissal was justified in that
he had been 'guilty of gross misconduct in his performance of duties as
President, Agent and Nottingham Area Official'. 104 The AEC also reiterated the
decision that Chadburn had 'resigned from his position as Nottingham Area
Presldent, Agent and Area Official or repudiated his obligations in respect
thereof on 8 July 1985'. 105 Following his dismissal Chadburn still maintained
that the Nottingham Area could not dismiss him from his post. From his new
office at the NUM's national HQ at Sheffield he said:
102 Transcription of Proceedings, High Court Hearing, 7 August 1985, p. 13. D. Amos collection.
103 Notes from High Court Hearing 7 August 1985, Richardson & Others v Lynk & Others, p. 11.
104 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 302.
105 Ibid., p. 304.
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As far as I am concerned I am still the President of the
Nottingham Area of the NUM ( ...) I am no part of their
organisation, I am employed by the Nottingham Area of
the NUM. I cannot resign from their organisation because
I don't belong to it. They cannot dismiss me from the
NUM.106
Amidst accusations of using an 'inquiry agent' and bullying tactics to inform
Chadburn of his dismissal, Roy Lynk stated:
We were honour bound to tell Mr Chadburn what the
result of the meeting was in writing. We were also
honour bound to tell the press in a democratic society
what the result was. We wanted to make sure that Mr
Chadburn did not learn of the decision by reading it in the
press first. We gave him the opportunity on the day of
the meeting to stay while we reached a decision and tell
him there and then. We had to give him the letter; we
knew where he was so we were not hunting him. 107
One of the first issues to be dealt with by the newly formed Nottinghamshire
Area of the NCB was to establish an agreement on joint negotiating machinery
between themselves and the newly split Nottingham Area Union. 108 Under the
1946 Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, Section 46, the NCB was required to
negotiate a conciliation scheme with organisations that represented 'substantial
numbers of persons employed in the coal-industry'. At the Nottingham union's
106 'My anger and my anguish: Chadburn,' The Chad, 22 August 1985, p. 3.
107 Ibid.
lOS The NCB Nottinghamshire Area was formed out of the old NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area
and NCB North Nottinghamshire Area. In 1986 the NCB's title was changed to the British
Coal Corporation.
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AEC meeting on 8 July it had been agreed that the union should approach NCB
Senior Management with regard to setting up recognition and negotiating
machinery. 109 In their reply to the Nottingham Area union the NCB suggested
that the setting up of joint machinery for matters specified in Section 46 (1) of
the 1946 Coal Industry Nationalisation Act was needed as a matter of some
urgency. 110 The same letter also stated that the terms and conditions of
Nottingham miners were not adversely affected by their recent decision to
secede from the national union.
Following the split in the NUM the NCB set up separate collective bargaining
schemes, firstly with the Nottingham Area Union and later with the Union of
Democratic Mineworkers after it came into existence on 6 December 1985. The
NUM objected to the move and referred the matter to the National Reference
Tribunal (NRT). The NUM's case was that they were the union specified in the
1946 Act to represent industrial workers in the coal industry. On 12 November
1985 the NRT ruled that although the NUM was indeed the union specified in
the Act, it was not legally enforceable. The soon to be in existence UDM
rendered the agreement and scheme obsolete. At the High Court Hearing in
June 1986 Mr Justice Scott ruled that the Conciliation agreement was not legally
enforceable and that British Coal had a duty under the 1946 Act to recognise
both the NUM and the UDM. In February 1986 British Coal contacted the
relevant mining unions with details of the proposed new conciliation scheme.
This was titled 'Consultation on New Conciliation and Consultative Machinery for
Mineworkers'. The existing agreements were due to be terminated on 31 May
1986. The new agreement, encompassing the UDM, would be based on a
majority / minority scheme and would cover mineworkers / workplaces at which
the respective union held a majority. As Taylor stated this situation put the
109 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1985, p. 258.
110 Letter from Bert Wheeler (NCB Nottinghamshire Director) to Roy Lynk, 8 July 1985.
D. Amos collection.
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NUM into a quandary; the new agreement required the NUM to recognise the
UDM's lawful right in the coal industry:
British Coal's majority/minority consultative proposals
required the NUM to recognise the UDM's legitimate
presence in the industry, participate alongside the UDM in
negotiations with British Coal and effectively abandon its
members in UDM areas.
The NUM never accepted the principle of the majority / minority principle, to do
so would mean abandoning the Nottinghamshire strike loyalists. A NUM SDC in
early 1987 made the decision that the NUM would not to appear on any stage
where the UDM was present. This situation still prevailed at the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the commencement of the strike in March 2009 when a
Nottingham NUM loyalist stated he would not appear in an article in a Sunday
newspaper with the author because of NUM policy of not appearing on the same
platform as the UDM.ll1 NUM policy regarding the majority /minority
negotiating machinery and its attitude towards the Nottinghamshire breakaway
could be described as unequivocal:
In its attempts to weaken the NUM and support the
breakaway, the Coal Board, or British Coal, unilaterally
scrapped the conciliation and consultation agreements
which had formed the bedrock of the industry since
nationalisation in 1947. British Coal has continued to give
every encouragement to the breakaway in Notts, and has
conducted a war of attrition against the NUM. 112
111 'Reunlted ...at last: The striker and the scab - The Miners' Strike 25 years on', Independent
on Sunday, 8 March 2009, pp. 30-31.
112 NUM, A Century of Struggle, p. 123.
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Griffin, writing prior to the ballot which formed the UDM, suggested that the
NUM, the union that most Nottinghamshire miners were associated with,
probably no longer existed:
However unpopular though its President now is, many are
still reluctant to opt out of the national union. Most of
them have no recollection of separate area unions (...) the
idea of one powerful national union to protect them in a
local environment still has its appeal. This is
understandable, but the question they must ask
themselves is whether the NUM they grew up with still
exists. 113
In the meantime, following the split from the NUM, the Nottingham Area met up
with representatives from South Derbyshire NUM, and CTAWA with view to
forming a closer association. At the July 1985 meeting the principle of a new
Federation was agreed between the Durham based CfAWA and the Nottingham
Area. It was surmised that the forthcoming ballot in the autumn would be a
vote to amalgamate and not a straight rule change poll. 114 The forthcoming
ballot was termed a 'Federation Ballot'. It was also suggested that the issue of
who represented the Nottinghamshire miners had entered another crucial stage:
Now as the fighting over whom represents the county's
pitmen rages, pitmen must wait until after the summer
holidays to find out what happens next. 115
A Harris Poll at the time suggested 50% of Notts miners would support a
breakaway, with 46% being against. More significantly 71% of miners surveyed
113 A. R. Griffin, County under Siege, p. 10.
114 'What happens next ballot in the autumn?', TheCha~ 18 July 1985, p. 3.
115 Ibid.
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in the same poll suggested Arthur Scargill was the main obstacle to
reunification.
The first official meeting to discuss the setting up of a new Miners' Federation
was held at the Nottingham Area HQ on 23 August 1985. 116 At the SECMthe
Area Executives from the Nottingham Area, the South Derbyshire NUM and
crAWA met to give consideration to the initial draft copy of the proposed rules
of the Amalgam to be known as the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM).
Legal advisers were present with each AEC in addition to the Branch Officials
from Daw Mill Colliery, who were there as observers. Daw Mill Colliery had a
branch ballot to secede from the NUM in the autumn of 1985. At the meeting
the rules were agreed upon, subject to further consideration and revision by the
rank and file membership in each area. Recommendations were also agreed for
the three senior UDM National Officials: President: Ken Toon (South
Derbyshire), Vice-President: George Hunter (c:rAWA) and Secretary: Roy Lynk
(Nottinghamshire). A Conference of Branch Secretaries and the Nottingham
Area Legal Advisors followed on 3 September 1985 to give an up to date report
on the proposed UDM rules and amalgamation. 117 At this meeting it was
reported that the Instrument of Amalgamation would require the approval of the
Certification Officer before the ballot could take place. It was also agreed that a
final draft of the UDM rules would be circulated to members as soon as possible
for perusal prior to the 'federation ballot'. At a Nottingham Area SEC meeting
the following day a Campaign Committee was set up with the aim of getting
support for the forming of the UDM in the forthcoming ballot. Strategy and
tactics were also discussed and an allocation of the various NCB collieries and
units was made.
In the run up to the ballot the two groups set out their stalls and launched their
campaigns. The NUM maintained their slogan 'Keep Notts National' and
116 Nottingham Union Area Minutes 1985, p. 329.
l17 Ibid., p. 330.
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arranged for a series of open meetings to discuss the forthcoming ballot to form
the UDM. The main gist of the NUM's argument was that the emergence of a
breakaway union would weaken the bargaining power of all miners and that a
breakaway would not be recognised by the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the
Labour Party, the Coal Industry Social Welfare Organisation (CISWO) and other
regional, national and international organisations. There was constant reference
in NUM literature of a return to 'Spencerism'. Commenting on the forthcoming
ballot NUM General Secretary, Peter Heathfield, stated that the main reason
why the ballot was taking place was that the NUM was the main stumbling block
.
to future plans for a slim lined, profitable coal-industry:
The ballot is taking place for one reason above all others,
to divide the NUM so that pits can be closed at will,
leaving a few highly profitable pits for privatisation (...)
tens of thousands of pounds have been made available to
finance grotesque giant posters, expensive Fleet Street
journalists ( ...) all designed to confuse and split the NUM.
118
The Nottingham Area summoned artist John Kent, a political cartoonist, to
design a number of posters backing the Area campaign. The huge posters
appeared at 124 sites throughout the county. Anti-UDM Literature started
appearing in some publications at the same time. (Fig. 9)
In the run-up to the ballot claims were made by the NUM that a form of
censorship was taking place in the Nottinghamshire coalfield with the
Nottingham Area union being accused of not making miners' welfare clubs
available for meetings. The NCB were also accused of threatening disciplinary
action against NUM members who distributed 'Keep Notts National' literature.
118 'No to Suicide', The NUM Miners (Notts Special Edition), October 1985, p.l.
D. Amos collection.
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According to the NUM, a case at Ollerton Colliery brought the issue to a head
and with a threat of industrial action hanging over the colliery, the NCB backed
down and allowed literature from all sides to be distributed. 119 Despite the
claims of censorship, details of public meetings, special editions of the NUM
newspaper, The Miner, and various other 'Keep Notts National' pamphlets were
ready available in the Nottinghamshire Coalfield. 120 (Fig. 10) In contrast to the
NUM Campaign, the UDM Campaign claimed that a 'yes vote' in the forthcoming
ballot meant a choice for Britain's miners for a 'vibrant, new alternative, a free
and democratic union genuinely controlled by the grassroots'. 121 Commenting
on the setting up of the UDM and claiming that the new union could become the
new NUM, Roy Lynk, Nottingham Area General Secretary said:
We shall return the power to where it belongs, the
ordinary members, and the new rule book will be, if
anything, even more democratic than the (old) NUM rule
book before Scargill hijacked the NUM from its
membership. 122
Despite rhetoric from both sides, and claims and counterclaims about whether
the UDM or the NUM could best represent Britain's miners, the recent issue of
the strike still dominated much thinking. Nottingham Area Official, David
Prendergast, touched on this when commenting on the UDM campaign, amidst
claims that instructions had gone out from the NUM HQ for its members to stop
calling Nottinghamshire miners scabs and now to refer to them as colleagues:
119 Ibid., p. 3.
120 The author still has most of the anti-breakaway propaganda from 1985.
121 'Yes means Freedom', The Nottinghamshire Miners No.6, Sept 1985, p. 1.
122 Ibid.
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Fig. 8. Pro and anti UDM Propaganda in the Nottinghamshire coalfield:
September 1985.
Source: D. Amos collection.
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Fig.9. 'Keep Notts National' Propaganda: The Nottinghamshire Coalfield -
September 1985.
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The theme of our campaign is 'remember the true face of
Scargillism', and scabs, lepers and outcasts are what he
has been calling us until now. Our members aren't stupid.
They can never forget the assaults and the intimidation.
Now at the eleventh hour, Scargill has realised a
fundamental fact of life, you can't degrade a man one day
and ask him to join you the next. 123
The NUM campaign tried to portray an image of unity by giving much airtime to
working miners who claimed they were stopping with the NUM. 124 However, the
emotions that had split the union from the start of the strike were still
instrumental factors in the run up to the ballot. Apart from a few exceptions,
the situation was static, working miners generally indicated support for the
Nottingham Area and the UDM campaign, and former Nottinghamshire strikers
kept loyalty with the national union. The leading officials from each side wrote
to all Nottinghamshire miners in the run up to the ballot, such was the
important nature of the vote. For the Nottinghamshire former NUM members,
Roy Lynk played on the loyalty issue and emphasised that he had followed the
Nottinghamshire miners' instructions throughout the dispute. A fact sheet
accompanied the letter suggesting the decision that was about to affect the
Nottinghamshire miners was not of their making and that working miners had
fought for a principle for twelve months and should not 'sell themselves short
now'.
We are about to make the biggest decision of our working
lives. A decision we never wanted to make, but a decision
that was forced on us. Remember for twelve months you
fought for a principle, don't sell yourself short now. This
123 'Our Poster has got' em rattled!' ,Ibid., p. 1.
124 'Notts Family reunites to back union', The Notts Collier, Sept 1985, p. 2, 'The Mood Changes',
The Miner, Notts Special Issue, October 1985, p. 2-3.
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ballot has to be won, if it is only to bring people to their
senses and show that men have a right to decide their
own future, by the only means they have, through the
ballot box. 125
A letter to the Nottinghamshire rank and file from the national NUM emphasised
the issue of union solidarity and that any breakaway was supported by anti NUM
organisations, but it also made an anti-democracy attack on the Nottingham
Area union:
The idea of seeking a simple majority in a ballot to
amalgamate with another Area of the Union and a handful
of anti-NUM miners is merely a device to create a
breakaway organisation of miners and avoid the normal
two-thirds majority required to change the rules. 126
This provoked a passionate attack from Keith Staley, a former migrant miner
from the Derbyshire coalfield, and former NUM committee member at Bentinck
Colliery, who replied with a public letter to Scargill and Heathfield:
Today you had the gall to write to my son employed at
Annesley Colliery. Having gone to great lengths to explain
to my son about democracy (...) the word that chokes me
every time I hear you ( ...) and why, Iwas there at Berry
Hill (Nottingham NUM HQ) ( ...) I was on the front row,
you both refused to give us a ballot. I could have cried,
having been a member of the union since 1946, being a
mining gypsy of the 1950s and 1960s, eventually moving
125 Nottingham Area Miners' Union, Fad Sheet, October 1985. D. Amos collection.
126 NUM, Letter from National NUM Offidals to al/ Nottinghamshire miners, October 1985.
D. Amos collection.
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to the Nottinghamshire coalfield Coo.) I am proud to have
been a Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire miner, proud that
my son has the gumption to say "No Arthur, get lost". Let
this defeat of our beloved union go with you to your grave
C···) Given the vote you stole from the Nottinghamshire
coalfield the outcome I'm certain would have been very
different. The only shame I feel, is the fact that I, Keith
Leslie Staley, helped to put the pair of you in office. 127
Keith Staley had made a passionate verbal attack on Peter Heathfield at the
Nottingham Area NUM BOCM meeting at the Nottingham Area NUM HQ on 25
April 1984, when as a working member of the Bentinck NUM Branch Committee,
he attacked the decision not to have a national ballot for the 1984-85 strike.
Prominent NUM Officials such as Henry Richardson, Ray Chadburn, Bill
Ethrington, Peter Heathfield and Arthur Scargill were all actively involved in the
campaign to try and keep the Nottinghamshire miners in the NUM. Yet, all five
had made unhelpful comments about the Nottinghamshire miners, either during
or since the end of the strike. 128 Griffin suggested that the NUM leadership
would have been better advised to let others run their campaign:
Mr Scargill has been addressing meetings throughout the
(Nottinghamshire) coalfield appealing to members to vote
against the breakaway. Now, it would appear, he accepts
that Nottinghamshire and South Derbyshire had a perfect
right not to strike in 1984, and yesterday's scabs, outcasts
and lepers have become valued colleagues C ... ) In truth,
127 'Retired miner's letter to Scargill and Heathfield', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 11
October 1985, p. 4.
128 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 285.
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the NUMwould have been well advised to leave others to
run the campaign. 129
At a Nottingham Area SCMheld on 28 September 1985, it was reported that
formal approval of the Instrument of Amalgamation would be given by the
Certification Officer within the next few days. 130 After receiving a report from
Roy Lynk, Nottingham AreaGeneralSecretary, and PaulTodd from Hopkinsand
Sons Solicitors, the meeting unanimously agreed that the Nottingham Area
NUM, the South Derbyshire Area NUM and the Colliery Trades and Allied
Workers Association (CTAWA) should amalgamate to form the Union of
Democratic Mineworkers with effect from the date of registration of the
Instrument of Amalgamation. 131 Arrangements were then made to hold a
ballot vote of members of the union, in accordancewith the provisions of the
Trade Union (Amalgamationetc.) Act of 1964upon the question:
Do you approve the Instrument of Amalgamation of the
NationalUnion of Mineworkers(Nottingham Area) with the
National Union of Mineworkers (South Derbyshire Area)
and the Colliery Trades and Allied Workers Associationto
form the Unionof DemocraticMineworkers?132
Detailsof the CouncilResolutionfrom 28 September 1985, along with the ballot
question and details of ballot opening hours were sent out in a notice to
members all concerned. 133 In addition, it was agreed that copies of the
Instrument of Amalgamation be sent out to all members not less than seven
days prior to the ballot taking place. It was also arranged for sufficient copies
of the UDM rules to be sent to all Nottinghamshire union branches.The ballot
129 A. R. Griffin, Countyunder Si~e, p, 10.
130 Nottingham Area Union Minutes 1985, p. 349.
131 Ibid., p. 350.
132 Ibid.
133 Nottingham Area Union, Notice to Members, October 1985. D. Amos collection.
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was arranged to take place over a twenty-four hour period from 5pm on 17
October 1985 to 5pm on 18 October 1985.
A Conference of Nottingham Area BOCMwas held on 7 October 1985 to discuss
the proposed rules for the UDM and to finalise ballot details on the proposed
amalgamation. Peter Keenan, Barrister, was in attendance in addition to Paul
Todd, as the Nottingham Area's legal advisor. Mr Keenan explained to the
Conference that the basic aims when preparing the new rules were firstly, to
preserve the best of the old system and improve on it where necessary and
secondly, to preserve the local independence of Areas whilst introducing a new
umbrella structure over Areas. 134
Mr Keenan explained that in preparing the new (UDM) rules, they (the legal
advisors) had sought to:
• Embody as far as practically possible the democratic control of the Union
by members through the ballot box.
• Preserve the legal autonomy of Areas which will be called Sections.
• Preserve the basic principle that the only gateway to membership of the
Union is to be the member of a Section.
• Preserve the Union as a Union of Mineworkers and Ancillary Workers. 135
The basis of the UDM Rules and Constitution very much fitted in with the
previous arrangements that existed with the NUM from its inception in 1944 till
the rule changes in 1985.
134 Nottingham Area Union Minutes 1985, p. 355.
135 Ibid.
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The results of the ballot were announced at a Nottingham AEC Meeting on 23
October 1985. 17, 750 (72%) voted in favour of forming the UDM with 6, 792
(28%) being against the proposal in a 90 per-cent turnout. (Appendix 11) The
Nottingham Union AC unanimously confirmed the result of the ballot at its
meeting on 28 October 1985 and agreed that this should become the policy of
the Area. The victory was not as convincing as some of the Nottingham Area
AE had hoped, however Roy Lynk suggested that the UDM would be the new
NUM in the county:
We are the new NUM in Nottinghamshire, and anyone
who stays with the NUM will not be represented in
Nottinghamshire in any way, shape or form. I expect a
large proportion of the people who voted national to go
along with the ballot result. 136 .
Counteracting what Roy Lynk had said, Mick McGinty, leader of the 'Keep Notts
National' campaign suggested that 7,000 Nottinghamshire miners had pledged
to continue their loyalty to the National NUM. He stated that as far as they
were concerned 'there would be two unions in most of the Area's pits'. 137
However, the NCBdeclared that the UDM would be the only recognised union in
the county and said that if the 7,000 miners who supported the national NUM
wanted recognition from the Coal Board they would have to be part of the new
union. Following the ballot it was six weeks before the former Nottingham Area
of the NUM became the Nottingham Section of the UDM. £4 Million of NUM
assets would then be transferred to the UDM and a new name would appear
over the door at the former Nottingham Area NUM HQ. The UDM came into
official existence on 6 December 1985 following clearance from the Certification
Officer. It soon started a nationwide campaign for membership. (Fig. 11)
136 'We will be the New NUM', Mansfield & Sutton Observer, 24 October 1985, p. 1.
137 Ibid.
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In the euphoria of the ballot result some optimistic claims were made that the
UDM could become the majority union for Britain's coal mining industry. Amidst
claims that the UDM were being inundated with requests for membership, David
Prendergast stated:
I am confident that before long we will prevail as the
majority union in the mining industry. When we have
more than 50% of miners joining us we will expect full
negotiating rights for the miners in the country. 138
Subsequent events in the Leicestershire, Lancashire and North Wales coalfield
were to shatter any illusions that the UDM would challenge the NUM in size. All
three areas, all of which had significant sections of working miners through the
strike, turned down joining the UDM in the two months following its formation.
Perhaps Leicestershire's decision was the most surprising of all. There, Jack
Jones' influence persuaded the majority of the Leicestershire miners to remain
in the NUM. 139 In the Leicestershire Area ballot on 25 January 1986 the four
collieries voted by 885 to 490 to remain in the NUM.140
Apart from disparate sections of membership around Britain's coalfields, the
UDM never really broke out of its Nottinghamshire heartland. Even the South
Derbyshire vote was a near-thing recording a majority of only twenty-six in the
UDM formation ballot. Unsurprisingly crAWA members voted by a majority of
90% to form the UDM; a large proportion of crAWA's members had been
expelled from the Durham Mechanics section of the NUM for working during the
strike.
138 'United they stand', Notts Free Press, 25 October 1985, p. 1.
139 See C. P. Griffin, The Leicestershire Miners Vol. 3, pp. 274 -279.
140 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 289.
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Fig.l0. UDM Recruiting Propaganda: December 1985.
UNION OF DEMO(RATIt: MINEWORIEIS
THE WORlD'S
FASTEST GROWING UNION-
\YE ARE ON ODR WAY
JOIN THE UDM AND-
• Your NCB Pension will be protected
• Your Fuel Entitlement will be protected
• CommDn Law Claims will be pursued by experts (in 1984 £2,000,000
damages .ere won for the Notts. Miners)
THEUDMWILL ALSOPROVIDE-
• A Legal Advice Service
• An Education Department which provides regular Schools for Members
• A Research Department
• A Social Insurance Department to assist in pursuing DHSSClaims
• Fully qualified Mining Engineers and Electricai/Mechilicil Engln_
THEUDM RULEBOOKIS DESIGNED-
• TD protect its Members and ensure their democratic ri&ht$
• To ensure the rigbt of all Members to VDte on all major issues
THE UUM FIGHTS fOR DEMOCRACYAND IS COMMinED TO THE PRINCIPLE
THAT "THE POWERIS IN THE HANDSOF THE MEMBERS"
JOIN THE UDM NOW
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Whilst a trade union civil war had been enacted by the two disparate sides from
the 1984-85 strike, Geoffrey Goodman drew definite links between the 'domino
strategy' employed by the NUM at the start of the strike and the breakup of the
NUM in 1985. Commenting in the immediate aftermath of the ballot to form the
UDM he stated:
The break-up of the NUM is by far the worst sequel to the
twelve-month strike ( ...) In this revolt by the
Nottinghamshire and (South) Derbyshire miners there is
an uncanny parallel with the events of 1926. The big
difference between then and now is that this time
Nottinghamshire miners (mainly) refused to join the strike
from the beginning. It was that decision which became
the principal issue in defeating Scargill and the NUM. 141
In its 'Random Shots' section the Notts Free Press newspaper suggested that
the UDM was not a 'fly on the wall' trade union, adding that, in hindSight, if the
NUM National President and his supporters ever regretted the counter-
productive strategy of sending flying pickets into Nottinghamshire at the start of
the strike:
They (UDM) have proved they are not 'putty in the hand'
trade unionists, wilting under pressure. They said they
would do it and they have. In moments of tranquil
retrospect we wonder if Mr Scargill ever regrets the bully
boy louts coming to our pits. 142
141 Geoffrey Goodman, 'Deeper into the Pit', Daily MilTOr, 21 October 1985, p. 6.
142 'Random Shots', Notts Free Press, 25 October 1985, p. 6. A 'Fly on the Wall' trade union
infers a short lived existence merely spontaneously reacting to a situation.
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As we enter the second decade of the twenty first century, with only five large
deep mines left in production in Britain (at November 2011), perhaps we should
reflect on the words of Morgan and Coates. During the post union-split, without
showing bias, they stated:
Splits are relatively easy to initiate, but may prove difficult
to overcome. What is clear beyond doubt is that the
future in its own way, will continue to be complex and
difficult as the heroic battle in the mid 1980's. 143
The union split proved impossible to overcome despite the common factor of
the coal industry's rapid post-strike demise affecting everyone. The UDM saw its
25th anniversary on 6 December 2010. Their main membership now (November
2011) is at the last working Nottinghamshire colliery, Thoresby, and at the last
Warwickshire colliery at Daw Mill. Membership, in terms of working miners, is
probably no more than 750; at its peak the UDM claimed around 45,000
members throughout Britain. Likewise the NUM's membership for 'active
miners' in 2011 probably stands at a no more than 1,750, being based mainly at
the three remaining Yorkshire collieries of Kellingley, Maltby and Hatfield.
Was it possible to stem the decline of the deep-mining coal-industry in Britain at
any time? That is open to debate. However, it should be remembered that the
deep coal mining industry in Britain has been in decline since the time of World
War One. There were two significant periods of decline, the Robens Era (1960-
70) and the aftermath of the 1984-85 strike (1985-1994). Collieries have closed
in significant numbers throughout the history of the coal industry, the main
difference being that now we are approaching the 'end of a chapter of British
industrial history' as the closure of Britain's last large deep colliery is probably
not too far in the future. The 1984-85 NUM strike was a 'last stand' valiant
143 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfleld and the British Miners'Strike, p. 25.
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attempt at trying to stop the decline in the industry. It failed because there
were many factors against it, the most tragic one being that in its attempt to
stem the decline the NUM ended up destroying itself.
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Chapter 4: What a load of ballots! - The Nottinghamshire
Miners and the Ballot Issue in the 1984-85 Miners'
Strike
1. Introduction
A Ballot would have been won for the strike (...) what
it would have done is guarantee unity right across the
mining labour force. 1
To hide behind a ballot is an act of cowardice. I tell
you this now, decide what you like about a ballot but
this coalfield [South Wales] will be on strike and stay
on strike. 2
The most controversial issue surrounding the 1984-85 miners' strike centred
on the running of the dispute without a national ballot of all NUMmembers;
instead a domino policy under NUM Rule 41 was attempted with an
emphasis on trade-union solidarity (see Chapter 5). Since that time
arguments have raged as to the rights and wrongs of the 1984-85 strike
strategy. Traditionally the NUM was perhaps the most democratic trade
union in Britain with pit-head ballots regularly recording turn outs in the
region of 80% - 90% on a wide range of issues. These included the
election of NUMNational, Area and Branch representatives, pay issues, and
in 1982 and 1983 on the issue of pit closures. In 1984 it was the NUMRule
41 domino strategy which caused controversy from the outset and split the
NUM members into two sections: one which wanted the strike conducted
under what they saw as the established constitutional methods {working
1 D. Summers, 'Neil Kinnock attacks Arthur Scargill for 'suicidal vanity' over miners' strike'
www.quardian.co.ukloo1itics 12 March 2009.
2 Arthur Scargill, 'We could surrender, or stand and fight', www.quardian.co.uk/politics, 7
March 2009.
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miners) and a second group willing to strike under an act of unity to try and
stop the continued run down of the deep mining industry in Britain (striking
miners).
Unlike the 1926 Lockout, the majority of Nottinghamshire miners never
came out on strike in 1984-85, claiming that the lack of a national ballot and
the strategy under Rule 41 made the strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield
both unconstitutional and unofficial. Although the split in the NUMoccurred
after the end of the strike in 1985, as Stephenson maintained, it was
impossible to understand the evolution of the UDMwithout recourse to the
strike itself. 3 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the main issues of the
strike which caused the initial split in the NUM membership and eventually
led to the formation of the Nottinghamshire based Union of Democratic
Mineworkers (UDM). This chapter looks at some of the arguments made at
the time and the theories that have been put forward since as to why a
national ballot was not held, and aims to investigate why these arguments
against holding a national ballot failed so miserably in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. In Chapter 5 the weakness of the Rule 41 'domino strategy' will
be debated, making some historical comparisons with how the
Nottinghamshire miners had reacted to unofficial strike action in the past.
In 1984 why did the strike take off without recourse to a national ballot?
Previously a national ballot preceded any proposed strike-action, as it did in
the two national strikes of 1972 and 1974. The main reason was probably
the failure to get a majority in the three national ballots held in the two
years leading up to the 1984-85 strike. NUMNational ballots held in January
1982, October 1982, and March 1983 all turned down proposed strike
action. The ballots of October 1982 and March 1983 included the issue of
voting on pit closures. In some circles the October 1982 'no strike' vote was
attributed to the linking of wages and pit closures on the same ballot paper.
But as the NUM reported in 1983 'such an interpretation was proved false in
3 Stephenson, Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting? BA Dissertation, p. 24.
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March 1983'. 4 The March 1983 national ballot over the Ty-Mawr-Lewis
Merthyr closure produced the same 61% - 39% no strike majority as the
October 1982 national ballot had. Some interesting trends occur when
looking at the strike figures between the ballots of January 1982 and March
1983. (Appendix 1) Only two NUM areas, the traditional left-wing South
Wales and Kent, showed an increase in support for strike action over the
period. Ironically, in the Yorkshire and Scotland NUMAreas, the two Areas
which acted as catalysts for the 1984-85 strike, support for strike action had
dropped: in Yorkshire from 66% to 54% and in Scotland from 63% to 50%.
More interestingly when the figures for the Area strike ballots taken in
March 1984 are studied, only one NUM Area, Northumberland, showed a
slight majority in favour of strike action, but all the others showed an
increase in support for strike action since the national ballot in March 1983.
In the Nottingham Area NUMsupport increased from 19% in March 1983 to
26% in March 1984. This was in spite of intensive picketing in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield in the week leading up to the Area ballot on 15
and 16 March 1984.
The problem for the NUMwas trying to get a consensus in favour of striking
on the contentious issue of pit closures. The mass closures in the 1960s saw
a passive attitude towards pit closures which resulted in the halving of the
coal industry from almost 700 collieries to just under 300 by 1970. As Allen
stated the problem with pit closureswas:
Those with jobs were not keen to jeopardise them
whilst those who had experienced closures in the past
resented being called out on strike for pits which had
not supported them when their pits had closed. 5
Even during the supposed resurgence of the coal industry in the 1970s,
following the two national strike victories of 1972 and 1974, the problems
associated with protests over pit closures were prominent. In 1976 when
4 NUM, 1983 NUM Annual Conference report, p. 248.
5 Vic Allen, The Militancy of British Miners (Shipley, 1981), p. 302.
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Langwith Colliery in Derbyshire was proposed for closure, the NUM had to
call off a national overtime ban against the proposed closure after only four
days because of strong opposition to it. A national ballot showed 61%
favoured lifting the ban. 6 In the Derbyshire Area NUM itself there was a
majority opposed to taking industrial action to save Langwith. Only the
traditional left-wing NUMareas of South Wales, Kent and Scotland plus the
left-moving Yorkshire Area voted against lifting the overtime ban. A mirror
image of this result happened in the national ballots against pit closures in
October 1982 and in March 1983. Similar patterns to the Langwith closure
followed with the Teversal closure in Nottinghamshire in 1979 (see Chapter
1 pp. 23 - 32). Also in 1979 the South Wales NUM took no constitutional
steps to test the feeling of the NUMmembership when Deep Duffryn colliery
was proposed for closure. As Allen stated 'they realised that the divisive
elements generated by pit closures would predominate in South Wales as it
had done in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire'. 7 In the event the closure of
Deep Duffryn was agreed at local level when dangerous conditions were
experienced trying to develop a new coalface. (see Chapter 1 pp. 27 -30).
As Taylor mentioned the situation was no different in the Scottish coalfield
in the two years preceding the 1984-85 strike; here Scottish miners crossed
picket lines for the first time in living memory. 8
Hilary Cave, former NUM Education Officer, cited three main reasons as to
why no individual national ballot vote was taken on strike action in the
1984-85 strike. 9 Firstly, there was a fear that a ballot would not be won
because miners not affected by pit closure would vote against such
industrial action. This is sometimes referred to as the 'safe pits' theory.
Secondly, it was claimed that some sections of NUMmembers were already
out on strike, and a no strike ballot result would have the effect of
undermining them and 'pulling them back from the brink'. This was linked
with the way the strike evolved under the 'domino theory'. Thirdly, it was
6 Nottingham Area NUM minutes 1976, p. 95.
7 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 304.
8 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 176.
9 Interview with Barry Johnson and Hilary Cave, 8 March 2008, Chesterfield.
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claimed that the strike was a principled strike about the issues of saving
jobs and not simply about payor conditions of employment. Another factor
involving the ballot issue that came into play was the controversy over the
introduction of Area Incentive Bonus Schemes in 1977-78. In November
1977 a majority of miners nationwide voted against the introduction of an
incentive bonus scheme; despite this Area based incentive schemes came
into operation in all coalfields shortly afterwards. How did this occur and
what were the implications for democracy in the NUM?
The remainder of this chapter will critically analyse the three theories which
have been put forward as to why no national ballot vote was taken. Firstly,
the 'safe pits' theory is looked at, secondly, the part played by the
controversy surrounding the introduction of Area Incentive Bonus Schemes
in 1977-78 is reviewed and finally, the effects of the introduction of
enhanced redundancy payments in the early 1980s on the decision not to
have a ballot is studied.
2. The Ballot and the Safe Pits theory
Those on the left of the NUM claimed a national strike ballot of all NUM
members was unfair because some Areas were unaffected by pit closures
and manpower rundowns and NUM members in those regions would vote
against any such strike action. Thus miners, especially in the central
coalfields, in supposedly safe regions, would be unwilling to act in solidarity
to save their comrades in the peripheral coalfields of Scotland, South Wales,
the North-East and Kent. This is sometimes known as the 'safe pits theory'.
BaSically,the theory is that at a safe pit there would be favourable geological
conditions, which lead to higher profits, and thus higher incentive bonus
payments, and therefore there would be less inclination for the miners there
to strike. Searle-Barnessuggested the hypothesis was that better conditions
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made for bigger tasks, higher profits and higher wages. This in turn fostered
better labour relations, co-operative effort and willingness to innovate. 10
The 'safe pits' theory has found advocates ever since the strike, including
some prominent historians. Clarke described the NUM's initial approach to
the 1984-85 strike as being flawed and betraying some lack of confidence in
its members:
This proved most damaging since the Nottinghamshire
miners, least at risk and least militant, went on
working. 11
Likewise, Fraser made reference to the double factor of the Nottinghamshire
coalfield being a 'safe haven' from pit closures and also a historical weak link
in the national chain of miners' solidarity since 1926;
There (Nottinghamshire) many pits were new and
efficient and therefore not threatened with closure;
loyalty to the national union had always been weaker
since the bitter divisions of 1926. 12
Lowe suggested that the initial response to the strike was positive except in
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire. The reaction to the strike in many parts of
the Nottinghamshire and some parts of the Derbyshire coalfield was
apathetic from the outset. 13 Lowe also added that the Nottinghamshire
coalfield was at least risk from pit closures but that the strike strategy of
running without recourse to a national ballot was a fatal error:
There was an excellent response from the miners
except in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, where they
10 R. G. Searle-Barnes, Pay and Productivity Bargaining: A study of the effect of national
wage agreements in the Nottinghamshire coalfield (Manchester, 1969), p. 19.
11 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900 -1990 (London, 1996), p. 378.
12 W. H. Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism: 1700 -1998(Basingstoke, 1999), p.
241.
13 The Area Ballot results in March 1984 showed 27% in favour of striking in the Nottingham
Area NUM and 49.5% in North Derbyshire NUM: see Appendix 1, trends in NUM ballots per
Area 1982-1984.
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were least at risk (...) Scargill made the fatal mistake
of failing to hold a national ballot on whether to strike.
14
Even Ian MacGregor (NCB Chairman 1983-1986) made reference to the
supposed security of the Nottinghamshire coalfield:
Most non strikers, particularly those in Notts, wanted
nothing to do with Scargill's blatantly political ends,
and on the other side of the same coin was they
neither felt particularly threatened in their jobs. 15
Coulter's view is more typical than that of the historians quoted. Some
stereotypical views of the Nottinghamshire miners have found sympathy with
the left in the post-strike aftermath. Coulter suggested that the
Nottinghamshire coalfield was continually in profit, did not suffer from bad
geological conditions and historically had not suffered through the mass pit
closures of the late 1950s and 1960s. 16 Similarly, Morgan and Coates made
reference to the supposed favourable working conditions and high pay in the
coalfield together with the view that the Nottinghamshire coalfield was
unaffected by pit closures in the run up to the strike:
Traditionally the Nottinghamshire miner has always
been the highest paid in the British coalfields,
benefiting from relatively fortunate conditions that
prevailed in the area. He has rarely felt himself to be
under threat as the county provided a sheltered area
of coalfield employment. 17
14 Norman Lowe, Mastering Modern British History (T edition) (BaSingstoke, 1998), p. 575.
lS Ian MacGregor, The Enemy Within: The Story of the Miners'Strike 1984-85 (London,
1986), p. 196.
16 Coulter, Miller and Walker, The Iron Fist: State of Siege, p. 70.
17 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miner's Strike, p. 5.
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The safe pits theory of 1984 was mentioned in a letter sent from the Kent
Area NUM to the Nottingham Area NUMduring the early days of the strike.
In the letter to Henry Richardson, Nottingham Area NUMGeneral Secretary,
dated 24 March 1984, Jack Collins, Kent Area NUM Secretary, whilst
cancelling his proposed attendance to the 1984 Nottinghamshire NUM
Miners' Gala due to be held later that year, said:
You by advocating a ballot, are assuming that your
members have some kind of authority over the future
of my two sons and their families together with the
future of others in this coalfield. Such an assumption
is dangerous claptrap and a betrayal of other workers
who are demanding the right to work (...) Voting
another's job away has nothing to do with democracy
but is the ethics of the rat cage. 18
The inference from this statement suggests that the Nottinghamshire
coalfield was safe compared to the plight of the Kent coalfield. Whilst the
plight in Kent was generally much worse than in Nottinghamshire (in terms
of geological conditions and financial losses) it did not mean that an
automatic assumption could be made that the Nottinghamshire coalfield was
safe from the effects of manpower rundown and pit closures. It was not.
Pits in the Nottinghamshire coalfield were under threat and indeed two,
Moorgreen and the Pye Hill Complex, were being run-down towards closure
at the time the 1984-85 strike began.
The safe pits / favourable conditions view of the Nottinghamshire coalfield
was not new to the 1984 strike and post-strike period; Searle-Barnes
suggested it already existed in the pre nationalisation period. 19 Neverthe-
less, he advocated that geological conditions at many Nottinghamshire
collieries were little different to geological conditions in some other coalfields,
18 NUM Kent Area, letter from Jack Collins (Kent Area NUM Secretary) to Henry Richardson,
(Nottingham Area NUM Secretary) , 24 March 1984. D. Amos collection.
19 Searle-Barnes, Pay and Produdivity, p. 19.
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citing South Yorkshire as an example. Yet, Nottinghamshire collieries had a
longer history of greater productivity, higher wages and better labour
relations. 20 He suggested that the Nottinghamshire tradition of industrial
relations played a role here:
Some part of the credit for this must go to the
Nottinghamshire coal-owners and to the union
leadership in Nottinghamshire. Their legacy to the
coalfield was recognition, on the one hand, that high
wages can produce higher profits and, on the other,
that strike action creates more problems than it
solves.21
John Stafford, in his poem 'Fellow Men', made reference to the supposed
favourable geological conditions in the Nottinghamshire coalfield that the
Durham miners were expecting when they migrated south in the mid to late
1960s. The reality, as the poem states, was different:
So from Durham, down to the Midlands,
To mine coal as soft as chalk,
Why, you only have to get to the coalface
It's just like a picnicswalk.
Like the old folk forty-niners,
And with an old hessian bag,
Fill it up with fivers,
Why it's just like making jam.
Of course this was all a dream,
Hard work was what they met,
Like the steel they were made of,
Dayswere hard with hurt and sweat. 22
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 John Henry Stafford, Pastimes Forgot - a glance back (Kirkby-in Ashfield, 2009), p. 55.
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John Stafford added personal evidence of this scenario from his working days
spent with various migrant Durham miners who settled at Annesley Colliery
in the late 1960s. Prior to them transferring, they expected working
conditions and the pits themselves to be much improved and more modern
than where they had come from.23 In some cases, such as at Annesley, the
reality was markedly different. Low seam mining, sometimes combined with
mining methods antiquated for the time, was not uncommon in some parts
of the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Keith Staley, a migrant Derbyshire miner
who worked at Ripley, Denby Hall and Ormonde before settling in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield in the 1970's made reference to this:
In Derbyshire we'd gone from handfilling right
through mechanisation, but as we got to Moorgreen,
we had to go back to handfilling (...) we went into
the Low Main seam and it was very low. In
Nottinghamshire you were expecting seams to be six
and seven feet thick, but in the Low Main it was
really very low. 24
At the start of the 1984-85 strike many collieries in the Ashfield region of the
Nottinghamshire coalfield were working in low seams, i.e. seams under four-
feet in thickness. Annesley had coalfaces in the Deep Hard and Tupton (Low
Main) seams, both in far from perfect geological conditions. Newstead was
also working the Tupton seam, also in far-from-perfect conditions. 25 Other
low seam mining was taking place at Sutton, Silverhill, Linby and in the
Waterloo seam at Bentinck. The thick Blackshale seam (six to seven feet)
was being worked at Hucknall, Pye Hill, Moorgreen, 8entinck and Annesley
(one face). As the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) report from
1983 stated, coal seams were not homogeneous. They varied from location
23 John Stafford in discussion with the author in the summer of 2009 about working with
former Durham miners Luke Dobinson and Jim Stephenson when they first transferred to
Annesley in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in the late 1960s.
24 Bell, Memories of the Nottinghamshire Coalfield, p. 105.
25 For poor geological conditions in the Tupton seam at Newstead Colliery see Stanley,
Nottingham Miners do strike, pp. 44 - 45.
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to location in seam thickness, and suffered poor geological conditions such
as faults and inclusion of foreign matter. 26 Issues of geological interaction,
increased manshift time getting to the face, and a requirement for a greater
proportion of back up manpower at older pits to maintain the coal and
conveyance systems, were not uncommon factors in all coalfields, including
Nottinghamshire. It was at many of these Nottinghamshire pits, working low
seams, that the majority of NUM members opposed the way the 1984-85
strike was conducted. Therefore, in many cases, the theory of all
Nottinghamshire miners working in thick seams, in favourable geological
conditions, can be dispelled and therefore would not have been a factor for
those miners voting against strike action in a ballot over pit closures.
If it is accepted that parts of the Nottinghamshire coalfield did not conform
to being 'safe pits', what of the claims of it being a modern, protltable
coalfield, and that being a major reason why a national ballot was not held
and why the Nottinghamshire miners failed to join the 1984-85 strike? The
issue of comparing supposed 'safe pits' with older collieries became an issue
because of the nature of working the coal reserves at the older collieries.
This is because productivity, and hence profitability at older collieries
generally, but not necessarily, declines as the main seams for which the pit
was sunk in the first place become exhausted, leaving more distant, poorer
quality, more difficult to mine reserves. 27
Firstly, considering the issue of the Nottinghamshire coalfield being modern,
it can be seen that some parts of the description fitted whilst other parts did
not. The newest pits in the Nottinghamshire coalfield were the 1950s and
1960s NCBsinkings to the east of the coalfield at Calverton, Cotgrave and
Bevercotes respectively. In contrast, the oldest pit was at Babbington (sunk
1840-42), with other older collieries dating from the 1860s and 1870s,
notably in the Leen Valley and around Sutton-in-Ashfield. Parts of the
coalfield, especially in the NCBNorth Nottinghamshire Area, could be seen to
26 Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report, A report on the efficiency and costs in the
development, production and supply of coal by the NCB Vol.2, June 1983, p. 69.
27 Ibid., p. 167.
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fit a modern, profitable coalfield description, for example at Thoresby,
Ollerton and Weibeck, but inconsistencies existed and old unprofitable pits
mining low seams could be found in other parts of the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. Looking at the sinking dates of Nottinghamshire pits it can be seen
that the pits in the NCBNorth Nottinghamshire Area were much newer than
pits in the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area. (Appendix 12) The majority of
sinkings in the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area took place between 1904
and 1928 whilst in the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area sinkings took place
generally between the 1860s and 1900. Apart from three longer life pits to
the east of the South Nottinghamshire Area at Calverton, Gedling and
Cotgrave, the other eight pits had an average age of 114 years at the start
of the 1984-85 strike. These, therefore, cannot be classified as new
collieries, and yet it was at these collieries that the majority of NUM
members opposed the strike and, it could be argued, that the seeds of the
UDMwere sown.
In the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area the twelve collieries that made up
the Dukeries coalfield (with the exception of the NCBsinking of Bevercotes
Colliery) had an average age of just over 68 years at the start of the 1984-85
strike. If we compare the pattern of sinking dates with that of the NCBSouth
Yorkshire and Doncaster Areas it can be seen that the NCBSouth Yorkshire
Area had a similar range of sinking dates to the South Nottinghamshire Area,
with the sinking dates for pits in the NCB Doncaster Area being similar to
those in the NCB North Nottinghamshire. (Appendix 12) The thirteen
youngest collieries in the NCBSouth Yorkshire Area had an average age of
91 years at the start of the strike with the ten collieries in the NCBDoncaster
Area having an average age of 76 years. Yet the Doncaster region was one
of the more militant Areas that supported the strike whilst in the North
Nottinghamshire Area the strike was opposed by the vast majority of miners.
As the areas formed part of the Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire
coalfield, it is not surprising that many of the pits in the four NCBAreas
mined the same or similar seams. The Top Hard seam in Nottinghamshire
becomesthe BarnsleyBed in the Yorkshire coalfield, likewise the Blackshale
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Fig 11: Map showing position of collieries in the NCB South
Nottinghamshire Area (Map 16) and the NCB North Nottinghamshire
Area (Map 15) c 1980 .
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seam becomes the Silkstone seam. In many respects the collieries in the
NCB South Yorkshire Area were younger than those in the NCB South
Nottinghamshire Area and yet more miners struck in the NCB South
Yorkshire Area than in the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area. Likewise, the
average age of collieries in the pro-strike NCBDoncaster region, were similar
to those in the anti-strike NCB North Nottinghamshire Area. Overall there
seems to be little concrete evidence in claims that there was no ballot in
1984 because the Nottinghamshire miners were working in a more modern
coalfield.
There is evidence for some of the claims that the Nottinghamshire coalfield
was profitable. The main collieries in what constitutes the Dukeries coalfield
in the NCBNorth Nottinghamshire Area were continually in profit from 1976-
77 to 1981-82. (Appendix 13) Some of these profitable collieries such as
Thoresby, Welbeck and Ollerton were classified as the 'jewels in the NCB
crown'. However, at the other end of the scale the results at Bilsthorpe,
Rufford, Blidworth and Sutton mainly showed losses in the same period. In
the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area only three of the eleven collieries in the
region continually showed a surplus between 1976-77 and 1981-82, and by
the early 1980s one of these, PyeHill Colliery, had been identified for closure
because of exhaustion of economic viable reserves. (Appendix 13)
Increasing losses were experienced at Annesley, Bentinck, Linby, Newstead
and Babbington by the early 1980s, and by that date around half of the
Nottinghamshire coalfield (as a whole) was loss making. Far from it being a
wholly profitable coalfield some of the losses at Nottinghamshire collieries
were comparable to the lower loss makers in the NCBScottish Area and the
NCB Doncaster Area. (Appendix 14) Similarities can be seen when
comparing working against striking pits across the whole British coalfield
(Appendix 15). Again there is no correlation between the pro-strike heavy
loss-making collieries such as Bettshanger in Kent with the anti-strike heavy
loss making collieries such as the Snibston and Whitwick complex in
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Leicestershire, where the vast majority worked through the strike.28
Peculiarities occur within NCB Areas themselves when comparing working
and striking pits. In the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area miners opposed
the strike at the profitable Thoresby Colliery and also at the loss making
Sutton Colliery. In the NCB Doncaster Area militant stances on the strike
were taken by miners at the loss-making Hatfield Main and also at the
generally profit-making RossingtonColliery.
Agreement for closure had been made at local level in all coalfields prior to
the 1984-85 strike and this fitted in with the tradition of dealing with pit
closures right through the nationalisation period. The Monopolies and
Mergers Commission identified this in its 1983 report:
8.23 The NCB regards effective local consultation and
the availability of attractive redundancy and transfer
compensation as key elements in gaining the
acceptance at local level of its polices for dealing with
uneconomic capacity, not only closures but also
measures to improve performance at continuing
collieries. 29
This method of pit closures using 'salami tactics' had become custom and
practice in many coalfields by 1984. Out of the 58 pit closures in the decade
prior to the 1984-85 strike, 43 were by agreement with the Area NUM at
local level. Of the remaining fifteen collieries which went to appeal, five
were closed following the appeal, eight continued in production but were
subsequently closed by local agreement and at the remaining two collieries it
was agreed to work the remaining reserves from other units. 30 In effect 53
of the 58 colliery closures under the 1974 Plan for Coal were by agreement,
mainly at local level.
28 In the Leicestershire Area (NUM) only 30 miners out of a membership of c2,SOOstruck in
1984-85. They were known as the 'Dirty Thirty'.
29 MMCreport, 1983, p. 174.
30 Ibid.
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At a Nottingham Area NUM Branch Secretaries Conference on 29 November
1982 the NCB South Nottinghamshire Area Director gave a portrayal of
limited classified coal reserves of 122 million tonnes, compared to 465 million
tonnes in the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area, declining manpower, and
only three long life pits at Calverton, Cotgrave and Gedling. 31 At the same
meeting it was suggested that the life of Babbington Colliery would be
extended into the 1990s through the merger with Hucknall Colliery. Between
1981 and 1983 coal preparation plant jobs (CPP) had been lost because of
underground mergers at Annesley, Newstead and Babbington and there
were fears for the future of the Annesley, Newstead, Bentinck Complex
following a crisis meeting in February 1984 about its future (see Chapter 1:
Part 1) Automation underground had also been responsible for a number of
job losses such as those of conveyor attendants (button men). Taken
together all these factors, and the financial evidence, do not suggest a
region that was unaffected by the issue of pit closures, job losses and a
climate of contraction.
Both during and since the strike the left have referred to the safe pits theory to
defend their no ballot position. In addition to the evidence considered above
the NUM's 'safe pits' theory was flawed by its own admission. The NUM NEC
resolution passed on 8 March 1984, which started the Area by Area strike
strategy, stated that 'No area is safe, none will escape the McGregor plan' (see
Appendix 5) In March 1984 the NUM Newspaper, The Miner, listed seventy-
four collieries which the NUM leadership suggested were under threat of
closure. This was an updated list from the 'Scargill Seventy Pit Closures List'
c1982. The article, titled 'Why No Pit is Safe', listed a number of collieries
under threat in each Area. 32 It is interesting that when the list is examined
and some local knowledge is applied, then the proposed closure list only
confirmed what was common knowledge in most areas: that some pits had
closed and others were due to close anyway, by local agreement. (Appendix
16) For example in Nottinghamshire the three collieries that had already been
31 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1982, p. 366.
32 NUM, 'Why no pit is safe', The Miner, March 1984.
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agreed for closure, namely Pye Hill, Moorgreen and Sutton, were on the NUM
hit list. The remaining Nottinghamshire colliery on the list was Babbington,
which was the worst loss maker in the whole Nottinghamshire Coalfield in the
early 1980s. Most colliery mergers are in effect closures in everything but
name. Mergers and abandonment of old workings had been happening in the
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalfields for as long as people could
remember. Despite the NUMclaiming 'the facts are obvious to a blind man'
about proposed colliery closures, nothing would save Pye Hill, Moorgreen and
Sutton Collieries from closure. The hit list was not so much a list confirming
the NUM's closure predictions but a list of inevitable closures and the biggest
loss makers. Forty two out of the seventy four collieries on the list were either
already closed or had been agreed for closure at local level.
Despite this, twenty-five years on from the strike, the same 'safe pits' theory is
still being used to defend the decision not to have a National Ballot. Arthur
Scargill, former NUM National President, reiterated that the decision not to
have a national ballot was due to the 'safe pits' theory:
A question that has been raised time and time again
over the past 25 years is why the union did not hold a
national strike ballot? The real reason that NUMAreas
such as Nottinghamshire, South Derbyshire and
Leicestershire wanted a national ballot was that they
wanted the strike called off believing their pits were
safe.33
Stanley contended that the Nottinghamshire coalfield was not affected by
closures at the start of the strike, and this influenced its miners' decision not
to strike:
33 Arthur Scargill, 'We could surrender, or stand and fight', The Guardian, 7 March 2009,
www.guardian.co.uklpolitics
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I don't know whether it was selfishness because
none of the pits in Nottinghamshire Area were under
threat. You only have to look what coalfields we
have left to show maybe they were wrong in their
decision. 34
As previously mentioned the Annesley, Bentinck, Newstead Complex where
Stanley worked was under serious threat at the start of the 1984-85 strike.
Had the Nottingham Area NUMand local NUMBranch Officials not agreed to
the cutbacks in February 1984, including 550 job losses for miners aged over
50s, it was a distinct possibility that the whole Complex could have been
closed and over 3,000 jobs lost in 1984.
Pro-strike supporters believed that the Nottinghamshire miners had no
intention of joining any strike in 1984 because it was a safe and prosperous
coalfield. The evidence put forward shows this view to be a myth;
Nottinghamshire was affected by cutbacks, technological advances in the coal
industry, colliery mergers and closures through 'exhaustion of economic
reserves'. No coalfield was immune from the laws of economics or the
exhaustion of economic workable reserves. In 1984 the NUM attempted to
stop closure by local agreement in its tracks. In closure terms the deep coal
mining industry was a former shadow of what it had been at nationalisation.
83% of the NCB'sdeep mines had closed since vesting day in 1947. Indeed
in the period 1955 - 1970, just over 550 pits had closed nationally. At the
end of December 1955, 850 collieries, employing 695,000 men, were in
production. 35 By the end of December 1970 this figure had fallen
dramatically to 293 collieries, employing 283,000 men. Many of these closed
under the Labour Government of 1964-1970. At the start of the strike these
figures had fallen even further: 174 collieries were in production employing
192,000 men in March 1984. During the mass closures of the 1960s right
through to the early 1980s the NUMhad failed to get a rallying point against
34 'Miners Strike still divides the community 25 years on', Ashfield Chad, 4 March 2009, p. 4.
35 Robert Bradley, Snippets of the past on the coalmining Industry (Ollerton, 1993,
unpublished typescript).
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pit closures. With the rise of the left to prominent positions in the NUM
during the early 1980s it was always likely that there would be a standoff
against the continued demise of the deep coal mining industry in Britain.
When it came it would eventually prove fatal, not only for the industry, but
for the NUMitself.
3. Incentives, Ballots and Democracy
In defence of its no ballot strategy in 1984 the left-wing of the NUM often
point to the anomalies surrounding the introduction of Area Incentive
bonuses following the 1977 ballot vote not to introduce a national incentive
bonus scheme. Along with pit closures, piecework was a major shift in policy
and was one of the most divisive issues the NUM had to deal with. For the
left a return to piecework would fragment the national solidarity which had
grown since the National Power LoadingAgreement (NPLA)was introduced in
1966. As Taylor stated there was a historical aspect to the introduction of
NPLAwhich had divided the miners in the past:
The NPLAwas the culmination of the historic struggle
to eradicate the cut-throat competition of piecework
and it expressed a powerful sense of social justice
amongst the workforce. Supporters of incentives
schemes were (...) portrayed as selfish and parochial,
wishing to return to the days of 'blood on the coal'. 36
In their defence, supporters of incentive schemes (NUM moderates) point to
the fact that significant shifts in policy had always divided the NUM. As
Taylor pointed out, the moderates pointed to the evidence that the NPLAhad
been introduced by a small majority vote in 1966, and the 1972 strike was
authorised by a majority vote of only 58% of NUM members. 37 However,
once the decision had been made the NUM became united on whatever the
issuewas.
36 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 122.
37 Ibid., p. 123.
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However, the national solidarity that the left claimed was not what it
seemed. In some NUM Areas there was unrest about the lack of a
productivity scheme. NUM Areas that pushed for this were the traditional
moderate Areas of Lancashire, South Derbyshire, Leicestershire and
Nottinghamshire. It should be remembered that at the same time the
Yorkshire Area of the NUMwas rapidly moving to the left with the election of
Arthur Scargill as Area President in 1973. He was passionately opposed to
any form of productivity bonus and indeed took legal advice on the issue
prior to the NUMSDCwhich discussedthe subject in September 1974. 38 He
later led the Yorkshire delegation out of the meeting.
The Wilberforce enquiry recommended the implementation of a productivity
scheme following the 1972 national strike. Whist it is not in the scope of this
study to do a full account of wage uniformity and productivity schemes in the
British coalmining industry, the outcome of the negotiations that started in
1972 culminated in two NUM National Ballots turning down the introduction
of a National Productivity Scheme, firstly in 1974 and again in 1977. It was
the 1977 ballot on which the principal debate concerning democracy was
centred when the strike broke out in March 1984. At the 1977 NUMAnnual
Conference moves to try and introduce a National Incentive Bonus scheme
were opposed by a majority of delegates. It was, however, a narrow decision
and the motion was carried by only three votes. Resolution 24 from the
South Derbyshire NUM proposed that a meaningful incentive scheme be
implemented from 1 August 1977 but it was turned down by 137,000 votes
(50.5%) to 134,000 (49.5%). The NUM was hopelessly split on the issue.
The South Derbyshire resolution, however, put in a clause that in the event
of an incentive scheme being turned down, different NUM Areas should be
allowed to negotiate local self-financing schemes.
Despite the 1977 Annual Conference decision the NUM NECdecided to put
the issue to a national ballot of all NUM members. Pressure had been
brought on the NECby some NUMAreas for the introduction of an incentive
38 For an account of this Conference see Gormley, Battered Cherub, p. 149.
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scheme since the stagnation of miners' wages under the NPLAfrom the late
1960s, and the Social Contract of the Labour Government (1974-79). Miners'
real wages had fallen by 2 per cent in 1974-75, by 4 per-cent in 1975-76 and
then by 5 per-cent in 1976-77. 39 In 1975 miners' earnings were 125 per cent
of those in manufacturing; by 1977 it was down to 108 per cent. 40 At the
same time productivity had fallen under the NPLAduring the 1970s from 2.44
Overall Tons per manshift (OMS) in 1970-71 to 2.18 tons OMS in 1977. 41
Rumours were circulating the Nottinghamshire coalfield that 'special
payments' were being made in other coalfields in order to keep up production
targets. The 1978 NUMAnnual Conference Report described these additional
payments as being 'additions to the day wage system by means of localised
incentives supported by other variations to national agreements'. 42 There
was serious concern within the NUM about declining production in the coal
industry and that the NUMcould be held to account for not playing its part in
the tripartite agreement under the 1974 Plan for Coal. 43
This was during the general climate of unrest and limited wage rises under
the then Labour Government's Phase 3 of the Social Contract. Inflation was
running at record levels and the Labour Government had to secure a loan
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the previous year to prop up
the ailing British economy. Accordingly, the Labour Government had to
adopt a monetarist economic policy over two years prior to the election of the
first Thatcher Government in 1979. Despite Labour being in power and the
Plan for Coal being in place, the issue for the NUM was how to pacify the
miners' pay issue without breaking the Government's incomes pay pollcv,
Regardingthe forthcoming incentive bonus ballot the Kent Area NUMwent to
court arguing that the NUM NECwas not acting lawfully within the rules and
constitution on the union and was in defiance of an Annual Conference
decision. However, the judge declared that the NEC'sdecision was lawful
39 Calhnlcos and Simons, The Great Strike, p. 32.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 33.
42 NUM, Report to the 1978 Annual Conference, p. 317.
43 Ibid., p. 316.
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and the Kent Area of the NUM had costs awarded against them. The Judge
stated that a ballot of all members was by far the fairest and most
democratic process:
What the NEC is proposing to do is to hold a secret
ballot of all members. This is the very essence of the
democratic process, a far more satisfactory and
democratic process than leaving it to the delegates of a
Conference.44
When the ballot result was announced, much to the surprise of many people,
a majority of NUM members nationally voted against the introduction of a
National Incentive Bonus scheme. The scheme was rejected by 110,634
votes (55.5%) to 87,901 (44.2%) In the Nottingham Area NUM a majority
voted for the introduction of an Area Incentive Bonus Scheme (AIS), but the
majority was not as substantial as one would expect. 14,744 (59.5%) voted
in favour of the introduction of a bonus scheme with 10,042 (40.5%) being
against. 45 Thirty three branchesvoted in favour with only six being against.
In response to the national 'no vote', the NUMNECthen ruled that any Area
that wished to negotiate for the introduction of Self FinancingArea Incentive
Schemes could do so under Rule 36 of the NUM National Rules. They got
round the 1977 'no-ballot' result on the grounds that the ballot had rejected a
'national scheme' and this did not stop individual NUMAreas from negotiating
Area based schemes. This part of the South Derbyshire Resolution was
approved in the NUM NEC section of the report on incentive schemes,
apparently without comment or debate. 46 The South Derbyshire Area NUM
was the first to negotiate a local based scheme, quickly followed by the
Leicester and Nottingham Areas of the NUM.The South WalesArea NUMwas
the last area to negotiate an incentive scheme in January 1978. Following
the NUM NECdecision to allow Area incentive schemes the Yorkshire, South
44 John Mdlroy, Trade Unions in Britain today (Manchester, 1988), p. 128.
45 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1977, p. 369.
46 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 129.
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Wales and Kent Areas then went to court arguing that the NEC were in
breach of the rules, the constitution of the union and the previous court
ruling. The courts however upheld the NEC'sactions. When summing up
JusticeWatkins said:
The result of the ballot, nationally conducted, is not
binding on the NEC in using its powers between
conferences. It has no great force or significance. 47
In the democratic process, which was the correct decision, the judge who
stated the ballot was the essence of democracy or the judge that ruled that
the ballot was of no great force or significance on the NECusing its powers
between conferences? As John McIlroy pointed out, the issue of trade union
democracy was a complex one; but was the incentive bonus introduced as a
result of a democratic decision?:
Was it a result of an Executive which had already
made up its mind and imposed its will on the
membership? Were the judges who thought a national
ballot was the essenceof democracy right? Or was the
judge who believed it was 'of no great significance' on
firmer ground? Was it right for the Executive to go
against the decision of a more representative
gathering of delegates, the Conference and a national
referendum of members as exemplified by the ballot?
48
When the no-ballot issue cropped up at the start of the 1984-85 strike, the
left-wing of the NUMwas quick to point to the ballot anomalies of the 1977
incentive debacle to defend its no ballot position:
It is interesting to note that (...) the sanctity of the
ballot box was not shown in 1978. Then a ballot
47 Ibid.
48 McIlroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today, p. 129.
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supported the earlier delegate conference decision to
reject pit productivity schemes (...) despite the vote
rejecting productivity, discussion on area schemes
began in 1978 with South Derbyshire leading the way.
There was no uproar in the press on that occasion. 49
The issue of 'foul play' over the introduction of Area Incentive Schemeshas
remained as an instrument in defending the 'no ballot' issue in the 1984-85
strike ever since. Twenty years after the strike Dave Douglass suggested
that the 1977 incentive ballot debacle was the major influence in the aversion
to a ballot in 1984:
The antipathy to a ballot had more than one source.
Perhapsthe greatest related to an earlier period when
the NCB, with the approval of Mr Gormley (...) had
tried to introduce a productivity scheme. The
Conference, fearful that such a scheme would bring
back financial divisions between areas and break
national pay bargaining, would not agree. 50
The Area Incentive Schemes have been put forward as a major cause of
disunity among NUMminers and thus a main factor in causing a 'no vote' in
any NUMnational strike ballot. Like Douglass previously, Wilsher was of the
opinion that the introduction of area incentive schemes fractured unity in the
NUM:
In January 1978, as area vote followed area vote, the
men indicated, pretty unequivocally, that for them the
choice was money first and unity a poor, rather
49 Labour Research Department, The Miners' Case (London, October 1984), p. 11.
50 D. J. Douglass, Strike, not the End of the Stoty(Overton, 2005), p. 32.
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theoretical, second. It was to prove a critical decision
when 1984 came round. 51
Likewise Milne backed the theory of incentive bonus payments being a factor
for causing division within the NUM 'rank and file' members, along with the
myth of the 'safe pits' theory:
The division between what appeared at the time to be
pits and coalfields guaranteed a long term future,
notably Nottinghamshire (...) and the rest had been
deliberately nurtured by the Coal Boards'
reintroduction of incentive payments favouring miners
at high productivity pits. S2
The inference from this way of thinking is that high productivity pits with
favourable geological conditions automatically command high incentive bonus
payments whilst low productivity and bad geological conditions automatically
command low incentive bonus payments. The Nottinghamshire coalfield is
often described as being a monolithic coalfield, with good geological
conditions and an assumption that these conditions were linked
automatically to high incentive bonus payments at all of its collieries. Thus,
because the Nottinghamshire miners had been bought off by high incentive
bonuses, they would be unwilling to back strike action in a national ballot.
However, as the Revolutionary Communist Party pointed out, this does not
explain why Barnsley miners, who also got high bonuses, were among the
most militant supporters of the strike. S3 Also, as previously mentioned in
part 1 of Chapter 4, there were distinct differences in geological conditions
within the Nottinghamshire coalfield.
51 Wilsher, Macintyre and Jones, Strike, p. 21.
52 Seumas Milne, The Enemy Within: The Secret War against the Miners? (Basingstoke,
1995), p. 19.
53 Revolutionary Communist Party, The Notts Scapegoats, January 1985. D. Amos collection.
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In his address to the 1983 NUMAnnual Conference,Arthur Scargill suggested
that the Area Bonus Incentive Agreement was the main reasonwhy the NUM
membership had turned down industrial strike action twice in the previous
year:
There can be no doubt that the main reason [for
turning down strike action] was the Bonus Incentive
Scheme, which has indeed put man against man, pit
against pit, and Area against Area (...) The Incentive
Scheme has disunited us and set this union back fifty-
years. 54
Despite this claim there were flaws in the left's argument that the AISs were
the main cause of disunity in the NUM in the early 1980s. When the NPLA
agreement came into existence in 1966 a clausewas introduced whereby the
NUM were involved in setting the 'norms' for production workers on
coalfaces. The NPLAhad the effect of finishing the different country-wide
piece-rates for coalface workers that existed prior to 1966, replacing it by a
standard face rate (power-loading rate) for face workers throughout the
country. Under the scheme parity was to be achieved for all face production
workers throughout Britain by 31 December 1971. Real wages in some
coalfields stagnated and workforce morale collapsed. As a result of this and
the devastation of the deep mining coal industry during the Lord Robensera
(c1960 - 1970), no more was this seen than in the Nottinghamshire coalfield,
as real wages fell and thousands of migrant miners settled in the county with
stories of their pits being closed in other regions for no apparent reason.
Dick Martin's view on NPLA, 'that the incentive in pit work had been kicked
out', echoed throughout the Nottinghamshire coalfield. 55 In order to try and
maintain some kind of incentive for production workers on NPLA,the issue of
'method study' was brought in. Method study set the norm for the task
which should be achieved. Clause4 of the NPLAschedule stated:
54 NUM, Report to 1983 National Conference, p. 351.
55 All our Working Lives (Cutting Coal), 1983, Channel4 Production.
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The number of men who shall comprise a power-loading
team will be assessed by method study within four
weeks where possible of the face starting. The union
may, if they wish, have an observer present whilst
method study is being taken. During this period the
number of men shall be assessedby management after
consultation with the union on experience of similar
installations working in comparable conditions. 56
In the event of a dispute arising at pit level out of the implementation of
Clause 4, the following system should operate: (This came under Clause 19
of the NPLASchedule)
In the event of a dispute at pit level arising out of the
implementation of Clause 4 of this Schedule two
persons shall be appointed by the Board and two by
the union at District level, all of whom must have
knowledge of power loading systems in other parts of
the district. They will visit the face and report their
findings to a meeting of the parties at District level for
decision. In the event of a dispute on any other
Clause of the Agreement it shall be treated as a
national question under the National Conciliation
Agreement of 1947 and dealt with accordingly. 57
It should be remembered that NUMPolicy at the time NPLAwas introduced
objected to measurement by the time clock. At the start of the 1984 strike
NPLAstill gave a basic set wage for face-workers, and incentive bonus could
be earned, on top of the basic wage, when the face produced above the set
norm. Incentive bonus schemes could be district-based, pit-based or face-
56 NCB and NUM, National Power Loading Agreement, November 1966, p. 7.
57 Ibid., p. 10.
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based. Pit-based or district agreements were referred to as 'chuck in
systems'. Pits that operated individual coalface contracts were called 'face to
face agreements'. From 1978 negotiating the norm, for the face or
development heading, was therefore an important aspect of determining
miners' earnings at pit level. The duty for negotiating on incentive bonuses
at pit level usually lay with the local NUM Branch; in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield this responsibility usually lay with the NUM Branch Secretary. His
duty would be to negotiate both face-norms and incentive rates with the local
colliery management for each coalface or development heading. In the event
of a face suffering from poor geological conditions it would be the duty of the
NUMBranchSecretary to try and negotiate down the norm i.e. reduce the set
norm pro-rata to take into account whatever particular problems were
beyond the control of the face team. In some cases coalfaces with poor
geological conditions would get a pit or area fall-back rate. Former NUM
National President, Joe Gormley, dispelled the theory that area incentive
schemes were bound to lead to wide discrepancies between earnings in
different coalfield areas becauseof the issue of pit based norms:
In theory this [earning discrepancies] ought not to be
the case, because norms are decided at pit level,
according to the conditions of each coalface. This is a
matter for negotiation between the local NUM
representatives and the Colliery Manager. And the
payment for achieving the norm, or percentages above
and below it, is the same throughout Britain, so that
theoretically everyone should be able to earn the same
bonus. 58
In reality, the Area Incentive Bonus schemes did not work out this way,
hence the myth of good geological conditions creating good bonuses and bad
58 Gormley, Battered Cherub, p. 153.
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geological conditions creating poor bonuses. However, Joe Gormley drew an
important historical comparison between the then new Area Incentive
schemes of the late 1970s and the old piece work systems that existed prior
to the introduction of NPLAin 1966:
(...) the curious thing is that the Areas with the lowest
earnings are the same Areas which had the lowest
earnings under the old piece-work systems, the same
areas incidentally, which supported the NPLA and
opposed the Incentive Scheme. That suggests either
that they are not interested in earning themselves
more money, or that they just don't know how to
negotiate properly for themselves. 59
Stanley dispelled the theory that bad geological conditions automatically led
to poor incentive bonuses. When working on a coalface in the Tupton seam
at Newstead Colliery prior to the strike, lower norms to take account of poor
geological conditions were negotiated at pit level which then allowed decent
incentive bonuses to be earned:
I have to say that even though we had these horrible
conditions we also earned some very good money, as
the norms for the coalface production negotiated by
the union were very good. The incentive scheme
was exploited to its fullest by the Tupton men. 60
Ironically, Stanley contradicts himself earlier in the same document by
suggesting that the incentive bonus scheme was responsible for the disunity
in the NUM whilst earlier claiming that the Newstead Tupton men were
benefitting from the same incentive bonus scheme:
59 Ibid.
60 Stanley, Nottinghamshire Miners do strike, p. 45.
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The avarice of the Nottinghamshire miner was
becoming more and more prominent as we then
entered into a pit by pit bonus scheme and then
shortly afterwards a face by face scheme. Even at
local pit level you would have workers doing the same
kind of work as others being paid differently because
of the production achievements of each individual
coalface or heading. 61
Therefore, it can be construed that negotiations on the norm, and
subsequent incentive earnings, were an important factor in determining
miners' wages at pit level by the early 1980s. However, evidence exists that
another important influence, involving the negotiation of pit bonus, was
happening at the same time. In the Nottinghamshire coalfield in the early
1980s a new breed of NUM Branch Officials was replacing the old NUM
Branch stalwarts from the 1960s and 1970s. The left-wing of the NUM was
ideologically opposed to differential earnings, the goal of standard earnings
for face-workers being a long sought after policy. Thus, from 1966 to 1978,
the left's ideological policy of standard face rates throughout the British
coalfields was achieved. This was thought to underpin the unity in the NUM
during the two national strikes of 1972 and 1974. But it was also, as Jack
Jones (Leicester Area NUM) stated in 1976, at a cost to districts like
Leicestershirewhere production levels regularly topped the national OMSbut
no additional payments were forthcoming as wages levels stood still.
Attacking the principle of NPLAand national unity it had created he said:
Call it what you may, standardisation or rationalisation,
the Leicestershire miner has paid dearly for National
Agreements. 62
61 Ibid., p. 39.
62 C. P. Griffin, The Leicestershire Miners Vol. 3, p. 178.
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Real earnings during the periods 1966-72 and 1975 - 1978 declined in
several coalfields, as the coal industry continued to contract. By the time of
the introduction of the Area Incentive Scheme in 1978 it had become
apparent there was a need for a fresh approach to the negotiating process.
Williamson suggested that in the run up to the 1984-85 strike a new breed of
Branch Official was emerging in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. He contended
that these new NUM Branch Officials, many of whom were craftsmen, were
more suited to the changing pattern of industrial relations in the coal industry
at that time. Williamson saw a distinct difference between the old school of
BranchOfficials and the new school:
The old Branch Secretaries were usually those that
could shout the loudest and fight the hardest, to be
fair they were never elected for their intellect and
intelligence (...) then the pendulum began to swing
( ...) more and more craftsmen were being elected onto
the union because of the incentive scheme coming in
and many of them knowing they were being ripped off
with bonus payments 63
What Williamson was describing was an altering industrial relations climate
for the union, a climate changing from the industrial muscle of the 1970s to
one of industrial negotiation, mainly centred at pit level. During the NPLAera
(1966 - 1978) negotiations, especially concerning the issue of wages, moved
to a more national base, but with the advent of pit based incentive schemes
from 1978, the emphasis on earnings moved back to pit level. It was left to
the local NUM Branch Officials to negotiate a significant part of production
workers earnings from this time. From the early 1980s, many of the old
Nottinghamshire NUM Branch stalwarts from the 1960s and 1970s were
starting to take advantage of the new enhanced redundancy terms and were
63 Interview with Steve Williamson, Selston, 8 March 2009.
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leaving the coal industry. In many cases the 'New Breed' of NUM Branch
Secretarieswere taking their place.
Concluding this section on the ballot issue, three important themes can be
identified. Firstly, the controversy surrounding the introduction of Area
Incentive Schemes in the 1977-78 period highlighted the 'different
perceptions of democracy' which existed in the NUM. As John Lloyd rightly
stated, the NUMAnnual Conference was the supreme authority in the union;
between conferences the NUM NEC was responsible for conducting the
business and affairs of the union. However, in addition to resolutions to
Conference, there were other 'countervailing pressures to the delegated
democracy of conference'. 64 One of these was the requirement under NUM
National Rule 43 to hold an individual ballot vote on any proposed national
strike action. The two legal judgements on the incentive bonus debacle
(1977-78) merely highlighted this democratic anomaly in the NUM.
Secondly, the issue that once the Area Incentive Schemes had been
introduced, the argument that they were a main causeof disunity in the NUM
need not be the case. From 1978 onwards a significant part of miners'
wages was reliant on NUMBranchOfficials negotiating incentive contracts at
NUM Branch level. As in the case that Stanley highlighted in the pre-strike
period at Newstead, strong branch negotiations could result in face workers
earning decent bonuses despite unfavourable geological conditions. Also, as
Griffin stated, 'it hardly took an area incentive scheme to divide the union;
division was its normal condition'. 65 There had been constant division for
most of the 1970s on 'the futility or desirability of pressing for substantial
wage claims and taking militant or conciliatory stances over pit closures'. 66
More importantly, the left's claim that NPLAcreated unity in the NUM was
challenged. Griffin suggested that apart from the 1972 - 1974 period which
was affected by particular economic circumstances, 'National wage
agreements and uniform, national rates of pay had not brought unity, NPLA
64 Lloyd, Understanding the Miners'Strike, p. 20.
65 C. P. Griffin, Leicestershire Miners Vo!.3, p. 181.
66 Ibid.
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had been a constant source of division'. 67 Finally, in the period pre dating
the strike, there was a move in the centre of negotiations from National level
to Area and pit level. No more was this seen than in negotiations at NUM
Branch level which determined the level of earnings a miner could get
through additional incentive bonuses.
Despite the safe pits theory and the issue of wages disparity, there was
another main factor which was influential on the ballot issueand the ability to
win a strike: the effect that enhanced redundancy terms had on the NUM
members leaving the industry. This was especially prevalent among the over
50s. The implication was that NUM members over 50, signifying that they
would take advantage of the new enhanced voluntary redundancy terms,
would be unlikely to vote for industrial strike action in a national ballot vote.
Part 3 on the Ballot issue appraises the link between redundancy and the
failure to hold a national strike ballot in the 1984-85 strike and investigates
why this affected the eventual outcome of the strike.
3. Bailing Out: Redundancy, the Ballot issue and the strike
Hilary Cave'sthird reason (see p. 192) why the 1984-85 strike was conducted
without a national ballot lies in the issue of the strike being a principled strike
about saving jobs for future generations.68 Bob Collier, a striking miner from
Newstead Colliery, made reference to a 'genuine strike', based on the issue
of saving jobs:
We were totally united in 1972 and 1974 when it was
about money. The 1984 strike brought out the
difference between the genuine man concerned about
his job and his future and the greedy people who
67 Ibid.
68 Interview with Barry Johnson and Hilary cave, Chesterfield, 8 March 2008.
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knew what they were doing was wrong, but all they
wanted was the money. 69
Likewise on the centenary of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB)
in 1989 the NUM'saccount of the strike emphasised the 'principled issue' as
being the preservation of jobs:
This strike had not been about wages, better
conditions or any material gain. It had been waged on
principle; the principle that miners' jobs were held by
each generation of workers in trust for those who
would come after them, and must not be wantonly
destroyed. 70
Overall manpower had been falling in the British deep-coalmining industry
since it reached its peak in 1913 of around one million workers. A
combination of new technologies, economic downturns and a move to
alternative fuels had combined to cause this decline. From the early 1980s
one of the main obstacles obstructing the fight for jobs was the issue of
enhanced redundancy. Many miners, especially the over 50s, had been
leaving the coal-industry in significant numbers since the introduction of
enhanced terms in 1981, available under the Government based Redundant
Mineworkers PaymentsScheme (RMPS).Benefits were increased again under
the RMPSfrom April 1983. Redundanciesin the coal-industry doubled from
8,100 in 1982-83 to 18,100 the following year. 71 This issue was not unique
to the coal industry. As Adeney and Lloyd maintained, enhanced redundancy
packages had been brought in to deal with a period of contraction
throughout British Industry, especially in the public sector, in the steel
69 Bell, Memories of the Nottinghamshire Coalfield, p. 109.
70 NUM, A Century of Struggle, p. 112.
71 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 25.
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industry, shipyards and British Telecom. 72 The main question surrounding
the redundancy issue is what effect did it have in undermining the ability to
win a strike ballot, and thus the ability to win a strike which was about saving
pits and mining jobs?
Reg Guest's humorous poem (Appendix 17) summed up the general climate
of both the pre-strike and post-strike periods, when constant rumours
circulated the Nottinghamshire coalfield about imminent requests from the
NCBfor voluntary redundancies:
Ave' you eard owt is the greeting,
Heard at every shift,
Ave' you eard owt's what they cry
When you're going down the lift. 73
The RMPSwas a Government funded scheme which replaced the Voluntary
Early Retirement Scheme (VERS). The VERS had gradually brought the
miners' retirement age down from 65 to 60 in the late 1970s. The RMPSpaid
benefits over and above those paid under the Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act of 1978. Importantly, redundant miners over the age of
55, with a least ten years' service, received both a lump sum and a weekly
benefit, the amount depending on service in the industry and average
earnings in the tax year prior to redundancy. 74 The benefits under RMPS
could effectively be split into two parts. Enhancedbenefits for miners over 50
were based on lump sums up to £20,000 plus pension benefits, which
combined with state entitlements, gave a weekly income over £100. For
miners under 50 the new rates gave a payment of £1,000 for each year of
service. In the industry this was usually referred to as severance pay.
How is the issue of the strike ballot and the enhanced redundancy terms
connected? Finishing figures from a Nottinghamshire colliery during the
72 Ibid., p. 263.
73 Reg Guest,' Ave' you eard owt', The Chad, July 1986. D. Amos collection.
74 NCB, Benefits payable under the Redundant Mineworkers Payments Scheme, April 1983.
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period that pre dated the introduction of the enhanced redundancy terms
(1978-79) and following their introduction (1983-84 & 1986-87) show some
interesting trends:
Table 3. Leaving statistics for Annesley Colliery: 1978-79, 1983-84 and
1986-87.
Overall Tons per manshift
(OMS)
~
., .
14 (11.0%) 124 (83.0%) 97 (75.0%)
14 (11.0%) 8 (05.3%) 7 (05.5%)
13 (10.3%) 3 (02.1%) 10 (08.0%)
46 (36.5%) 7 (04.7%) 7 (05.5%)
3 (02.5%) 1 (00.6%) 0
33 (26.5%) 3 (02.1%) 0
1 (00.8%) 1 (00.6%) 8 (06.0%)
1 (00.8%) 2 (01.6%) 0
1 (00.8%) 0 0
126 (1000/0) 149 (1000/0) 129 (1000/0)
957 981 890
2.91 3.64 4.39
Redundancy
Dismissed
Transfer
Voluntary
Death in Service
Early Retirement eVERS)
Incapacity
Emigration
Other reason
Totals
Average Colliery Manpower
Annual Colliery Tonnage 588,556 682,181 844,902
Source: Annesley Colliery Leavers Book 1972 - 1993. D. Amos collection.
Note that the percentage of leavers in the three financial years was relatively
constant; between 13% and 15% of manpower left the colliery each financial
year for a variety of reasons. However, the reasons for miners finishing is
noticeably different in three areas over the periods studied. The most
significant factor is the mass increase in miners finishing on voluntary
redundancy under the enhanced RMPS terms by 1983-84. From just over
10% in 1978-79 the figure soared to 83% by 1983-84, in the year before the
strike, and remained at three-quarters of the leavers in 1986-87, following
the strike. Directly connected with this trend is the fact that miners finishing
voluntarily or through early retirement virtually disappeared between 1978-79
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and 1983-84 onwards. Retirement went down from 33 in 1978-79, to just 3
in 1983-84 and then none by 1986-87. Voluntary leavers accounted for over
a third of finishers in 1978-79 (36.5%); by the 1980's this had dropped to
around 5% in each of the years studied. The inference from this is that from
the time of the enhanced redundancy terms being announced, most miners
waited to be paid off instead of leaving the industry voluntarily. However,
another significant factor when looking at the redundancy/retirement figures
should be considered. The average age of miners leaving Annesley Colliery
dropped considerably between 1978-79 and 1986-87. In 1978-79 the
majority of miners leaving Annesley were in the 57 to 63 age group and the
majority left on the VERSScheme. By 1983-84 this figure had dropped; most
miners who left then were in the 56 - 59 age group and finished on voluntary
redundancy. Three years later this figure had dropped even further; in 1986-
87 most of the miners who left Annesley on redundancy were in the late 40s
to early 50s age group; out of the 97 miners who left in 1986-87 only one
was over 55.
An important factor for the increase in miners leaving Annesley in 1983-84 on
redundancy terms was to make way for displaced miners at the due to close
Pye Hill and Moorgreen Collieries. At these two collieries men under 50 were
given the opportunity to transfer to the more 'high priority pits' to facilitate
redundancy on a one to one basis. In effect, every transferred miner from
Moorgreen or PyeHill meant the opportunity of a redundancy for an over 50s
Annesley miner; the same scenario applied at other Nottinghamshire Area
'receiving pits'. The rationalisation would come under the banner of 'natural
wastage'. Beynon, Hudson and Sadler described a similar situation in the
Durham Coalfield in 1985 following the strike. At Horden and Bates
Collieries, which had been scheduled for closure, the men were given the
opportunity to transfer to the high-priority pits in the region to make
redundancies available for the over 50s at the receiving pits. The main
difference between the Durham and Nottinghamshire cases was that the
closures in the latter had been agreed at local level prior to the strike; in
Durham the closures were contested. Both the Horden and Bates closures
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went to appeal through the Extended Colliery Review Procedure (ECRP)but
both still closed following that appeal. In the NCB South Nottinghamshire
Area an influential factor for accepting closure was that younger miners could
get jobs at receiving collieries while they still existed. Some former
Moorgreen miners told the story of Henry Richardson, the pro-strike
Nottingham NUM Area Official, telling Moorgreen NUM members in 1983 to
accept the closure of the mine whilst other jobs still remained available in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield.7s Within a year he was telling them to 'get off
their knees' and fight for their jobs.
The number of miners over 50 finishing from 1981 onwards was an important
factor when the NCBannounced its plans to shed 20,000 jobs in early March
1984, the trigger that started the strike. This issue was the crux of the
matter for the NUM. Who could deny men who had worked thirty to forty
years in the pits the chance of a decent redundancy payment and to rescue
of what was left of their lives from the dust of the pit? At the 1983 NUM
Annual Conference in Perth, Peter Heathfield, then NUM Area Secretary for
the NUM North Derbyshire Area, told the conference of the imminent threat
to 70,000 jobs in the coal industry. Interestingly he claimed 53,000 of these
were miners over 50:
( ...) there are 53,000 miners in our industry over the
age of SO. Many of them may sigh with relief (...) I
know 70,000 into 53,000 does not go (...) inevitably in
the course of the next few years (...) the 40 year aids
of our industry, are going to feel the axe. 76
The fact that Heathfield stated that many of them 'may sigh with relief'
inferred that he thought many over 50s would be willing to accept
redundancy and get out of the industry as soon as they could. The figures
75 The author in discussion with Mick Kirby and Trevor Wilson, ex Moorgreen miners, at
Annesley Colliery following the 1984-85 dispute. Henry Richardson was the Nottingham Area
NUM Agent for Moorgreen Colliery.
76 NCB, 'Midland Miners need Convincing', Coal News, September 1983. D. Amos collection.
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from Annesley for 1983-84 confirm this view. There was no shortage of
volunteers to make way for younger miners affected by closure. In the event
of 70,000 jobs losses being correct this would leave a deficit of 17,000 jobs.
One factor Heathfield did not include in his calculation was the number of
miners waiting to reach the 50 milestone and have the opportunity of getting
redundancy with the lump sum and associated weekly benefits. Todd Clark,
from Bentinck Colliery, described the prevailing atmosphere of this sector of
workers in the immediate aftermath of the strike in 1985:
The carrot's there and any man over the age of 46
who keeps his mouth shut and his head down will
hope he gets redundancy . 77
This scenario Clark described existed before the strike, during the strike and
following the strike as the figures from Annesley confirm. In the
Nottinghamshire coalfield it was added to by the introduction of £1,000 per
year severance pay for miners under 50. This was first introduced in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield following announcement of the Hucknall-
Babbington closure in September 1986.
If the Annesley scenario for 1983-84 were to be projected nationwide, the
20,000 job losses the NCBrequired, which sparked the 1984-85 strike, could
have been achieved. However, as the NUM leaders knew, this would be at
the cost of pit closures. Was the attitude to redundancy from the over 50s
nationwide the same as the miners in Nottinghamshire? Some evidence
suggests this was so. Coulter suggested 450 men were leaving the coal
industry weekly from the time of Ian MacGregor's appointment as NCB
Chairman in September 1983. 78 Both Ivor Evansand Roy Walters from the
South Wales Coalfield suggested miners over 50 would leave the industry on
enhanced redundancy terms rather than transfer. When asked if miners in
77 Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 82.
78 Coulter, Miller and Walker, The Iron Fist: State of Siege, p. 13.
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South Wales would transfer to other pits in the event of closures, Ivor Evans
suggested that men over 50 would not go: 'They'll take the pittance (oo.) this
redundancy money'. 79 In July 1983 RoyWalters of Tower Colliery suggested
that redundancy payments would improve with the imminent appointment of
Ian McGregoras NCBChairman:
The redundancy payments are now good (oo.) I suppose
when he (Ian McGregor) gets in that he will ask for
higher (redundancy) payments (oo.) which is a way of
demoralising the people over 50 (oo.) and they will say,
well we've worked thirty years, forty years in the pit, if
we go to 60 we only get £500, we can have £21,000
now or £30,000 or whatever the case may be, they're
going to take it and you can't blame the men for taking
't 80I .
Colin Bottomore, NUM Branch Secretary at Bentinck Colliery in
Nottinghamshire, also identified the issue of the £500 VERS payment as
being a factor in the over 50s deciding to accept redundancy. At the
Nottingham Area NUM Conference in February 1984 he very bluntly stated
the reasonswhy he thought the men over 50 were leaving the industry:
They [the men] accept redundancy because they are
knackered, because they cannot continue to do the
work at that age, and because if they go to 60, they
finish up with £500 [VERS]. 81
The redundancy problem and the destiny of the 1984-85 strike is considered
to be a clash between the ideologies of the left-wing NUMunion activists and
the realities of the situation for miners over 50. Union ideology talked of no
man having the right to sell the job of a son or grandson. The NUMNational
79 Ibid., p. 56.
80 Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 64.
81 Nottingham Area NUM, 1984 Area Conference Report, (6 and 7 February 1984), p. 62.
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President's address to the 1983 NUM Annual Conference touched on this
issue:
We must face the fact that our people, are, all too
often, selling the job of son or grandson in exchange for
a lump sum benefit (...) we must convince our members
that, while they have every right to demand early
retirement (...) they do not have the right to sell the
jobs of their sons and grandsons. 82
As Adeney and Lloyd stated, the Government and the NCBhad fashioned a
redundancy package which appealed to the individual miner but was bound
to receive the opposition of the union. 83 There was a clash of ideologies
within the union between the collective idealism of some of the NUM
leadership and activists, and the individualism expressed by some of the NUM
members at branch level. There was, as Adeney and Lloyd identified, a
conflict of opinion in the union on the issue of voluntary redundancy:
Its [the NUM's] definition of collective responsibilities
and the need for struggle necessarily conflicted with
the short term, family bonded horizons of many of its
members.84
The issue for the left-wing of the NUMwas that the job reductions achieved
in the 1983-84 period were the 'thin end of the wedge'. During that period,
under the NCB chairmanship of first Norman Siddall, then Ian McGregor
(from September 1983), expected production capacity had been reduced by
four million tons, resulting in fifteen pits being closed and over 18,000 miners
leaving the industry on voluntary redundancy. 85 Only 300 of those miners
were under the age of SO. As Harper and Wintour pointed out, the NUM had
82 NUM, 1983 Annual Conference Report, p. 352.
83 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 263.
84 Ibid., p. 264.
85 Keith Harper and Patrick Wintour,'The bitter battle that ended an era', The Guardian,S
March 1985, p. 16.
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found it impossible to find a rallying point of resistance to these 'closures by
stealth'. The Penallta NUM Branch Secretary (South Wales) commented on
the limited impact of increased redundancy payments stating the issue was
really about younger miners fighting for jobs. However, he did emphasise
the impact of the redundancy terms on the over 50s in the coal industry:
(...) I made it clear to our General Meeting that, you
know, fighting for jobs (...) was not for me or for the
Chairman (of the Branch), because both of us were
over 50. But I said, if the younger people are
prepared to fight for their jobs (...) then I'd be
prepared to vote with them. And the majority of our
older men voted for strike action in the 1984-85
strike, although they had nothing to gain. 86
The inference from the Penallta example is that all the strike did was to delay
the inevitable; that the flow of voluntary redundancies for the over 50s would
continue despite the strike. The reality of the situation was that by the early
1980s many miners aged over SO, throughout Britain, were willing to accept
voluntary redundancy and leave the coal industry. Every pit had a significant
number of miners over 50 and often, as at Penallta, there was no distinction
between NUMBranch Officials and NUM rank and file members volunteering
for redundancy. The pro-strike NUM Branch Secretary at Newstead finished
his twelve weeks' notice in June 1984 and subsequently left the coal industry
as did the Branch Secretary at Allerton-Bywater in the Yorkshire coalfield in
May 1984.87
Many of the over 50s had been in the industry for thirty to forty years and
had experienced the rundown of the coal industry in the Robens era of the
86 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 106.
87 Allerton Bywater Colliery Miners' Memorial/History / Miners Strike 1984-85,
www.abcminersmemorial.co.uk
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1960s, when most of the mass closures were conducted under a Labour
Government. Some, like Keith Staley had transferred from other coalfields
into Nottinghamshire. More importantly, if they carried on till the age of 60
they risked not only a £500 VERSpayment but worsening health after years
working in the pits. A redundancy payment before this, with a weekly
payment and lump sum, could get them out of the pit and enable a better
retirement than the previous generation had experienced. Many stories
circulated the coalfield areas of some old miners who retired in their early
60s and died before enjoying the benefits of retirement. It could be a
hazardous occupation for a NUM Branch Official to openly voice his
opposition to any potential redundancies at the pit. As Adeney and Lloyd
stated:
Indeed, union officials found that if they expressed
their opposition too forcefully they met the anger of
their members. 88
The factor of more generous redundancy terms being available than had
been previously, combined with a type of blackmail-style implementation by
the NCB,ensured the NUMcould never get round the issue of jobs going by
stealth. The NCBensured that each scheme was given a terminal date, with
no assurancethat a further schemewould be introduced. This helped create
a climate of uncertainty among miners, especially those nearing 50 and those
over 50 years of age. Despite the strike, over six and a half thousand miners
still left the industry on redundancy in the financial year 1984-85, with over
five-hundred leaving on leaving on VERS. In total the workforce nationally
reduced by almost 12,000 in 1984-85 with the Scottish, Western and South
Nottinghamshire NCBAreas suffering over half of those job losses. 89 In each
of those areas the redundancies took place as a result of pit closures which
were taking place prior to the outbreak of the strike.
88 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 263.
89 NUM, 1985 Annual Conference Report, p. 29.
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Parker cited the issue of the redundancy benefits as being one of the main
factors which defeated the strike:
The redundancy terms for the mineworkers were kept
as generous as necessaryto ensure the men themselves
would vote for closure, therefore allowing a policy of
voluntary redundancy to be sustained in a way which
made union opposition to closures ineffective. 90
This policy would be sustained throughout the mass run down of the
industry between 1985 and 1994. A combination of more generous lump
sums, the fear of withdrawal of the lump sums if the miners went to appeal,
and the policy of ensuring each scheme had a terminal date with no
assurance of another scheme being introduced, swept through the industry
like a plague. As Williamson stated the general malaise that the strike
caused throughout the industry meant that, in the post-strike era, the NCB
could have closed any pit in Britain without too much resistance:
After the strike you could have closed any pit in the
country, the men had had enough and were fed up
with it all. They didn't want any more strikes, didn't
want any more intimidation, they could have shut all
the pits and the men would have been happy to get
out. 91
The great irony of a strike primarily aimed at saving jobs was that while all
the turmoil was breaking out in March 1984 miners in the Cumberland
coalfield agreed to accept the finish of production at the region's last
colliery. NUM members at Haig COlliery, near Whitehaven, discussed the
NCB's plans to shed 580 jobs by August 1984 and put the colliery on a
90 M. J. Parker, Thatcherism and the Fall of Coal (Oxford, 2000), p. 80.
91 Interview with Steve Williamson, Selston, 8 March 2009.
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development only basis, leaving 134 development workers to try and
develop new coal seams. 92 It was reported that the colliery had been
plagued by geological problems and had lost £29 million in the last ten
years. Despite the fear of job losses the NUMmembers at Haig voted by a
four to one majority against striking in the area ballot the previous week.
Harry Hanlon, NUM NEC member for Cumberland NUM, suggested there
was a fear of the colliery workings flooding and thus it not reopening again,
this would put the miner's redundancy payments at risk. Commenting on
this situation Hanlon stated:
Under the old agreement, a man of 49 could have
expected to pick up around £8,000 in redundancy
payments. Under the new scheme, the same man
can expect £33,000. 93
The Cumberland Area (NUM) members were not willing to gamble an
unsecure future against enhanced redundancy payments that could
disappear if they did not act fast. Haig Colliery, the last Cumberland pit,
finally closed in 1986, the search for new seams having been unproductive.
The Haig casewas interesting in that it was not just another colliery closure
but the end of coalmining altogether in a former industrial region.
Although not known at the time, the Haig scenario would set the scene for
things to come in the British coalmining industry over the next decade.
Following the end of the 1984-85 strike, colliery after colliery closed
throughout Britain, the majority of miners at each closed colliery not willing
to gamble enhanced redundancy payments against an uncertain future.
Despite claims from some post-strike NUMactivists, this scenariOapplied to
both NUM and UDM majority pits. During the 'coal crisis' of 1992-1994,
British Coal closed three out of five of its profit-making Midland's collieries
on one day in February 1994. This followed the announcement of a
significant drop in coal supplies to the newly privatised power generation
92 'Redundancy Talks', The Observer, 18 March 1984, p. 17
93 Ibid.
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markets following the 'dash for gas'. Enhanced redundancy payments
ensured that there was little resistance to the closures, even though the
three collieries concerned, Manton, Ollerton and Annesley-Bentinck had
restructured and were showing significant productivity increases by the
early 1990s. At Manton only 5 miners voted to oppose the closure in the
NUMBranch ballot. Majorities of four to one at Ollerton and three to one at
Annesley-Bentinck voted not to contest the closures. The latter two were
UDM majority pits; Manton was a NUM majority pit. Colin Stephenson, a
Colliery Fitter at Annesley-Bentinck, summed up the situation as he saw it at
the time:
When British Coal came with their closure proposal the
pit was producing coal like it was going out of fashion.
Production records had been broken and earnings
were very good. However, the closure put some
people into a quandary because of the uncertainty
surrounding the future of the industry and whether
any future redundancy payments would be as
generous, or indeed would be there at all. When the
closure was announced I think one-third of the
workforce wanted the pit to close, another third
wanted it to stop open and the remaining third were
undecided. When British Coal put a time limit on
accepting the enhanced redundancy terms, the
undecided third joined the third wanting the pit to
close, hence the 3 to 1 vote not to oppose the closure.
94
At Annesley-Bentinck in 1994, as at Haig a decade previously, the majority
of miners were not willing to gamble an uncertain future against enhanced
redundancy terms available at the time. The strange thing at the
commencement of the 1984-85 strike, ignited by the Cortonwood issue, was
94 Interview with Colin Stevenson, Kirkby-in-Ashfield" 11 April 2009.
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that Haig and three other collieries due to close all produced no-strike votes
in a dispute supposedly against pit closures! Along with Haig, Cronton in
Lancashire and Moorgreen and Pye Hill in Nottinghamshire all had
significant votes against strike action in the area ballots of March 1984.
This again suggests that the loss of 20,000 jobs nationwide that the NCB
had proposed in early March 1984 could probably have been achieved
without too much bother. The issue had been dealt with at a local level, by
local custom and practice. A similar amount of jobs and cuts in capacity
had been achieved voluntarily in the previous financial year (1983-84).
However, for the NUM leadership and many of its activists, the issue was
seen as the thin end of the wedge. As Douglass stated at the pre-strike
Delegates Meeting at Hatfield on 10 March 1984, the issue was about the
need to fight then or there would be nowhere to go eventually. It was a
reaction against the passivenessof the NUMwhich closed up much of the
coalfield in the North-East during the reign of Lord Robens in the 1960s:
When our pits closed up yon (the North-East), we
came to Yorkshire. Where is your Yorkshire going to
be? There is no place left to run, our backsare to the
wall. 95
At the 1983 Annual Conference Emergency Resolution 1 was passed and it
asked the NECto embark on a nationwide campaign to oppose pit closures
and reductions in manpower. (Appendix 18) The resolution further
instructed the NEC to 'conduct a national ballot on the question of pit
closures at a time deemed to be the most appropriate'. 96 The appropriate
time was the crux of the matter for the NUM as this proved impossible to
pin down. For Dave Douglass and the activists at the Hatfield meeting on
10 March 1984 the time was then, for the Cortonwood miners the time was
also in March 1984. However, for the Ty Mawr- Lewis Merthyr miners the
95 Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 98.
96 NUM, 1983 Annual Conference Report, p. 592.
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time had been a year earlier in March 1983 when their pit closed; for the
Teversal miners in Nottinghamshire the time had been in March 1979. In
the white-hot atmosphere of the Hatfield meeting Dave Douglasshad asked
the men who did not believe in fighting for jobs to get up in the meeting
and say so. They did not need to, as miners throughout Britain, especially
the over 50s, were quietly leaving the industry or were waiting for the
appropriate time to leave quietly. With miners willing to leave the coal
industry voluntarily any strike aimed at trying to stop manpower reductions
in their tracks was always likely to be fruitless. The strange thing is why did
supposed experienced men on the NUM NEe, knowing these facts, let the
strike proceed as it did in March 1984?
5. Wot no ballot! - the consequences
How significant was the decision not to have a ballot connected with the
failure of the 1984-85 strike? Neil Kinnock, the then Labour Party leader
regretted his decision not to press harder for a national ballot at the time. 97
He cited three main reasons that were instrumental in isolating the NUM
and assisting in the defeat of the strike. He suggested that if the NUMhad
had a national ballot three things would have resulted:
1. There would have been unity among all miners, in all coalfields, as
there had been on previous occasions when a democratic pithead
ballot had been taken; everyone accepted the majority view.
2. There would have been more active, wider support, from trade
unions and trade unionists, which would have changed the whole
environment of the strike.
97 'Miners' Strike: Kinnock launches fresh attack on Scargill', www.guardian.co.uk/po/itics, 16
March 2009.
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3. The miners would have had the unalloyed respect of the great
majority of the public because it would have been understood that
the strike was on a strictly democratic basis and men were struggling
to save the pits, not a pay dispute. 98
On Kinnock's first point, a ballot most certainly would have held the NUM
together, whether it was a pro or anti strike ballot. Admittedly an anti-strike
ballot would have been in a climate of continuing decline for the deep
mining coal industry. On the second polnt, the NUMalienated large sections
of wider trade union support because of its no ballot strategy. Apart from
support from a few trade unions, notably the rail union ASLEF,the NUMhad
limited support because other trade unionists questioned the democratic
validity of the strike. The NUM only went to the Trades Union Congress
(TUC) for support in the autumn of 1984, and then, despite many token
gestures from the rostrum, wider union support was still lacking. For the
left-wing of the NUM there were ghosts from 1926, when the miners were
left to fight on their own following the collapse of the General Strike.
Kinnock's third point was about the need to have public sympathy with you
in any industrial conflict.
Harper and Wintour also identify three key areaswhy the strike failed. They
cited the failure of a national ballot, the failure of NUM leaders to condemn
violence and contended that the battleground should have been on future
investment instead of 'the futile situation of defending uneconomic pits'. 99
They suggest that the refusal to hold a national ballot threw up three key
points:
1. It ran against the populist pro ballot mood the Government had
created among union members.
2. It allowed around one-third of NUMmembers to remain at work.
98 Ibid.
99 Harper and Wintour, 'The bitter battle that ended an era', The Guardian, 5 March 1985, p.
16.
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3. It was a self-inflicted wound. A ballot could probably have been won
in April 1984.
In 2002 Linda Bardill came up with some thought-provoking evidence on the
ballot issue and Nottinghamshire miners in the 1984-85 strike. 100 Her
findings were obtained through a series of oral interviews conducted in
2001. Two main points came out of her findings; firstly that the
Nottinghamshire miners would have joined the strike if a national ballot had
been held; secondly, in the absenceof the ballot, the confrontational tactics
of the Yorkshire pickets remained a potnt of contention. On the first point,
Bardill found mixed reactions among Nottinghamshire miners in respect of
their attitude to strike action in 1984, but found an overall reaction that
Nottinghamshire miners would have abided by the results of a national
ballot.
Some were in favour of strike action but would not do
so in the absence of a ballot. Some disagreed with the
strike so decided to work but stated they would have
taken strike action if instructed to do so by the outcome
of a (pro-strike) national ballot. 101
Bardill added that the Nottinghamshire miners' refusal to strike was 'rooted
in a genuine belief that the rule book of the union was being violated'. 102
Other commentators also suggested that the lack of a national ballot
undermined the legitimacy of the strike. Harper and Wintour maintained
that whilst NUM activist support was forthcoming, the lack of a national
ballot crippled the potential political power of the strike. Reviewing the
strike in March 1985 they stated:
100 Bardill, 'Changing perceptions of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike', pp. 49-52.
101 Ibid., p. 51.
102 Ibid.
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The absence of a ballot, the centre piece of the NUM
constitution, poisoned the dispute. The moral
legitimacy of the strike and therefore its potential
political power was crippled (...) winning the support
of activists is one thing, but it does not stop there.
You have to go out to the coalfields and win the
approval of ordinary members. 103
Over a quarter of a century later the issue of the lack of a national ballot in
the 1984-85 strike remains a major point of contention. NUM activists
maintain that it was unfair to hold a ballot on the issue of pit closures for
the reasonsdiscussed in this chapter. Nottinghamshire NUMworking miners
maintain that the lack of a national ballot made the strike both
unconstitutional and unofficial in the Nottingham Area of the NUM. This
dissertation cannot attempt a full in-depth study of trade union democracy,
that is a subject in its own right, but it is worth looking at the views of Allen
and McIlroy. On the matter of NUM national rule 43 (the rule for national
strike action) Allen stipulated the important role played by 'rank and file'
members:
Special provisions are made for colliery national strikes.
A national strike must be supported by a 55% majority
of the members who vote in a national ballot ( ...) It is
quite clear from this synopsis that power was intended
to lie in the hands of ordinary members. 104
Allen's inference is that ordinary members were the men at the pit, the rank
and file NUMmembership. Rank-and-file NUMmembers were the key to the
dispute. The 1984-85 strike ran in the hands of mainly young left-wing
activists, constitutionally through a system of delegated democracy. Without
103 Harper and Wintour, 'The bitter battle that ended an era', The Guardian, 5 March 1985,
pp. 16-17.
104 Ibid., p. 205.
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recourse to a vote of all rank and file NUM members it was difficult to
assess whether there was a definite majority for strike action amongst all
NUM members on their own accord. The various Area Ballots held during
March 1984 and the outcome of the three national ballots in the two years
that preceded the 1984-85 strike implied there was not a desire for strike
action among the NUM membership. At the time of the NUM SDC on 19
April 1984 it was claimed that 80 per cent of NUM members were out on
strike. If all of the 80 per cent were out on their own accord, then as
Donovan stated, a pro-strike ballot would have removed the 'democratic fig
leaf' for all working miners, not just those in Nottinghamshire. But as the
Webbs stated, a tension existed between ordinary members, who would
normally look to their own imm~diate interests, and union officials, who
were able to bring wider vision, expertise and consistencv into union
activities. It would be disastrous if either were to completely dominate union
decision making. 105
McIlroy suggested that the controversy over the ballot issuewas one about
procedural arguments which were related to the key issue of where
individuals stood over the issue of job losses and what should be done
about it. 106 He suggested the ballot was vital to the fortunes of the strike
as this eventually led to the sequestration and legal tying up of the NUM's
assets:
The issue of the ballot had a vital impact on the
fortunes of the strike and the legal judgements
eventually produced the state takeover of the NUM's
assets. 107
Comparing the NUM's experience of trade union democracy with the area
incentive bonus controversy of 1977/78 and the area-by-area strike strategy
controversy which started the 1984-85 miners' strike, he suggested that
105 Mdlroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today, pp. 131-132.
106 Ibid., p. 129.
107 Ibid.
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"the question of trade union democracy was a complex and not a
straightforward matter (...) it was not a scholastic exercise; it goes to the
roots of trade union activity". 108 The problem for the NUM, as with most
trade unions, was trying to marry the different competing interests within
the union, and trying to balance different forms of decision making at
national, area and branch level. The federal set up of the NUMmeant the
alliance between the individual area unions and the national union was a
fragile one. The 1984-85 strike and its aftermath was an effort to centralise
control of the union. Like the reaction of anti-Europeans to a Brussels led
EU, various groups in the NUM were willing to defend the status quo and
acted accordingly against an increasingly centralised and dominant NUMat
national level. A crucial issuewas about managing diversity in the NUM.
McGaheystated on more than one occasionthat getting constitutional strike
action over pit closures was impossible because of the diverse nature of
closures. Those with jobs were not keen to jeopardise them whilst those
who had experienced closures in the past resented being called out on
strike for pits which had not supported them when their pits closed. 109
Arthur Scargill maintained that the NUM's strike strategy in 1984 was
correct. Commenting on the NUM's 1984 strike policy on the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the strike he stated:
(...) if the coal board planned to force pit closures on
an area by area basis, then we must respond, at least
initially, on the same basis. The NUM rules permitted
areas to take official strike action if authorised by the
NEC in accordance with Rule 41. If the NEC gave
Scotland and Yorkshire authorisation under this rule, it
could galvanise other areas to seek similar support for
action against closures. 110
108 Ibid.
109 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 302.
110 Arthur Scargill, 'We could surrender, or stand and fight', www.guardian.co.uk/politics, 7
March 2009, p. 1.
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The problem was it did not galvanise similar support but instead opened up
fractures in the NUM's armoury. The origins of the 'domino strategy' lay in
the unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970 and to some extent 1981. The
reaction of the Nottinghamshire miners to those disputes was a key factor in
their adverse reaction to the 1984-85 strike. Chapter 5 investigateswhy the
Rule 41 domino theory failed in the Nottinghamshire coalfield and draws on
historical evidence from previous similar acts of industrial action, notably the
unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970. Whilst the 1969 and 1970 bouts of
unofficial strike action were seen as a springboard for the left in the NUM,
the reaction in a moderate and conservative (with a small c) coalfield like
Nottinghamshire was restrained. The chaos which accompanied the 1984-85
strike was evident in the 'false starts' of 1969, 1970 and 1981. In 1981 the
NCB helped create divisions in the NUM by staggering the closure
announcements in the different NCBAreas, thus preventing unified action.
As Allen stated there was some heSitancyabout the 1981 strike in sections
of the coalfields which had conservative traditions. 111 This was the case in
the Nottinghamshire coalfield (see Chapter 5 - Part 4). The concern was
over the constitutional legitimacy of the strike, exactly the same issue which
arose from the start of the 1984-85 strike in Nottinghamshire. The strikes
of 1969, 1970, 1981 and 1984-85 were all seen in Nottinghamshire as being
unofficial as they had not been processedthrough what was considered the
agreed constitutional methods in the union. Allen commented:
(Industrial) Action which is not processed through
these procedures can be a threat to the union itself
(...) Miners who are unwilling to engage in unofficial
strike action inevitably accept a national strike
decision without hesitation (...) coalfields which have
conservative traditions tend to be more constitutional-
minded than the rest. They are willing to strike
111 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 313.
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whole-heartedly provided it is done through what they
regard as the proper procedures.P''
It is for this reason that the 1984-85 strike in Nottinghamshire was doomed
from the start. The Area by Area 'domino strategy' was alien to the
Nottinghamshire coalfield by its nature. In Nottinghamshire the disputes in
1969, 1970, 1981 and 1984-85 all had a common link, they were all
classified as being unofficial because they had not been conducted through
the understood constitutional procedures of the union. For this reason alone
the lack of a national ballot in 1984, as far as the Nottinghamshire coalfield
was concerned, was a fatal error.
112 Ibid.
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Chapter 5: Agame of Constitutional Acrobats: The Rule
41 'Domino Strategy' and the roots of disunity
1. Introduction: The Rule 41 Domino Strategy and the 1984-85
Miners' Strike.
Stephenson, in his dissertation on the Nottinghamshire miners, suggested
that the UDMwas formed as a direct result of the strike 1 He also stated it is
only by studying the strike that the evolution of the Nottinghamshire based
'breakaway union' can be understood. He placed much emphasis on the split
that occurred in the NUMwithin the first few days of the strike as being the
main factor in helping to establish the UDM:
The split in the NUM occurred within a few days of the
beginning of the strike in March 1984. The UDM was
born out of and becauseof this split. 2
In order to assessthe validity of Stephenson's assessment it is necessary to
analyse the evolution of the strike and its effects in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. The Rule 41 strike strategy is still a hotly contested issue.
Previously the NUM NEe had resorted to well-understood constitutional
procedures, now with the left in control there would be another course of
action. The theory behind the 'domino strategy' was that different NUM
federated Areas (mainly left wing dominated) would initiate strike action in
their own Areas, then other NUMfederated Areas and trade-groups would be
obliged to join the 'rolling strike action' and a national strike in all but name
would exist. It relied on two main factors: the effective use of flying pickets
and other areas respecting the sanctity of the picket line. It was adverse
aspects associatedwith these two factors that ensured the NUMmembership
was split from the onset and the strike eventually failed, leading to a post-
1 Stephenson, 'Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting' BA Dissertation, p. 24.
2 Ibid.
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strike speeding up of colliery closures and the terminal decline of the British
deep coalmining industry.
Prior to the 1984/85 strike Arthur Scargill had stated that it would be
legitimate to run a strike under Rule41 by calling each area out on strike and
creating a de-facto national strike. This was suggested in a 1983 BBCradio
interview, a week prior to the failed national ballot on the Tymawr Lewis
Merthyr closure issue. Scargill stated that a strike could be run in this way
and that it would be constitutional and within the rules of the NUM.Different
NUM Areas or Trade Groups could use Rule 41 to call strikes in their own
areas, through their own constitutional means, and it could secure a national
strike by another way: 'This could amount to a national strike but called by
different, though still constitutional means'. 3 Harper and Wintour suggested
that leaked 1983 NUMNECminutes showed the NUMNational President had
also advocated such a strategy at the NEC. 4 At that time the NUM NEC
rejected the idea and instead called a national ballot. The 1983 national
ballot turned down industrial strike action by 61% to 39%, with only two
NUMAreas reaching the 55% majority needed for strike action. 5
In order to understand how the domino strategy evolved in early March 1984
it is necessary to review the events leading up to the strike. The local
disputes in the South Wales, Scottish and Yorkshire coalfields in the months
leading up to the strike have been well documented by Samuel, Adeney and
Lloyd, Richards and Taylor. 6 In late 1983 at Brynlliw in the South Wales
coalfield the local NUM branch accused the NCB of reneging on agreed
investment for the pit and on agreed joint arrangements for extending the
pit's life. 7 The Scottish coalfield saw the closures of Kinneil, Cardowan and
3 Routledge, Scargill, p. 140.
4 Harper and Wintour, 'The bitter battle that ended an era', The Guardian, 5 March 1985, p.
17.
5 South Wales NUM and Kent Area NUM both recorded 68% majorities for strike action,
Yorkshire Area NUM had a 54% vote for strike action, 1% short of what was needed under
the rules ..
6 See Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, The Enemy Within, pp. 43-66; Adeney and Lloyd, Loss
without Limit, pp. 70-87; Richards, Miners on Strike, pp. 94-100; Taylor, The NUM and British
Politics VOI.2, pp. 94-100.
7 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 95.
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Polmaise in the eighteen months prior to the commencement of the 1984
strike and in January 1984 Bogside Colliery was flooded. The PolmaiseNUM
Branch appeared on the cover of a Special edition of the NUM's paper, The
Miner, as the strike broke in early March 1984. 8 In the Yorkshire coalfield
there was industrial unrest at Bullcliffe Wood (over its proposed closure) and
Manvers Main Complex. The Manvers dispute over lunch break or 'snap
times' led to 10,000 out of 14,000 miners in the NCBSouth Yorkshire Area
being called out on strike by February 1984. The Cortonwood closure was
the issue which 'ignited the strike call' in the South Yorkshire coalfield. The
fact that it was seen as an economic closure hiked up the stakes; the issue
was about closing Cortonwood because its coal was too expensive. Dave
Douglass, Hatfield NUM Branch Delegate, touched on this issue at the
Hatfield NUM Branch meeting which authorised strike action on 10 March
1984:
Cortonwood is an attempt by the Board to establish the
principle that pits will close on economic grounds. If we
accept Cortonwood can close (...) because its coal's too
expensive, then we can accept that any pit can close on
economic grounds. 9
The NUM had recently produced a document which showed that 115 out of
the 179 pits in production could be classified as uneconomic. 10 This suggests
that 64 were in the situation of being supposedly 'safe pits'. This evidence
dismisses the pro-striker's-claims of 'safe areas' being able to vote
threatened areas out of work in a national ballot on pit closures. (see
Chapter 4 - part 1)
It should be remembered that in the Nottinghamshire coalfield there were
also issuesaround job lossesand rationalisation leading up to the strike. (see
8 NUM, 'The Fight's on and here is why', The Miner: Special Edition (Sheffield, March 1984), p.
1.
9 Samuel, Bloomfield, and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 93.
10 Wilsher, Madntyre, and Jones, Strike, p. 54.
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Chapter 1: Part 4). Economic closures in the industry were nothing new,
despite the claims that the Cortonwood closure was the first one on
economic grounds. Many of the 300 plus closures in the 'Robens era' of the
1960s were economic closures. 11 The issue then was the cost of cheap oil
undercutting the price of coal against a falling market for coal. Lord Robens
(NCBChairman 1960 - 1971) recalled this era when the NCBhad to tour the
coalfields in a whistle stop 'morale-boosting tour' in the late 1960s. When
admitting to cheap oil as being a main cause for coal's decline, he recalled a
meeting when an old miner asked him if he thought that 'the Arabs would be
content to live in tents forever'. 12 In similar fashion to the Elsecar men
transferring to Cortonwood just prior to the start of the 1984 strike, and then
being told the colliery was to close imminently, Langton miners arrived at
Kirkby Colliery early in 1968 to be told three weeks later that the Kirkby
'super pit' was to close. The Kirkby delegation at the Nottingham Area NUM
Gala later in 1968 carried a coffin inscribed with the words 'Kirkby Colliery:
murdered by NCBpromises'. 13
The period between June 1983, following the re-election of the Thatcher
Government for a second term, and March 1984 saw relations between the
NCBand the NUMdeteriorate and enter what Richardsdescribed as being a
"deepening crisis". 14 Milne suggested that the NUM were left with little
option but to go into battle following the Cortonwood closure decision:
Against such a background, any attempt by the union
leadership to postpone action in March (1984) would
have been interpreted as a sign of weakness,
encouraging a further acceleration of closures, and very
11 SeeW. Ashworth, The History of the eritish Coal Industry Vol.S 1946 - 1982: The
Nationalised Industry (Oxford, 1986).
12 Alf Robens, Ten Year Stint (London, 1972), p. 221.
13 'Miners' symbol of Summit's Murder', Notts Free Press, 7 June 1968, p. 1.
14 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 95.
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likely to lead to a battle in still more unfavourable
circumstances. 15
Supporters of the strike still maintain that it was provoked by the Thatcher
Government at a time of year unfavourable to the NUM, with the winter
period nearly over. However, as some commentators have stated, other
factors suggest the NUMwere also spoiling for a fight. A Yorkshire NCBArea
Manager commented on the NUM agitation in the Manvers Main dispute in
Yorkshire during February 1984, 'Some of the NUM left had been running
around with a lighted match looking for a blue touch-paper (...) but Manvers
was pretty damp'. 16 Parker suggested that the Government could not
possibly have foreseen some of the events that were to unfold with miner
against miner and limited trade union support for the strike. He suggested
that in the event of a national coal strike, the Thatcher Government would
have planned to take on the whole NUM,Nottinghamshire included:
( ...) the government could not have foreseen the way in
which the chaos in early March 1984 would result in the
strike beginning when it did, and with a third of the
industry continuing to work (...) there was no way of
knowing before the event that Nottinghamshire and
other moderate coalfields would continue to work
throughout the strike, that any difficulties with NACODS
would be so readily solved, or that support from other
trade unions would be so limited. 17
However, Parker did suggest that on the other hand the Government must
have thought that a clash with the NUM was inevitable at some time. He
listed three main factors as to why this could happen. The NUM leadership
15 Milne, The Enemy Within, p. 18.
16 Wilsher, Madntyre, and Jones, Strike, p. 42
17 Parker, Thatcherism and the fall of coal, pp. 44-45.
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had made impossible demands. First, that the coal industry should be greatly
expanded, secondly, that coal should be produced whatever the cost, and
finally, that the NUMshould have the power of over veto over NCBdeclslons,
18 There is other evidence to suggest that the NUM was planning for a
confrontation. In December 1983 Mick McGaheyis stated as having warned
Jimmy Cowans (NCB) about an imminent strike being planned for March
1984. McGahey advised him to quit the industry because the forthcoming
turmoil in the coal industry would become unpleasant. Cowans thought, that
as in the past, the NUMNECwould keep Scargill and the militants in check.
However, McGaheyapparently told him that plans for the strike were already
afoot:
The die is cast, it's too late. The strike will take place. It
will start in March with the Yorkshire area led by Jack
Taylor and Henry Richardsonwill look after Nottingham
and make sure they join in. 19
An important feature of the period before the strike was how the pro-strike
supporters in the NUM thought that the strike action would spread. The
domino strategy was based on the issue of solidarity, the sanctity of the
picket line, combined with the use of flying pickets to ensure that Areas that
did not conform were brought into line. Arthur Scargill repeatedly gave his
opinion on the subject:
There is one rule, in my view, above all the rules and
that is when workers are involved in action, you do not
cross picket lines under any circumstances. 20
The problem here was that Scargill's appeal not to cross picket lines was
what McIlroy described as being 'an appeal to moral principle'. 21 In March
18 Ibid., p. 44.
19 Mick McGahey (NUM National Vice- President) quoted in Routledge, Scargill, p. 141.
20 Arthur Scargill, quoted in Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 187.
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1984 the moral principle appealed to left wingers in the NUMand to younger
radical miners. In some NUM Areas this strategy ran into the buffers of
district union protocol and age old area traditions. McIlroy suggested an
important part in the organisation of picketing was to try and find out as
much as possible about other workplaces. Although the 1984 NUMpro-strike
activists made much of Nottinghamshire and the links with 1926 and
Spencerism, there is more recent evidence which helps explain the adverse
reaction of the Nottinghamshire miners to the Rule 41 domino strategy in
1984. The 1984 strike had its roots in the unofficial industrial disputes of
1969 and 1970. Milne identified this link, not only with the 1969 and 1970
disputes, but also that of 1981:
As in 1969, 1970 and 1981, there was a domino effect as
activists spread the action from area to area through
mass picketing (...) the decision not to hold a national
ballot would dog the NUM'sefforts to win support for the
strike, even though it essentially repeated the tactics of
1969-70 and 1981 on a larger scale. 22
Therefore, if we accept Milne's theory there is a need to look at the
Nottinghamshire miners' reactions to the unofficial strikes in 1969, 1970 and
1981 in an attempt to try and understand why there was such an adverse
reaction to the conduct of the 1984-85 strike. Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Chapter 5
look at the reaction to unofficial industrial action in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield in 1969, 1970 and 1981 respectively.
21 John Mdlroy, Strike: How to fight and how to win (London, 1984), p. 171.
22 Milne, The Enemy Within, p. 19.
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2: The Nottinghamshire Miners and the 1969 unofficial NUM
Strike
In October 1969 a major dispute occurred over the unexpected issue of
surface workers' hours. The dispute centred on a campaign for a reduction
in the hours of work for surface workers in the coal industry. The issue of
surface workers' hours gained momentum during the spring and summer of
1969 and finally erupted in the autumn of that year. As Allen stated, the
timing of the dispute was important following a major contraction of the coal
industry over the previous decade:
After a decade of humiliating repression what indeed was
capable of creating a sense of unifying injustice amongst
miners. Pit closures had not done so. 23
The Yorkshire Area acted as a catalyst for the 1969 strike. Bya vote of 85 to
3 the Yorkshire Area NUMACMapproved strike action on the issue of surface
workers' hours. This followed an upheaval at the meeting when the
Yorkshire NUMChairman, Sam Bullough, was ousted from the chair because
he refused to accept the strike motion on the grounds that it could result in
unofficial strike action. The motion for strike action was moved by Arthur
Scargill, a young Branch Delegate from Woolley Colliery. By the morning of
13 October 1969 the whole of the Yorkshire Area was out on strike, except
for one colliery. The remaining working colliery was forced out by Tuesday
14 October by the flying pickets. From that time flying pickets, mainly from
Doncaster, had started visiting other coalfields in an attempt to spread the
rolling strike action. The 1969 strike was important as it acted as a
springboard for getting left-wing activists into positions of prominence in the
NUMand moving sections of the NUMto the left during the 1970s and early
1980s. Most notable among these was Arthur Scargill, whose rise took him to
23 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 153.
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being NUM Yorkshire Area President in 1973 and then the NUM National
President in 1982.
At the Nottingham Area NUMAECmeeting on 13 October 1969 a delegation
of 50 miners from the Yorkshire Area NUM arrived at the Area NUM HQ
without the prior knowledge of the Nottingham Area. 24 Standing orders of
the AEC were suspended while the Yorkshire delegation addressed the
Nottingham Area NUM AEC as to the situation in the Yorkshire coalfield.
After the Yorkshire representation had finished the Nottingham Area NUM
AECagreed it should act in accordancewith the Rulesand Constitution of the
Union at all times. It was agreed that the Nottingham Area should wait for
any recommendation from the NUM NEC.They had to consider up to date
reports on negotiations between the NUMand the NCBand on the Yorkshire
Area's unconstitutional action. 25 For the week ending 24 October 1969 it
was reported that five NCBNorth Nottinghamshire collieries out of fourteen
were idle due to the effects of the Yorkshire flying pickets. 26 In the NCB
South Nottinghamshire Area it was reported that all twelve pits were working
normally. In Similar fashion to the events of March 1984, Nottingham Area
NUMOfficials condemned the Yorkshire tactics and moves were made to get
protection for workers against 'hooliganism'. Proposed joint action by the
NCB and the Nottingham Area NUM discussed the possibility of getting a
police presence on standby to ensure Nottinghamshire miners could get to
work. Albert Martin, Nottingham Area NUMGeneral Secretary, condemned
the actions of the Yorkshire flying pickets:
From peaceful picketing it has gone to a policy of
intimidation and we are not going to have that. 27
24 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1969, p. 228.
25 Ibid.
26 'Notts miners keep it constitutional', Notts Free Press, 24 October 1969, p. 1.
27 Ibid.
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The NUMNECcalled a SDCfor 30 October 1969 on the NCBoffer for surface
workers. The NCB offer was on two issues: firstly, a wages increase and
secondly, on surface workers' hours. In the meantime a Nottingham Area
NUM SCMheld on 18 October 1969 discussed the issue of the forthcoming
national SOC. An up to date report on negotiations was given at the meeting
and NUMDelegateswere advised that neither the Nottingham NUMACMnor
NUM Branches should vote on the NCB's offer until the NUM NEC had
discussed them at its meeting next week. A resolution recommending that
Nottinghamshire NUMBranches support the Yorkshire Area's unofficial action
was defeated by 32 votes to 2. 28 Ironically a Linby NUMappeal to council
on 27 October 1969 urging the Nottingham Area NUM ACM to compel the
national union in leading the membership into militant action was carried by
19 votes to 12 at the December 1969ACM. 29
The NUM SOC turned down the NCB package for surface workers by 168
votes to 165. However, the NUMNECagreed to hold a national ballot on the
issue. In an atmosphere of great controversy, the NUM NEC decided to
combine the issue of wages and surface hours on the same ballot paper.
This meant, as Allen stated, that the acceptance of one was dependent on
acceptance of the other. 30 He contended that with the ballot paper only
requiring one answer it was 'a devious and well known way of getting an
unsatisfactory offer accepted'. 31 This proved to be the case as the NUM
membership accepted the NCB'soffer by 237,462 to 41,322. (Appendix 19)
The unofficial strike of 1969 lasted from 13 to 27 October. At its peak it
involved 140 collieries (out of around 300) and spread from its main base in
Yorkshire to the coalfields in Scotland, South Wales, Kent, North Derbyshire,
parts of the Midlands and parts of Nottinghamshire. Alien suggested that
the main rationale for the 1969 strike was more about the episode of actually
striking rather than hours of work:
28 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1969, p. 231.
29 Ibid.
30 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 159.
31 Ibid.
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The unofficial strike of 1969 was more about the
phenomenon of striking than about hours of work. In a
sense the strike was experimental. For so many years
miners had been told that strikes would boomerang and
cause additional pit closures ( ...) nothing like that
happened.F
Alien believed that the 1969 strike gave the NUM left some actual experience
of militant trade unionism. Prior to that the only thing they knew of it was in
mining folklore. However, there were other aspects of the 1969 strike which
provide parallels with the strike of 1984. One factor was a poor line of
communication between the different areas. In some cases there were
incidents of miners being called out on strike, led back and called out again.
Attitudes were mixed in the Scottish coalfield; altogether around 18,000
miners out of 27,500 were on strike at one time or another. A traditional left-
wing area had failed to get total unity, an issuewhich would crop up again in
the Scottish coalfield just prior to, and during the 1984 strike. Allen stated
that the 1969 strike was actually a shambles everywhere except in the
Yorkshire coalfield. 33
In the Nottinghamshire coalfield, Len Clarke, Nottingham NUM Area
President, was scathing about the tactics employed by the Yorkshire pickets.
Commenting at the tactics employed for the 1969 unofficial strike, he could
easily have been describing the early days of the 1984-85 strike in
Nottinghamshire coalfield:
Last week's action of a minority of members who were
determined to act unconstitutionally ( ...) can only be
described as irresponsible, and to say the least
deplorable. Unconstitutional action of this nature
32 Ibid., p. 159.
33 Ibid., p. 156.
251
Chapter 5: A game of Constitutional Acrobats: The Rule 41'Domino Strategy' and the roots of
disunity.
discredits the movement, and can only inflict hardship
and distress to the many thousands of loyal and staunch
members, whose desire is to abide by the constitution
(...) it is regrettable that those of our members who
wanted to work last week were denied that opportunity
for various reasons, including intimidation. 34
Clarke went on to suggest that the real cause of the strike was not just the
'twenty-minute (surface workers) snap break' but was an accumulation of
other frustrations. However, in line with Nottingham Area NUMcustom and
practice, he supported the Nottingham Area NUM members who had
continued to work during the unofficial strike and suggested those who gone
on strike had been mistaken:
If it becomes necessaryfor strike action to achieve (...) an
eight-hour day inclusive of mealtimes for surface workers,
it must be done constitutionally. We, as leaders, can only
advise, but we are not empowered to impose our desires
on our members (...) remember if we are to achieve our
objects, it is essential we be united. 35
Clarke's comments had remarkable parallels with RoyLynk's comments at the
Newstead NUMBranch meeting which started the 1984-85 strike. 36 1969 Sid
Ford, NUM National President, at the NUM SOCon 30 October 1969, talked
of the need to run the union by established and constitutional practices.
Opening the SOCto discuss the issue of the surface workers hours, Ford
made a plea for calm otherwise:
34 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1969, p. 238.
35 Ibid.
36 See Stanley, Nottingham Miners do Strike, pp. 55-56.
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You take the first steps towards chaos and disorder and
the break-up of the union as you have known it. 37
A year later, Joe Gormley would be making similar remarks to Ford during
the 1970 wages dispute as flying pickets again tore through the coalfields.
Whilst the NUM left claimed militancy had won the day in 1969 a fragile unity
lay just under the surface.
3: The Nottinghamshire Miners and the 1970 unofficial NUM
Strike
By the autumn of 1970, and almost one year on from the surface workers'
'hours dispute', the NUM and NCBwere once again in confrontation over
industrial relations matters. The NUMwere demanding a wage of £20 weekly
for surface workers, £22 for Elsewherebelow Ground (EBW) and £30 for coal
face workers. The 1970 NUMAnnual Conference had adopted Composite III
for the above resolution; Resolution 12 from South Wales added a clause for
strike action in the event of the NCBnot conceding the demand. Resolution
16 put forward by the Nottinghamshire Area NUM in support of the
introduction of local incentive schemes was rejected by Conference. The
NCB had made an offer of £16 and £28 respectively. The newly elected
Heath Government had set a limit of 12 per cent for wage demands in the
public sector; the NUM's demand amounted to a wage increase of 33 per
cent.38 The Nottingham Area NUM AEC proposed that the NUM NEC put
forward an overtime ban as a means of putting pressure on the NCBto meet
their wage demands. Len Clarke, Nottingham NUM Area President
commented:
We are urging miners to show solidarity in the fight for
higher wages. We shall support the national union to the
37 Andrew Taylor, The Politics of Yorkshire Miners (Beckenham, 1984), p. 193.
38 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 162
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best of our ability and make an effort to bring about a
national strike. 39
The NPLAwas causing great frustration in the Nottinghamshire coalfield, real
wages for power loader men having stood still since its implementation in
1966. At the 1970 NUMAnnual Conference Clarke stated that any proposed
strike action over wages would be backed by the Nottingham Area of the
NUM. However, he did state such action must have a mandate and be in line
with the established union rules and constitution:
If that course (strike action) is taken in conformity
with the rules of this organisation, and the majority
of our members vote in favour of such strike action,
you will find that we are as solidly at the back of
you as we have ever been. 40
A meeting of Nottingham Area NUM BOCM on 19 September 1970 was
convened to hear an up to date report on the latest stage of wage
negotiations from the two Nottingham NUM NECmembers. The NUM NEC
noted that the NCBoffer was their final one and the NCBhad declared their
opposition to the wages claim which was described as totally unacceptable. 41
The NUMannounced a national ballot of all members would take place, with
a recommendation that all NUMmembers vote in favour of strike action. The
ballot vote was scheduled to be held over the four days 13 to 16 October
1970, with each NUMbranch holding the ballot over a 24-hour period within
this period. The meeting of Nottingham NUMBOCMalso moved two motions,
the first to back the call for national strike action and the second to urge
Nottinghamshire NUMmembers to work normally until the result of the ballot
was known. 42 The ballot result was announced on 23 October and it
resulted in 143,466 (55.5%) being in favour of strike action with 115,120
39 'Miners urged to ban overtime', Notts Free Press, 25 September 1970, p. 1.
40 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 36.
41 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1970, p. 216.
42 Ibid.
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(44.5%) being aqalnst." (Appendix 20) Ten out of the twenty-three NUM
Areas voted for industrial action, these including the traditional left wing
Areas of South Wales, Scotland and Kent. The Yorkshire region polled
36,291 (60%) for strike action with 22, 307 (40%) being aqalnst." In the
Nottingham Area NUM ballot 12,149 (42%) of the membership were in
favour of striking with 16,963 (58%) being against. 45 Despite showing a
majority for strike action, the ballot result caused a constitutional crisis in the
NUM. The vote in favour of strike action did not reach the two-thirds
majority required to call a national strike under the unions' rules and
constitution. McCormicksuggested that the ballot result showed some of the
contradictions that lay under the surface. Under the new show of militancy,
a breakdown of the voting figures revealed the problems, tensions and
conflicts that lay within the NUM:
On the one hand, the vote of manual members was
in favour of strike action by more than the
necessary two-thirds and it was the white collar
vote of the Colliery Offices and Staff Association
(COSA) members which swayed the total vote
against strike action. Hence, there were comments
that the union was dominated by petticoat
government. 46
The vote had shown up the vast diversity that existed in the NUM
membership. Under the union's rules the NUM NEC could not call for a
national strike. Rule 43 was amended to 55% for strike action the following
year (1971) and again to a simple majority (50% + 1) at a NUMSDCin April
1984. Following the announcement of the 1970 ballot result the NUM NEC
resumed negotiations with the NUM on the wages issue. This did not stop
some of the areas which had voted for industrial action from starting
43 Ibid., p. 263.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 B. J. McCormick, Industrial Relations in the CoalIndustl}'(Basingstoke, 1979), p. 195.
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unofficial strikes. The use of Rule 41 in the areaswhich had shown a majority
for striking was advocated by the Scottish Area (NUM) but this was turned
down by the NUMNEe.
Following the return to the negotiating table the NCBoffered a 10 shilling
(SOp) rise on all levels and the NUM NECordered a second ballot with a
recommendation to accept the amended wage offer. From 26 October 1970
various collieries, mainly in the traditional left-wing areas, began unofficial
strike action against the NCB's revised offer. At its peak around 103,000
miners (out of 292,000) were on unofficial strike, mainly in the traditional
left-wing Scottish and South-Wales coalfields, but also in parts of the rapidly
left-leaning Yorkshire coalfield. The peak of strike activity occurred on 10
November 1970 when 116 collieries were out on strike: 42 collieries out of 72
were out in Yorkshire, 21 out of 32 in Scotland, all 50 collieries in South
Wales, 4 in Durham, all 3 Kent collieries, Wolstanton in Staffordshire and
Pleasley in Derbyshire.47 The focal point for unrest in the Yorkshire Coalfield
was in the Doncaster region, as it was in 1984. It was from here that flying
pickets travelled to other coalfields trying to drum up support for what in
effect was 'rank and file' unofficial strike-action.
On 12 November 1970 the NUM NEe rejected a call for a soe and an
instruction was given for miners on unofficial strike to return to work. What
was made clear at the NEe meeting was that no Area had the right to call
upon its members to act contrary to the advice of the NEC. 48 This would
appear to be a direct reference to the growing left presence in Yorkshire
through the Panelswhich existed outside the official NUMArea constitution.
Early in the year at the 1970 NUM Annual Conference, Arthur Scargill had
proudly associated himself with 'splinter groups' which ran against what he
considered was passive union policy. Ironically, when the Nottingham Area
'cried foul' at the soe which authorised official strike action on 19 April 1984,
Scargill and the left were not then impressedwith the 'splinter group' action.
47 Ibid., p. 196
48 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1970, p. 275.
256
Chapter 5: A game of Constitutional Acrobats: The Rule 41'Domino Strategy' and the roots of
disunity.
Taylor described the 1970 unofficial strike action as 'an explosion of
consciousness in which some miners ignored the ballot result, and their
leaders, and struck'. 49 A similar situation would be re-enacted in March
1984 when miners ignored some areas no-strike ballot mandates and went
on strike.
Back in 1970 the second ballot on the revised wage offer was held in
November and it resulted in 76 per cent of NUM members accepting the
revised offer. The unofficial strike finally ended on 20 November when the
last of the Doncaster collieries returned to work. The fall-out from the 1970
strike centred on the nature of picketing, described by Joe Gormley (then the
new elected NUMnational President) as hooliganism. (see Chapter 2, pp. 62-
63) Also the problems in trying to achieve unity in the NUM were again
highlighted by the dispute. Both Taylor and Allen refer to the 'pattern of
uncoordinated action' which was a feature of both the 1969 and 1970
unofficial strikes. Taylor described the mixed up situation that the 1970
unofficial action caused in the Yorkshire Area of the NUM:
The pickets concentrated on the North and South
Yorkshire Panelswho had, as yet, made no decision. The
Barnsley pits were beginning to come out, and the North
Yorkshire Panel expressed its support, but only Wheldale
and Kellingley had struck. The South Yorkshire Panelwas
split; some pits were out but others, perhaps a few
hundred yards away continued working. The situation
was very confused, with rumour chasing rumour. 50
Considering its near solid position in the 1984 strike, it was a return to work
by two Doncaster pits, Hatfield Main and Bentley, against the decision of the
Doncaster Panel,which was instrumental in ending the unofficial action in the
49 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 41.
50 Ibid., p. 199.
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Yorkshire coalfield in 1970. 51 Allen also made reference to the nature of
uncoordinated action that the 1970 unofficial dispute caused:
The pattern of the uncoordinated action of 1969 began
to emerge. For instance, as the Yorkshire pits came out
on strike, six Scottish pits went back to work on the
recommendation of the Scottish Area NUM AEC. Very
little reliable information about the intentions of Areas
seemed to pass from one to the other. In any case it
took time before an Area could respond to what others
were doing and by then some of them had changed their
minds. 52
McCormickcited three main differences between the unofficial strikes of 1969
and that of 1970. Firstly he suggested there was a shift towards militancy in
the NUM leadership. Lawrence Daly had refused to meet unofficial strikers in
1969. In 1970, when he addressed some unofficial strikers in Doncaster, he
was given a rough ride. This treatment is thought to have shaken him up
and during 1971 and 1972 he displayed increasing militancy. 53 The second
factor cited by McCormick was that the South Wales NUM and the Scottish
Area of the NUM, two of the more disciplined coalfields, voted to strike and
joined the unofficial strike action initiated by the Doncaster panel of the
Yorkshire Area NUM. Thirdly, the ballot figures showed increasing militancy
in the moderate areas of Durham and parts of the Midlands where some
joined in the unofficial action.
Taylor believed that there was a change in the miners' awareness in 1970
which finally led to a majority of NUM members voting for strike action.
Many of the frustrations had been caused by the stagnation of wages
following the introduction of NPLAin 1966, the Labour government's incomes
policy and the recent massive rundown of the deep coalmining industry
51 Ibid., p. 200
52 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 163.
53 McCormick, Industrials Relation in Coal, p. 196.
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under the Labour Government of 1964 - 1970. The unofficial strikes of 1969
and 1970 challenged the passivity and dominance of the right-wing of the
NUMwhich had dominated during the malaise of the 1960s. New left-wing
leaders emerged out of the two disputes, leaders who advocated militant
industrial action to defend miners' interests. Nowhere was this move to the
left seen more than in the Yorkshire coalfield. As Taylor said "between 1971
and 1973 this new generation came to power (...) in doing so they
profoundly affected the political orientation of the NUMas a whole". 54 Arthur
Scargill was elected as the President of the Yorkshire Miners in 1973.
However, in the Nottingham Area NUMmoderation still dominated and union
business ran very much in line within the established moderate traditions. As
Taylor stated, although there were traits of the left-wing in Nottinghamshire
through officials such as Joe Whelan, it remained on the right of NUMpolities
as epitomised by LenClarke. 55
The 1970 strike, despite acting as a springboard for the national strikes of
1972 and 1974, also showed up the potential fragility of the NUM. In a
manner similar to what happened early in the 1984 strike at the Groby Inn,
moderates on the union's right met in 1970 at Snibston MinersWelfare Club
in Leicestershire to consider how they should react to the developing
unofficial strike-action. As in 1984 the moderates were concerned about the
'unconstitutional methods that had been employed by certain groups in the
NUM'. 56 Following the moderates' meeting, accusations were made that a
breakaway union was being planned, a claim strongly refuted by Len Clarke
and Albert Martin, the two Nottingham NUMNECmembers. In a statement
to the press they suggested that the Nottingham Area NUM had
demonstrated its loyalty to the national union and national decisions, even at
times when this had been to the financial disadvantage of the
Nottinghamshire miners. The statement emphasised the unconstitutional
actions which they considered discredited the NUM:
54 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p. 207.
55 Ibid.
56 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 164.
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There have been certain suggestions from various
quarters that the lucrative areas of the NUM are
attempting to bring about the disintegration of the
union. We, in the Nottinghamshire coalfield, want
to make it abundantly clear that at all times we
have been loyal to the national union, abiding by
democratic decisions taken in accordance with the
rules and constitution. We are perturbed at some of
the actions in recent months, which are not in the
interests of our members and tend to discredit the
union. 57
John Thierry from the elipstone NUM Branch, condemned the 1970
unconstitutional strike action, suggesting that aims should be achieved by
constitutional methods and by using democratic procedureswithin a 'National
Union of Mineworkers'. 58 He had attended the lobby of the NUMNEeoutside
the NUM HQ in an attempt to put his views to the pro-strike activists. He
was of the opinion that they were wrong in the tactics they were adopting.
Thierry'S suggested that anti-strike comments were not popular with the
lobbvlsts, but he stated they respected his views, although having differences
of opinion. In addition to criticising the tactics of the 1970 unofficial strike,
he was also scathing about the two Nottingham NUMNEeOfficials attending
the meeting of moderates in Leicestershire. He suggested their action was
undemocratic and made their intentions suspect:
( ...) To attend such a meeting is deplorable and
highly suspect of their intentions regarding the
future of the NUM, were they wanting Spencerism
again? 59
57 'No break up of NUM planned', Notts Free Press, 27 November 1970, p. 1.
58 'Strike was wrong', Notts Free Press, 27 November 1970, p. 7.
59 Ibid.
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Just over thirteen years later the accusations of '5pencerism' would resurface
to haunt the Nottinghamshire coalfield once again.
4. The Nottinghamshire Miners and the 1981 Coal Crisis
On 10 February 1981 the NCB announced plans to cut ten million tons of
uneconomic capacity forthwith, in order to stay within the Government's new
cash limits brought in by the 1980 Coal MinesAct. It was thought this would
mean around fifty colliery closures, with the loss of 30,000 jobs over a three
year period. Individual collieries were not identified and different NCBArea
Directors would decide on the cuts that would be necessarywithin their own
areas. With the threat of a national strike ballot by the NUM, plus sporadic
unofficial strike action in some areas, the Government eventually backed
away. This was the Thatcher Government's U-turn or a 'body swerve' as
McGahey referred to it. 60 A week after the closure announcement Welsh
miners began strike action in protest against the planned colliery closures.
Tripartite talks were eventually held and the threat to the fifty collieries was
withdrawn. The NCBagreed to stick to the Colliery Review Procedure (CRP),
which had been agreed in the early 1970s as the medium for closing
collieries. As Lloyd stated, 'Once again strike action, or the threat of it, had
been seen to be successful'. 61
Twenty five years on from the strike, Arthur Scargill supported the Rule 41
Area strategy for the 1984-85 strike and suggested that unofficial strike
action in 1981 by miners, including those in Nottinghamshire, had sown the
seeds for the 1984-85 strike:
The NUM's historic battle did not begin in March 1984
(...) the seeds of the dispute had been sown long
before. A pit closure programme resulted in miners,
including miners in Nottinghamshire, taking unofficial
60 NUM, 1983 NUM Annual Conference Report, p. 483.
61 Lloyd, Understanding the Miners'Strike, p. 5.
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strike action (without a ballot) and forcing Thatcher into
a U-turn. 62
In spite of Scargill's claim, what actual role did the Nottinghamshire miners
take in the 1981 dispute? This section aims to try and determine if the
Nottinghamshire miners actually did take part in the 1981 unofficial action,
and if so to what extent. Also, was there a similar reaction to the sporadic
unofficial strike action in the Nottingham Area NUMas there had been to the
unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970?
Firstly, the situation by 1981 had been reached partly through the failure of
the 1974 Plan for Coal to deal with the issue of uneconomic capacity, one of
the issues which was central to the 1984-85 dispute. The period 1979 to
1981 saw a world energy glut, especially in oil and international coal prices,
which hit world markets just as market demand was flattening out. This led
to a collapse in world coal prices from around $70 per ton to $40 per ton.
Much emphasis had been placed by the NUM leaders on the part of the Plan
for Coal which envisaged an annual market for coal of 150 million tons by
1985, increasing from the 113 million tons per annum when the 1974 plan
was hatched. However, under the Plan for Coal it was hard to pin down a
definition for taking out uneconomic capacity. Lloyd suggested the 1974
version of the Plan for Coalwas not one, but a series, of documents. 63 The
1974 documents envisaged that 3 to 4 million tons of capacity, both
exhausted and uneconomic, would be taken out of the system annually. As
Lloyd noted, by mid-1982 only a quarter of this uneconomic/exhausted
capacity (8.84 million tons or 58 collieries) had actually been taken out which
averaged out at 1.1 million tons annually. 64 Combined with a falling market
for coal and with coal production consistently outstripping demand, this
meant that coal stocks gradually doubled from 27.9 million tons in 1979 to 58
million tons in 1983. As Lloyd suggested these stocks of coal were 'crucial to
62 Arthur Scargill, 'We could surrender or stand and fight', www.guardian.co.uk!politics, 7
March 2009.
63 Lloyd, Understanding the Miners'Strike, p. 13.
64 Ibid., p. 27.
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the ultimate victory of the Government and the NCBin the 1984-85 dispute'.
65 This is the point the left of the NUMemphasised in their argument about
the introduction of area incentive bonuses in 1978, Le. that incentive bonus
schemes helped to create the huge stockpiles. Nevertheless, it was not solely
the incentive scheme but also a failure in the Plan for Coal which played a
part in creating the huge stockpiles in the early 1980s.
The 1981 dispute followed hotly on the heels of the Nottingham Area NUM
Annual Conference which had taken place at Sutton-in-Ashfield on 2 and 3
February 1981. Fighting the threat of colliery closures emerged as the main
priority from the Area Conference, following reports that there were concerns
about the futures of New Hucknall Colliery (over its proposed closure) and
Sutton Colliery (uneconomic issue) in the Ashfield region, along with fears for
four other NCB North Nottinghamshire collieries which were believed to be
loss makers, namely Mansfield, Rufford, Bevercotes and Blidworth. 66 NUM
Branch Delegates, fearing a return to the mass closures of the 1960s, voted
251 to 4 in favour of lobbying the NUMNECfollowing their meeting with the
NCBon 10 February which had announced the SO pit closures nationwide. A
national strike vote on the issue was to be deferred until the outcome of the
10 February meeting was known. The emotional debate was conducted in
the aftermath of the Teversal Colliery closure debacle from two years earlier
(see Chapter 1: pp. 23- 32). During the debate there were claims and
counterclaims that Nottingham Area NUM union officials had not opposed
colliery closures strongly enough. Ray Chadburn, Nottingham Area (NUM)
President, refuted these allegations pointing to evidence of that only 28% of
the rank and file membership had supported Teversal in the 1979 area ballot.
He also referred to poor member attendance at some branch meetings which
full time Area Officials had attended in recent times. Earlier in the
Conference, the Bolsover MP, Dennis Skinner, had warned of the Tory
65 Ibid., p. 11.
66 'Fears for future of four local pits', The Chad, 5 February 1981, p. 1.
263
Chapter 5: A game of Constitutional Acrobats: The Rule 41'Domino Strategy' and the roots of
disunity.
Government's strategy to close more collieries and the necessity to ensure
unity and solidarity amongst the NUM. 67
Following the 10 February meeting between the NCBand NUM,the NUMNEC
discussed the matter at its meeting on 12 February. Despite rejecting the
NCB'splans to cut capacity, it was decided that no immediate action should
be taken but that all the facts should be ascertained from the different NUM
Areas and a total picture built up. Areas were to meet in the period 13 to 18
February with the NUM NEC reconvening on 19 February. Additionally
tripartite agreements were arranged to discuss the Government's
commitments under the Plan for Coal, the need to control coal imports, and
parity for the coal and steel industries with those of Europe. The NUMNEC
agreed that if there was no satisfactory response to these representations
then the union would ballot its members on the question of strike action.
In the meantime the depth of feeling on the emotive issue of colliery closures
led to unofficial strikes occurring in several coalfields. Some Area discussions
had brought out the names of individual collieries that were due to be
scheduled for closure under the NCB's plans. As Goodman stated, the
eventual figures revealed later indicated that twenty-three collieries, relating
to a cut in four million tons of capacity, were to be taken out, figures
remarkably similar to the ones announced in March 1984 which sparked the
1984-85 strike. 68 Becauseof the gravity of the situation both the NUMand
NCBpushed for a meeting with the Government; eventually this was brought
forward from 23 February to 18 February. David Howell, Secretary for
Energy, listened to the NCB'sand NUM'scase, and performed the U-turn. He
stated that the Government fully supported the Plan for Coal and that he
would support a continuation of the amount of investment needed for it to be
implemented. Since that time, various reasons for the U-turn have been
given, notably that there was not enough coal in stock at power stations to
deal with a lengthy miners' strike and the 'special measures' needed to deal
67 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1981, p. 34.
68 Geoffrey Goodman, The Miners'Strike (London, 1985), p. 22.
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with the trade union problem not yet being in place. For example, the 'special
police force' Cited under the Ridley Plan had trouble dealing with the inner-
city riots in the spring and summer of 1981. 69 As Taylor stated the 1980
steel strike and the 1981 dispute with the NUM had showed that it would
take time and preparation to break the trade unions' power. Limited coal
stocks at power stations, the memory of the 1972 and 1974 disputes still
being relatively fresh, combined with the Thatcher revolution still being in its
infancy meant that 'a tactical withdrawal made perfect, if embarrassing,
political sense'. 70
Following the U-turn decision the NUMNECmet the following day and it was
reported that the U turn was a victory for common sense. In the light of this
it was decided to instruct NUMmembers still out on unofficial strike to return
to work. 71 A Nottingham Area NUMdelegation, made up of two from each
Nottinghamshire NUM Branch and led by Henry Richardson (then Cresswell
NUM Branch Delegate), travelled to lobby the NUM NECmeeting 'to stress
the grass roots feeling that the proposed colliery closures should be resisted'.
72 In a sign of things to come in 1984, Joe Gormley, then NUM National
President, had cautioned some of the Areas backing unofficial strike action by
stating that a national ballot would be wanted if the NUM were to avoid
damaging court action. 73 It was reported that 50,000 miners nationwide
were still on unofficial strike on 20 February, the day after the NUM NEC
meeting; the last of the unofficial strikers returned to work on 23 February
1981. The unofficial stoppage had lasted just under of two weeks.
In the Nottingham Area NUM there is little documentary evidence of any
stoppages taking place. Nevertheless, a short stoppage occurred at
Babbington Colliery in the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area on 19 February
1981. The colliery was working normally again by 20 February following a
69 See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Year.s1979 - 1990 (New York, 1993), pp.
139-143.
70 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 159.
71 NUM, 1981 Annual Conference Report, p. 18.
72 'Name the Pits to be axed', The Chad, 19 February 1981, p. 3.
73 Goodman, The Miner.s'Strike, p. 22.
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'temporary stoppage' as confused workers tried to ascertain from union
officials whether the merger (with Hucknall Colliery) was on or off. 74 Further
evidence that little or no unofficial strike action took place in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield existed from G. K. Naylor of Bilsthorpe Colliery.
Citing the 1980 Coal MinesAct as being the main causeof the 1981 industrial
unrest (it required the coal industry to break even by 1983-84) he suggested
that it was the South Wales miners along with backing from other sections of
the trade union movement which made the Government see the errors of
their ways. However, in the letter he indicated that the Nottingham Area
NUM had been inactive during the dispute, even though Nottinghamshire
collieries were not immune from the effects of the NCB'sclosure plans:
I would like to thank the Yorkshire and South-Wales
miners who took action that provided me with security
of employment. I will just finish by saying;
Nottinghamshire NUM, where the hell were you when
we needed you. 75
No reports of any unofficial strike action in the Nottinghamshire coalfield or
any picketing from other NUMAreas appeared in the Nottingham Area (NUM)
1981 Minutes. Despite G. K. Naylor's 76 accusations of inactivity, a meeting
of Nottingham Area NUM BOCMtook place to discuss the situation in the
industry in a specially convened meeting on 21 February 1981. Following the
withdrawal of the proposed pit closures the main issue of concern to the
Nottinghamshire coalfield were the proposed closure of New Hucknall Colliery
and the proposed merger of Babbington Colliery with Hucknall Colliery, the
issue which had caused the walk out at Babbington in February. The
Nottingham Area NUM had received a non-committal reply from the Deputy
Area Director (Mining) of the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area on these two
issues. The Conferenceof BOCMagreed that Sir Derek Ezra(NCBChairman)
should be contacted immediately to try and ensure that the recent
74 'Huthwaite pit saved pledge', Nottingham Evening Post, 20 February 1981, p. 1.
75 G. K. Naylor, 'Newark MP has got it wrong', The Chad (Letters Page), 5 March 1981, p, 4.
76 Ibid.
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withdrawal list included New Hucknall and the proposed Babbington/Hucknall
merger was still on. The Nottingham Area NUM passed a resolution
supporting proposed industrial action in the event of the Government or NCB
reneging on the promises given by David Howell on 18 February 1981 77
(Appendix 21). Ironically, given events three years later, the resolution
included a call for strike action by Nottingham Area NUMmembers, not only
on the issue of the New Hucknall closure plus the Babbington/Hucknall
merger, but 'to support any other collieries in the British coalfield'. 78
Despite the U turn of February 1981, collieries continued to close by a
process of stealth. Discussions at local level saw 12 collieries close, the
largest number of closures since 1974. Prior to the 1982 NUM Annual
Conference the NUMNECnoted that other closures had been agreed at local
level that would be implemented over the coming year.79 The report
suggested that if further closures were not firmly resisted then the NCBmay
have "achieved its original objectives in terms of reduced colliery capacity by
a process of stealth". 80 The process of closures by stealth continued under
the short chairmanship of Norman Siddall. In his eighteen month reign as
NCBChairman twenty-three pits closedwith the loss of 21,000 mining jobs.
A second factor from the events of 1981 was influential on the future of the
coal industry. In the immediate aftermath of the 1981 U-turn the Nottingham
Area NUM President raised his concerns about the potential effects of the
Redundant Mineworkers Payment Scheme (RMPS) introduced in April 1981.
In the 1981 President's report to the Nottingham Area NUM ACM on 23
March 1981 he stated:
Whist on the face of it, it could be argued that we have
been successful in protecting the interests of the industry
and our members' jobs, we have to view with suspicion,
rr Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1981, p. 51.
78 Ibid.
79 NUM NEC, Report of the NEe 1982, May 1982, p. 17.
80 Ibid.
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and be alert to the consequences of, the improvements
in the RMPSand the effects they could have on the
industry. It could be construed as a back door method
of picking individual pits off by inducing our members to
accept cash at the expense of jobs and job avallabilitv."
An important aspect of the 1984-85 strike had its roots in 1981; the decision
to enhance miners' redundancy terms, especially for the over 50s. A
principled strike aimed at saving jobs was counteracted by significant
numbers of miners indicating that they would wish to leave the industry on
the voluntary redundancy. The pre and post-strike figures from Annesley
show this to be the case (see Chapter 4: Part 3).
From the available evidence it appears that there was little industrial action in
the Nottinghamshire coalfield during the unofficial strike of 1981. Whilst it
cannot be ruled out that some Nottingham Area NUM left-wing activists may
have supported the unofficial strike action, what was clear was that the issue
of any potential industrial action in the Nottinghamshire Area NUMwas dealt
with by established union procedures. Similarities existed between 1969,
1970 and 1981; in all cases the issues were dealt with in the Nottingham
Area NUM by the established constitutional methods. It was, as Alien
described, a trait of coalfields with conservative traditions. 82
In the aftermath of the 1981 dispute it soon became clear that the unofficial
strike action plus the threat of an official strike had not solved the problem of
colliery closures. The NUM had still not found unanimity on the issue of pit-
closures. Closures were being pushed through at local level with the
enhanced redundancy payments, combined with improved transfer payments
for younger miners being used as levers to get the cuts implemented. As
Allen stated there was a feeling, similar to that of the massclosures from the
81 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1981, p. 106.
82 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 313.
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1960s, that there was little the miners could do about it, despite the rhetoric
of some left wing national and area NUMOfficials:
Many miners believed that they had been outwitted and
they could do little about it because the mood for unified
action which had characterised the (1981) strike had
been dissipated. Suchmoods are not easily recreated. 83
Despite appeals for militancy to combat the continued run down of the deep
coal mining industry there was a perception that following the 1981 unofficial
strike the NUM's power was continuing to weaken. Three times NUM
members rejected industrial strike action in national ballots between January
1982 and March 1983. Taylor suggested history would prove there would be
a time when the miners would stand their ground. The time and place was
not known then, for some that time would come in March 1984:
(...) history shows that there will come a polnt, as their
leaders predict, where the miners will take a collective
decision to retreat no further and to stand their ground
and fight. 84
The problem, as with the Emergency Resolution 1 to the 1983 NUMAnnual
Conference, was that the point in time could not be tied down. The
staggered nature of closures meant each colliery and NUMArea had its own
time to launch its protests. Also the issue of colliery closures was a diverse
issue that the NCBalways seemed to be able to get round. The words of
PeterTait, cited during the colliery cull of the 1960s remained prophetic:
When a pit is earmarked for closure, then the Board
has its own way of ensuring that in spite of
everything we do or say, close it will. 85
83 Ibid., p. 315.
84 Taylor, Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p. 290.
85 Quoted in Powell, The Power Game, p.179.
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5. The Rule 41 Domino Strategy and the roots of disunity
The unofficial strikes of 1969, 1970 and 1981 were 'explosions of
consciousness' among sections of the NUM. What the evidence from the
unofficial strikes of 1969, 1970 and 1981 shows is that there were problems
getting coordinated solidarity in the NUM in the absence of a pro-strike
national ballot. In March 1984 it was mainly an 'explosion of consciousness'
among left-wing activists and younger miners which triggered the strike.
Because the strike started with confusion over mandates and whether the
industrial action was official or unofficial in different NUM Areas,
bewilderment reigned, as some miners struggled to establish what they
should do. On the 12 March 1984 it was reported that miners in Scotland
were confused as to the situation of the strike:
Scotland's pits appear to be divided on the stoppage.
There were angry clashes between fellow miners
meeting at Bilston Glen, Scotland's largest pit (oo.) no
vote was taken on whether to strike or not and the
meeting was adjourned for a week. 86
It was reported that miners in both the Scottish and South Wales coalfields
referred to the lack of support they had received from Yorkshire, and
elsewhere, when they were battling closures in 1983. 87 The situation in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield in the first few days of the strike was just as
confusing as in other coalfields. Amidst reports of both picketing successes
and failures in the Ashfield region of the Nottinghamshire coalfield, both the
Nottingham Area NUM and the local NCB admitted to being confused over
the style of industrial action. During the first week of the strike it was
reported that a chaotic situation prevailed:
86 John Ardill and Peter Hetherington,'Split vote strains coalfield strike call', The Guardian, 12
March 1984, p.l.
87 Ibid.
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King Coal faced anarchy in Ashfield on Wednesdaywith
virtual civil war breaking out at pit yard gates.
Meanwhile, local pits were coming to a standstill amid
scenes of confusion and uncertainty (...) The NCB
admitted to being as confused as everyone, such was
the determination and mobility of the pickets. 88
In the Nottinghamshire coalfield the parallels with the adverse reaction to the
1984-85 strike and the unofficial strikes of 1969, 1970 and to some extent
1981, were uncanny. The main theme of protest from the working
Nottinghamshire miners concerned the unconstitutional nature of the strike.
Most would agree that a protest aimed at saving jobs was a good cause but
would argue the way it was conducted was the real issue. A typical comment
came from a working Hucknall miner. He stated that the cause of the strike
was right but inferred that the strategy employed was wrong:
I would have voted for a strike but my feelings were
that it wouldn't change anything but the cause was
right. 89
From her research Bardill identified two main issueswhich led to the failure of
the 1984-85 strike in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. First, she found that the
overriding main reason for working was the absence of a national ballot vote.
Linked with this, the other main point of contention was 'confrontational
tactics' employed by the Yorkshire pickets. Many Nottinghamshire miners saw
this as a violation of the union rules and constitution. A typical comment came
from a working Notts miner at Ollerton Colliery:
( ...) becausewe were being told by Yorkshiremen what to
do, it was like a red rag to a bull. 90
88 'Battlefield', Notts Free Press, 16 March 1984, p. 1.
89 Bardill, 'Changing Perceptions of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike in the Nottinghamshire
Coalfield', p. 52.
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Neil Greatrex commented on the dictatorial nature of the Yorkshire pickets in
the early days of the strike and suggested this clashed with the traditional
philosophy of the moderate Nottinghamshire rank and file NUMmembers:
Order or tell a Notts miner what to do and nine times out
of ten he will go out of his way to oppose you. Ask him
and you will get a more favourable response. 91
The Nottingham Area NUMPressstatement of 13 March 1984 prophesied that
the nature of picketing could be counter-productive. Francis identified two
reasons why a different style evolved among the South Wales NUM from the
'head to head' picketing style adopted by Yorkshire flying pickets. He
suggested that the 'intense and dynamic industrial strategy' employed during
the early weeks of the strike seemedjustified by:
A combination of long distant travelling to the English
coalfields and the experience of past troubles resulted
in a distinct South Wales style of picketing, very
different from the confrontational picketing engaged in
by the Yorkshire miners in particular. 92
For many Nottinghamshire working miners in 1984 it was the confrontational
style of picketing, especially from the Doncaster region, which became the
main point of contention. However, there was some sympathy with the
Welsh pickets, as the author recalls, the problem was the damage had been
done in the first few days of the strike. 93
90 Ibid., p. 53.
91 Interview with Neil Greatrex, Mansfield, 20 March 2008.
92 Francis, History on our sides, p. 30.
93 The author conversed with some South Wales pickets two weeks into the strike when they
came to picket Annesley Colliery. Attitudes were entirely different from the aggressive,
confrontational approach of the Doncaster pickets. It was suggested that had the Welsh led
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Some of the evidence suggested that strike tactics based on total solidarity
would be a risky venture. Apart from the national strikes of 1972 and 1974
the whole history of strikes in coalmining had an issue of non-solidarity
attached to them. Outram and Church found evidence that showed many pit
based strikes in which very few men were directly involved and none were
indirectly involved; in many cases the majority of the workforce carried on
working, 'One out all out' was a myth. 94 By late March 1984 eleven areas of
the NUM had conducted Area ballots on the issue of strike action. Out of
these only Northumberland showed a slight majority, 52%, for strike action.
Even the South Wales NUMArea initially voted to work by 18 branches to 13
but striking NUMmembers picketed out the coalfield. 95 This meant, initially,
there was no strike mandate in ten NUMareas, equally important, in terms of
NEC representation, it showed that 12 out of the 23 NEC members had
backed strike action at national level (under Rule 41) when they did not have
a pro-strike ballot mandate from their own members. At the time these ten
NUM areas represented around 95,000 members out of a total NUM
membership of 225,000 or around 40% of the membership. Commenting on
this pattern of no-strike votes Taylor suggested that 'the results indicated a
marked absence of automatic solidarity on which the success of Rule 41
depended'. 96
Part of the problem for the NUM lay in the fact that the Union was federally
based. It was as Allen described 'a de facto federation of semi-autonomous
county unions disguised as Areas of a national union'. 97 This was the very
argument Arthur Scargill used at the TUC Conference in September 1983
when trying to preserve the two NUM seats on the TUC General Council.
Maintaining that each NUM Area or Group was voluntarily in the national
union, Scargill stated that the NUMwas:
with the picketing in the 1984-85 strike instead of the Doncaster pickets there could have
been a different outcome.
94 Roy Church and Quentin Outram, Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield conflid in Britain 1889-
1966,(Cambridge, 1998), p. 263.
95 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 186.
96 Ibid., p, 186.
97 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 283.
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(...) a combination of independent trade unions,
coming together in the National Union through a
National structure voluntarily. We have also pointed
out that each union has its own Rule Book and its own
constitution, and that only certain parts of those rules
directly interconnect with the Rulesand constitution of
the National Union. 98
Howell also identified that the federal structure of the NUM was a problem
when trying to secure total solidarity in the strike. He suggested that the
different NUMAreas were 'products of complex circumstanceswhich inhibited
easy generalisations'. 99 Likening the situation of the working Agecroft NUM
Branch in Lancashirewith the situation in Nottinghamshire he stated:
(...) the Agecroft confrontations, coupled with the
Nottinghamshire shambles, demonstrated that
the NUM's strategy was fatally flawed. The
method of spreading the strike on an inherently
divisive issue was itself divisive (...) any attempt
at a domino strategy had to take the dominoes as
they were and not as they might be in an ideal
world; how they were was a consequence of the
structure of the national union and contrasting
Area cultures. 100
From the evidence some themes can be identified that were common
between the unofficial strikes of 1969, 1970 and 1981 and the start of the
1984-85 miners' strike. First, there was difficulty getting unified action
because it took time for news from the different areas to filter through and
influence what was happening. The initial reaction of some of the men to
98 NUM, 1983 Annual Conference Report, SOC 7 July 1983, p. 562.
99 Howell, Politics of NUM, p. 111.
100 Ibid., p. 110.
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the closure of Cortonwood, the issue that sparked the 1984-85 strike, was
'let the pit close and let's get to a better pit'. 101 There was hesitancy about
the constitutional legitimacy of the strike in sections of the coalfields which
had conservative (with a small c) traditions such as the Nottinghamshire
coalfield. Also as Allen identified each coalfield has differing industrial and
political characteristics which become particularly marked during times of
crisis. 102 However, it was not as easy as labelling different coalfields as
either militant or moderate; within each coalfield there are contradictory
tendencies. At the start of the 1984-85 strike in the Nottingham Area (NUM),
Annesley and Newstead collieries stood adjacent to each other but the
reaction to the way the strike started produced completely differing contrasts
from the two sets of NUM Branch Officials. The Annesley Officials followed
the Nottingham Areas conventional tradition and viewed the strike as lacking
constitutional legitimacy, whilst the Newstead Officials backed the strike.
Newstead had a reputation for militancy which dated back to the era of
Spencerism following the 1926 strike; it had one of the largest numbers of
members who remained in the Nottinghamshire Miners Association (NMA)
between 1926 and 1937. Initially more rank and file miners joined the strike
at Newstead than at Annesley. However, at the end of first week of the
strike the Nottinghamshire Area NUMballot gave results of 80% at Annesley
and 71% at Newstead against strike action. This was a classic example of
the moderate check on left-wing activism at Branch level in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield.
Summing up, why did the Rule 41 Domino strategy fail so dismally in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield? In the absence of a national ballot the plan, as
Stephenson suggested, was to get a rolling area-by-area strike by using
flying pickets, and once the Areas were out apply Rule 41 to each Area to
give the strike some legitimacy:
101 Samuel, Bloomfield, and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 67.
102 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 310.
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The decision not to ballot was taken in the belief that a
domino effect would occur. That is striking miners would
be able to picket other areas into support, and, as each
area came out on strike Rule 41 would be applied to give
the individual strikes official recognition. 103
Because the Rule 41 strategy relied on the picketing out of areas, some of
which was conducted in a highly confrontational way, Stephenson suggested
that the effect was to shift the emphasis of the strike. He suggested that the
nature of picketing distorted the whole strike and instead of being seen as a
noble attempt at fighting pit closures and saving jobs the centre of attention
became centred on infighting within the NUM. 104 Trevor Bell, one of the
three NUMNECmembers who voted against sanctioning the Rule41 strategy
on 8 March 1984, also suggested the nature of the strike had diverted
attention away from the real issues:
The publicity our union was getting was not about the
case we were fighting (...) it was about the methods of
our approach to those problems and the real issue was
lost. 105
In the Nottinghamshire coalfield there was also a feeling that the presence of
the Yorkshire pickets during the first week of the strike had an effect on the
on the way that Nottingham Area NUM members voted in the Area strike
ballot on 17-18 March 1984.106 At the NUM NECmeeting on 8 March 1984,
which authorised strike action under Rule 41 in Yorkshire and Scotland,
authority was given for the Nottinghamshire Area of the NUM to ballot its
members on strike action against colliery closures. When the Yorkshire
pickets entered the Nottinghamshire coalfield during the first few days it was
103 Stephenson, 'Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting', p. 26.
104 Ibid.
105 Roger, Ratcliffe,' Village at War', The Guardian, 18 March 1984, p17.
106 See Richardson comment in Chapter 2, p. 68.
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pointed out by members of the Nottingham Area NUM AEC that their
presencecould have an effect on the forthcoming area strike ballot:
The point was made that the pickets which had arrived
in force on the Tuesday in Nottingham would never be
able to stop the area ballot set for the end of the week,
and as a result the ballot vote would not be about pit
closures, but about the presence of Yorkshiremen
attempting to bar their way to work. 107
In effect this is what happened, members of the Nottingham Area NUMvoted
against the presence of the Yorkshire pickets and not on the real issue of
saving jobs and fighting pit closures.
Roy Ottey, NUM NEC member for the Power Group, who prophetically
forecast that the Rule 41 strategy would cause much infighting in the NUM,
commented on the legitimacy of trade union democracy when strike action in
the PowerGroup was made official by the NUMNEe. NUM lobbyists from the
Power Group met the Group's Executive members (EC) on 19 June 1984 to
ask for strike action in the Power Group to be made official under NUM
national rule 41. The PowerGroup ECagreed to the request by four votes to
two and the national NUMmade the strike action in the Power Group official
on 6 July 1984. This was in accordance with the NUM NECdecision from 8
March 1984 and the NUMSDCdecision from 19 April 1984. Ottey stated he
was flabbergasted that such a system could operate under the banner of
trade union democracy:
I was astounded that such a decision could be made,
particularly when one of the four voting in favour (of a
strike) was due to pick up his redundancy pay within
three to four weeks of leaving the industry, and another
107 Ibid.
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was employed in ancillary work in the coal industry and
had worked continuously throughout the strike. Even
worse was the fact that 75% of the Power Group
members were at work, we had not had a strike ballot,
and if we did, it would be against strike action. lOB
Although constitutionally, in the eyes of pro-strike supporters, the Rule 41
strategy was seen to be legitimate it could also be seen as being a theoretical
model rather than a practical one. Although parallels can be drawn with the
unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970, the problem was that it had never been
used before to try and mount a constitutional strike. Wilsher made reference
to this:
Until the 1984 dispute Rule 41 had never, on any
occasion, been used as a constitutional platform for a
countrywide stoppage. 109
But as Harper and Wintour pointed out, the NUMPresident had confidence in
the use of the domino strategy. As well as advocating its use prior to the
Lewis Merthyr closure dispute in March 1983, he had confidence in a system
which had launched his own reputation:
He CScargill)had an enduring faith in the efficiency of
flying pickets C...) his own reputation within the
Yorkshire Area had been built on his own organisation
of pickets into Nottinghamshire in 1969. 110
Dave Douglass, NUM Branch Delegate at Hatfield Branch in the militant
Doncaster region of the NUM, also indicated his faith in the successful use of
108 Ottey, The Strike: An insider's view, p. 124.
109 Wilsher, MacIntyre, and Jones, Strike, p. 53.
110 Harper and Wintour, 'The bitter battle that ended an era', The Guardian, 5 March 1985, p.
17.
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the domino strategy when the strike was launched at Hatfield on 10 March
1984:
Scotland and Wales are with us from Monday. Kent and
possibly Derbyshire will be joining of their own bat and
the rest will be picketed out. The fight back has started
lads. Let's get into it. 111
The term 'will be picketed out' suggests a confidence in the domino strategy
and a confrontational approach to picketing. The past evidence from the
unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970 has shown that the domino strategy had
flaws. Despite this the Rule 41 strategy was nearly a success in 1984.
Following the NUM NEe meeting on 8 March 1984, which authorised strike
action under Rule 41 in the Yorkshire and Scottish Areas of the NUM, the
twenty-eight South Wales NUM lodges met on 11 March 1984 and voted
against joining the strike. However, within twenty-four hours only six south
Wales pits were still operating and it was reported that ten of the pits had
come out voluntarily with twelve others being picketed out. 112 By the middle
of the first week all the South Wales coalfield was out on strike and would
remain so for the next eleven months. However, it should be noted that
South Wales was one of the minority of NUM Areas which had constantly
voted in favour of strike action during the failed national ballots in the 1982-
1983 period. Harper and Wintour suggested that the first few days of
picketing in Nottinghamshire determined the whole course of the strike. 113 It
was, as Taylor stated, a challenge to the traditional constitutional methods
used in the county:
From the Notts perspective the events of March 1984
were a fundamental challenge to a deeply entrenched
industrial and political tradition. They ( ...) responded
111 Samuel, Bloomfield, and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 99.
112 Harper and Wintour, 'The Bitter Battle that ended an era', The Guardian, 5 March 1985, p.
17.
113 Ibid.
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with a defence of the ethos and culture expressedby the
1944 NUMRule Book. 114
Central to the decision to conduct the 1984-85 strike under the Rule 41
'domino strategy' were the actions of the NUM NEe. Their role in the strike
was as integral to the outcome as was the presence of the massesof police
to ensure the rights of the individual miner to go to work. It is to the role of
the NUMNECin determining the course of the strike that we shall now turn.
6: Abnormal Actions! - The role of the NUMNational Executive
Committee in the 1984-85 strike
One important factor in trying to understand the evolution of disunity in the
1984-85 strike is the role played by the NUM NEe. The 1969 and 1970
disputes ended with 'constitutional intervention' by the NEC by means of
using established constitutional procedures. In the 1984-85 strike the NUM
NECtried a different strategy which would eventually split the union and lead
to the subsequent formation of the UDM. Why did the traditionally more
conservative right-wing members of the NUMNECgo along with the Rule 41
domino strategy? Surely the experiences from the 1969 and 1970 unofficial
strikes had shown that such a strategy was seriously flawed? The domino
strategy was traditionally associated with support from the left-wing of the
NUM, but it was the role of the traditional right-wing members who, by their
support of it, played a significant part in the way that the 1984 strike
evolved. Various causes have been cited as to why this state of affairs
happened.
By 1984 there had been a weakening of the right for a number of years;
from the time of Joe Gormley's retirement in 1982 the right had lost much of
its effectiveness within the NEe.This was apparent from the time of Scargill's
election as National President when the right failed to get its act together by
nominating a single successor to Gormley. Initially it was thought that
114 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 191.
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Tommy Bartles from Durham would be a natural successor to Joe Gormley,
but he died in a traffic accident. Another factor in the demise of the right on
the NUMNEewas the NUM'smove of HQ to Sheffield in 1983. This played a
significant part as the moderate NEe members no longer had the benefit of
their pre NEe meetings, as they did when the NUMNEemet in London.With
most of the moderates being from the central coalfields overnight stays for
Sheffield meetings were no longer an option. However, the traditional left
wing areas of South Wales, Scotland and Kent still enjoyed their overnight
stays and pre NEe meetings as they had done in London, and thus were able
to meet and collectively discuss their strategies.
Howell suggested three reasonswhy the moderate right NEe members acted
as they did in 1984. 115 First, some of them who represented areas where
colliery closures would occur were prepared to go along with the Rule 41
strategy or any other strategy, if it could mobilise any kind of opposition to
colliery closures. Secondly, some, as initially in the case of the two
Nottingham NUM NEe members, believed that eventually there would be a
national ballot on the pit closure issue. Howell's third reason was a shrewder
one, it legitimised both striking and working:
Some, pessimistic about opinion in their own areas, could
comfort themselves with the assurance that they could
protect themselves with their own Area ballots, and the
results could legitimise either involvement in spreading
the strike or working on. 116
This third view was reflected in the Nottingham Area NUM AEe
recommendation on 21 March 1984 which gave the fundamental right for
Nottingham Area NUMmembers not to cross picket lines but also to respect
115 Howell, Politics of the NUM, p. 101.
116 Ibid.
281
Chapter 5: A game of Constitutional Acrobats: The Rule 41'Domino Strategy' and the roots of
disunity.
the Area mandate and go to work. 117 Henry Richardson, Nottinghamshire
NUM NECmember in 1984, maintained that as a NECmember he had the
right to recognise a NECmandate, even if it conflicted with his own area's
mandate, as it did in 1984. For some in the Nottinghamshire coalfield there
was a problem with this as the NUM NEC did not elect Richardson, the
Nottingham Area NUM membership had in an area ballot in 1982. 118 A
custom in trade unionism in the Nottinghamshire coalfield was that elected
union members were there to advise, not, as Len Clarke stated, to impose
their will on the membership. 119 In the past the NUM NEe had been a
check on militant left wing members at national level, in the Nottinghamshire
coalfield the membership were a check on elected left-wing union officials at
both Area and Branch level.
Despite these issues affecting NUM NECmembers, in 1984 another aspect
came into play which affected some miners' unwillingness to fight the colliery
closure problem. This issue was redundancy terms. However, for NUM NEe
members this was not NCB redundancy terms but NUM redundancy terms.
The Government had recently enhanced the redundancy terms for
mineworkers when the 'domino strategy' was hatched. 120 The aim was clear,
the improved redundancy terms were designed to get miners to drop any
protests and leave the industry quietly. The enhanced redundancy terms
were especially aimed at getting the over 50s to voluntarily leave the coal
industry. (See Chapter 4: Part 3) Many of the traditional moderates on the
NUM NEe were in the latter parts of their union careers and to oppose the
'Scargill influenced left' could put any possible retirement terms at risk. As
the 1984 strike went on, in an NECatmosphere described as being fearful,
the issue of NUM redundancy terms cropped up. One anonymous NEC
moderate suggested that fear and money were the two main factors which
stopped the moderate right-wing members from speaking their minds during
the strike:
117 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1984, p. 92.
118 Interview with Steve Williamson, Selston, 8 March 2009.
119 Nottingham Area NUM Minutes 1969, p. 238.
120 New terms for the RMPScame in in April 1983.
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( ...) the whole set up of the union is fear. There were
witch hunts on the executive itself. It was not only fear,
money came into it. For many years (...) it has been the
practice that when a full-time official retired, he got three
years pensionable salary as a lump sum. On a General
Secretary's pay that could be worth £40,000. Then they
give you the union car ( ...) It could all be taken away
from you. 121
Just as the NCBredundancy scheme influenced some older miners' decisions
to leave the industry, so the same situation applied to senior NUM NEe
members. The NEemember above made reference to this:
It's the finance committee which decides in the first
instance, but there are only two moderates on it now,
and the fear is that Arthur (Scargill) could influence its
decisions. It is a hold on you (...) if you do anything
which could be claimed to be detrimental to the union
you think "There goes my car, there goes my lump
sum". Nobody ever said it, but we all think it. 122
Neil Greatrex suggested that it was this scenario that cost RoyOttey £30,000
when he resigned from the NUMNEe in November 1984. 123 Ottey was one
of only three NEe members who voted against the Rule 41 strategy at the
NUM NEe meeting on 8 March 1984. It was suggested that other factors
were probably at work. 124 In the Staffordshire coalfield working miners
enquired why their NUMNEemembers had either 'drifted into the woodwork'
121 G. Turner, 'Miners' Leaders who are afraid to speak their minds', Summer 1984,
D Amos collection. (National Newspaper article - Source unknown).
122 Ibid.
123 Interview with Neil Greatrex, Mansfield, 20 March 2008.
124 Can you remember?, The Working Miners Newsletter Issue 1,20 August 1984, Stoke on
Trent, p. 1. D. Amos collection.
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or were openly plotting to force working miners out on strike, against their
Area's majority wishes. It was suggested that pressure was being put on
their pension entitlements and this was the real reason why they were not
speaking out about the validity of the strike:
Had the Golden Tongue of Arthur struck again, one
could ask, and convince so called men of principle the
error of their ways, or did someone warn them that
their actions could directly affect their pension
entitlements? Officials' entitlements at present are one
year's salary, on today's rates anything up to £30,000, a
big weekly pension and usually the (union) car (...) The
exact amount is awarded discretionally by the NEe to
whom they have to apply personally. Draw your own
conclusions. 125
Nottingham NUMArea Officials also had a union house, rent free for the rest
of their lives, The evidence suggests there were significant financial
penalties for an NEe member, nearing the end of their NUM career if he
championed the working miners' cause. In the Nottingham Area (NUM) the
initial reaction of the two NEe members was to oppose the way the strike
had evolved, even though they voted in favour of authorising strike action
under Rule 41 at the NUM NEe meeting on 8 March 1984. 126 However,
within a month both were seen to be obeying the pro-strike line against the
majority wishes of the Nottingham Area NUMmembers and the Area working
mandate obtained from the Area Ballot of 15-16 March 1984. Were the NUM
redundancy/retirement benefits an influencing force on their decisions to
comply with the pro-strike national line?
125 Ibid.
126 It was the two Nottingham NUM NECmembers, Ray Chadburn and Henry Richardson,
that asked for the Nottingham Area ballot on pit-closures at the NUM NEe meeting on 8
March 1984. Up until early April 1984 they advocated the need for a national ballot until
succumbing to left-wing pressure for no ballot.
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Why was the control of the NUM NECso influential in the evolution of the
1984-85 miners' strike? Government of the NUM(under NUMRule 8) was by
Conference; usually this would be Annual Conference but Special Delegates'
Conferences (as in 1984) could apply. In between periods of conference it
was the duty of the NUM NECto administer union business, its job being to
perform its duties in line with resolutions to conference. The constitution of
the NUM NEC is made up of Area Officials, the numbers depending on the
numerical strength of NUMmembership in each area, this being under Rule
12 of the NUMNational Rules.The supreme authority of conference works on
a system of delegated power from the different Areas and Branches of the
NUM. Delegates to national conference are elected from the different Area
Councils, the Area Councils being made up of Branch Delegates, elected
annually by pit head ballot. Branch Delegates, in many cases, get their
mandates from NUM Branch meetings. These can be the usual monthly
meeting or in the case of the Yorkshire Area NUM in 1984, special branch
meetings could mandate the Branch Delegate to vote for strike action. 127 Pitt
suggested that mandates in the Kent Area of the NUM were obtained at
canteen and pit gate meetings. 128
Nevertheless, as happened in the Nottingham Area NUM in March 1984,
Branch Delegates can also get their mandates from Area Ballots votes in
addition to Branch meetings and ACM's. This is what Lloyd described as
being 'countervailing pressures'which applied to the delegated democracy of
conference. 129 At national level Lloyd cited two mechanisms which applied
this countervailing pressure. Both involve national ballot systems, the first
the national ballot vote for the NUM National President and NUM General
Secretary, and the second the requirement under National Rule 43 to hold an
individual ballot of all NUMmembers on any proposed strike action. But as
Lloyd stated, the power of the Conference was less than sacrosanct, both in
constitution and practice, because of the countervailing pressures and
127 samuel, Bloomfield, and Boanus, The Enemy Within, pp. 92-99.
128 Pitt, The World on our Back: The Kent Miners, p. 17 and p. 86.
129 Lloyd, Understanding the Miners'Strike, p. 20.
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loopholes in the system. Not all NUM members attended branch meetings
and they could be controlled by a small clique of activists. Additionally there
was a numerical bias of Delegates (usually left-wing) that attended AC's and
SOC's.130
Lloyd stated that, prior to the election of Scargill, previous NUM leaders had
attempted to balance these various centres and mechanisms of NUM power
i.e. Conference, Executive, Areas and Ballot votes. 131 From the time of his
election as NUM National President, Arthur Scargill, on several occasions,
notably in his inaugural address to the NUM Conference in 1982, put on
record his opinion that the conference was the 'supreme authority' of the
union. This was not a controversial statement but merely a statement of
intent; he was indicating the way he intended to run the NUM:
( ...) he (Scargill) was making clear his intention of
running the union and its policies through a forum which,
because it is composed of the most active, committed
and usually (leftist) members would be most likely to
support his radical policies. 132
Williamson was of the opinion that once the left-wing were in control of the
processof the delegated democracy and various other influential positions in
the NUM, then the strike would naturally run its course. 133 George Bolton,
Scottish NUM NEC member, was of a similar opinion. 134 In the
Nottinghamshire coalfield in March 1984, in the absence of a national ballot,
the domino strategy ran into the rocks of the great check on it, a no strike
mandate from the rank and file membership in an area ballot. With no
national ballot forthcoming what in effect happened was that the Rule 41
Domino theory opened up 'different perceptions of democracy' in the NUM.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Interview with Steve Williamson, Selston, 8 March 2009.
134 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 261.
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Disagreeing with the left's view that the issue was solely one of competing
individual and collective rights, Lloyd saw the issue as one causing a clash of
'competing collective rights':
The point at issue was (...) one of competing collective
rights; the collective right of the NEC, and the NUM
SDC, to call a strike; and the collective right of
Nottinghamshire and other areas to abide by their
results of their ballots taken under Rule 41 to go to
work. 135
The NEC's role in the unofficial strikes of 1969 and 1970 was to adhere to
trusted and used constitutional means which had the effect of checking the
flow of the left-wing influenced unofficial strikes. In 1984 it was the NEC's
role in letting the left run with the Rule 41 domino strategy which eventually
led to the split in the NUM and the eventual formation of the UDM. The
principle of the Rule 41 domino strategy was solely based on the sanctity of
the picket line, a basic call to solidarity and a 'one size fits all' strategy. As
Outram and Church indicated, for the main part of mining history this had
not happened, the events of the 1970swere a temporary variation from this
trend. In concluding this chapter it would be worth reviewing the comments
of Pitt, made in the context on the amendment of NUMRule 43 following the
debacle of the October 1970 national ballot. 55% of NUM members had
voted for strike action but constitutionally, even though it was a majority, it
did not reach the required two-thirds majority required under union rule at
the time. The outcome was the unofficial strike of 1970. Following the
unofficial strike NUM Rule 43 was amended from a two-thirds majority to
55% to authorised strike action. 136 The significance of this was that the
1972 National Miners' Strike was authorised on a 58% majority vote.
Emphasisingthe importance of using Rule43 to secure unity in the NUM, Pitt
135 Ibid., p. 34.
136 Resolution No. 7 to amend NUM Rule 43 from a two-thirds majority to 55% for strike
action was carried by a card vote of 215 votes to 98 at the 1971 NUMAnnual Conference in
Aberdeen.
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suggested an area by area strategy in 1970 would have resulted in an
acrimonious internal battle in the NUM:
If the miners were forced to confront the Heath
Government on an area basis, and under the stigma of
unofficial action, a demoralising defeat would turn the
wages offensive in on itself, and into a bitter
internecine struggle within the Miners' Union. 137
Inadvertently he had forecast the outcome of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike.
137 Pitt, The World on our Backs- The Kent Miners, p. 110.
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Chapter 6: Digging Deeper - Habits, attitudes and actions
in the Nottinghamshire coalfield
1. Strike Breaking in coalmining - a brief outline
Oh, it's in the evening after dark,
When the blackleg miner creeps to work,
With his moleskin pants and dirty shirt,
There goes the blackleg miner. 1
The song, BlacklegMiner, is thought to originate from the 1844 Miners' Lockout
in the North EastCoalfield. The Miners' Association of Great Britain and Ireland
(MAGBI), founded in 1841 by Martin Jude, was in dispute over the yearly
bonding systems. The union was demanding fortnightly contracts. The lockout
in the North East lasted twenty weeks and collapsed largely as a result of the
introduction of 'blackleg labour'. The coal owners, including Lord Londonderry,
imported strike breakers from Wales, Cumberland, Ireland and the lead mines.
In the Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalfield the miners were out for thirteen
to fourteen weeks. Williams suggested the miners had grievances other than the
bonding system, including wages, hours of work, the truck system, the butty
system, methods of weighing coal and working conditions in the mines. 2 The
MAGBIwas relatively young in Nottinghamshire, the first branches having been
formed at Kimberley and Thomas North's Cinderhill Collieries (sunk 1840 -
1842). When the miners at Pinxton returned to work in August, the strike
organisers were refused work. Included in this, ironically, was the Hayes
Family, who had been part of the 'blackleg interlopers' who had gone to the
North East to break the 1832 strike. It was the 1832 strike that broke Hepburn's
union. Hepburn's union is often considered to be the first coalmining trade
union that had a semblance of permanence. According to Wheeler'Saccount the
Hayes family were tricked into moving to the North East in 1832 by the coal
1 Steeleye Span, Hark the Village Wait (Mooncrest Records, London, 1970).
2 J. Williams, The Derbyshire Miners: A Study in Industrial and Social Histo!}, (London, 1962), p.
91.
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owners. 3 Griffin suggested that the 1844 strike failed in Nottinghamshire
because of the inexperience of the new union, the employers' use of the
'document' and the blacklisting of leading union activists. 4 The document was
included in the return to work terms and it denounced trade union membership.
s
The other big dispute of the nineteenth century was the 1893 Miners' Lockout.
The dispute was over proposedwage cuts by the coal owners to compensate for
a fall in coal prices since 1890. 300,000 miners were eventually locked out but
the strike was not a national one. The main stronghold of the MFGB(formed in
1889) was the central Federated coalfields. Miners in the exporting regions of
the North East and South Wales operated on sliding scales and were not
involved in the dispute. The MFGBwould have nothing to do with a sliding scale
method of paying miners' wages. The 1893 strike was eventually settled in
November after intervention by the Prime Minister, W. E. Gladstone and Lord
Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary. Following this intervention it was agreed there
should be a resumption of work on the pre-stoppage terms and conditions. A
Conciliation Board was set up to look into miners' wages which lasted until 1918.
One consequenceof the lockout was the Durham Miners' Association (DMA) was
expelled from the MFGBfor refusing to join the 'national strike'. There was no
mention of this in the NUM's abridged history of the MFGBwhich stated that
'fifteen weeks of united action forced the owners to restore wages cuts they had
tried to introduce'. 6 Along with the Northumberland miners, the DMA went
back into the MFGBin 1907. The South Wales miners joined the MFGBin 1899.
So during the 18305 and 1840s a powerful tradition of ostracism and hatred of
strike-breakers, blacklegs and scabsentered mining trade union culture. In coal
mining history, especially for the left, the most significant legacy of strike-
breaking followed from the events of 1926. As in 1984-85, the Nottinghamshire
3 M. Wheeler, The Life of Matthew Hayes: The Colliers Spurgeon (Pinxton, 1899).
4 A. R. Griffin, Mining in the East Midlands, p. 75
5 19th Century Mine-Owners often used the document following strikes and lockouts. The idea
was to get the men to sign it, thus denouncing trade union membership under the new terms of
employment following the dispute.
6 NUM, A Century of Struggle, p. 8.
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coalfield was at the centre of the controversy. In the latter stages of the 1926
lockout a split occurred in the MFGB, and a breakaway, moderate union, the
Nottingham Miners Industrial Union (NMIU) was formed. Most union branches
in the Nottinghamshire coalfield went over to the 'breakaway' NMIU, commonly
known as the 'Spencer Union'. The NMIU was led by the Nottinghamshire
Miners' leader, George Alfred Spencer, and controversially it did not align
politically to the Labour Party but advocated 'non-political trade unionism'. The
Spencer Union lasted from 1926 until 1937 when, following the Harworth
dispute, it amalgamated with the Nottinghamshire Miners Association (NMA) to
the form the Nottinghamshire Miners Federated Union (NMFU). The NMFU
lasted from 1937 until 1944 when, at a conference in the Black Boy Inn in
Nottingham, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was formed. The
Nottingham Area (NUM) became a constituent part of the newly formed NUM.
Ironically, it was in Nottinghamshire sixty years later that the NUM found itself
in its greatest crlsls, the Nottinghamshire miners, as in 1926, being at the centre
of the crisis.
The song 'Blackleg Miner' was revamped by the folk-rock group Steeleye Span in
1970, and became part of their repertoire in live performances during the 1970s
and 1980s. During the 1984-85 miners' strike the song was used by striking
miners in some coalfields to intimidate those who continued to work. The song
became a political statement for supporters of the strike. A legacy from the
strike still exists at some football matches when supporters of Nottingham
Forest, Notts County and Mansfield Town visit former coalfield striking areas.
They are greeted with spontaneous chants of 'scab, scab, scab' throughout the
match:
To this day, Nottingham Forest supporters receive far
more of the usual away followers' normal share of
abuse when they visit Hillsborough or Bramwell Lane
(homes of Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield United
respectively). Nottinghamshire's football teams have
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been objects of scorn in parts of Yorkshire and North
Derbyshire since the 1984-85 coal strike. 7
2. Fitting the Bill:The Nottinghamshire Miners and the Strike-
breaking issue in 1984-85
Samuel contended that notions of honour and shame were pivotal in the
conduct of the 1984-85 strike:
To resist the blandishments of the Coal Board (over return
to work incentives) was an act of self-respect; to stand up
to the police was an act of physical courage, even proof
of manhood. Union men (supporters of the union) were
steadfast. Weaklings and cowards were scabs. 8
How do the Notts miners who worked through the 1984-85 strike technically fit
the bill as scabs? Were they the weaklings and cowards suggested by Samuel?
Scab is a derogatory term that is generally used to refer to people who continue
to work when trade unionists go on strike. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
defines a scab as being 'a person who refuses to strike or join a trade union, or
who tries to break a strike by working, a blackleg'. 9 The term 'blackleg' is an
older word for scab, blackleg being defined by the OEDas 'a person who fails or
declines to take part in industrial action'. 10 Such a worker was memorably
portrayed in the 1960 British drama film, The Angry Silence, in which Richard
Attenborough plays factory worker Tom Curtis, who refuses to take part in an
unofficial strike and is ostracised by the other workers as being a scab. 11
During and since the 1984-85 miners' strike some references to 'scabbing' or
'blacklegging' use the example of the working Nottinghamshire miners in the
7 'Football fans still bear brunt of strikers' ire', Eastwood & Kimberley Advertiser, 27 March 2009,
r·8.
Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, The Enemy Within, p. 27.
9 The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1992), p. 964.
10 Ibid., p. 102.
11 The Angry Silence (1960), directed by Guy Green, screenwriter Bryan Forbes.
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1984-85 strike. Lynn Beaton suggested that striking miners referred to
Nottinghamshire as being 'scabland in 1926' during the first few weeks of the
strike.12 At Harworth Colliery during the first week of the strike Yorkshire
strikers at the heavily picketed pit openly talked of 'trying to force the Notts
men out, men who they openly talked of as being scabby bastards'. 13 In the
early part of the 1984-85 strike, Jack London's definition of a scab was
revamped and circulated in the Nottinghamshire coalfield by South Wales NUM
activists (Appendix 19). Jack London (1876 - 1916) was an American author,
journalist and social activist. He was a passionate advocate of unionism,
socialism and the rights of workers. The leaflet caused some concern amongst
some South Wales NUMLodgeOfficials because they considered its derogatory
nature could be counter-productive in the efforts to get Nottingham Area NUM
members to join the strike. 14 In the 1996 film, 'Brassed Off', Stephen
Tomkinson played the part of a former striker in the 1984-85 strike and
ironically referred to himself as being a scab when he told his work colleagues
that he had voted 'to take the money' in the ballot vote to save Grimley
Colliery. 15
McIlroy suggested a deeper definition for strike breaking and pointed out a
distinct difference between scabbing and blacklegging. He suggested that
workers who replace strikers were, 'threatening (their) livelihood and
organisation (and) by doing so (were) 'scabbing' in the correct sense'. 16 In
comparison he suggested that workers who 'blacklegged' as against 'scabbing'
were:
(oo.) breaking the democratic decision of their
fellows (and), by doing so, (were) attacking their
brothers and sisters and opening them up to
12 L. Beaton, Shifting Horizons (London, 1985), p. 69.
13 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 88.
14 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 101.
15 Brassed Off, Channel4 TV Corporation, 1996.
16 Mdlroy, Strike, p. 150.
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victimisation. By going in they (were) 'blacklegging'
in the correct sense of the term. 17
If we use McIlroy's interpretation can the Nottinghamshire miners of 1984-85
be seen to have been 'blacklegging' as against 'scabbing'? However, there is
one contentious point in McIlroy's interpretation, the breaking of the
'democratic process'. It is because there was some debate over the democratic
process in the 1984-85 miners' strike that the question is raised as to whether
the working Nottinghamshire miners were scabs at all. Jimmy Reid, leader of
the 1971 Clyde Shipyard strike, was critical of the term being applied to
working miners:
A scab is someone who participates in a vote in which the
majority are for taking strike action and then refuses to
honour the decision. If you are denied the right to vote it
is impossible to be a scab. 18
Likewise Roy Ottey, NUM NEC Member for the Power Group, who resigned
from the NEC in November 1984, questioned the definition of a man being
called a scabwho had abided by a no strike area ballot vote in the absenceof a
national strike ballot:
How can a man, exercising the right given to him in a
ballot in his own area, be called a scab if he abides by the
result and goes to work? After all, the members are the
union, not the Officials and the leaders. If the result of a
(national) ballot had been to strike (...) there would have
been few if any, so called scabs. 19
17 Ibid.
18 'Opinion Special', Channel4, 13 January 1985. (Script of the programme in the Nottingham
Evening Post, 15January 1985, p. 6)
190ttey, The Strike: an insider's view, p. 123.
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Joe Keenan from the British and Irish Communist Association also called into
question the issue as to whether the Nottinghamshire miners were scabs:
The Nottinghamshire miners are to be congratulated
for their courageous stand (...) far from indulging in a
bout of latter day 'Spencerism' or seeking to revert to
the Federation they are treating the NUM in a more
principled manner than its President cares to (...)
Whilst Scargill calls them scabs and despatches his
heavies to assault and intimidate them they are
keeping up the overtime ban. Some scabs! 20
While some of the NUMstrike activists had referred to Nottinghamshire miners
as scabs from the start of the strike, the issue of 'scabbing' came to a head at
the NUMExtraordinary Conference in July 1984. At the start of the Conference
Terry Thomas (South Wales NUM) came to the rostrum on a point of order
following the Obituary. The Conference had stood in respect of the deaths of
flying pickets David Jones and Joe Green. Thomas made a passionate attack on
'scab delegates' attending the Conference, and suggested that they had been
responsible for most of the reverses the NUMhad suffered during the strike up
to that time:
I come to this rostrum (...) to ask a question as to
whether or not there are any scab delegates in this
Conference. Comrades, these rats who have assisted in
trying to defeat the NUM, have assisted the
establishment in Britain of seeing thousands of our
comrades arrested, hundreds of our comrades beaten up
by police, and two of our comrades killed, and those
20 Joe Keenan, Scargill's Strike, (Belfast, 1984), p. 6.
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people have the audacity to ( ...) stand and pay their
respects to those comrades who have been killed. 21
The NUMSouth Wales Delegation then made a collective decision to leave the
Conference, leaving their Area General Secretary (against his wishes) in order
for the NUM South Wales conference vote to be cast. To his credit Arthur
Scargill, NUMNational President, ruled that every NUMDelegate had been sent
to the Conference in accordance with the rules and constitution of the union.
However, the serious fractures in the NUM, which had split the union from the
start of the strike, came to the fore in the debate on the 'Situation in the
Industry'. Jack Collins of the Kent Area NUM accused those who lined up with
the scabs, i.e. Thatcher, the Policeand the NCB,of being 'all that is disgraceful
and disgusting in SOCiety'.22 Mick Walker, Nottingham Area NUMDelegate and
striking miner, when commenting on the Nottinghamshire working miners'
stance, suggested they had forgotten their class but made an important
reference to the issue of getting the messageover regarding pit closures:
People have forgotten their class. People take the biscuit.
People believe the press (...) I tell you this, if we don't get
the message over after this confrontation then we have
failed, and we have failed miserably. I never thought in
my lifetime we would have a situation in Nottinghamshire
again where they scab on the rest of the British coalfield. I
never contemplated that we could have one man cross a
picket line, never mind 20,000 of them. 23
Mick Walker concluded his speech by declaring 'eternal shame on the
Nottinghamshire scabs'.24 This quote was resurrected during the autumn of
21 NUM, 1984 Extraordinary Annual Conference Report (Sheffield, July 1984), p. 403.
22 Ibid., p. 451.
23 Ibid., p. 453.
24 Ibid., p. 452
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1985 in the campaign in the run up to the ballot which formed the UDM (Fig.
14). Incidentally at the time he was NUM Branch Delegate at Rufford Colliery
and had recently been voted out of office in the June 1984 NUM Branch
Elections.25 The 1984 Branch elections virtually wiped out any remaining pro-
strike representation in the Nottingham Area of the NUM. (see Chapter 2: pp.
105 -108) Interestingly in the Nottingham Area NUMBallot of March 1984 the
Rufford Branch, which Mick Walker represented on the Nottingham Area NUM
AC, voted to work by 760 votes (64%) to 409 (34%). Back at the 1984 NUM
EOC when Ken Toon, South Derbyshire Area NUM, tried to give his
interpretation of scabbing, it provoked a mass walk out by pro-strike delegates.
Ken Toon was one of the senior members of the NUM NEC, having attended
NUMAnnual Conferencesfor over twenty years, through the severe decline of
the 1960s, including closures in his own South Derbyshire Area. He remarked:
I want to give a definition of what I think of scabbing and
that is if this union had held an individual ballot vote
under Rule 43 and the required percentage of that vote
had been achieved (oo.) [if] following such a decision
individual Areas or members refused to stop work, then
they would be entitled to be called scabs.
Twenty-five years on from the strike the role of the Nottinghamshire miners in
strike-breaking is still a hotly contested issue. Both sides of the divide still air
strong views on the subject. Arthur Scargill stated he would never forgive the
strike breakers who he insisted helped crucify the industry:
25 NUMDelegates were still were selected as Delegates for the NUMNational-Conferenceunder
Nottinghamshire Area (NUM) Rules prior to the elections for branch representatives for the
subsequent union year. Branch elections were held in May and June each year and officers and
committee members took office from 1 July each year. Because of the logistics involved
Delegates from the previous year attended the NUMConference in early July each year. Hence
in July 1984 a mainly pro-strike Nottingham Area NUMdelegation attended the NUMConference
even though they had been recently voted out of office in the NUM Branch Elections for 1984-
85.
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Fig. 12: Pro-UDM Propaganda in the Nottinghamshire Coalfield, September
1985.
TOIII ","m6BMI DEI MEDEIS
(Confirmed by High Court Judgment on 7 August, 1985)
A statement made by "ICK WALlER, a NOm. STRIKE LEADER
speaking at the NUH Conferente on 11/12 July, 1984-
"I SlYTI mSE KIll, SIWIE011111.
I l'tI."
A questionn_ to be asked of THESE PEOPLE NOW PLEADING
fOR US to return to the National Union. They claim there was
a STRIKE LEADER at wery pit If so, ask tile STRIIEWD£R-
.ESBESTR1NEUm I r
ASK-THE ONES WHO SPAT 01 YOU
THE ONES WHO AnACKED YOUR HOUSES
THE ONES WHO AnACIED YOUR CARS
THE ONES WHO lOADED YOUR OffiCES
IDIEDEI
NIWIlEY 511 • II JIlIN IT
I
IIEY DI NI' NEED'II
IIEY NEEDYin 5".. nlI5
NI' 10111BlllOT BOI!
ISSUED01 B£IIAlf OF THE IlTTllIIIAII AIEl EXECUTIVECIMMlmE
Source: D. Amos collection.
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Those miners who went through picket lines committed
the unforgivable sin and broke the n" commandment;
history will never forgive them and never forget them.
Their role in this is one of treachery. 26
Bob COllier, a striking Nottinghamshire miner at Newstead, suggested that the
Nottinghamshire working miners had been mistaken in their decision to cross
picket lines:
Every one of them that crossed the picket line knows
what they are (...) in my mind they were very foolish and
that it is a polite way of putting it. 27
Neil Greatrex, a working Nottingham NUMBranch Official in 1984, later to be a
senior UDM Official, in line with Jimmy Reid, Roy Ottey and Joe Keenan,
questioned the constitutionality of the strike and the scab title given to the
Nottinghamshire working miners:
My interpretation of a scab is someone crossing a picket
line but there wasn't anything official about those picket
lines set up in Nottinghamshire. 28
The relationship between the NUMand the UDMwas never one that was on an
easy footing, at activist level anyway. Part of Lerner's work on breakaway
unions looked at some of the internal union problems which led to breakaway
unions being formed. It also looked at the relationship between the parent
union and the breakaway. 29 Activists in the post-strike NUM never accepted
the existence of the UDM, especially following the introduction of British Coal's
majority / minority concept for branch recognition and negotiating rights in
26 'Scargill Insists: I will never forgive', Hucknall Dispatch, 24 April 2009, p. 3.
27 Bob Collier, 'Why I went on strike', Ashfield Chad, 4 March 2009, p. 4.
28 BBC News, 'What is a scab?' http//news bbc.co.uk, 4 March 2004.
29 Lerner, Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union.
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1987. Non-recognition and non-participation with the UDMbecameofficial NUM
policy following a Special Delegates Conference (SDC) in February 1988. This
rejection was, as Taylor stated, a novel development in NUM politics because
the veto on the UDMentailed the rejection of the fundamental principle of both
the MFGBand the NUM: one-industry, one-union. 30 Despite splits and breaks
in the mining unions and the hostility shown towards strike-breakers and 'scab
unions', mining unions in the past strove for inclusivenessto preserve solidarity
and limit the ability of management to divide and rule. 31 The NUM rejection
was odd in the fact that while rejecting the UDM and everything it stood for
they gladly would accept miners who broke the strike in 1984-85 to
membership of the NUM.
At the 1988 SDCArthur Scargill identified the UDM with 'Spencerism', taking
the view that the MFGBhad made a fatal mistake when it brought the NMIU
back into the MFGB in 1937 as this had infected the body politic of this
organisation for 50 years. 32 However, what he did not mention was that the
Leicestershire miners had stayed under the banner of the MFGB during the
1920s and 1930s. The character of the Leicestershire union was, as Waller
stated, very similar to that of the Spencer Union in Nottinghamshire in that
there was:
Very similar politics, a return to work in late 1926,
followed by negotiation and co-operation with the
employers, that were adopted by the Leicestershire
Miners Association (LMA) which remained within the
MFGBthroughout the 1920sand 1930s. 33
There was no mention of the LeicestershireMiners infecting the body politic of
the national organisation! Additionally, Scargill's 'infectious statement' was
noticeable in that no mention was made of the splits and breakaways in the
30 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 291.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 296
33 R. J. Waller, 'Sweethearts & Scabs: Irregular Trade-Unions in Britain in the Twentieth
Century', in P. J. Waller, Politics and Change in Modern Bril:iJin (Brighton, 1987), p. 221.
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Scottish coalfield during the 1920s, especially that of the Communist inspired
breakaway, The United Mineworkers of Scotland (UMS), formed in 1929 and
accepted back into the MFGBin 1935. According to Griffin the UMScaused as
much trouble to AJ Cook and the MFGBas the Spencer Union split had. 34 The
UMS had a significant influence in the NUM following its formation in 1944.
John McArthur and Abe Moffatt, both prominent leaders of the breakaway UMS,
became leading figures in the NUM. Abe Moffatt was President of the Scottish
Area of the NUMfrom its inception until 1961 whilst John McArthur became the
NUM District Secretary for Fife, retiring from office in 1964. There was also
Willie Allan, the first UMSSecretary, who left the Scottish coalfield and settled
in Northumberland, and eventually became an Area Official of the
Northumberland Area of the NUM.
Following the strike there has been a view expressed among the 1984-85 pro-
strike activists that the strike-breakers were the main cause for the demise of
the coal-industry in Britain. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the start of the
strike Arthur Scargill suggested that had the Nottinghamshire Miners joined the
1984-85 strike there would have been a flourishing coal industry in the county
in the Twenty-First century:
It is a sobering thought that if all Nottinghamshire miners
had joined their brave colleagues who did come out on
strike in 1984, Nottinghamshire would have a thriving coal
industry today and Britain would not be dependent on
imported coal. 35
Bob Collier's 2009 poem also makes an inference that a thriving coal industry
could have existed in the event of the 1984-85 strike being won:
Shameon the working miners for not joining the fray,
34 A. R. Griffin, 'Avoiding a split', The Nottinghamshire Miner No.1, February 1985, p. 4.
35 Arthur 5cargill, '5cargill writes for the Chad', The Ashfield Chad, 18 March 2009, p. 4.
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Because if we had stood together it could have been a
different story today. 36
Although we are entering the world of counterfactual speculation, it could be
reasoned that these views ignored the economic, technological and political
rationale of the situation. The coal industry had been in decline for some time,
other sources of energy having significantly cut into its markets from the late
1950s onwards. Also, coal was an extractive industry and the closure of some
collieries and mergers of others had been an on-going process since mines
were first sunk. Technology, in the guise of coalface mechanisation, was a chief
factor, along with cheap oil, that caused the industry to halve in the 1960swith
the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. Into the 1980s many mining jobs
continued to be lost through computerised technological advances such as
MINOS (Mine Operating System) and FIDO (Face Information Digested Online)
and other rationalisations such as the elimination of coal preparation plants by
merging collieries underground. The NUM listed technology as being one of
the four main threats to the industry in its 1983 Education Pack (Fig. 15).
Politically there was no certainty that a Labour Government would have
secured a large coal industry. More collieries closed under the Labour
Government of 1964-70 than in the aftermath of the 1984-85 strike. 280
collieries closed with the loss of 185,000 jobs during the 1964-70 Labour
administration compared to around 150 in the post-strike period 1985-1994
under the Conservatives. 37 This amounted to an average of one colliery a week
closing between October 1964 and June 1970, with a subsequent average loss
of over 600 mining jobs per week, for the whole duration of the 1964-70
Labour Government's period of office.
36 Bob Collier, The 25th Anniversary of the Great Miners' Strike 1984-2009', The Nottingham
NUM Ex Miner, Issue 16, March 2010, p. 11.
37 Bradley, Snippets from the Past.
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Fig. 13. NUM Flyer: Four Serious threats to your Jobs - NUM Education Pack
1983.
NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS
(NOTIINGHAMSHIRE AREA)
FOUR SERIOUS THREATS
TO YOUR JOBS
1. GOVERNMENT POLICY
The Government intend to shed uneconomic capacity and create a
few super pits, which they could sell to Private Enterprise.
WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUR JOB AND YOUR PIT?
2. SUBSIDENCE
Subsidence damage has now become so critical that it now can
make an economic pit lose money.
All the losses in South Nottinghamshire last vear were equivalent
to subsidence damage paid. North Nottinghamshire announce that
next year they expect to pay between £40 million and £80 million
in subsidence damage.
. HOW LONG 'BEFORE NORTH NOTTS. BECOMES UNECONOMIC?
3. NEW TECHNOLOGY
r=: The National Coal Board have introduced the Micro Chip and have
announced that they wish to reduce the number of craftsmen
by 40,000 and de-skill the remainder.
New Technology should benefit the workers by shorter hours and
longer holidays and not by redundancy.
ARE YOU THE ONE THAT THE MICRO-CHIP REPLACES?
4. NUCLEAR POWER
The Sizewell B Inquiry has divulged that bV the year 2000 40% of
electricity will be generated by Nuclear Power and by the year
2020 90%. (This means the remaining 10% is half the production
of the Selby Project).
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE COAL INDUSTRY?
IS YOUR JOB SAFE?
Source: D. Amos collection.
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Despite this mass rationalisation Labour did not suffer a loss of support in its
traditional Labour heartlands, even in those coalfields most severely hit by
closures. But as Taylor argued, what it did do was to have most profound
changes in the NUM,and subsequently for British politics overall:
Labour paid no electoral price even in those coalfields
which had suffered most from pit closures but the NUM
was undergoing rapid political change. This change was
reflected in the new legitimacy of industrial action in the
unofficial strikes of autumn 1969 which were a reaction to
the events explored above [the rationalisation of the coal
industry in the 1960's]. This change was to have
profound consequencesfor British politics. 38
The consequenceswould be the 1972 and 1974 strikes, the subsequent move
to the left in some quarters of the NUM and a lurch to the right in the
Conservative Party, which eventually led to the election of the right-wing
Thatcher Government in 1979. Griffin, writing in 1976, asked whether the
resurgence in the coal industry's fortunes since 1970 was permanent or merely
a temporary amelioration of long term decline. 39 It was to be a temporary stay
of execution.
The rationalisation of the coal industry in the 1960s would have ramifications
for the 1984-85 strike in two main ways. First, in the way that the 1984-85
strike evolved, essentially it was a militant backlash against the passivity in the
NUMwhich saw the industry halved in the 1960s. Secondly, in the way that the
miners who experienced this contraction reacted to the enhanced redundancy
payments introduced from 1981 onwards (See Chapter 4: Part 3). Many of the
miners who experienced the rationalisation of the 1960s ended up working in
the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Numerous miners had worked in parts of the
38 Alan Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.11944-1968 (Aldershot, 2003), p. 250.
39 Alan R. Griffin, The British Coalmining Industry: Retrospect and Prosped(Hartington, 1977),
crss.
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Scottish, North-East and Derbyshire coalfields which suffered the severest part
of the 1960s rationalisation programme. When statements were made about
the Tories' intentions to 'axe the coal-industry' they calculated that there would
probably be no respite even under a Labour Government. History had shown
that. By the start of the 1984 dispute the majority of these men were in their
50s and in a position to consider the enhanced redundancy terms that were
available. When the Labour Government of Tony Blair was elected in 1997,
although coal was a much smaller industry, again the Labour Government
showed no special favours to the deep mining coal industry in Britain and the
industry continued to shrink.
With the deep coalmining industry in Britain now (2012) in the final stage of its
long history, it is predictable that the NUMstrike loyalists will say 'We told you
so'. It is often been quoted that one of the ultimate aims of the Thatcher
Government was to destroy the unions, starting with the NUM. 40 However, this
viewpoint fails to take account of some of unforeseen and unexpected factors
which hit the coal industry during the 1980s and 1990s. Parker made reference
to some of these catastrophic factors:
The outcome (for the coal industry) was the result of
chance, unexpected consequences and economic trends
that could not have been foreseen when Margaret
Thatcher came to power in 1979. Thus, the Conservative
Governments were attended by good fortune, being
greatly assisted by the folly of the NUM leadership (which
was a decisive factor in enabling the Government to
defeat the Great Strike), the professionalism of British
Coal (BC) in managing decline, the unforeseen way in
which electricity privatisation was followed by the 'dash
for gas' and the unpredicted severity of the progressive
40 See Callinicos and Simons, The Great Strike, p. 42; Milne, The Enemy Within: The Secret War
against the Miners, pp. 6-14; plus Huw Beynon and P. McMyler, 'Decisive Power: The New Tory
State against the Miners' in Beynon (ed.) Digging Deeper, pp. 29-45.
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economic and other external pressures on the UK coal
industry. 41
Many of the factors cited by Parker were not manifest at the time. For example
the main alternative energy fear was from the nuclear sector and not a "dash
for gas" (see Fig. 15). Therefore, the argument about the 'scabs' being
responsible for the demise of the coal industry is very much a case of the left
verifying their own 'self-fulfilling prophecies'.
3. Digging Deeper: the strike breaking issue in the
Nottinghamshire coalfield in 1984-85.
Bardill identified the lack of a national ballot as the overriding reason why the
majority of the Nottinghamshire miners carried on working. 42 Other key issues
she identified as being influential on the decision to work were the
confrontational picketing tactics and the role of the police. Cliff's assessmentof
Hem Heath and Florencecollieries during the 1984-85 strike led him to believe
that the materialist issues thrown up as excuses for the Nottinghamshire
miners working i.e. better working conditions, higher bonuses, security of
employment, did not stand up when they were scrutinised. 43 Hem Heath had
better conditions, higher bonuses and more job security than Florence, yet
greater militancy was shown by the Hem Heath strikers than at Florence.
Because of this situation, Cliff believes that the real reasons for the
Nottinghamshire miners' failure to respond to the strike call may be due to
deeper reasonsthan have been suspected. 44
Despite significant migratory patterns into the Nottinghamshire coalfield,
especially since the end of World War Two, and an increasedmilitancy shown in
the two national strikes of 1972 and 1974, traditions of moderation remained
41 Parker, Thatcherism and the Fall of Coal, p. 222.
42 Bardill, 'Changing Perceptions of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike in the Nottinghamshire Coalfield',
p.49.
43 Dave Cliff, 'A Tale of Two-Pits', in Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, TheEnemy Within, pp. 86
- 92, here p. 87.
44 Ibid.
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strong in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Some migrant miners retained regional
characteristics, and formed distinct communities in parts of the Nottinghamshire
coalfield e.g. former Durham miners at Calverton and Cotgrave. However, many
of the migrant miners were to be influenced over time by the moderate
traditions, attitudes and practices of the Nottinghamshire coalfield. During the
1984-85 strike the issue that it was not just Nottinghamshire miners, but 'ex
pats' that were working, becamea bitter pill to swallow for some strikers:
At Durham we got a great response. They thought that
no-one was out. Anyway they couldn't accept the fact
that it is their own people who live down there who were
still working (...) they tried to say to themselves its Notts
miners who won't come out, but of course it was
Geordies, Scots as well as Notts miners that were keeping
the pits open. 45
The issue of migrant miners taking up the attitudes and practices of their
adopted coalfield is worth investigating. This situation could fit in with Cliff's
theory on why there were different responses to the strike call by different
collieries in the 1984-85 strike. Cliff suggested that basic historical differences
went a long way in explaining the divergent courses taken by Hem Heath and
Florence Collieries. Although he stated there were no simple answers to explain
why some collieries went on strike and other did not, in the end it was the
working environment which determined whether a workforce would be either
militant or moderate:
Individuals starting work in a militant, pro-union
environment are quite likely to become strong
supporters (...) of collectiveness,while the opposite is
'IS In 'Notts Women strike back', Claire Higney Arts Connection, an independent pamphlet, April
1985, cited in Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners Strike,
p.6.
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true of a moderate, management orientated
environment. 46
Cliff's simplistic explanation needs some examining. In explaining Florence's
moderation and Hem Heath's militancy he ventured into the different historical
backgrounds at each colliery. He suggested Florence's moderation stemmed
from the pre nationalisation days of the Cheadle pits. There, working
conditions were bad, management was oppressive and there was no tradition
of militancy amongst the men. Things improved considerably when the men
transferred to Florenceand according to Cliff the much improved conditions did
not foster a need for unity. Since that time an easy qoinq, non-militant attitude
had existed at Florence which permeated the majority of new entrants and
maintained the moderate traditions. This could go some way to explaining
migrant miners developing moderate attitudes which influenced them when
they transferred to pits in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Working conditions at
some Nottinghamshire collieries were an improvement from where they had
come but this was not the case universally throughout the Nottinghamshire
coalfield (see Chapter 4 - Part 1).
One of the more popular explanations for the adverse reaction of the
Nottinghamshire miners to the 1984-85 strike was the influence of
'Spencerism'. Some commentators, mainly on the left, have drawn parallels
with the splits in the union in the Nottinghamshire coalfield of 1926 with that of
1985 and made the easy conclusionthat 'Spencerism'was the cause:
After the strike, sections of the Notts miners formed a
breakaway organisation, as happened in 1926. Having
withdrawn from the struggle for pits and jobs, they now
established with the encouragement of the Coal Board
and Tory Government a body known as the Union of
46 Cliff, 'A Tale of Two Pits' in Samuel, Bloomfield and Boanus, The Enemy Within, pp. 86 -92,
here p. 92.
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Democratic Mineworkers (UDM). The same bitterness and
anger directed at the 'Spencer Union' after 1926 has been
shown by miners towards the UDM. 47
Liversuch provided another simplistic view comparing the UDM with the
Spencer Union:
The breakaway of the UDMwas an exact replica of what
happened in the 1926 strike ( ...) This union was anti-
strike and pro-mine owners, and why it calls itself
moderate, it was always referred to as a 'scab union' by
the majority of miners. The name of George Spencer was
one that was reviled in NUMcircles. 48
Despite other coalfields working in the 1984-85 strike, it was the
Nottinghamshire coalfield that drew most the attention. For most of the left,
the reason for them acting as they did was simple; it was their birthright. But
as Taylor stated 'the easiest and least satisfactory explanation for the UDM's
formation is that Nottinghamshire miners had always been scabs'. 49 He points
to the symbolic absence of a national ballot in 1984 as being an overriding
factor. Likewise Stephenson (1986) suggests that there has been an over-
emphasis on the importance of 'Spencerism' which could be drastically
misleading. 50 He cited several factors that existed in 1984-85 but not in 1926:
these included the coal-industry being nationalised, miners enjoying a higher
standard of living than in 1926, the work process had altered significantly, and
the role of coal in the energy economies of Britain had also changed drastically.
51 Morgan and Coates also point to changes in the work process which had
dramatically altered between 1926 and 1984. They cited the influence, and
47 NUM, A Century of Struggle, p. 123.
48 Paul Liversuch cited in David Bell,Memories of the Derbyshire Coalfield (Newbury, 2006), p.
104.
49 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 282.
50 Stephenson, 'Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting', p. 8.
51 Ibid.
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subsequent collapse, of the butty system as being an important factor in the
demise of Spencerism. They maintained that the 'Spencer Union' was a
creation of the Butties, when the 'Spencer Union' re-unified back into the MFGB
in 1937 it was accompanied by the collapse of the butty system itself. 52
Morgan and Coates also pointed to the role played by the Nottinghamshire
miners in the introduction of the National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) in
1966 as being an influential factor that made Spencerism an unlikely
influencing factor on the Nottinghamshire miners' actions in 1984. 53 The
arguments for centralised wage bargaining were greatly developed in the
aftermath of the First World War, and even after nationalisation local
bargaining continued in the coal industry and led to frequent local disputes. At
this time local strikes in coalmining, usually over piece-work payments and
small and short in duration, outnumbered strikes in all other industries. 54 The
NPLA put an end to this situation and from 1966 wage questions became
centralised. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the miners' dissatisfactions now
became more concentrated, the NPLA came at a price. Under NPLA face
workers' wages were to achieve parity by 31 December 1971. ss (Appendix 20)
This meant serious cuts in real wage terms for many miners in the Midlands
coalfields as other areas caught up. Dick Martin worked on a NPLA face in
Nottinghamshire shortly after its introduction and told the story of a slow-down
in the work process being noticeable. Expounding on the counter-productive
nature of the NPLAhe said:
There was a 'money's in the tin' attitude among miners on
that coalface. Because everyone was paid the same you
would not do six-feet (of ripping) when you got paid the
S2 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners'Strike, p. 7.
53 Ibid., p. 8.
54 Ibid., p. 7.
55 NeB/NUM, National Power Loading Agreement, November 1966, p. 6.
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same for doing four-feet. Many old colliers said that the
incentive had been kicked out of pit-work. 56
Alan Scrivens, a Tail-Gate Ripper at Newstead Colliery in the mid 1960s, stated
that the motivation dropped almost immediately because of the effects of
NPLA:
The last wage I received on piece rates (on a ripping
contract) I took home f70. On the new face we moved
onto NPLAand my first take home pay under NPLAwas
f20 10/- (f20.S0p) (...) the effects of this was that
everyone slowed the pace down after this (...) setting
one ring instead of three or four became the norm then.
57
Hughes and Moore suggested that Nottinghamshire miners saw their pay
decline in real terms by 15% between 1966 and 1972, compared to only 1.8%
in the South Wales coalfield. 58 Accounting for the downturn in production
levels at some Nottinghamshire collieries in the late 1960s, Searle-Barnes
suggested that the NPLAwas another case of a national agreement which was
detrimental to the interests of the Nottinghamshire miners but which had been
accepted in the national interest. 59 He stated that:
A number of instances were quoted in Chapter 2 of
national settlements which were prejudicial to the interests
of Nottinghamshire but which were accepted in the
coalfield in the national interest. It seems, on the evidence
of this study, that the 1966 Power Loading Agreement
must be accounted in such a settlement. It may appear
from the downturn in productivity that on these occasions
56 Channel4 Production, All our working lives- Cutting Coal, 1984.
57 Interview with Alan Scrivens, Annesley Woodhouse, 20 October 2011.
58 J. Hughes and R. Moore, A Special case? Social Justice and the Miners (Harmondsworth,
1972), p. 29.
59 Searle-Barnes, Pay and Productivity Bargaining, p. 168.
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the dictates of national policy have by no means fully
accepted in the coalfield. 60
The dissatisfaction with NPLA,along with a reaction to the mass rationalisation
of the coal industry in the mid and late 1960s, culminated in the national strike
of 1972 and the subsequent Wilberforce Enquiry. Despite their opposition to
the NPLA and alleged '5pencerite traditions', the Nottingham Area NUM
accepted the new NPLAarrangements voted in at a special Conference of the
NUM in April 1966, and subsequently played a significant part in the two
national strikes of 1972 and 1974.
Morgan and Coates identified another aspect which differentiated the
Nottinghamshire miners in 1984-85 from the spectre of Spencerism. They
compared the strike organisation of a Nottinghamshire mining community in
1972 and 1984-85. 61 Calverton was the most easterly and newest colliery in
the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area, starting production in 1952. In 1972 the
Calverton NUM Branch initiated a bulk grocery co-operative and had an active
women's support group, which not only distributed the food hampers but were
politically involved. In 1984 the Calverton NUMBranch would play an entirely
different role, despite the NUMBranch Delegate being a pro-strike devotee and
member of the Nottingham Area NUMAEC.
On the formation of the UDMPeter Heathfield, NUMNational General Secretary
during the strike, suggested '5pencerism' had returned to the coalfields.
Adeney and Lloyd maintained it was not 'Spencerism'. They cited substantial
evidence to support their claim. Despite encouragement from the NCB, the
UDM had erupted from below in OPPOSitionto the bulk of the NUM leadership,
it did not rely on the management enforcing membership by refusing jobs to
those who were not in the union and it was not part of a larger movement
hostile to the Labour Party and the TUC. 62 Supporting this view Waller
argued: could the UDM properly be placed in a tradition of anti-socialist trade
60 Ibid., p. 169.
61 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners'Strike, p. 9.
62 Adeney and Lloyd, Loss without Limit, p. 277.
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unionism?63 Research conducted by Richards found that many
Nottinghamshire miners continued to situate themselves and their new union
within the traditions of the Labour movement. 64 He also suggested that
support for the Labour Party among non-striking Nottinghamshire miners
remained relatively strong despite misgivings about the Party's role during the
1984-85 strike and its subsequent attitude towards the UDM. 65 Morgan and
Coates stated that 'catch-all explanations like Spencerism had little or nothing
to do with the hostile reaction of the Nottinghamshire miners to the 1984-85
strike'. 66 Stephenson stated that the arguments he presented surrounding
'Spencerism' were important to dismiss the belief, and myth, that the UDM is a
return to the 1920s. 67 He suggests that the direct seeds of the conflict could
be found rather closer to the event itself. 68 If Stephenson is correct it is to
those closer events that we therefore should look to discover if the
Nottinghamshire miners in 1984-85 have been made the main culprits for the
failures of the 1984-85 strike. However, the debate remains how much has
1926 and 'Spencerism' to do with the 1984-85 miners' strike in
Nottinghamshire? It is beyond the scope of this thesis to look in-depth into the
links between 1926 and 1984-85 in the Nottinghamshire coalfield.
Nevertheless, there is scope for a future study to look into the 'Spencerism'
links in more detail. In the meantime the evidence presented in this thesis
suggests that the 1984-85 miners' strike evolved into an internal union dispute
over procedural issues. In 1984 the majority of Nottingham NUM members
reacted not just to what they saw as being an oligarchy, but an ochlocracy.The
words from the Oakdale NUMLodge in South Wales sum up the whole episode:
What people don't realise is that Notts did not do
anything wrong, under rule. They went to their men, but
they did not want to strike ( ...) which they were quite
63 R. J. Waller, 'Sweethearts & Scabs: Irregular Trade-Unions in Britain in the Twentieth
Century', in P. J. Waller, Politics and Change in Modern Britain (Brighton, 1987), p. 226.
64 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 199.
65 Ibid., p. 200.
66 Morgan and Coates, The Nottinghamshire Coalfield and the British Miners'Strike, p. 9.
67 Stephenson, 'Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting', p. 9.
68 Ibid.
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entitled to do (...) I think the biggest thing against the
Notts miners coming out was the way they went about
picketing (...) I have always found if you ask someone to
do something it's a lot better than trying to tell them (...)
I think the whole thing was handled wrongly and we
ought to be big enough to admit that. 69
69 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 192.
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Conclusion
During the autumn of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike a letter appeared in the local
press in Eastwood, Nottinghamshire, from a retired local miners' union man. 1
Making reference to his union mentoring from iconic Derbyshire miners'
leaders of the past, namely Bert Wynn, Harry Hicklin and Bert Parkin, he
suggested there were three basic principles for successful industrial action:
• Make sure the cause is right.
• Pick the right time.
• Makesure the majority of the membership is with you.
On face value it would appear that the 1984-85 miners' strike met two out of
three of the criteria. A strike against pit closures and saving jobs was surely
an honourable cause. It also appeared that the majority of the miners backed
the call and voluntarily came out on strike without redress to a national ballot.
The time could not be helped, it was the NCBand the Thatcher Government
who had provoked the strike, thus the miners starting a strike at the 'wrong
time of the year' could not be helped. Nevertheless, as Parker indicated, some
of the evidence suggested that the NUMwere also spoiling for a fight. 2 On
closer inspection though, the situation was not what it seemed. The issue of
pit closureswas a divisive issueas mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 4.
The results from NUM national ballots on the issue of pit closures in 1976,
October 1982 and March 1983, the problems trying to get industrial action
over colliery closures in the South Wales and Scottish coalfields in the early
1980s and the results from the various Area ballots held in March 1984
suggest the NUMhad still not got a consensuson the issue of colliery closures
by the start of the 1984-85 strike. As Taylor indicated no national coalition
had ever been built around pit closures; historically the effect was to fragment
1 Alf Martin, 'For successful strike action', Eastwood and Kimberley Advertiser- Letters Page,
19 October 1984, p. 4.
2 Parker, Thatcherism and the Fall of Coal, p. 36.
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the NUM, not unite it. 3 Therefore, the very subject on which the 1984-85
strike was founded was a historically contentious issue.
The issue of the 'majority being with you' became entangled in an inter-union
civil war over the constitutionality of the strike. This related to the strike
strategy. The 1984-85 strike was never truly a national strike: industrial action
was authorised under NUM Rule 41 on an Area by Area basis. The idea was
that a domino effect would take place and a rolling strike would evolve.
However, the strategy relied on cohesion. Two factors were essential for its
success: the sanctity of the picket line and the effective deployment of flying
pickets to bring indifferent NUM areas into line. As Stephenson mentioned,
this laid the foundation for the split in the NUMand the subsequent formation
of the UDM in 1985. 4 The lack of a national ballot and the subsequent
confrontational picketing was seen as a serious breach of the NUM ethos.
From the time the Nottinghamshire NUM members turned down industrial
action, and in the absence of a national ballot, the Area's no-strike ballot
result became highly contestable. As Ratcliffe reported, this ensured that the
dispute in Nottinghamshire soon became one about intra-union rivalry and not
one about saving jobs and pits. 5 Taylor argued that the seeds of the split in
the NUMwere sown once the Rule41 strategy was approved. 6 He suggested
that if the strategy had been adhered to a year earlier, during the Lewis
Merthyr dispute, the split in the NUMwould have been a year earlier. 7
One of the arguments put forward by the pro-strike supporters was that the
majority of miners had marched with their feet and there was no need for a
national ballot. The pro-strike advocates suggested that a national ballot was
unjust because it was unfair for miners in 'safe areas' to vote on miners' jobs
in area that were not safe. The evidence presented here proves this 'safe
pits' theory to be a myth. The NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area was affected
by rationalisation like all other areas, but the majority of miners there
3 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 186.
4 Stephenson, 'Democratic Breakaway or Union Busting', p. 24.
5 Roger Ratcliffe, 'A Village at War', Sunday Times, 18 March 1984, p. 17.
6 Ibid., p. 187.
7 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol. 2, p. 178.
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opposed the conduct of the strike. What was not widely broadcast was that
when the strike broke the run down to closure of two collieries was taking
place there (See Chapter 1: Part 4 pp. 38 - 43). Yet at these two collieries
the majority of NUMmembers opposed the way the strike evolved and were
scathing about the lack of a national ballot and the subsequent
confrontational picketing that took place. This scenario was repeated in the
Cumberland and Lancashire coalfields. Also, there was a great irony in that
one of the collieries due for closure, Pye Hill, started the legal action which
eventually declared the strike unofficial in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in
May 1984. A seemingly ludicrous situation occurred when a colliery due to
close put its name to a legal challenge to prove a strike against colliery
closures illegal!
Richards and Bardill point to the alienating effects of the picketing tactics
adopted by the Yorkshire flying pickets as being a main factor for the failure
of the strike in Nottinghamshire. As Richards indicated, it was not so much
about Nottinghamshire miners being against a strike but about them being
dictated to on the matter. 8 The Rule 41 'domino strategy' was an attempt to
get a consensuson the pit closure issue. The 1960s had seen passivity in the
NUMand the coal industry halved. In some respects the 1984-85 strike was a
left-wing reaction to this passivity. It tried a different approach to
constitutional strike action with fatal results. By its confrontational nature the
nature of the strike brought out all the cracks in the federal structure of the
NUM. EachNUMArea was an independent union in its own right, with its own
rule book, and an amount of local autonomy within a federation of the
national union. The ethos and culture of the 1944 NUM Rule Book
encompassed these differing area traditions and values. That is the reason
why Rule 43 on national ballots existed. As Taylor stated the issue was not a
one size fits all but about managing diversity. 9
8 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 181.
9 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 3.
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When the Yorkshire flying pickets entered the Nottinghamshire coalfield in the
first days of the strike the evidence suggested that they came with
preconceived ideas about the Nottinghamshire miners. As Taylor suggested,
these ideas included 'materialistic' and 'culturist' explanations of why
Nottinghamshire miners would be predisposed against striking. 10 Nottingham,
it was alleged, had easy coal and thus large incentive bonuses, more modern
pits and thus immunity from pit closures and a history of a lack of solidarity
dating back to 1926. These enduring myths about the Nottinghamshire
miners were repeated by Bolsover MP,Dennis Skinner, in 2011:
Those leading the fight at national level always knew
Notts would renege upon what the rest of us were
dolnq, as they had in the old days of the General Strike
of 1926 (...) The Notts coalfield, generally speaking,
made a lot of money as it was newer than the others,
at most pits you did not have to go out so far to reach
the coal ( ...) The colliers there used to get wages that
were a little above the odds. All this meant they
thought they were the bees-knees, indispensable. 11
It is clear from the evidence presented in this thesis that this was not
necessarily the case. Not all Nottinghamshire pits fitted the modern category,
as Chapter 4 - Part 1 shows. Collieries in the NCBSouth Yorkshire Area and
the NCBSouth Nottinghamshire Area were of similar age, as were collieries in
the NCB Doncaster Area and the NCB North Nottinghamshire Area (see
Appendix 12). The evidence shows there were inferior geological conditions
in parts of the Nottinghamshire coalfield and not all collieries were working
six-feet plus seams of coal. Incentive bonus payments were dependent on
negotiating on 'norms' and 'contracts' at Branch level and as the author
mentions not all Nottinghamshire miners were earning large incentive
bonuses. Faceworkers, working in poor geological conditions, could earn
10 Ibid., p. 191.
11 Cited in Symcox (ed.), The Oiaryof John Lowe, p. 7.
318
Conclusion - The Nottinghamshire Miners, the UDM and the 1984-85 Miners' Strike - Scabs or
Scapegoats?
reasonable bonus payments as Stanley hinted was the case at Newstead. 12
Therefore the AISs were not necessarily a vehicle for division in the NUMas
the left suggested. Recent history from 1966 showed that the
Nottinghamshire miners had a history of solidarity; the introduction of the
NPLAin 1966, the loyal support given to the national strikes of 1972 and 1974
and the keeping to the overtime ban during the 1984-85 strike were instances
of this. Searle-Barnes suggested some of the abiding myths about
Nottinghamshire miners were wrong because disputes and strikes were not
entirely unknown in the history of the Nottinghamshire miners:
The early history of the union in Nottinghamshire was
characterised by disputes and strikes on the same sort
of issues as occurred in other districts, though to a
lesser extent. Moreover, the Nottingham Area of the
Union never failed to join other areas in concerted
strikes on national issues, though the rank and file of
Nottinghamshire miners had not the same tenacity of
purpose. 13
As Bernard Savage stated in 1966 at the NUM Special Conference which
introduced the NPLA,the Nottinghamshire Coalfield and its miners had 'some
very peculiar history'. 14
Despite the preconceived ideas of those supporting the strike the evidence
presented suggests that the lack of a national ballot, the nature of picketing
from Yorkshire and a circumvention of the NUM rulebook were the main
issues that were instrumental in the decision of the Nottinghamshire miners to
12 Stanley, Nottinghamshire Miners do strike, p. 45.
13 Searle-Barnes, Pay and Productivity Bargaining, p. 19.
14 Colin P. Griffin, 'Notts have some very peculiar history': Understanding the reaction of the
Nottinghamshire Miners to the 1984-85 Strike', Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, No.
19, Spring 2005, pp. 63 - 99. Here p. 63.
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work through the strike. As Taylor stated, the 1984-85 strike was a challenge
to a deeply rooted industrial and political tradition:
From Nottinghamshire's perspective the events of
March 1984 were a fundamental challenge to a deeply
entrenched industrial and political tradition. The
Nottinghamshire miners responded with a defence of
the ethos and culture expressed by the 1944
rulebook. 15
In 1984 this tradition derived not from 1926, but from more recent unofficial
disputes of 1969, 1970 and to some extent 1981. As the evidence in Chapter
5 shows, the reaction in many parts of the Nottingham Area of the NUM to
the 1984-85 strike was the same as it had been to the unofficial disputes of
the past; they were seen as being unconstitutional and unauthorised.
Although the left see 1969 and 1970 as being victories for militant action and
a springboard for the rise of the left in the NUM,other coalfields retained their
conventional traits. As Allen stated, these coalfields with conservative
traditions were often hesitant to strike under such circumstances because
there was a problem of it being conducted through accepted and understood
procedures:
Unofficial strikes suffer from the inherent defect that
they lack constitutional union legitimacy. This is
significant because a union derives strength from the
uniform acceptance of a common set of governing
procedures. Action which is not processed through
these procedures can be a threat to the union itself. 16
15 Taylor, The NUM and British Politics Vol.2, p. 191.
16 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p. 313.
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It was a lack of uniformly accepted governing procedureswhich was the root
cause of the split in the NUM in 1984. The roving picketing style employed by
the Yorkshire NUMflying pickets may have been custom and practice to them
but the practice was alien to the Nottinghamshire coalfield and the
Nottinghamshire miners felt threatened by this style of picketing. The threat
to the union was hatched in March 1984 and played out through a series of
episodes throughout the rest of 1985. It ended with a split in the union and
the subsequent formation of the UDM.
It is clear from the evidence presented and reviewed that the division in the
NUM in the 1984-85 strike was not simply a matter of strikers trying to protect
jobs and non-strikers taking a selfish position because their jobs were safe.
Analysis of the evidence points clearly to several underlying reasons which
resulted in disagreement and division in the NUM and the subsequent
formation of the UDM. The lack of a national ballot made the strike
unconstitutional for many NUM members in Nottinghamshire, in what had
been a very constitution-compliant trade union. The use of democratic pit-
head ballots on major issues that affected them was a feature of this.
Additionally, the lack of a national ballot had the effect, in Richards'words, of
legitimising the breaching of that most potent symbol of collective solidarity:
the picket line. 17
Essentially the issue was how to deal with the continuing decline of the coal
industry? The effects of the enhanced redundancy terms following the 1981
unofficial strike seriously undermined the NUM's attempts to save jobs.
Nevertheless, for some the situation was fast moving to one where there
would be no jobs to go to for the younger miners, especially in the peripheral
coalfields. Passivity in the NUM in the 1960s ended up with almost 300 pit
closures and a shrinking industry but the NUM remained intact. Because of
the nature of the 1984-85 strike it not only laid the foundations for the
terminal decline of the coal-industry but split the NUMin the process. Market
confidence was lost, morale was rock-bottom amongst the workforce and the
17 Richards, Miners on Strike, p. 180.
321
Conclusion - The Nottinghamshire Miners, the UDM and the 1984-85 Miners' Strike - Scabs or
Scapegoats?
union was split. As Williamson stated, the NCBcould have closed any pit in
Britain in the post-strike period, such was the malaise in the industry.
The pro-strike critique of the Nottinghamshire miners and the UDMsuggested
it was their role in undermining the strike that was the root cause of the strike
being lost and the subsequent terminal demise of the coal industry.
Nevertheless, the evidence submitted suggests that the Nottinghamshire
miners acted within their established traditions. Richards' findings clarified
this position. 18 First, they continued to support free and independent trade
unionism. Secondly, they continued to situate themselves within the
traditions of the labour movement. Thirdly, the style of industrial relations
espoused by the UDM was very much in keeping with traditions of the
Nottinghamshire coalfield. Fourthly, support for the Labour Party remained
strong despite serious misgivings about its role in the 1984-85 strike. In the
post-strike aftermath Mick McGahey refused to criticise the Nottinghamshire
miners, inferring that they were acting within their traditions, whilst putting an
emphasis on re-unification:
I don't treat 20,000 Nottingham miners (...) and their
communities as outcasts, untouchables, they're miners.
They have got basic problems, the same as other
miners (...) and that is the avenue upon which we must
build the basis of unity (...) they have not breached
from the labour movement, they have breached from
the national leadership of the miners. 19
What had altered in 1984 was the NUM at national level. Just prior to the
strike all three senior positions in the union were filled by the left, and the
moderate group on the NEC had more or less collapsed following the
retirement of Joe Gormley in 1982. The national NUM had lost some
18 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
19 Ibid., p. 193.
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experience in its back up staff following the move from London to Sheffield in
1983. Added to this was the loss of experience at Area level at the
Nottingham Area of NUM. In the seven years preceding the strike three
senior officials, Albert Martin, Len Clarke and George Cheshire retired, and in
1982 JoeWhelan suddenly died. The loss of Whelan was especially significant
as it robbed the NUM of the experience it needed to deal with the
Nottinghamshire problem in 1984. The testimony shown in this thesis
suggests that certain moderate NUMNECmembers acted out of character and
it is possible that they were being coerced at national level over their
retirement terms with the NUM. Many were approaching the twilight of their
union careers and it would be easier to adhere to the status quo for a
relatively short period of time rather than risk losing any retirement benefits.
In conclusion, this thesis argues that the Nottinghamshire miners acted within
their traditions of moderate trade-unionism. Despite claims about their
'apartness' in 1984, the evidence presented demonstrates this. Their past
adherence to national decisions in the 1960s and 1970s, the observance of
the overtime ban throughout the 1984-85 strike and their disassociation from
the Nottinghamshire and National Working Miners Committees all point to
traits of strong moderate trade unionism. Becauseof this, the suggestion that
Nottinghamshire miners are scabs is inaccurate. The evidence suggests they
acted within their own understood accepted procedures and thus have been
made the main scapegoats for the failure of the 1984-85 strike. The real
failure in 1984 was that the left of the NUM failed to deal with the issue of
managing diversity in the union. The Rule 41 domino strategy relied on a one
sizes fits all policy, there was no place for diversity. As Howell stated, once
the domino strategy was employed it had to take the dominos as they were
and not as they might be in an ideal world. 20 The Nottinghamshire miners'
actions were a consequence of the structure of the national union and
divergent Area cultures. In conclusion, it would be worth looking at the views
of Colin Griffin, who suggested a combination of local 'custom and practice'
20 Howell, The Politics of the NUM, p. 110.
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and a division in the NUM ranks caused by disagreements over inter-union
procedures were the main reasons for the defeat of the strike and subsequent
split in the NUMwhich led to the formation of the UDM:
In 1972 and 1974 (...) the self-interest of the
Nottingham Area NUMcoincided with that of the union
as a whole and a united front was displayed. In 1984-
85 it was very different. The NUM was wrecked, as
the MFGBhad been in 1926, by a combination of the
pursuit of local self-interest and autonomy,
mismanagement of strike mobilisation and bitter,
uncompromising division within its ranks which proved
conclusively that miners' solidarity was not natural and
that they were as capable of destroying as
constructing it when confronted by extreme, adverse
circumstances. 21
21 C. P. Griffin, 'Notts have some very peculiar history', p. 99.
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Valour
Nottinghamshire Working Miners 1984
"All that is necessary for the
triumph of evil is that good
men do nothing".
Text of an A3 Cardboard Medallion received at Annesley Colliery NUM Office
during April 1984 during the early stages of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike. The
mail was postmarked from the Durham Area.
Edmund Burke (1729 - 1797)
Irish orator, Philosopher and Politician.
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Area Trends in NUM Ballots for strike action January 1982
- March 1984 (Area per-centages for and against strike action)
NUM Area or No. of NUM NUM NUM NUM
Group Members National National National Area
(approx.) Ballot Ballot Ballot Ballots
January October March March
1982 1982 1983 1984
Cumberland 650 52% 36% 42% 22%
Derbyshire Area 10,500 50% 40% 38% 50%
South 3,000 16% 13% 12% 16%
Derbyshire Area
Durham 13,000 46% 31% 39% -
Kent 2,000 54% 69% 68% -
Leicestersh ire 2,500 20% 13% 18% -
Area
Midlands Area 12,200 27% 23% 21% 27%
Nottingham 32,000 30% 21% 19% 26%
Area
Lancashire Area 7,500 40% 44% 39% 41%
Northumberland 5,000 37% 32% 35% '52%
Scotland 11,500 63% 69% 50% -
Yorkshire 56,000 66% 56% 54% -
North Wales 1,000 18% 24% 23% 36%
South Wales 21,000 54% 59% 68% -
COSA 16,000 14% 10% 15% -
Cokemen 4,500 32% 22% 39% -
National 198,350 45% 39% 39%
Average
Source: Callinicos A & Simons M, (1985), p44. Reproduced from the New
Statesman 23 March 1984.
Denotes NUM Area or Group in favour of industrial action
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NUM Memorandum: Special Delegates Conference, 21
October 1983 re Overtime Ban
Area Circular No. AS273/83
At the Special Delegates Conference held on Friday 21 October 1983, a
Resolution was proposed from the floor of the Conference and unanimously
accepted by Conference.
This read as follows:
"This Special DelegatesConference has discussedthe very serious and rapidly
deteriorating situation in the mining industry, and notes with grave concern
the increasing pressure to close pits and destroy jobs. It has also discussed,
and denounced, the intensified harassment of the workforce now taking place
in all sections of the British Coalfield. It is clear that the NCB and the
Government are determined to close at least seventy pits and wipe out 70,000
jobs over the next few years - despite the acknowledged fact that the cost to
the taxpayer of this proposed closure programme would be £4,300 million
over a ten-year period; more than double the cost keeping those pits open,
and saving those jobs. The Conference has also received a report on the
wage negotiations, and has noted the wholly unsatisfactory offer from the
Board (NCB), whose proposed 5.2% increase falls short of the amount
required to restore the real value of miner's wages. The Board's refusal to
make any improvements on unsocial shift payments, rate protection and
hours of work is regarded as a further attack on miner's living standards".
Having heard a full report on both the situation in the industry and the
Board'soffer on wages, the
Special DelegatesConferenceagrees;
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1. Wages
To reject the Board's proposal as totally unsatisfactory, and to instruct
the NECto continue negotiations to secure an improved offer.
2. Situation in the Industry
To reaffirm the Union's opposition to all pit closures other on the
grounds of exhaustion, to fight any further reduction in manpower
levels, and to resist the NCB/Government plans to close 70 pits over
the coming five-year period.
3. Overtime Ban
To impose a full overtime ban from 31 October 1983, as a first step in
the campaign against the Board's programme of attack on jobs and the
living standards.
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Nottingham Area (National Union of Mineworkers)
NUM Branch voting re National Overtime Ban - October 1983
NUM Branches voting in favour NUM Branches voting against
Ashfield NUM Branches voting in Ashfield NUM Branches
favour voting against
1. Hucknall 1. Annesley
2. Linby 2. Bentinck
3. Newstead 3. Bestwood Plant & Industrial
Other Notts NUM Branches (in favour) 4. Bestwood Workshops
4. Bevercotes 5. Moor-green
5. Bilsthorpe 6. Moorgreen Worksho_Qs
6. Blidworth 7. Pye Hill No.1
7. Calverton 8. ~e Hill No.2
8. Clipstone 9. Silverhill
9. Cotgrave 10. South Normanton Transport
10. Cresswell 11.Sutton
11. Mansfield Other Notts NUM Branches
voting against I
12. Ollerton 12. Babbington ,
13. Rufford 13. Boisover i
14.Sherwood 14. Gedlinq :
15. Thoresby 15. Harworth I
16. Welbeck I
Voting Figuresfrom the Nottinghamshire NUMArea Council Meeting, 20October 1983.
The overtime ban was proposed by the National NUMwho asked all Areas to give full
and urgent consideration to a National Overtime Ban in order to strengthen the union's
ability to resist the NCB'sclosure programme.
The overtime ban was discussed in Nottinghamshire at an Area Special Conference on
15 October 1983. This was followed by Nottinghamshire NUMBranches holding Special
Branch Meetings over the weekend of 15/16 October 1983 in order that the views of
the Nottinghamshire Branches could be reported to the Area Council Meeting on 21
October 1983.
Source:Nottingham Area (NUM) Minute Book 1983, pp355 - 365. D. Amos collection.
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NCB Deep Mined Revenue Output 1984-85 Budgets
NCB Area 1983-84 1984-85 Difference
Estimated 52 weeks Budget (million tons)
(adjusted overtime (million
ban losses) tons)
(million tons)
Scottish 5.9 5.15 -0.75
North East 11.9 10.5 -1.40
North Yorkshire 9.1 9.3 +0.20
Doncaster 6.3 6.3 0
Barnsley 8.0 8.2 +0.20
South Yorkshire 7.6 7.1 -0.50
North Derbyshire 7.5 7.5 0
North Nottinghamshire 12.0 12.0 0
South Nottinghamshire 7.7 7.2 -0.50
South Midlands 7.4 7.1 -0.30
Western 10.7 10.3 -0.40
South Wales 7.3 6.75 -0.55
Great Britain 101.4 97.4 -4.0
Source: NCB South Nottinghamshire Area, February 1984, Eastwood Hall (PR Dept)
D. Amos collection.
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National NUM Resolution: 8 March 1984
The National Executive Committee condemns the National Coal Board
announcements of a further savage programme of pit and plant closures over
the next twelve months.
We have witnessed twenty-three pit closures and the loss of 21,000 jobs in
the past year and it is clear that this latest announcement is further evidence
of the Board's intention to reduce the British Coal industry to almost half its
present size.
The Coal Board's decision will result in the closure of half the pits in Scotland,
South Nottinghamshire, North Derbyshire...and an even larger closure
programme in the North-East and South Wales.
No Area is safe, none will escape from the McGregor Plan; Areas such as
Yorkshire, North Nottinghamshire, the Midlands, as well as Cokeworks,
Workshops, Transport Departments and offices of clerical staff will be
affected. The latest round of Coal Board cutbacks follow the pattern deployed
by Ian McGregorat both British Leyland and British Steel.
The National Coal Board has been adopting an increasingly provocative
attitude, which has led to a rapidly deteriorating situation throughout the
coalfields and resulted in spontaneous escalating action.
The Yorkshire and Scottish Coalfields have declared their intention to take
strike action as from the end of the Friday night shift, 10th March 1984, in
opposition to the Board's pit closure programme. Both Areas seek permission
from the NECto declare this action official.
In accordancewith (National) Rule 41, the NECdeclares the proposed strike
action in Yorkshire and Scotland, and in any other Area which takes similar
action, as official. The Union (NUM) will monitor the situation and take any
action it feels appropriate or necessary in light of changing circumstances.
Source: Nottingham Area (NUM) Area Minutes 1984, p78/79. D. Amos collection.
331
Appendix 6
National Union of Mineworkers - Rules, Model Rules and
Standing Orders: 1978
Rule 41: Strikes and Lockouts
In the event of a dispute arising in any Area or applying to the workers in any
Branch likely or possible to lead to a stoppage of work or any other industrial
action short of a strike the questions must be immediately reported by the
appropriate official of the Area in question to the National Executive
Committee (NEC) which shall deal with the matter forthwith, and in no case
shall a cessation of work or other forms of industrial action take place by the
workers without the previous sanction of the NEC, or of a Committee
(whether consisting of members of the NEe or of other persons) to whom the
NEC have delegated the power of giving such sanction, either generally or in a
particular case and no funds of the union shall be applied in strike payor
other trade dispute benefit for the benefit of workers who shall have ceased
work without the previous sanction of the NEC.
Rule 43: NATIONAL ACTION
In the event of national action being proposed by the union in pursuance of
any of the objects of the union, the following provision shall apply: -
That a national strike shall only be entered upon as the result of a ballot vote
of all members taken in pursuance of a resolution of Conference, and a strike
shall not be declared unless 55% of those voting in the ballot vote in favour of
such a strike. If a ballot vote be taken during the time a strike is in progress,
a vote of 55% of those taking part in the ballot shall be necessary to continue
the strike.
If a ballot vote be taken during the time a stoppage is in progress, such
stoppage may not be continued unless 55% of those voting in the ballot vote
in favour of continuance.
Source: NUM - Rules, Model Rules and Standing Orders 1978, pp21 & 22. D. Amos collection.
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Appendix 7
Nottinghamshire NUM Joint Press Statement by T H
Richardson (General Secretary) and R Chadburn (President),
supported by R Lynk (Financial Secretary) and D Prendergast
(Pensions/Benevolent Officer): 13 March 1984.
We abhor the situation that is now arising in the (Nottinghamshire) Area. The
Yorkshire Pickets are in the Area unofficially, as the Yorkshire leaders have
undertaken to keep them out of the Area until the Notts ballot has taken
place, but even when the ballot is over, we cannot accept the type of
intimidation that is taking place.
We have instructed our members not to cross picket lines, but the type of
action taking place is not picketing, but merely mass blockading. The
principle of picketing is that the majority attempt to persuade a minority who
are ignoring that majority, but what is taking place now is entirely the
opposite and will be counterproductive.
No union can sustain a strike under these circumstances. We have always
believed that the miners should stand and fight the pit closure programme,
but the way things are developing, it will be at the price of destroying this
Union and that price is as devastating as the pit closure programme itself.
We appeal to the Yorkshire lads to withdraw and we also appeal to non-
miners and miners' wives, to keep away from picket lines, as it will only
exacerbate the situation.
We also appeal to the National Officials to grasp and control the situation
before someone is injured, not only in this Area, but in some other Area in the
Country.
Source: Nottingham Area (NUM) Press Statement, 13 March 1984. 0 Amos collection.
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Appendix 8
Nottinghamshire Area (NUM): Strike Voting Figures, 15-16
March 1984.
The question on the ballot paper: "Do you support strike action to prevent pit
closures and massive run down of jobs?"
NUM Branch Voting Yes Voting No Spoilt Blank Totals
1. Annesley 161 (20%) 642 (80%) 0 0 803
2. Babbington 159 (23%) 562 (77%) 6 0 727
3. Bentinck 229 (16%) 1065 (82%) 6 0 1300
4. Bestwood Industrial 11 (4%) 255 (96%) 0 0 266
5. Bestwood Workshops 56 (16%) 310 (84%) 1 0 367
6. Bevercotes 384 (34%) 751 (66%) 2 0 1137
7. Bilsthorpe 238 (25%) 760 (75%) 8 0 1006
8. Blidworth 399 (46%) 461 (54%) 2 0 862
9. Bolsover 341 (42%) 479 (58%) 1 0 821
10. Calverton 233 (21%) 1088 (79%) 2 0 1373
11. Clipstone 344 (28%) 907 (72%) 0 1 1252
12. Cotgrave 401 (29%) 1017 (71%) 1 0 1419
13. Cresswell 395 (45%) 488 (55%) 2 0 885
14. Gedling 261 (21%) 1001 (79%) 2 0 1264
15. Harworth 312 (30%) 753 (70%) 0 0 1065
16. Hucknall 208 (23%) 711 (77%) 4 0 923
17. Linby 276 (34%) 562 (66%) 2 1 841
18. Mansfield 221 (19%) 987 (81%) 3 0 1211
19. Moorgreen 123 (20%) 511 (80%) 0 0 634
20. Moorgreen Workshops 83 (19%) 364 (81%) 0 0 447
21. Newstead 223 (29%) 551 (71%) 0 0 774
22. Ollerton 335 (34%) 681 (66%) 3 0 1019
23. pye Hill No.1 121 (19%) 525 (81%) 0 0 646
24. pye Hill No.2 18 (14%) 123 (86%) 1 0 142
25. Rufford 409 (34%) 760 (64%) 0 1 1170
26. Sherwood 330 (40%) 494 (60%) 2 0 826
27. Silverhill 248 (24%) 788 (76%) 1 0 1037
28. South Normanton Tran 21 (11%) 333 (89%) 1 17 372
29. Sutton 107 (20%) 455 (80%) 2 0 564
30. Thoresby 314 (24%) 1003 (76%) 3 0 1320
31. Weibeck 324 (29%) 801 (71%) 2 1 1128
Totals 7285 (26.5%) 20188 57 21 27551
(73.5%)
Source: Nottingham Area (NUM) Minutes, p114. D. Amos collection.
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Balance sheet re Colin Clarke: legal Action to prove strike
action in Nottingham Area (NUM) unofficial, On behalf of the
Notts Working Miners: May 1984.
Monies Received
Received from Rits Donation Totals
C. Clarke - miscellaneous pits £886.72
Linby £179.61
Cresswell £348.17
Workinq Nottinqhamshire Miners £759.85
Blidworth £32.00
Pye Hill No.2 £12.00
South Normanton Transport £138.06
Bestwood Workshops £126.80
Welbeck £217.03
Calverton £557.54
Babbington £200.00
Silverhill £382.59
Hucknall £371.00
~ye Hill No.1 £935.36
D Cooke - miscellaneous collieries £455.00
Bolsover £257.00
Bilsthorpe £391.31
Rufford £447.35
Sherwood £527.25
Harworth £550.00
Ollerton £295.00
Bestwood Landsale £72.50
Bestwood Industrial £95.00
Oipstone £311.00
Newstead £322.95
Annesley £449.47 £9,320.56
Individual Donations £1,573.40
Added interest earned on deposit £14.04 £1,587.44
Total £10,908.00
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Appendix 9 continued
Notts Working Miners Legal Action to prove strike in
Nottinghamshire unofficial re Colin Clarke: Monies paid out,
May 1984.
Monies Paid out Payment Totals
M Burton QC - Counsel £3,400
fees
£510.00 £3,910.00
VAT@ 15%
Richard Siowe
(Junior Barrister) £2000.00
VAT@ 15% £300.00 £2,300.00
£6,210.00
Expenses
Hotel - London
(4 members of staff & 2
clients - 2,3 or 4 nights £524.60
each)
Train fares & Taxis £630.29
Meals & miscellaneous £157.31
items
Court fees,
commissioners fees etc. 78.50 £1,390.70
Total Costs £7,600.70
Balance in Hand £3,307.30
£10,908.00
Source: Nottingham Area: Annes/ey NUM Branch 1984. D Amos collection.
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Appendix 10
Decisions of 1985 NUM Annual Conference re Disciplinary
Hearing against Roy Lynk and David Prendergast (Nottingham
Area NUM): July 1985
Conference resolved:-
"That Mr Lynk and Mr Prendergast (are) in breach of (their) Contracts of
Employment in respect of charges brought by the NUM National Secretary on
behalf of the union".
It was further resolved that
"Conference having heard and considered the evidence in this matter, agreed;
a) That Mr Lynk and Mr Prendergast (have) committed acts of gross
misconduct in relation to (their) Contracts of Employment as Area
Officials of this union.
b) That Mr Lynk and Mr Prendergast (have) despite repeated warnings
and directions, disobeyed the lawful instructions of (their)
employers, the NUM.
c) That this union no longer has confidence in Mr Lynk / Mr
Prendergast to act with loyalty and fidelity in his capacity as
employeesand Area Officials of this union.
d) That the employment of Mr Lynk and Mr Prendergast as Area
Officials be terminated, in accordancewith the terms and conditions
of (their) Contracts of Employment, three months from the decision
of Conference and that from the date of Conference (they are)
suspendedfrom office on full pay.
e) That the decisions taken in the context of Mr Lynk and Mr
Prendergast'sContracts of Employment only and in no way affects
(their) individual rights as members of this union.
Source: Decisionsof the 1985AnnualConference,NUM,1985,p24.
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UDM Amalgamation Ballot Results: Nottingham Area: 17-18
October 1985.
No. Branch Voting Voting Unissue Blank Spoilt Total
Yes No. d
1 Annesley 612 200 75 3 0 890
2 Babbington 260 119 61 0 0 440
3 Bentinck 843 240 48 1 2 1134
4 Bestwood Industrial 198 12 25 0 0 235
5 Bestwood Workshops 259 80 20 0 0 359
6 Bevercotes 782 384 198 1 7 1372
7 Bilsthorpe 725 254 135 0 2 1116
8 Blidworth 526 262 86 0 1 875
9 Bolsover* 333 388 101 4 1 827
10 Calverton 1014 237 86 0 3 1340
11 Clipstone 832 328 141 0 1 1302
12 Cotgrave 987 354 159 0 1 1501
13 Cresswell 636 211 81 3 5 936
14 Gedling 849 346 132 1 1 1329
15 Harworth 831 135 127 0 3 1096
16 Hucknall 703 263 108 1 2 1077
17 Linby 494 292 63 0 1 850
18 Mansfield 959 251 62 0 3 1275
19 Moorqreen ** 66 33 29 0 0 128
20 Moorqreen Workshop 355 84 41 1 2 483
21 Newstead 418 244 52 0 0 714
22 Ollerton 620 359 103 0 0 1082
23 Pye HillNo.1 ** 67 11 71 0 0 149
24 Rufford 817 310 157 0 1 1285
25 Sherwood 466 370 68 0 1 905
26 Silverhill 660 287 109 4 1 1061
27 South Normanton
TransportDepot 256 28 30 0 1 315
28 Sutton 474 95 53 0 0 622
29 Thoresby 1016 254 178 1 2 1451
30 Wei beck 689 361 94 0 1 1145
31 NottsArea HQ 3 0 4 0 0 7
Totals 17750 6792 2697 20 42 27301
Total Valid Papers= 24,542
Total Participation = 90%
Voting Yes 72% Voting No 28%
Source: Nottingham Area (NUM) from the Electoral Reform Society, 19 October 1985.
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Appendix 12 Sinking Age at Sinking Age at
Date start of Date start of
1984- 1984-85
85 strike
strike (years)
NCB South
Nottinghamshire
Area
NCB South
Yorkshire
Area
Babbin ton 1840 144 Shireoaks 1854 130
Annesle 1865 119 Kilnhurst 1858 126
Hucknall No.2 1865 119 Kiverton Park 1866 118
Moor reen * 1865 119 Manvers Main 1868 116
Linb 1873 111 Cortonwood 1873 111
Newstead 1873 111 Wath 1873 111
Pye Hill No. 1 & 1875 109 Treeton 1875 109
No.2 *
Bentinck 1893 91 Cadeb 1889 95
Gedlin 1900 84 Manton 1899 85
Calverton 1950 34 Silverwood 1900 84
Cot rave 1964 20 Dinnin ton 1903 81
Maltb 1907 77
Thurcroft 1909 75
Barnbur h 1909 75
Brookhouse 1929 55
NCB North
Nottinghamshire
Area
NCB
Doncaster
Area
Sutton 1873 111 Hickleton Main 1892 92
Silverhill 1875 109 Frickley / South 1903 81
Elmsall
Cresswell 1891 93 Brodsworth 1905 79
Sherwood 1902 82 Bentle 1905 79
Mansfield 1904 80 Yorkshire Main 1909 75
Rufford 1911 73 Goldthorpe / 1910/19 74
Hi hate 16
Welbeck 1912 72 Askern 1911 73
Harworth 1920 64 Hatfield Main 1911 73
Cli stone 1920 64 Rossin ton Main 1912 72
Ollerton 1923 61 Markham Main 1922 62
Thoresb 1925 59
Bilsthor e 1925 59
Blidworth 1926 58
Thoresb 1928 56
Bevercotes 1958 26
339
*Sinking date denotes starting date for the sinking of the shafts and not the start of coal
production which in most cases could be two to five years later.
Sources: Nottinghamshire collieries sinking dates - Bradley R, Snippets from the Past
Excerpts from the pits of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, unpublished, Ollerton, 1998.
Yorkshire collieries sinking dates, Hill A, South Yorkshire Collieries: A History and
Development, Stroud, Tempus, 2001.
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Appendix 13 J976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82
Harworth
Bevercotes
Bilsth
Rufford
Blidworth
Sutton
4.8
10.7 13.3
9.2 9.0
10.8 13.0
7.3
NCB
South
Nottinghamshire
Area
Collieries
. - . .-
• • •
Calverton
Hucknall No.2
Annes
Bentinck
Lin
Newstead
Source: MMC - A report on the efficiency and costs in the development, production and
supply of coal by the NCB, Vol. 2, June 1983.
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Appendix 14
NCB Area 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82
Hatfield Main
Hickleton
Bentl
Yorkshire Main
Markham Main
Askern
Ross
Cardowen
Sorn
Ba
Killoch
Seafield
Iston Glen
Frances
Source: MMC - A report on the efficiency and costs in the devetopment; production and
supply of coal by the NCB, Vol. 2, June 1983.
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Appendix 16: NUM article: Why no pit is safe, March 1984
Area Pit already closed * Pit being dosed ** Pit under threat ***
Scottish cardowan PoImaise Killoch
Highouse
Scm
Kinnell
BogsIde
Becllav
Yorkshire Newmarket Silkstone Savtle FrystonPark Hili CortDnwood Ledston LuckRothwell Glasshoughton GoIdthorpe
Elsecar Bulldiffe Wood Highgate CM)PeckfieId Cadeby (PC) BrookhouseLofthouse HickJetonNewmillendam
Orarave
50uttI Wales BIaengwrach Blaensserchan BedwasBritannia BiaenantTrmawr CeIynen SouthBrynHIw Mardy
Wyndham/Westem Penrhlwcelberlewis Merthyr
Coegnant
Mor1als
SoutII Midlands Desford Bagworth(Including Kent) Snlbston (M) Eliistown
Newdlgate Measham
South Leicester
Whltwlck
Snowdown
Nottinghamshire PyeHIII Babbington
Moorgreen
SUtton
North East Martey Hili Bearpark Ashlngtoo
East Hetton HerrIngton Bates
Saaiston
South Hetton
Lvnemouth
North Derbphlre Westthorpe ArkwrIght
Pleasley (M) Ireland
Whitwell
Western West canned No.5 Cronton Wolstanton (PC)
Bic:kershaw CM) BIrch Coppice (PC)
Hapten Valley
VIctorIa
Totals 33 14 28
.-
Source: NUM,Why no pit is safe, The Miner, Sheffield, March 1984.
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Appendix 17: Ave' you eard owt'
There's speculation at the pit,
We know it's on the cards
That soon they'll shut the faces down
And close up all the yards.
Scargill or the UDM,
Or Thatcher's flaming lot,
Just seem to talk but don't do owt',
To try and stop the rot.
It makes me mad not knowing when,
The hammers going to fall,
Not knowing when me mates and me,
Are going to hear the call.
That's it lads, you can down your tools,
You're finished now for good,
Go home, here's your dough,
We've had our share of blood.
Oh yes, it's going to come,
It's just not knowing when,
The big wheel will stop turning,
Cos the cage ain't got no men.
Ave' you eard owt' is the greeting,
Heard at every shift,
Ave' you eard owt's what they cry,
When going down the lift.
Somewhere in an office,
Written on a piece of paper,
Is the very time and date,
But they think it's a caper
To keep you hanging on,
Not knowing when your work has ended,
Not knowing that by secrecy,
You are most offended.
No more do you want to hear the cry,
When you take off your coat,
From dozens of your mates who ask,
Ave you eard owt!
SOurce: Guest R, Ave' you eard owt, Mansfield Cha4 July 1986.
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NUM: 1983 Annual Conference - Emergency Resolution 1
Situation in the Industry
This Conference of the National Union of Mineworkers instructs the NECand
the National Officials to immediately embark upon a campaign to win the
whole hearted support of the miners to not only oppose pit and works
closures, but all reductions in manpower. The NEC is further instructed to
conduct a National Ballot of members on the question of pit and works
closures at a time deemed to be most appropriate.
Source: NUM, 1983Annual Conference Report, NUM,Sheffield, 19B3, p4B2.
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Jack London's definition of a Scab.
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire,
He had some awful substance left with which He made a scab. A
scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a waterlogged
brain, and a combination backbone made of jelly and glue. Where
others have hearts, he carries a tumour of rotten principles.
When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and
angels weep in heaven, and the devil shuts the gates of hell to keep
him out. No man has a right to scab as long as there is a pool of
water deep enough to drown his body in, or a rope long enough to
hang his carcass with. Judas Iscariot was a gentleman compared
with a scab. For betraying his Master, he had character enough to
hang himself. A scab hasn't.
Esau sold his birth right for a mess of pottage. Judas Iscariot sold
his soul for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country
for a promise of a commission in the British Army. The modern
strike breaker sells his birth right, his country, his wife, his children,
and his fellow men for an unfulfilled promise from his employer,
trust, or corporation.
Source: D. Amos collection
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Appendix 20: National Power Loading Agreement: 6 June 1966
Supplement Agreement to the revision of the Wages Structure
Agreement of 20th April 1955.
Whereas:
d) The Board and the Union consider that power loading techniques have now
developed to the stage where a day wage is appropriate, provided that
method study is adopted to determine maximum machine utilisation and the
number of men needed on each installation on each shift.
e) The Board and the Union have agreed to introduce a uniform national rate
shift for men employed on power loading faces not later than 31st December
1971.
Schedule
7) Team members will be classified as task workers and will be paid an
inclusive standard shift rate as follows:
Location of colliery Inclusive
Standard (£ p)
Shift Rate (£ s d)
Scotland 75/- £3.75
Northumberland 81/- £4.05
Durham 75/- £3.75
Yorkshire 82/6 £4.12.5
Lancashire 84/5 £4.22
Cumberland 75/- £3.75
North Wales 75/- £3.75
Nottinghamshire 86/9 £4.33
North Derbyshire 84/5 £4.22
South Derbyshire 83/1 £4.15.5
Leicestershire 79/3 £3.96
Cannock Chase 79/6 £3.98
North Staffordshire 76/11 £3.84.5
South Staffordshire & Salop 75/- £3.75
Warwickshire 83/2 £4.16
South Wales 75/- £3.75
Kent 89/5 £4.47
Source: NCB/NUM: National Power Loading Agreement, NeB/NUM Booklet, 1966, pS - 8.
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